



ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

3010 DEFENSE PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-3010

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MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARIES OF THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Policy for Ensuring Chemical and Biological Contamination Survivability
(CBCS)

This memorandum establishes Department of Defense (DoD) policy for CBCS. Section 1053 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-375, provides that the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a plan that sets forth a systematic approach for ensuring the survivability of defense critical systems upon contamination by chemical or biological agents.

Pursuant to the authority delegated to me by the Secretary of Defense, I established an interim policy designating all Acquisition Category 1D programs as "Defense Critical Systems" for purposes of Section 1053 while the final policy was being developed.

The final policy (attached) replaces the interim policy and includes a process for identifying critical systems, instructions on how CBCS should be addressed by the Military Departments, a process for DoD oversight, and definitions of decontamination, hardness, and compatibility.



Kenneth J. Krieg

Attachment:
As stated



Policy for Ensuring Chemical and Biological Contamination Survivability (CBCS)

1. REFERENCES

- (a) Department of Defense Directive (DoDD) 5000.1, "The Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003.
- (b) Department of Defense Instruction (DoDI) 5000.2, "Operation of the Defense Acquisition System," May 12, 2003.
- (c) "Defense Acquisition Guidebook," Sect. 4.4.12. (e-version released November 17, 2004, formerly DoD 5000.2-R, now cancelled).
- (d) Section 1053, "Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law 108-375," October 28, 2004.
- (e) Defense Acquisition University (DAU) "Glossary of Defense Acquisition Acronyms and Terms," 12th Edition July 2005.
- (f) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01E, "Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS)," May 11, 2005.
- (g) Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual (CJCSM) 3170.01B, "Operation of the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System," May 11, 2005
- (h) Section 141, Public Law 108-375, "Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005," October 28, 2004.
- (i) Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)) Memorandum, "Implementation Plan for the Management of the Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP)," April 22, 2003.

2. PURPOSE

This document establishes processes for ensuring that the survivability of defense critical systems in the event of contamination by chemical or biological agents is addressed adequately throughout the Department of Defense (DoD) (references (a)(b)(c)), including:

- a. Definitions of decontamination, hardness, and compatibility.
- b. Instructions on how Chemical and Biological Contamination Survivability (CBCS) should be addressed by the Military Departments.
- c. A systematic process for identifying those systems that are defense critical systems.
- d. A process for acquisition oversight.

3. BACKGROUND

The processes herein are provided as direction to DoD components to establish a uniform CBCS program. This action is in response to Section 1053 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2005, Public Law No. 108-375 (reference (d)), which provides that the Secretary of Defense shall develop a systematic approach for ensuring the survivability of defense critical systems upon contamination of any such system by chemical or biological agents.

4. DEFINITIONS

- a. Chemical and Biological Contamination Survivability (CBCS). The capability of a system to withstand a chemical and biological (CB) contaminated environment and

- relevant decontamination, without losing the ability to accomplish the assigned mission. A CB contaminated survivable system is hardened against CB contamination and decontaminants; it can be decontaminated, and is compatible with individual protective equipment (derived from reference (e)).
- (1) Chemical and Biological Hardness. The capability of materiel to withstand the materiel-damaging effects of CB contamination and relevant decontaminants (derived from reference (e)).
 - (2) Chemical and Biological Compatibility. The capability of a system to be operated, maintained, and re-supplied by persons wearing a full complement of individual protective equipment, in all climates for which the system is designed, and for the period specified in the Capability Development Document (CDD) or Capability Production Document (CPD) (derived from reference (e)).
 - (3) Chemical and Biological Decontamination. The process of making personnel and materiel safe by absorbing, destroying, neutralizing, making harmless, or removing chemical or biological agents (derived from reference (e)).
- b. Defense Critical System. A defense critical system is a mission critical system.
 - c. Mission Critical System. A system whose operational effectiveness and operational suitability are essential to successful mission completion or to aggregate residual combat capability. If this system fails, the mission likely will not be completed. Such a system can be an auxiliary or supporting system, as well as a primary mission system (derived from reference (e)).
 - d. Capability. The ability to achieve a desired effect under specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a set of tasks. It is defined by an operational user and expressed in broad operational terms in the format of a joint or initial capabilities document or a joint doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) change recommendation. In the case of materiel proposals, the definition will progressively evolve to DOTMLPF performance attributes identified in the capability development document and the capability production document (reference (f)).

5. POLICY

This policy applies to equipment or systems with the goal of making mission critical systems survivable against chemical and biological agents. CBCS for mission critical systems will be addressed as early as possible for new systems, including commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) and non-developmental items (NDI), and legacy systems undergoing capability documentation review. System risk assessment, based on system concept of operations and validated threat assessment, shall be considered in conjunction with affordability, schedule, and performance (reference (g)). Design, testing, and/or analysis during the acquisition process will be carried out against specific performance attributes to ensure the system can withstand well-defined CB contamination environments while minimizing loss of performance.

