

**Department of Defense
Operational Contract Support
Action Plan
FY 2015–FY 2018**



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Preface

Operational contract support (OCS) is a critical component of Total Force capability. Across defense components and functional areas, we share responsibility for OCS readiness. The Department of Defense (DoD) OCS Action Plan shapes the work required for the joint force that will continue to depend on OCS across the range of military operations.

Covering fiscal years 2015 through 2018, the updated Action Plan describes how DoD will close the remaining OCS capability gaps and implement the OCS Joint Concept to support Joint Force 2020. Since the 2013 publication of the first DoD OCS Action Plan, the Department has identified and begun accomplishing the tasks that close capability gaps and transition the OCS Joint Concept into practice. This action plan update describes 108 new and continuing tasks that the Offices of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commands, Defense Agencies, and Military Services have agreed to complete by FY 2018.

This plan commits DoD leaders to substantive actions that overcome identified OCS shortfalls and keep OCS on a transformational course to support Joint Force 2020. The plan designates an “owner” responsible for completion of each task. It sets DoD OCS objectives, links those objectives to products or outcomes, and marks deadlines for completion.

DoD will monitor policy and doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities to pinpoint areas where we can improve to meet the expectations of Joint Force 2020 and better align OCS with Defense readiness requirements.

We will continue integrating OCS into the processes through which the Department shapes its components to support military operations. The DoD OCS Action Plan documents planned work through FY 2018 to ensure OCS capability meets Joint Force commanders’ needs.

Approved



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Executive Summary

Operational contract support (OCS) is a Defense core capability that spans the range of military operations. The DoD Operational Contract Support Action Plan assigns actions needed through 2018 to optimize the capability that OCS provides the joint force commander. The plan ensures that the Department aligns OCS with legislation and strategic guidance, builds OCS readiness, and shapes OCS to be a Joint Force (JF) 2020¹ enabling capability.

OCS is “the process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations.”² It is an “ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the joint force within a designated operational area.”³

The FY 2015-2018 OCS Action Plan is organized around the highest-priority gaps described in the OCS Initial Capabilities Document (ICD)⁴ and addresses capabilities brought forward in the OCS Joint Concept. Updated annually, the Action Plan documents tasks that integrate OCS elements into DOTMLPF-P⁵, processes, and readiness reporting. For each task, this plan designates an office of primary responsibility (OPR) and a due date. The task OPRs take resourcing factors into account as they scope their tasks and set completion dates. Each of the 10 overarching gaps has an OPR that takes lead for closing the gap.

This Action Plan assigns the tasks that will transform OCS to the capability needed to operationalize JF 2020. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) validated the Joint Concept for OCS⁶ and approved the OCS Action Plan as the means to implement the concept’s transition into practice.⁷ The transition from concept to implementation builds on existing OCS solutions, giving DoD increased incentive to close gaps documented in the ICD.

This living document also includes initiatives of the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), military services, and Defense agencies to optimize, institutionalize, modernize, and operationalize OCS. The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Program Support [DASD(PS)] and Vice Director for Logistics, Joint Staff J4 (VJ4) will maintain and leverage it to carry out their missions. The DASD(PS) and the VJ4 co-chair the OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board of senior executives and general/flag officers, with its council of GS-15s and O-6s. DoD managers will continue to use the plan to guide their work and assess, develop, and manage current and future OCS capability.

As comprehensive as it is, this plan is not all-inclusive of the multiple efforts throughout the Department nor will it relieve or subvert any of the roles and responsibilities of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Defense agencies, Joint Staff, Combatant Commands, or Military Departments established in US Code Title 10 and Defense Policy.

¹ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, 10 September 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/ccjo_2012.pdf.

² Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, 16 July 2014.

³ 32 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) § 158

⁴ Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) 112-11, July 19, 2011, *Operational Contract Support Initial Capabilities Document*, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/cio/OCS_ICD_19Jul2011.pdf.

⁵ Doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities - policy

⁶ *Joint Concept for Operational Concept Support*, 7 October 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jic_opcontsupport.pdf.

