




**Maj Bill Long**  
**AFLMA**  
**30 Nov 06**

Boundaries shown are not necessarily authoritative

8 October 2005

7.6 magnitude quake  
hits northern  
Pakistan



# Dhanni

55 Personnel  
Level I Healthcare  
AUS Army/Air Force

# 212 MASH

400 Personnel  
Level III Hospital/  
NMCB 4  
USN/USA

# 267 QMCO

50 Personnel  
Airfield/FRB  
USA

08 Oct Earthquake epicenter

Dhanni

Balakot

Shinkiarl

Muzafferabad

# CMRT-3

250 Personnel  
B Surg Co, 3 MLG  
Level II+ Hospital/FRB  
USN/USMC

# 24 AEG

50 Personnel  
APOD/APOE  
USAF

# CDAC-PAK

280 Personnel  
CDAC HQ & LNOs  
USN/USMC/USA/USAF  
Coalition

Embassy - Islamabad

Chaklala

Qasim

# TF Eagle

400 Personnel  
CH-47/S-70-A  
USA/National Guard

Image © 2005 MDA EarthSat



Google

Pointer 33°59'39.51" N 73°19'05.46" E elev 4213 ft

Streaming 100%

Eye alt 50.00 mi



# Why We Were There

- 74,647 Dead
- 76,034 Injured
- 2.9M Displaced

Source: US AID Fact Sheet, 3 Mar 06.










# DAC-PAK J4 Network





# Threats to US Forces

- Primary threats to U.S. forces will be small arms fire, RPGs against targets of opportunity
- U.S. forces initially accepted, however security could erode over time
  - Threat in Northwest Frontier Province and along Afghan/Pakistan border will remain constant
    - Al Qaida and associated movements may attack targets of opportunity
  - MANPADs against U.S. aircraft
- Threat Level
  - Islamabad/Rawalpindi: Low
  - Earthquake Impact area: Medium



APPROX. SNOWLINE – 09FEB06  
 6500-7000FT  
“Unusually good weather”

IMPACTS	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	TOT
Fly Day	20	29	31	25	12	117
Schedule Impact	6	9	7	12		34
Mission Impact	3	5	4	10		22
No Fly Day	2	1		6		9
Days in Country	22	30	31	31	12	126

-  KALARSAR BAIHK  
ELEV: 9356 FT
-  KAGHAN  
ELEV: 7135 FT
-  MUREE  
ELEV: 6552 FT

 RAWALAKOT  
ELEV: 5420 FT


 BALAKOT  
ELEV: 3612 FT

 DHANNI  
ELEV: 3321 FT


 SHINKIARI  
ELEV: 3193 FT

 MUZZAFARABAD  
ELEV: 2329 FT

 CHAKLALA  
ELEV: 1637 FT



# Road Condition Map



- ★ US Camps
- ★ Slings Load Sites


<b>Road Conditions as of 01/02/2006</b>	● Route Point	— Open	Nominal Scale 1:870,000 at A4 0 5 10 15 20 25 Kilometers
	▨ Hazardous	— Closed	
	▨ No Go Zone [DSS]	— Unknown	
	— Un-Surveyed		

Date Created: 01.02.2006	Datum: WGS84
UNJLC Map Num: UNJLC-206-v18	GLIDE Num: EQ-2005-000174-PAK
The boundaries and names and the designations used on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance by the United Nations.	





TONNAGE BY ALL CONTRIES – HELO REL OP – 8 NLI REGT (KOH SHIKAN)  
FROM 10/12/2005 to 11/27/2005





# Initial Life Support

- **Food**
  - Hot Meals on Day 1
  - BOS Contracts for FOBs
- **Water**
  - Bulk Water Supply
- **Shelter**
  - Initial Hanger Space/Cots
  - Securing Embassy Safe Houses
- **Security**
  - Perimeter Fencing all FOBs
  - Base Access for Ktrs
- **Sanitation**
  - Medical Waste
  - Temp Shower
    - Lumber Buys for Seabees
  - Temp Latrines
  - Cadillac's Later On
- **Helo Parking**
  - 24 Helo Parking Pads
  - Taxiway





