

STATEMENT OF

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**CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL EQUIPMENT:
PREPARING FOR A TOXIC BATTLEFIELD**

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BEFORE THE

**SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY, VETERANS AFFAIRS,
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
HOUSE GOVERNMENT REFORM COMMITTEE**

INTRODUCTION

Chairman and Distinguished Committee Members, I am honored to appear before your Committee again to address your questions regarding the Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program (CBDP). I am Dr. Anna Johnson-Winegar, the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense (DATSD(CBD)). I will focus my remarks on improvements to the management and oversight processes for the Department's Chemical and Biological Defense Program since I testified in May 2000. As a result of several efforts initiated subsequent to my last testimony, the Department has made progress in improving areas that are of interest to your Sub-committee and we will continue to see improvements as recent decisions are further implemented. In addition, I will provide an overview of ongoing efforts on CBDP logistics management and briefly describe a program underway to address the Sub-Committee's previous concern on the ability of the Department to effectively account for Joint Service Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) defense equipment, such as the Joint Service Lightweight Integrated Suit Technology (JSLIST).

Related topics will be addressed by the other members of the panel, including:

- BG Stephen Goldfein, Director, Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Defense, Joint Staff, J-8
- Mr. Mike Parker, Soldier Biological and Chemical Command (SBCCOM)
- Mr. George Allen, Defense Supply Center-Philadelphia, Defense Logistics Agency

I. DoD Chemical and Biological Defense Program: Management and Coordination of Service Efforts

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Public Law No. 103-160, Section 1701 (50 USC 1522), mandates the coordination and integration of all Department of Defense chemical and biological (CB) defense programs. This law provides the essential authority to ensure the elimination of unnecessarily redundant programs, to focus funds on DoD and program priorities, and to enhance readiness. The continued support of Congress will ensure the successful implementation of the program.

Public Law 103-160 (Sections 1701-1703) directs the Secretary of Defense to take concrete management and oversight actions:

- Assign responsibility for overall coordination and integration of DoD chemical and biological defense (CBD) (non-medical and medical) research, development, and acquisition (RDA) programs to a single office within OSD.
- Exercise oversight of the programs through the defense acquisition board (DAB).
- Improve jointness of the program.
- Designate the army as executive agent for DoD to coordinate and integrate RDA programs of all Services.
- Submit funding requests for CBD RDA in the DoD budget as a separate account. Funding requests may not be included in the service budgets.
- Submit an annual report to congress concerning chemical and biological defense readiness and plans to improve the program.

As the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological Defense, I am the focal point within the Department for the CBD program, and responsible for the oversight, coordination and integration of all CB defense medical and non-medical research, development, and acquisition efforts, and provide the overall guidance for planning, programming, budgeting, and executing CB defense programs. My office remains the single office within OSD responsible for oversight of the DoD CB Defense Program.

As the program has matured, the Department has begun to make changes to the organization of the management structure. These changes address management improvements initiated by the Department as well as some of the recommendations identified by the General Accounting Office (GAO).

Following the Defense Reform Initiative in November 1997, the position for the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Chemical and Biological Defense, ATSD(NCB), was left vacant and my office was placed under the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E). In November 2001, the Senate confirmed Dr. Dale Klein to fill the position of ATSD(NCB). Subsequently, my office was moved from DDR&E and now reports to Dr. Klein. This re-organization increased the priority and emphasis of CBRN defense within the Department. This increased attention led to an increase in the size of my office staff from only two to nine permanent positions plus additional supporting resources.

To insure a focused departmental effort in the area of Homeland Defense the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on 9 November 2000, directed the disestablishment of the Consequence Management Program Integration Office and directed the functions previously performed by that office be institutionalized throughout the Department of Defense. In February 2001, the Deputy Secretary of Defense further directed that oversight for Research, Development, and Acquisition of equipment to support Consequence Management be performed by the USD(AT&L). That responsibility was further delegated to my office. As a result of this guidance, funding to complete the fielding and modernization of Weapons of Mass Destruction – Civil Support Teams and Reserve Component Recon and Decon Teams in support of Consequence Management is now a part of the DoD CBDP. This program includes the development and fielding of upgraded analytical platforms for the detection, identification, and characterization of CB and radiological agents used by terrorists in a civilian environment. Also included is the development and fielding of communication capabilities that are interoperable with other federal, state and local agencies. Finally, we now have increased focus on the testing and evaluation of this equipment to ensure that it is safe and effective to operate.

Since September 2001, there have been significant changes that have affected the security environment and the requirements effecting the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. First, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of September 2001 changed the basic force structure to support major theater wars but with greater emphasis on smaller regional conflicts. The Services are evaluating the impact of this changed force structure on system requirements. Second, the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent anthrax letter attacks have increased the potential roles and missions for the Department of Defense in supporting homeland security and increased the emphasis on chemical and biological defense initiatives within the DoD.

Due to the increased visibility and importance of chemical and biological defense within the DoD the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), in May 2001, implemented increased departmental oversight of the program by formally designating the CBDP as an Acquisition Category 1D program. This designation raises the priority and visibility of the CBDP within the Department and identifies the program as a Major Defense Acquisition Program. This landmark decision provides oversight by senior department officials over this critical national asset.