⁷ JROCM 060-14, 28 May 2014, *Joint Concept for Operational Contract Support Transition Implementation Plan*.

Introduction: Operational Contract Support

OCS is the “ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing support to the joint force within a designated operational area.”⁸ It is the “process of planning for and obtaining supplies, services, and construction from commercial sources in support of joint operations.”⁹

While it falls under the logistics Joint Capability Area, OCS spans numerous functional areas and all phases of operations. It can be a decisive factor in major combat operations; irregular warfare; and stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations.

The DoD OCS Action Plan shapes the required tasks to fully institutionalize contract services as part of the Total Force¹⁰ and ensure OCS is an effective and efficient capability spanning the full range of military operations. The 2015 plan takes account of the significant progress made since publication of the original OCS Action Plan¹¹ in April 2013 and updates the OCS Action Plan FY 2014-2017. It outlines initiatives to address forward-looking elements of the OCS Joint Concept¹² and close remaining gaps that are suboptimizing delivery of OCS. It documents and guides collective efforts to improve OCS capability through FY 2018

Purpose

This document is a strategic plan—it forecasts several years and addresses ways, means, and ends. The plan identifies: 1) actions to implement OCS Joint Concept elements and close capability gaps; 2) deadlines to complete tasks; and 3) OPRs who will lead DoD actions to accomplish the tasks. The OCS Action Plan establishes the comprehensive strategy for DoD to:

- transform OCS to support the Joint Force 2020¹³, and
- close capability gaps documented in the 2011 OCS Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).

It presents an integrated look at OCS-enabling activities across the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, military departments, defense agencies and combatant commands (CCMDs) and is reviewed and updated annually. In scoping their tasks and setting completion dates, the Action Plan’s task leaders have factored in available resources. The plan therefore represents work already acknowledged in budget elements.

The Action Plan looks ahead to JF 2020, detailing the actions needed across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and policy (DOTMLPF-P) to improve delivery of OCS to DoD and its operational partners. The document is organized around

⁸ CFR Title 32 — National Defense [32 CFR], Part 158 — Operational Contract Support [32 CFR 158], <http://cfr.regstoday.com/32cfr158.aspx>.

⁹ Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support*, 16 July 2014, www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_10.pdf.

¹⁰ Total Force. The organizations, units, and individuals that comprise DOD resources for implementing the National Security Strategy. It includes DOD Active and Reserve military personnel, military retired members, DOD civilian personnel (including foreign national direct and indirect-hire, as well as non-appropriated fund employees), contractor personnel, and host nation support personnel. DODD 5124.02, Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD (P&R)), 23 June, 2008.

¹¹ DoD OCS Action Plan, April 2013, https://extranet.acq.osd.mil/lmr/ps/fcib/OCS/OCS_Action_Plan_Final.pdf.

¹² *Operational Contract Support Joint Concept*, 7 October 2013, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jic_opcontsupport.pdf.

¹³ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, 10 September 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/ccjo_2012.pdf.

the critical OCS capability gaps originally defined in the OCS ICD¹⁴. Closing these OCS gaps will significantly improve commanders' options to achieve effects while reducing the need for significant force deployment, enhance global agility, provide a reversible capability, and reduce the cost of doing business. Transforming OCS with the solutions described in the Joint Concept will enable the JF 2020 to optimize contracted support and conduct globally integrated operations.

Problem Definition

The US has always used contracted support in military operations. The JF 2020 will depend on OCS. As contracted support became an increasingly important part of the US total force, the ability to manage this capability in operations was diminishing. Contractors comprised more than 50 percent of the 2007 U.S. manpower in theater.¹⁵ The congressionally established Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan concluded in its August 2011 final report that the “heavy reliance on contractors...overwhelmed the government’s ability to conduct proper planning, management, and oversight of the contingency-contracting function...”¹⁶

The Department was unprepared for the scope and scale of contracted support in Iraq and Afghanistan. The multiple activities relying on contractors in the theater rarely coordinated requirements or contracts. Several factors influenced the shift to a force reliant on contractors:

- modern warfare uses complex, contractor-maintained equipment and skills and services not readily available in the force structure;
- contractor support can provide a quick increase in force during conflict, potentially at lower cost than maintaining military force structure or civilian employees;
- some organic military logistics and mission support functions have been outsourced during prolonged operations to reallocate military force capacity to meet higher priority requirements; and
- DoD made a conscious decision to shed some capabilities, particularly those that are not inherently military in nature, in favor of contracting to save on manpower or cost.

