February 2003

Foreword

February 15, 2003

The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) proudly submits Military Door-to-Door Support to the Warfighter as a worthy candidate for the *2002 Supply Chain Council Award for Supply Chain Operational Excellence.* The Military Door-to-Door program is an excellent example of how USTRANSCOM supports the OSD vision to improve the Department of Defense's end-to-end distribution system.

Military Door-to-Door was initiated in November 2001, enhancing cargo movement by establishing an international, intermodal military end-to-end delivery service. This service expanded Air Mobility Command channel cargo delivery service to include air and surface operations at both ends of the pipeline. This process incorporates both military and commercial carrier capacity.

This initiative has become a cornerstone for expansion of enhanced end-to-end logistics to America's warfighting customers. Integrating key tenets of distribution (velocity, reliability, value, and visibility) characterized this synchronized and expanded service implementation. By significantly increasing all four key areas, Military Door-to-Door has paved the way for continued improvement, and has raised the bar for military distribution performance expectations.

Gary H. Hughey
Lieutenant General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commander
United States Transportation Command

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2003 Award Submission for Supply Chain Operational Excellence

Military Door-to-Door Support to the Warfighter

Executive Summary

The primary objectives of Military Door-to-Door Support to the Warfighter are: 1) Reduced wait time for supply receipt; 2) Efficient utilization of both military and commercial transportation assets; and 3) Financial savings.

Military Door-to-Door Support to the Warfighter is a distribution transformation effort under the auspices of Strategic Distribution. Strategic Distribution is a partnership led by the United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) and Defense Logistics Agency (DLA). Other participants include the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Staff, the Military Services and Combatant Commands, along with General Services Administration and commercial vendors and carriers. The Strategic Distribution program, through execution of initiatives like the Military Door-to-Door Service effort, seeks to optimize the Department of Defense global distribution and supply chain in support of the warfighter by focusing on three vital concepts: stock positioning, scheduled service, and synchronization, with Military Door-to-Door Service concentrating on the latter two. Application of these two concepts, coupled with benchmarking performance against leading private sector supply systems, yielded dramatic and quantifiable improvements that are evident to our customers and the DOD community at large. This is a paradigm shift for Air Mobility Command, expanding beyond port-to-port service and assuming responsibility, control, and accountability for delivery door-to-door.

Prior to Military Door-to-Door implementation, the Defense Transportation System pushed for efficiency by accumulating cargo to maximize aircraft capacity. This often resulted in extended aerial port hold times and unpredictable service. It also accurately contributed to the customer perception of the Defense Transportation System as untimely and unreliable. Further, as commercial transportation alternatives were procured at additional expense, military assets were underutilized. The Military Door-to-Door structure utilizes military assets more efficiently with the same level of performance customers have come to expect from commercial alternatives. Development and deployment of Military Door-to-Door service by USTRANSCOM/Air Mobility Command enhanced exquisite support to the warfighter by reducing customer wait time by approximately 18 percent, improving asset efficiency by establishing synchronized intermodal connections, and saving DOD over $27M in 2002 compared to 2001.

Despite dramatically increasing global demands, consistent distribution performance remained exceptionally high to Europe and Southwest Asia. Uninterrupted service continues during the transition from peace to war and continues to do so in support of the global war on terrorism. Implementation of Military Door-to-Door service has provided significant performance improvement and revolutionary change within the Department of Defense.

Section 1. General Information and Project Complexity

(1) Provide the name of the submitting organization (corporation, service, etc.).

United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM)

(2) Identify the organizational unit responding (site, function, etc.).

USTRANSCOM, Director of Strategy, Plans, Policy (TCJ5)

(3) Provide a brief mission description of the overall business objective, product lines, and mission of the organization.

The overall business objective of Military Door-to-Door service is to improve velocity, reliability, end-to-end service, and applicability in peace and war by concentrating on scheduled and synchronized intermodal service from the supply source to the theater warfighting commander's supply support activity.