Funding for defenses against the potentially devastating threat of chemical and biological attack post September 11th was also forthcoming within the Department and from the Congress. Significant funding from the Defense Emergency Response Fund (DERF) and Title IX of the Defense Appropriations Act of 2002 allowed the DoD to procure critical defensive capabilities and to energize the research base to address the most critical deficiencies in this key area. The department was able to procure significant quantities of biological detection systems, additional individual protective equipment and civil support CB defense capability while at the same time increasing our investment in the research area of medical countermeasures against the most serious of threats.

Another management change recently approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) is the creation of a *Joint Requirements Office (JRO) for Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Defense*, which will provide a single office within the Department responsible for the planning, coordination, and oversight of all CBRN requirements. This office will replace and assume the responsibilities of the Joint Service Integration Group (JSIG) with an official stand-up date of 1 October 2002. I feel this is a very positive step in improving the requirements generation process and gaining increased emphasis within the Joint Staff for Chemical and Biological Defense requirements. BG Stephen Goldfein, the Director of the new JRO, will provide more details as part of his testimony.

A key management change is the recent approval of the Joint Program Executive Office (JPEO) for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program by the USD(AT&L) on 19 September 2002. Since September 11, 2001, the criticality and importance of an integrated and viable DoD CBDP to the nation has increased significantly and the visibility of chemical and biological defense within all governmental agencies has increased far beyond the scope of the program established in 1994. The current program demands a CBDP that is visionary, able to respond quickly to warfighter and national security needs, and streamlined with authority and accountability vested in specific individuals. The result must be a well-coordinated effort at an appropriate level to meet the nation's needs.

The JPEO will supersede the existing management structure for Joint Service chemical and biological defense research, development, and acquisition programs. The JPEO will report through the Army Acquisition Executive to the Defense Acquisition Executive. The USD(AT&L), E.C. Aldridge, Jr., will serve as the Defense Acquisition Executive and the single Milestone Decision Authority for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program. This streamlines the acquisition process, reducing the number of Milestone Decision Authorities for the CBDP from nine to one. In support of the USD(AT&L)'s responsibilities as the Milestone

Decision Authority, the ATSD(NCB), Dr. Dale Klein, will establish and chair a permanent Overarching Integrated Product Team (OIPT), consisting of representatives from the Military Services, Joint Staff and OSD.

The Army will continue to serve as the Executive Agent for the Joint Service CDBP. Mr. Mike Parker of the Soldier, Biological, and Chemical Command (SBCCOM), will detail some of the key aspects of the acquisition program, with detailed information on the elements of individual protective equipment.

II. Chemical and Biological Defense Logistics Management

The DoD CB Defense Program jointly manages the research, development, and procurement of major end items of NBC defense equipment. These items are funded through defense-wide funding accounts. Consumable NBC defense items and maintenance of fielded items are managed by the Services and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) in accordance with Title X responsibilities of the Services, which provides for the Services to manage their Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds. Under the provisions of Title X of the U.S. Code, Service Secretaries are responsible for, and have the authority to conduct, all affairs of their respective Departments including supplying, researching, developing, training, and maintaining equipment. The existence of defense-wide (rather than Service-specific) funding accounts has ensured the joint integration of CB defense programs. However, OSD is limited to tracking the status of the DoD CB defense logistics readiness and sustainment programs in the Services and making recommendations to correct shortfalls. The tracking information is provided to Congress on an annual basis in the *Chemical and Biological Defense Program, Annual Report to Congress*. The April 2002 report was provided to Congress and is available on-line at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/nbc02/vol1-2002cbdpannualreport.pdf> (Volume 1) and <http://www.acq.osd.mil/cp/nbc02/vol2-2002cbdpperformanceplan.pdf> (Volume 2 – Performance Plan).

The April 2002 Annual Report to Congress on the DoD CDBP implemented GAO's recommendation from its September 2001 report, which recommended that items on contract were listed separately from those that were actually on hand. This gives a more accurate picture of the logistics readiness for U.S. forces. However, the annual report only provides a snapshot in time of the overall logistics readiness of U.S. forces for chemical and biological defense.

In order to improve the picture of logistics and unit readiness, the Joint Staff increased the visibility of operational standards and readiness reporting for chemical and biological defense within the Global Status of Resources and Training System (GSORTS). The Joint Staff directed units that report in GSORTS to report CB defense readiness beginning in July 2001. That system is in place and operational at the Joint level. GSORTS provides information from Unit Commanders on CB defense equipment and training. The operationally ready (serviceable) quantity of equipment provides a unit's S-level, and a unit's training status provides a unit's T-level. A unit's S- and T-levels are classified data. Each individual Service still has the primary responsibility to analyze CB defense unit readiness within that Service.