# 818 CRG / 24 AEG



## Cumulative total

- 371 Aircraft
- 9241 stons unloaded
- Awesome unload capability
- Small footprint
- Came expeditionary



# TF Griffin / TF Eagle

## Cumulative total

- 4,429 Sorties
- 12,206 tons HA supplies
- 3,743 Medevacs
- 15,046 Pax
- Fully log independent
- ALOC in Bagram, matl routing hub
- Aviation support...high readiness
- FFV prime vendor program
- 1<sup>st</sup> Unit to arrive, initial Log Ops/C2
- Ability to sling load early in operation





# 212th MASH / CMRT-3



## Cumulative total

- 32,044 HN patients seen
- 484 surgeries completed
- 13,092 vaccinations
- 475 patients/day average

- Medical supply support
- CMRT – expeditionary
- SBE – MASH hospital
- MASH - Non-expeditionary Log structure... arrived w/min Log support... funding, matl support, BOS... came expecting to be supported






# NMCCB 74 / NMCCB 4

## Cumulative total

- **Adopt a Village (Over 50 shelters built 5 SEAhuts constructed)**
- **School support (complete debris removal and temp bldg construction of 8 schools)**
- **Debris removal (3600 dump trucks)**
- **Latrine construction (1000 units)**
- **Assisted w/BOS**
- **Equipment used from intra-theater... good maintenance**
- **Equipment too big for most roads**
- **Arrived non-self supporting**
- **Road/structure assessment capability**





# TF Wright

## Cumulative total

- 896, 246 gal... \$1.92M
- 12 countries and 10 types of acft
- DESC fuel/resupply contract
- Hot/cold refuel capability
- Small footprint
- 2 FARPS (1 FOC, 1 backup)
- Non-expeditionary Log structure
- Arrived w/o Log support... funding, matl support, BOS... came expecting to be supported
- DESC refuel truck capability... bulk fuel only
- Universal nozzle...bladder to acft
- Fabricated/manufactured bulk truck to bladder fitting





# Logistics Challenges

- ESG-1 Staff 700NM from the ocean-fish out of water☺
- Units spread throughout valleys
  - FOB setup were delayed
- Terrain... affected area in Mountains
  - Most infrastructure devastated
- Road network and condition
  - Narrow
  - Rock/land slides
- Culture and Language differences



***“CDAC-PAK came to assist, not lead, the PAK Mil/Govt with their Earthquake Relief Efforts”***



# More Challenges

- **Ramadan/Eid Holidays**
  - Workers Tired/Delays
  - Loss in Time and Schedule
- **Funding Issues**
  - Long Term BOS Funding
  - Bulk Cash Replenishment
- **Lack of Resources**
  - Country Devastated
  - Resources Only Available in Islamabad
  - Avg 2-3 Day Lead Time to FOBs
- **Redeployment**
  - Turnover of Equip
  - Environmental Concerns





# Successes

- **24 Helo Pads/Taxiway**
  - Used Pak Mil to Clear/Grub
  - Essential for Number of Acft Due In
- **Qasim AB Stood Up in Days**
  - Hot Meals on Day 1
  - Containerized Showers/Latrines Day 7
  - Other FOBs within two weeks
- **Competition**
  - Able to Compete Everything
  - Established Vendor Base
- **JCC Concept**
  - CCOs Communicating w/ Each Other
  - Economies of Scale
  - Avoided Duplication of Effort
- **CCOs Leaning Forward**
  - Proactive vs. Reactive
  - Funding Indecisiveness
- **Thanksgiving/Christmas/New Years Meal**
  - Holiday meals served at 5 locations in Pakistan to over 1500 U.S. Forces





# Contract Summary

**Total # of SF 44s to date: 421**  
**Total # BPA orders to date: 10**  
**Total Contracts to date: 66**

**Total Contract dollars by type:**

**“M” Contracts: \$2,880,700.28**

**“C” Contracts: \$596,811.99**

**“P” Contracts: \$4,687,796.22**

**“F” Contracts: \$30,663.16**

**“A” Contracts: \$68,217.00**

**Total Dollars: \$8,264,188.65**





# Keys to Success

- Daily Visits to Customers
- Lean Forward – Anticipate Your Customer's Needs
- Don't Tell Your Customer No – Find a Way to Make it Work
- Establish Clear Lines of Communication for Requirements
- Follow Up With Your Customers – Keep Them Up to Date
- Stay Focused and Positive