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction and Afghanistan Reconstruction, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (2007 “Gansler Commission”) all found serious problems in planning, oversight, and accounting for contractors. Their reports prompted DoD and Congress to improve:

- laws, regulations, and policy;
- organizations;
- contracting and contractor management personnel; and
- training and tools.

The OCS ICD took into account the findings of the numerous external audits, commissions, and reports. This Action Plan reflects the needs articulated in the ICD and addresses the findings of contracting deficiencies. The OCS Joint Concept defines solutions for

¹⁴ Joint Requirements Oversight Council Memorandum (JROCM) 112-11, July 19, 2011, *Operational Contract Support Initial Capabilities Document*, http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/cio/OCS_ICD_19Jul2011.pdf.

¹⁵ DoD Analysis of the Interim Report of the COWC in Iraq and Afghanistan, November 4, 2009, p. 32.

¹⁶ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks* (Final Report to Congress), August 2011, p. 1. http://www.whs.mil/library/Reports/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf.

establishing the OCS capability that the JF 2020 will need. This Plan lays out the specific tasks to achieve those solutions.

Operational Contract Support Capability Gaps

This updated Plan organizes tasks by their relevance to capability gaps detailed in the 2011 OCS ICD.¹⁷ OCS remains a JROC “interest item.”

Table 1. OCS Capability Gaps

1. The DoD lacks sufficient ability to leverage the full potential of operational contract support because of insufficient awareness and appreciation for the significance and complexity of OCS.
2. The DoD lacks the ability to fully integrate OCS into capability and task planning, operational assessments, force development, training, readiness reporting, lessons learned, and continuous process improvement.
3. The DoD lacks a human capital strategy—recruit, train, track, and retain—for all OCS functions, which encumbers deployment and staffing for the joint force and complicates OCS execution and compliance with legislation and regulation.
4. The joint force lacks the personnel, rules, tools, or processes to integrate OCS into theater plans across all phases (including IV and V), all directorates (J-staff functions), and with non-DoD partners, e.g., multinational or interagency.
5. The joint force lacks sufficient ability to visualize, track, and monitor the types, location and status of OCS capabilities in theater.
6. The joint force lacks sufficient leadership oversight and awareness to address risk, opportunities, resources, communications, transitions, improvements, and inter-contingency issues associated with OCS.
7. The joint force lacks the ability to identify existing contract vehicles and capabilities by region and to direct integration of common contract support.
8. The joint force lacks sufficient capacity to effectively administer, oversee, and close contracts to ensure contractor performance is properly tracked and accessible and desired outcomes are achieved.
9. The joint force lacks a common capability to simply, rapidly, and accurately generate and coordinate (including deconflicting and prioritizing) acquisition-ready requirements packages.
10. The joint force lacks a common means to identify contractors and control base/post access across all geographic locations.

The OCS Joint Concept Transition

In October 2013, the JROC endorsed the Joint Concept for OCS.¹⁸ The need to implement the OCS Joint Concept added urgency to complete ongoing work and brought new tasks to evolve OCS to its JF 2020 enabling capability. The JROC-endorsed OCS Joint Concept guides OCS capability development for JF 2020, presenting a common vision for OCS—better integration and

¹⁷ *Initial Capabilities Document for Operational Contract Support*, July 19, 2011.

¹⁸ *Joint Concept for Operational Concept Support*, 7 October 2013,

http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/jic_opcontsupport.pdf.

synchronization of operational and contracting authorities, streamlined processes, and a quicker requirements development process, leading to more responsive and accountable contracting efforts.