Specifically, this is accomplished by incorporating the following product lines:

- Scheduled truck services linked to aircraft departures and arrivals
- Use of advanced visibility for modal planning
- Commercially competitive pricing and performance

The United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) mission is "To provide air, land, and sea transportation for the DOD, both in time of peace and war.

USTRANSCOM integrates global transportation operations using both military and commercial resources and synchronizes with DOD distribution partners (DLA, Services, and Theater Combatant Commanders) to provide predictable, consistent, and reliable time definite delivery of resources to the warfighting customer.

Responding to the needs of the Department of Defense's warfighting commanders is USTRANSCOM's No. 1 priority. USTRANSCOM is composed of three component commands: The Air Force's Air Mobility Command, the Navy's Military Sealift Command, and the Army's Military Traffic Management Command.

Reliable service requires teamwork between transportation and supply processes. To that end, USTRANSCOM formed the Strategic Distribution partnership with DLA, the Services and Theaters to remove seams in the end-to-end process. Strategic Distribution seeks to improve end-to-end distribution to sustain warfighting units. The three key targets for success are proper **Stock Positioning,** reliable **Scheduled Service,** and **Synchronization.** To provide the best possible support to our customers, Strategic Distribution analyzes DOD's global distribution—transportation and supply—systems, then redesigns and implements optimized DOD processes and policies. Military Door-to-Door is just such a process.

(4) Indicate the award category of submission. (Operations, Academic, Technology--winners in these categories will automatically advance to Global.)

Award for Supply Chain Operational Excellence

(5) Provide a brief description of the supply chain and the processes the submission spans (e.g., Plan, Source, Make, Deliver, Return).

Military Door-to-Door vision is synchronization of the global distribution processes. It focuses on improving end-to-end distribution among the Services, USTRANSCOM, DLA, vendors, and customers. This incorporates the planning and acquisition of commercial and military truck or air services, or combination thereof, to effectively deliver to the warfighter.

Figure 1-1 is a high-level graphic of the Strategic Distribution end-to-end distribution process. Military Door-to-Door enhanced the segment processes between #4 Depot Ship and #11 Customer Receipt (D6S).



Figure 1-1: End-to-End Distribution Process

Figures 1-2 and 1-3 below illustrate the scope of Strategic Distribution vision for DOD supply chain distribution, to include synchronization with overseas theater distribution chains. The vision is to streamline multiple and redundant systems into an integrated, scheduled, and synchronized global defense distribution hub and spoke system.



Figure 1-2. Multiple Distribution Systems—BEFORE SD



Figure 1-3. Rationally Constructed Distribution Networks—AFTER SD

(6) Provide the names of the supply chain partner organizations (external) involved in the project. Indicate the number of people involved from each partner organization and the functional category of each.

Military Door-to-Door is a product of the USTRANSCOM and DLA Strategic Distribution partnership (relationships identified in **Figure 1-4** below):



Figure 1-4. Strategic Distribution Structure

The SD Council is composed of our nation's senior logistics leaders, providing oversight and vision. These senior leaders advocate for change among their peers in OSD, Joint Staff, the Services, and Combatant Commands.

The SD Board of Directors (BOD) is a decision-making body charged with reviewing recommended changes and initiatives submitted by the committees. The global nature of distribution management requires the involvement and collaborative efforts of these many external supply chain partners in process decisions. The BOD is the "powerhouse" to work issues and provide aggressive oversight. In addition, it is the change agent responsible for developing recommendations and ensuring program integration.

The Intermodal and Stockage Committees work on behalf of BOD guidance. They are process-oriented and organized to exploit core competencies within USTRANSCOM and DLA. Their job is to recommend, define, and execute BOD initiatives. The committees prepare business case analysis and detailed action plans, and are responsible for executing and institutionalizing change.

Other external partner organizations important to Military Door-to-Door velocity are the Service components and logistics staffs of the United States European Command (USEUCOM), the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and the United States Pacific Command (USPACOM).

(7) Provide the names of the functional organizations (internal) involved in the project and indicate the number of people involved from each functional organization and functional category.