# Operation SANTA CLAUSE





# JCC I/A Visit





# Benefits of JCC

- Advanced coordination with JCC is a must!
- Operation LIFELINE proved the JCC concept of putting all CCOs under one umbrella is the way to go for future operations...ultimately changing the way we do business and Joint Doctrine
  - Creates environment for coordination/information sharing
  - All CCOs/warrants fall under one office chief/one HCA
  - Prevents CCOs from competing with each other for scarce resources within the theater of operations
  - Establish Base Operating Support (BOS) contracts quicker
  - Considerable cost savings/capitalizing on economies of scale
  - Avoids duplication of effort by individual CCO teams
  - Facilitates interaction between services, coalition partners and local contractors
  - Establishes standardized procedures
  - Establishes centralized planning/decentralized execution
  - Ensures compliance with procurement laws, rules and regulations
  - Advises requiring activities on acquisition options
  - Provides superior contracting support and sound business guidance



# Lessons Learned

- Observation – Funding was a serious problem throughout this operation. At one point there were 17 different lines of accounting our CCOs were working with.
- Discussion – After about a month, this was rectified down to five lines of accounting, but still confusing for units and CCOs to operate with. Funding needs to be established at the onset of the operation under one line of accounting (i.e. last year's Tsunami) and not pieced together on a monthly or quarterly basis.
- Lesson Learned – There were several instances where CCOs sent emails out to Units, NAVCENT and CFC-A stating that BOS services would be shut down if funds were not allocated. This was because individual units, NAVCENT and CFC-A were having to use their own operating funds (which were not being reimbursed) to fund the operation.
- Recommendation – Initially set up a centralized single line of accounting (central bulk fund) for the whole operation vs. having individual units, NAVCENT, or CFC-A fund with their own budget.



# Lessons Learned

- Observation – The type of funding limited contracting capability and created confusion for CCOs/Pay Agents
- Discussion – A single “no color” money Line Of Accounting (LOA) should be the norm for contingency contracting.
- Lesson Learned – The type of funding limited requirements we could contract for. A single “no color” money LOA would have allowed CCOs more flexibility and only one LOA vs. multiple LOAs (i.e. 17 LOA’s in the early stages of Operation LIFELINE).
- Recommendation – DoD should seek legislation to make contingency funding “no color” like the Defense Working Capital Fund. One “no color” LOA should be issued for everyone to operate with and then supplemental funding, O&M or whatever else to reimburse the fund as money is drawn out.



# Lessons Learned

- Observation – There was no accounting process or guidance establishing what items could be bought with available funding (colors of money) we had to work with.
- Discussion – Units and contracting officers need a clear understanding of what items can be purchased in this type of environment.
- Lesson Learned – It took up a lot of the contracting officers time trying to figure out who pays for what and what pot of money it was coming out of. Having a single resource manager on the ground is a must. During this operation, there were three individuals at different times acting as resource managers. This created a lot of confusion and discontinuity, which delayed getting CCOs funding.
- Recommendation – The accounting process needs to be established by the funding activity and put into writing at the onset of the operation to let units and CCOs know what can be bought and what can't. In addition, a good experienced resource manager needs to be on the ground to properly manage funding.



# Lessons Learned

- Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs) should be first to hit the ground.
- Observation – CCOs should be part of the ADVON team and be the first feet to hit the ground in any humanitarian operation.
- Discussion – This operation proved the JCC concept of how important it is to put CCOs on the ground first in any given operation.
- Lesson Learned – Hot meals were served on the first night of main body arrival because the CCO took advantage of what the embassy had to offer in terms of an already approved DLA food source. Basic life support items such as showers and latrines were in place within two weeks of arrival, which significantly and immediately improved camp morale.
- Recommendation – The concept of putting CCOs on the ground first as part of the ADVON team should become standard operating procedures for Joint Doctrine and future humanitarian operations.