The OCS Action Plan FY14-17 incorporated Joint Concept transition implementation, detailing the specific means to bring the concept into practice. In 2014, the JROC recognized DoD’s OCS Action Plan as the joint concept’s transition implementation vehicle.¹⁹ Implementing the joint concept recognizes the interdependencies inherent in JF 2020, requiring better OCS education and training, greater visibility, and better tools to plan, execute, integrate, and assess OCS across the Department.

The OCS Joint Concept identifies solutions DoD must develop and integrate in DOTMLPF-P doctrine, organization, training, leadership and education, and personnel. OCS Action Plan tasks address these solutions:

Table 2. OCS Joint Concept Solutions

1. DoD-wide OCS executive agents to lead DOTMLPF-P capability development across DoD and to coordinate EA-related resource requirements. <i>[The Action Plan addresses this capability through designation of an OCS joint proponent.]</i>
2. Skilled cadre of multi-disciplinary military and civilian personnel with specialized OCS training and experience.
3. An enduring, scalable OCS mission integrator originating from and utilized at the CCMD’s discretion by subordinate JFC or selected Service components to lead all OCS horizontal collaboration across the primary and special staff, and coordinate vertically with components and supporting agencies.
4. A sound OCS foundational knowledge base within leaders through professional military education to facilitate a cultural shift on how the DoD views, plans and accounts for contracted support.
5. Integrate OCS across joint functions into doctrine and in Service and joint live, virtual, and constructive training.
6. Networked total force partners with innovative OCS tools, data and processes to optimize capabilities and exploit existing and emerging technology to reduce manpower requirements and workload.
7. Rapidly deployable, trained and ready contracting organizations or capabilities, along with improved authorities and processes to better coordinate and control theater contingency contracting in the JOA.

Two near-term initiatives are bringing the concept into practice: 1) the establishment of the first OCS mission integrator (OMI) at US Pacific Command; and 2) designation of the OCS joint proponent.

The OMI will pursue OCS responsiveness to the demands of the joint force. At the CCMD staff, the OMI will synchronize OCS-related activities within the commander’s battle rhythm and decision cycles. Contracted support for JF 2020 requires a dedicated OMI to quickly react to mission needs and integrate OCS across joint functions. [Detailed tasks for the OMI are listed under Action 2.4.]

¹⁹ JROCM 060-14, 28 May 2014, *Joint Concept for Operational Contract Support Transition Implementation Plan*.

If the Secretary of Defense designates a joint proponent²⁰ for OCS, that organization will lead coordination for identifying requirements, conducting analysis, and making recommendations to develop and institutionalize OCS capabilities across the DOTMLPF-P spectrum. Assessment of a joint proponent's roles and responsibilities is in progress.

Scope of the OCS Action Plan

The capability gaps and the OCS Joint Concept transition elements define the scope of this Plan. The document addresses work to be accomplished through FY 2018. It will guide Department efforts toward transforming OCS as described in the 2013 Joint Concept and closing remaining gaps originally identified in the 2011 OCS ICD. The OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB) will oversee progress. The Plan will be a living document that the DASD(PS) and the Vice Director, Directorate for Logistics, Joint Staff (VJ4) will maintain and use to execute their missions and responsibilities. OPRs will use the Action Plan to set priorities as they develop and manage their organizations' current and future OCS solutions.

Development Factors

Statute

The OCS Action Plan includes tasks that implement the intent of USC Title 10 and the FY 2007, FY 2008, FY 2013, and FY 2014 National Defense Authorization Acts (NDAAs) that amended it.

Section 854 of the FY 2007 NDAAs amended Title 10 by adding section 2333: "The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, shall develop joint policies for requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting during combat operations and post-conflict operations."²¹ In October 2007, the acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition Technology and Logistics (USD(AT&L)) gave responsibility for implementing section 854 to the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (now the DASD) for Program Support.²²

Section 2333 requires joint policy to effectively implement "objectives, policies, and decisions regarding the allocation of resources, coordination of interagency efforts in the theater of operations, and alignment of requirements with the proper use of funds." Compliance with the statute requires up-to-date DOTMLPF-P.