The Strategic Distribution internal organization consists of the following organizations and support functions:

- SD Program Office (TCJ5-SD), led by a senior logistician located at USTRANSCOM.
- Military Door-to-Door Team, under the SD Intermodal Committee, composed of personnel from all of the SD partners: Military Traffic Management Command.(MTMC), responsible for surface coordination; and Air Mobility Command (AMC), responsible for the air segment.
- Overall analytical support to SD is provided by RAND Corporation, a team of experts from their Military Logistics Program.
- The two SD Committees are functionally aligned with flag-level chairs from key SD organizations. Each committee sends representatives to all other committee sessions and all committees represent a cross section of DLA, USTRANSCOM, other Combatant Commands, the Services, and DOD agency functional expertise tailored to the specific committee task. RAND provides an analytical expert to each committee.

(8) Provide a point of contact for each supply chain partner (name, mailing address, commercial telephone number, DSN, and e-mail address).

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Section 2. Implementation

(1) Describe the reason that the supply chain initiative was undertaken and how it was selected.

In early 2000, the SD leadership recognized the need to forge a strategic partnership with the Services and warfighting commanders for the 21st century. They stated:

> *"We consider the Strategic Distribution process to be the most important logistics partnership in this first decade of the 21st Century. The defense distribution business requires more change the next ten years than it has seen in the last thirty. Department of Defense customers have come to expect new levels of improved distribution service."*

The SD partnership then sought to build and provide these improvements via enhanced logistics processes, technology, and better business practices.

The DOD logistics community was in the midst of dynamic change as the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Logistics and the Services recognized the need to transform the 20th century cumbersome supply and transportation processes into a ready, reliable, and effective global defense distribution system. The environment was characterized by:

(1) Multiple, Service-centric distribution systems with varying performance
(2) Unique, uncoordinated stocking policies
(3) Expensive distribution networks relying on premium transportation service
(4) Warfighting customers demanding time-definite delivery standards comparable with commercial service
(5) Warfighting customers requiring near real-time asset visibility comparable to the commercial sector
(6) Diminishing DOD business base and readiness as customers sought and found alternative sources and methods of supply to reduce customer wait time

Under the SD umbrella, the Military Door-to-Door concept was formed. Key players saw this as an opportunity to improve and provide customers with much needed cargo velocity and reliability. This could only be accomplished with the help and support of all SD partners. Separate supply and transportation components exist in the distribution of materiel, representing a challenge and a reason for teaming in the pursuit of Military Door-to-Door.

(2) Indicate the duration of the project. Note if the project was a pilot that is being rolled out. Note if the project is ongoing/still in process.

Initiated November 2001, Military Door-to-Door is an ongoing evolutionary process. It is intended to effect permanent change in global end-to-end distribution.

(3) Describe, in detail, the process used to complete the initiative.

The logistics leaders and customers desired end-to-end capability with inherent commercial-like service and price. The initiative is depicted in **Figure 2-1** and described in detail below:



Figure 2-1: Military Door-to-Door Process

To enhance service through predictability and velocity, the following actions occurred:

3-1 Material from Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) depots is received and processed at DLA containerization and consolidation points (CCPs) Susquehanna PA and San Joaquin CA.

Materiel requiring further movement by organic air is received via surface transportation by the area of responsibility CCP (Susquehanna PA or San Joaquin CA). Materiel is then consolidated by destination, palletized, documented, and forwarded to the aerial port of embarkation (APOE).

3-2 The DLA CCPs provide advanced visibility to the Defense Transportation System.

The CCPs perform an important synchronization action--notifying (via fax) aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs), Dover and Travis Air Force Bases, of cargo inbound to their location.

3-3 Aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) capitalize on advanced visibility to load, plan and assign cargo to a specific air mission.

Using this faxed information from the CCPs, the APOEs retrieve an Advanced Transportation Control Movement Document (ATCMD) from the Global Air Transportation Execution System (GATES). The aerial ports now possess sufficient (level 6) detail to facilitate outbound load planning. If adequate lift exists, the aerial ports assign the cargo to a scheduled channel mission. If, however, additional lift is required, advance arrangements with the Global Channel Operations Directorate of the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) are made. This synchronization of events enables seamless processing of cargo to significantly speed what was once a cumbersome and non-reactive process.