# Lessons Learned

- Leaning Forward Logistics
- Observation – Deployment duration timelines were not established early on in the operation.
- Discussion – This creates unnecessary delays with establishing base operating support. Also limits base operating support capabilities (i.e. portalets vs. containerized latrines/showers).
- Lesson Learned – CCOs knew a more permanent solution for life support items such as containerized showers, latrines and DFACs would eventually be approved. CCOs put a plan in place, did the market research, prepped the contract, and were ready to pull the trigger once the approval was given for a longer term effort... instant customer satisfaction!
- Recommendation – CCOs coming into this type of environment should anticipate future customer requirements (i.e. showers, latrines, DFACs, etc.) so that when the approval for a more permanent solution is given, the CCO can put it on contract faster.



# Lessons Learned

- Storage of containerized showers/latrines/DFACs
- Observation – Availability of these items as GFE in theater would have saved time and money for Base Operating Support (BOS) contracts.
- Discussion – Having these items as GFE would have allowed for BOS services to come on line quicker and would have been less expensive.
- Lesson Learned – The containerized showers/latrines/DFACs did not arrive as advertised. The units had to be assembled and upgraded along the way. This severely delayed more permanent BOS services coming on line. Some consideration was given by the contractor for the delays and poor quality, but having a good quality product in theater where all you have to do is contract for the service would have allowed for a quicker means of putting these BOS services in place and would have saved time and money.
- Recommendation – Look into the feasibility of storing containerized showers/latrines/DFACs within the AOR for future operations.



# Lessons Learned

- Availability of Contingency Contracting Officers (CCOs)
- Observation – When Operation LIFELINE kicked off there was initially only one CCO supporting six geographically separated locations in Pakistan.
- Discussion – CCOs were stretched too thin to cover all six locations. The geographically separated locations were hard to get around to on a timely basis and would have been better suited by initially having a dedicated CCO at each location from the onset of the operation. Must go in heavy with CCOs upfront and early.
- Lesson Learned – We had to rely on the CCO assigned to the U.S. Embassy who was already stretched thin as it was to fill the gap until other CCOs arrived. Even then, it took several weeks to get additional CCOs into the theater.
- Recommendation – Initially have a dedicated office chief and the right number of CCOs ready to deploy from the onset of the operation vs. incrementally pulling CCOs into the theater.



# Lessons Learned

- Joint Contracting Command (JCC)
- Observation - Importance of having JCC in the fight
- Discussion – JCC provided responsive operational contracting support to the Disaster Assistance Center to efficiently acquire vital supplies, services and construction in support of US Forces and relief efforts.
- Lessons Learned - By utilizing the JCC concept, we were able to achieve the following:
  - Work together as one team vs. competing against each other for scarce resources
  - Greater economies of scale among theater contracting forces
  - As a team evaluate contractor performance for future buys
  - Advise requiring activities on acquisition options and provide sound business guidance
- Recommendation – Involve JCC early on in the planning of future operations and make JCC part of Joint Doctrine.



# Way Ahead

- **New legislature out on developing joint doctrine/acquisition flexibility**
  - **5 Jul 06 interim FAR rule published in the Federal Register**
    - Interim rule divides the flexibilities into two main groups
      - Available Acquisition Flexibilities identifies the flexibilities that **may be used anytime** and do not require an emergency declaration
      - “Emergency Acquisition Flexibilities identifies the flexibilities that **may be used only after an emergency declaration** or designation has been made by the appropriate official
  - **Aug 06 Draft DFAR Part 218**
    - **Draft being coordinated, publication as interim rule. Part 218 will have accompanying PGI with much more guidance on “how to”.**
- **Joint Contingency Contracting Working Group (JCCWG) formed with two-part role:**
  - Develop FAR/DFARS Part 18
    - Revises FAR Part 18 to provide a single reference to the acquisition flexibilities already available in the FAR
    - Facilitate and expedite acquisitions of supplies and services during all types of emergencies
  - Develop Joint Contingency Contracting Guide
    - AFLMA working with OUSD (AT&L) and SAF/AQC to develop new joint guide
- **Joint Doctrine Development**
  - Joint Publication 4-10 Contracting and Contractor Management during Joint Operations currently in development

# Questions?