The FY 2008 NDAAs further amended section 2333 of Title 10, U.S.C., and directed that joint policies provide for training of personnel outside the acquisition workforce who could have acquisition responsibilities during contingencies. It also required GAO to audit compliance with these requirements.

²⁰ Joint Proponent (Joint Publication 1-02). A Service, combatant command, or Joint Staff directorate assigned coordinating authority to lead the collaborative development and integration of joint capability with specific responsibilities designated by the Secretary of Defense.

²¹ 10 U.S. Code Section 2333: Joint policies on requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency contracting, <http://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=granuleid:USC-prelim-title10-section2333&num=0&edition=prelim>.

²² Under Secretary of Defense memorandum, *Designation of Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Program Support) to Implement Section 854 of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007*, September 5, 2007.

Section 845 of the FY 2013 NDAA amended Title 10 in requiring the Secretary of Defense to include contract support in Defense readiness reporting systems.²³

Section 331 of the FY 2014 NDAA²⁴ amended section 482 of Title 10, U.S.C., requiring “Quarterly reports” on “personnel and unit readiness” to include a “(i) Risk Assessment of Dependence on Contractor Support. Each report shall also include an assessment by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the level of risk incurred by using contract support in contingency operations...”

Other Major Influences

Factors that shape OCS actions include joint doctrine, congressionally-sanctioned commissions, audit findings, and the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*.

Joint Publication (JP) 4-10. JP 4-10 summarizes OCS and the associated terminology, lists the Department-wide roles and responsibilities, discusses contract support integration planning and execution, and addresses contractor management. The Joint Staff published the updated JP 4-10, “Operational Contract Support,” on 16 July 2014.²⁵

GAO statements, testimony, and reports. Through its audits, reviews, and reports, GAO has offered significant insight into how DoD manages contingency contracting. In a March 2010 report,²⁶ for example, auditors pointed out that DoD was slow in following 2006 guidance to integrate an “operational contract support annex—Annex W—into certain combatant command operation plans.” GAO found that 89 plans required an Annex W; by 2010, only four were approved, leaving the Department at risk of being unprepared for contractor deployments and in-theater oversight.²⁷ A 2011 GAO statement²⁸ to the Commission said “... beyond issuing new policies and procedures, DoD needs to fundamentally change the way it approaches operational contract support.”

The Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Commission (established by the FY 2008 NDAA) issued “Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks” in August 2011. The Commission reported that DoD had lost at least \$31 billion to contract waste and fraud. The report said that Iraq and Afghanistan contractors operated under weak oversight, leaving DoD vulnerable to contractor waste, fraud, and abuse.²⁹ Following the Commission’s disestablishment, GAO recorded the actions DoD took in response to Commission recommendations.³⁰

²³ Section 117(c) of Title 10 USC, “Readiness reporting system: establishment; reporting to congressional committees,” <http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/USCODE-2011-title10/html/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleA-part1-chap2-sec117.htm>

²⁴ Public Law 113-66.

²⁵ Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support, 16 July 2014, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp4_10.pdf.2014.

²⁶ GAO, *Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations*, GAO-10-472, March 30, 2010, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-472>.

²⁷ GAO, *Warfighter Support: DOD Needs to Improve Its Planning for Using Contractors to Support Future Military Operations*, GAO-10-472, March 30, 2010, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-10-472>.

²⁸ GAO, *Contingency Contracting: Observations on Actions Needed to Address Systemic Challenges*, GAO-11-580, April 25, 2011, <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-11-580>.

²⁹ Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, *Transforming Wartime Contracting: Controlling Costs, Reducing Risks* (Final Report to Congress), August 2011, p. 1, http://www.whs.mil/library/Reports/CWC_FinalReport-lowres.pdf.

³⁰ GAO-12-854R, *Contingency Contracting: Actions to Address Recommendations by the Commission on Wartime Contracting*

The Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.³¹ The CCJO guides force development toward JF 2020, the force called for by the defense strategic guidance, *Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense*. The CCJO describes how joint force elements will “combine quickly with each other and mission partners to harmonize capabilities and then “evolve, dissolve and reform in different arrangements as required.” This flexibility will demand a responsive OCS capability bolstered by solid doctrine and by military and civilian personnel trained to manage this large component of the total force. The CCJO recognizes that strategic success may depend on operating “in concert with the rest of the U.S. government, allied governments and their armed forces, and nongovernmental partners.”