3-4 Aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) provide advanced in-transit visibility to aerial ports of debarkation (APODs).

Further capitalizing on the power of advanced visibility, the CONUS APOE provides down line visibility to the receiving APOD. The data push contains the number of pallets, weight, destination, and pallet identification number. Additionally, the APOE dispatches air mission data detailing the type aircraft and estimated time of arrival to the receiving APOD. These steps are accomplished a minimum of 8 hours prior to aircraft arrival at the APOD, allowing for strategic planning from that location to next.

Participating CONUS APOEs/units, serving as AMC's executing agents, include the 60th Aerial Port Squadron, Travis AFB (15th Air Force); 436th Aerial Port Squadron, Dover AFB (21st Air Force), and Ramstein AB as a transient APOE for cargo destined for USCENTCOM on established air channels. The 621st Air Mobility Group (AMG), and the 23rd Air Mobility Squadron (AMS) are the participants that provide improved distribution performance to receiving military units in the field—the ultimate customer.

3-5 The APODs receive information of inbound pallets and arrange for onward movement to the ultimate customer.

The OCONUS APOD makes good use of the advanced data. They notify the next link in the distribution chain, surface transportations providers, of arrival time and quantity of cargo expected. Once the mission is on the ground at their location, the APODs will download and receipt for the cargo. This cargo is then documented using a GATES-generated truck manifest, and these pallets are subsequently loaded on trucks and transported directly to the customer's location.

Participating APODs/units serving as executing agents include the 730th AMS, Yokota AB Japan; the 731st AMS, Osan AB Korea; and the 733rd AMC, Kadena AB Japan. Within Korea, the 731st AMS coordinates with the Army's 25th Transportation Battalion to garner Common-User-Land-Transportation (CULT) services to move the cargo to military units located at Tongduchon, Suwon, Sungnam, Kimhae, and Kunsan.
Other AMC APOD units include the 8th EAMSS at Prince Sultan Air Base in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the contracted services of Menlo Transportation operating from Kuwait City International Airbase to provide final delivery service of the cargo to Camp Doha Kuwait.
In the European theater, the 623rd AMS works with the Army's 37th Transportation Battalion, providing onward trucking service to units throughout Germany.

3-6 Continuous improvement

It is important that all partners conduct a continuous process review, while soliciting/providing feedback through functional channels. This activity is instrumental in validating the Time Definite Delivery concept and meet stated goals and objectives. Additionally, segment time analysis will identify new candidate locations for implementation.

(4) Identify significant challenges encountered, the process for resolution, and the solutions. Identify best practices employed/developed.

4-1 Changing expectations top-to-bottom

Prior to the Military Door-to-Door initiative, the DTS strove to maximize efficiency by holding cargo movements in order to fully load aircraft pallet positions, resulting in extended port hold times and unpredictable distribution. Further complicating the issue was removal of aircraft from scheduled routes to support short notice higher priority requirements.

Altering the mindset of the DTS operators and customers has been a major challenge associated with Military Door-to-Door. Years of striving to maximize utilization of aircraft and the mindset of personnel in the operations, logistics, and financial communities had to be re-focused on balancing efficiency and velocity. Simultaneously, customers accustomed to unreliable transportation service from the DTS were satisfied with the current service provided by commercial carriers and reluctant to consider shifting back to the DTS.

Military Door-to-Door partners initiated discussions with prospective warfighting customers to propose process change and improvement. As a team, they identified practices requiring modification/revision to permit internal customers to implement revolutionary change. Additionally, they initiated an internal and external marketing campaign extolling the virtues of the new synchronized and scheduled service.