- a. How CBCS Shall be Addressed by the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) Sponsor (Military Department or other DoD agency).
- (1) For a materiel system that the Sponsor designates as mission critical, the Sponsor will address CBCS performance attributes in capability documents. Before accepting a materiel solution, the Sponsor will consider CBCS within the JCIDS process (reference (f)) of analyzing DOTMLPF. Mission critical systems will include CBCS capabilities based on the anticipated threat for its operational concept in the projected operating environment. If applicable, CBCS will be a performance attribute(s) included in the Force Protection and/or Survivability Key Performance Parameters (KPPs) (reference (h)). For those systems that do not have force protection or Survivability Key Performance Parameters (KPPs), CBCS capabilities will be established with threshold performance attributes.
 - (2) The concept of operations (CONOPS) in the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD) shall describe whether and how the desired capability is likely to be employed in a CB contaminated environment and decontaminated. CONOPS provide for the explicit consideration of CBCS performance parameters in subsequent capability documents.
 - (3) The Capabilities Development Document (CDD) and Capabilities Production Document (CPD) will incorporate objective, quantitative, and measurable system CBCS performance attributes with thresholds and objectives. These performance attributes shall be based on an assessment of the CB threats and risks for the system in the intended operational environment.
 - (4) The JCIDS documents (Initial Capabilities Document (ICD), CDD, CPD) shall address CBCS in the appropriate threat paragraph.
 - (5) This CBCS policy shall be revised as necessary to maintain its alignment with the JCIDS Process.
- b. Process for Identifying Mission Critical Systems. Sponsors initially determine if a system is mission critical. The Sponsor will submit capability documents for review in accordance with CJCSI 3170.01E (reference (f)) to the “Gatekeeper” of the JCIDS process (Vice Director, Joint Staff/J-8). The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) will validate system designation as mission critical, change system designation to or from mission critical, as necessary, and validate CBCS capabilities. The JCIDS process will document and archive the designation as mission critical.
- c. Implementation.
- (1) Sponsor/Combatant Command/Combat Developer Responsibilities. The Sponsor/Combatant Command/Combat Developer shall ensure that the appropriate CBCS capability gaps and concepts of operations are supported by analyses and threat assessments and are included in the capability documents. The Sponsor/Combatant Command/Combat Developer shall ensure that there

are sufficient resources to accomplish acquisition, test, and evaluation of CBCS capabilities.

- (2) Materiel Developer (MATDEV) Responsibilities. The MATDEV will tailor and implement a CBCS program in an acquisition strategy that will balance risk, cost, schedule, and performance in attaining the required CBCS capability (reference (c)). The MATDEV will demonstrate CBCS through a proposed combination of tests, studies, and analyses documented in the Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP).
 - (3) Gatekeeper (Vice Director, Joint Staff/J-8) Responsibilities. The Gatekeeper will review JCIDS documents and ensure CBCS is properly addressed for mission critical systems.
- d. Process to Change CBCS Capabilities.
- (1) The Sponsor shall follow the JCIDS Process for changes in CBCS capabilities for systems designated as mission critical.
 - (2) As early as possible in the system definition or development, the Sponsor/Combatant Command/Combat Developer or MATDEV may seek a change in CBCS capabilities that are impractical or unaffordable to implement or test. Any changes to the CBCS requirements will follow the JCIDS process and be approved by the same authority that approved the requirements documents.
- e. Process for Acquisition Oversight
- (1) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs (ATSD(NCB)), as principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and USD(AT&L) on chemical and biological matters, shall provide oversight to the CBCS program. The ATSD(NCB) shall direct the implementation of CBCS policy through the issuance of memoranda, instructions, and directives, as required. The Special Assistant for Chemical and Biological Defense and Chemical Demilitarization Programs (SA(CBD&CDP)) will assist.
 - (2) The Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) will verify compliance with CBCS capabilities for all mission critical systems at each acquisition milestone. This verification will be based on the approved acquisition strategy that balances risk, cost, schedule, and performance in attaining the required CBCS capability. The MDA shall ensure that the system will remain functional and effective within the architectural framework of systems in which it operates.
 - (3) Sponsors will report on a calendar year basis with the report due March 31 of each following year starting in 2007. These reports will be provided to the SA(CBD&CDP) in coordination with the Vice Director, Joint Staff/J-8 on CBCS compliance for mission critical systems that transitioned through a capabilities document approval or an acquisition milestone during the past year.

Sponsors will summarize how CBCS was addressed with regard to performance attributes specified, performance demonstrated during CBCS testing/modeling, mitigation actions considered (implemented or rejected), and will also report actions taken post-Milestone C to comply with any MDA-required additional CBCS actions.

6. QUESTIONS

Questions may be directed to the Office of the SA(CBD&CDP). The point of contact is Anthony Lee, 703-695-5486, or Anthony.Lee@osd.mil.