DLA and the Army Materiel Command (AMC) are the item managers, or National Inventory Control Points (NICP), for the vast majority of NBC defense items in all four Services. They are responsible for industrial base development, acquisition, and storage of wholesale peacetime and sustainment wartime stocks. They buy (process procurement actions) and, if requested, store NBC defense materiel (swing stocks) for the Services. However, the Services must provide funding to DLA and AMC for the procurements.

Mr. George Allen, DSCP-DLA, will address the Defense Logistics Agency role in logistics and inventory management

Service inventories of NBC defense items maintained at unit level use either manual records or a semi-automated tracking system. Stocks held at wholesale level are maintained using a separate automated system. Currently, there is little connectivity between the two systems. As a result, there is limited Service level asset visibility for NBC defense items. The Services are addressing this deficiency.

Under the Joint Program, the Program Manager for Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Defense Systems, Marine Corps Systems Command initiated the Joint Service CBRN Asset Management System (JSCBRN-AMS) program. The intent of this program is to support the CBRN and Combat Service Support logistical requirements of the Joint Warfighter. The JSCBRN-AMS program will integrate an existing database with Asset Identification Technologies (AIT) such as bar-coding and radio frequency identification (RFID) to create a bottom-up designed, interoperable system to provide seamless, end-to-end total asset visibility and shelf-life management of key consumables and non-consumables. As part of this project, the Program Manager conducted a market survey/search to identify existing technologies and systems that track assets in the private sector. When this technology is fielded, it will interact with Joint Service information systems and meet all DOD AIT standards. The technology within this program is key to enabling total integrated inventory management and transportation management in CBRN defense.

The Army has improved its visibility through an initiative to standardize individual issue of eleven critical NBC defense items across all major commands. Unit Status Reporting was implemented for units to report on-hand stocks vs. requirements on a monthly basis. In addition, plans are in place for consumable chemical defense equipment for all forces other than Force Package I and other early deploying units to be consolidated and centrally stored at one of the Army Depots. This seven-year execution plan is managed by HQ AMC and will enable better visibility and rotation of NBC defense consumable items. The Air Force has a similar program that consolidates stocks of NBC defense items for deployment in support of contingency operations. These initiatives have also reduced surveillance costs and improved overall management of NBC defense stocks. The Marine Corps has been leading a joint surveillance Technical Working Group, whose initiatives have been increasing cooperative efforts in surveillance and shelf life programs. The Marine Corps has also begun an NBC stocks consolidation program and uses a database called the NBC Defense Equipment Management Program (DEMP) to track the inventory, shelf life, and maintenance histories of NBC defense items. All Services are evaluating the Air Force's Mobility Inventory Control and Accounting System (MICAS) as a model for a CBRN defense equipment management and reporting system.

Although the database may not be identical across all Services due to Service unique requirements, the goal will be for a system that is interoperable.

III. CB Defense Equipment Logistics Status

A detailed data collection of the logistics status of CB defense equipment items is conducted annually and provided in the report to Congress. The most recent data collection is for fiscal year (FY) 2001. The data collection for fiscal year 2002 is underway and will be included in the next annual report. The FY01 data includes information on the inventory status of 129 fielded NBC defense equipment items. Quantities required for wartime needs were then compared to quantities currently on-hand.

Of the 129 items extensively reviewed, DoD developed risk assessments for 50 items based on data gathered as of 30 September 2001. These items were singled out because of their critical role or their ability to represent the general state of their respective commodity area. While some of the items assessed changed from the previous year's report due to obsolescence, the balance of assessed items among the commodity areas remained as constant as possible to provide for continuity. These items were rated as being in a low, moderate, or high risk category. "Risk" is based on the currently available percent fill of the two major theater war (MTW) requirements; the lower this fill the greater the likelihood that such shortages may significantly reduce DoD's ability to respond to a contingency. Shortages for FY01 were calculated by comparing the two MTW requirements, as defined for FY01, to on-hand quantities. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlines a shift in the basic DoD strategy away from a 2 MTW basis for planning to a transformed force that is able to defeat aggression in two critical areas in overlapping timeframes and planning for victory across the spectrum of possible conflict.

The redefinition of the two MTW requirement did not significantly affect most of the items that were assessed. Several items remain in the high to moderate risk categories while they are being fielded. These items will be monitored as continued procurement ameliorates their risk. Shortages of chemical and biological agent detection systems, collective protection shelters and their respective filters, and biological warfare defense vaccines may have a serious impact on the joint force's ability to survive and sustain combat operations under NBC warfare conditions. The extent of the operational impact of NBC defense equipment shortages is under review in several classified studies.

IV. CONCLUSION

As I have outlined, there have been significant changes in the management and oversight structures for the Chemical and Biological Defense Program over the past two years. These changes have streamlined the oversight process and improved Joint Service coordination. They will also enhance the linkage between requirements and fielded capabilities. These changes are still in the process of being implemented and will continue to yield improvements. There remain many areas where improvements can still be made. None of the changes made—whether filling the ATSD(NCB) vacancy, establishing the JRO for CBRN Defense, approving the Joint Program Executive Office for CB defense, enhancing CB defense with the joint reporting system—would have been made without the Department identifying CB defense as a high priority program.