Collaboration During Development

DoD developed this Action Plan through a collaborative effort led by an ad-hoc working group. The OCS Action Plan working group is composed of representatives of the Plan’s OPRs and other organizations with major stakes in transitioning OCS to a JF 2020 capability. The FCIB authorized the working group to maintain and update this Plan for FCIB approval. The FCIB will oversee required actions to meet the Plan’s target due dates through 2018.

Objective

This document’s primary objective is to assign and enable tracking of all the actions necessary for OCS to reliably support commanders’ desired operational outcomes. The Action Plan shows the individual projects and participants, both planned and ongoing. Organized around the OCS ICD’s gaps, this document sets specific OCS outcomes and identifies the OPRs for achieving them. This year’s Plan update shows 108 tasks, 12 of which are new. Tasks directly related to implementing the Joint Concept are shown in **purple font**. The Plan’s Appendix A is a detailed table tracking the status of all tasks in the FY 2014-FY 2017 Action Plan, including those that were completed and those that were deleted or incorporated into another task. Appendix B addresses the changes that were made to tasks from the original 2013 Action Plan to the FY 2014-FY 2017 Action Plan.

Organizational Roles and Responsibilities

OSD develops timely, implementable policy and aligns OCS strategy across the Department.

The Joint Staff and the military departments contribute to the operational readiness of OCS through updates to DOTMLPF-P, development of the OCS joint concept, experimentation and assessment, and implementation. The military services have responsibility to institute DOTMLPF-P changes.

Defense agencies and joint commanders that manage and oversee OCS bring valuable lessons learned and practical process changes that influence DOTMLPF-P.

in *Iraq and Afghanistan*, August 2012),). GAO-12-854R: <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-12-854R>.

³¹ *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020*, September 10, 2012, http://www.dtic.mil/futurejointwarfare/concepts/approved_ccjov2.pdf.

The OCS Action Plan assigns each “gap” section to a lead office responsible for assigning every task to an OPR. The OPRs either accomplish the task themselves or ensure it gets completed by the target date. The Plan depends on the OCS FCIB to act as the central governance body to track and monitor progress, resolve challenges, integrate the efforts in DoD, coordinate sustained progress, and recommend change to DOTMLPF-P.

Performance Measures

Each task is a deliverable or outcome measured against a target completion date. The aggregated tasks in each section close an ICD-described gap or meet an OCS Joint Concept objective to support JF 2020. DoD’s primary monitors for performance targets are the OCS FCIB co-chairs—the DASD(PS) and the VJ4. The FCIB will be their forum for examining progress on specific actions and deadlines.

As an action is completed, those monitoring the close-out will document what DoD delivered (e.g., a policy document) and when DoD delivered it. Along with the other FCIB members, the FCIB chair and co-chair will review and validate the effectiveness and sustainability of corrective measures. They will indicate risk areas and select DoD leads to mitigate these risks. The DASD(PS) will store documentation for completed tasks on the DASD(PS) secure website to track Action Plan deliverables.

External Factors

Factors external to DoD or beyond its control (e.g., appropriations, changes to law or national security strategy, or a significant expansion of contractor support in peacetime security cooperation) can affect progress or change the direction of OCS requirements. The FCIB will monitor this environment and bring these factors to the Board’s attention for recommendations and action.

Conclusion

The OCS Action Plan outlines what the Department will do, who is responsible for each action, and when the work is anticipated to be completed. The detailed sections correspond to the highest-priority capability gaps in the ICD. OCS is a core defense capability, important to combatant commanders through all phases of operations. The Action Plan will guide leaders through 2018 in two equally important objectives: closing the remaining ICD gaps and implementing DoD OCS transformation plans. As long as the joint force is reliant on OCS, the Department will protect the health of this capability through up-to-date DOTMLPF-P guidance.