4-2 Finding partners

SD's first initiative partnered with USEUCOM, a large user of DLA and USTRANSCOM services. The three partners identified best business practices from industry, and aligned them with USEUCOM-unique customer requirements. As such, Military Door-to-Door provided tailored services to fulfill requirements and exceed expectations. Thus, in mid-2001, the first improvement opportunity with a warfighter commenced by synchronizing the pipeline between CONUS and Germany. Cargo arriving via truck from the Defense Depot Susquehanna PA (DDSP) was synchronized with AMC aircraft departing from Dover AFB DE. At Ramstein AB Germany, arriving aircraft were synchronized with the trucking network supporting USEUCOM's Theater Distribution Center (TDC). The collaborative efforts of this triad resulted in marked distribution performance, with velocity improvements approaching 30 percent from baseline performance, realizations of consistent, steady performance, and over $14M in financial impact.

USCENTCOM also identified theater-unique requirements. By April 2001, aircraft arriving at Kuwait International Airport were synchronized with theater intermodal trucking support, and distribution performance and velocity improvements similar to those experienced in the European region were realized, with savings to DOD of over $11M.

Primary support was provided by the Army's SSA at Camp Doha in Kuwait, and at the Prince Sultan Air Base in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

USPACOM subsequently partnered with three distinct requirements and tailored solutions in Mainland Japan, the Korean Peninsula, and Alaska. Through the application of Military Door-to-Door concepts, military units like the Marine Air Logistics Squadron – Twelve (MALS 12) in Iwakuni, Japan; or the 35th Supply Logistics Group (35th SUP LGS) in Misawa, Japan are reaping benefits of markedly improved delivery velocities and consistent service. These same kind of positive results are being experienced with Army units (examples include the 2nd and 302nd FSBs of the 2nd ID) at Tongduchon, Korea; or the 43rd Air Defense Artillery Battery (1/43 ADA, 19th TSC), Suwon Air Base, Korea. Additionally, by incorporating theater common-user land transportation, PACOM Military-Door-to-Door is outperforming commercial door-to-door service to Korea by 1.5 days and at $.12 per pound cost savings.

4-3 Shift from stovepipe service to door-to-door provider

Prior to the Military Door-to-Door concept, stakeholders/participants within the distribution portion of DOD's supply chain operated largely within their respective functional areas. Further, elements within the partners' organizations operated within their established borders. For example, prior to Military Door-to-Door, AMC provided service only from the APOE to the APOD. Prior to Military door-to-Door, movement of the shipment from the APOE was not scheduled until the shipment was received. Further transportation for the movement of the shipment from the APOD was not requested until after the shipment was received at the APOD. Additionally, if the shipment was eligible for air movement within the destination theater, the shipment was held at the APOD until air transportation could be scheduled, regardless whether the shipment could be transported via surface transportation to its destination in a timelier manner and at a reduced cost. While restructuring this paradigm proved challenging, Military Door-to-Door's demonstrated success encouraged the SD partners to identify institutionalization opportunities.

Military Door-to-Door processes enabled collaborative participants the use of advance inbound shipment information to make informed transportation modal decisions, optimizing both reliability and velocity at a reduced cost. Military door-to-Door resulted in shipments arriving in the warfighter's theater via airlift and transitioning to surface transportation via preplanned onward movement.

4-4 Resistance to change

The sheer size of the DOD makes all significant changes a challenge. Equally challenging is changing the perception of the customer. Keys to overcoming resistance include:

a) Publicize previous successes at all levels of the organization(s);

b) Align with the customer, discuss, and collect their requirements; baseline existing processes and performance; develop the improved process; and

c) Develop, market, and execute the plan, measure results, and refine the process based on the results.

Through this procedure the Military Door-to-Door effort demonstrated a reliable DOD distribution chain focused on velocity and reliability.

4-5 Institutionalizing change

The demonstrated success of Military Door-to-Door encouraged participating organizations to identify institutionalization opportunities. Institutionalization of the principles includes synchronizing shipment release/movement with scheduled transportation, and using advance information to reduce customer wait time**. Figure 2.2** illustrates actions to institutionalize through codifying regulatory documentation.

Publication	**Synopsis of Change**
JP 4-01 Joint Doctrine for the Defense Transportation System	Examination doctrinal guidance; propose changes to support SD/MD2
JP 4-01.4 Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Joint Theater Distribution	Examination doctrinal guidance; propose changes to support SD/MD2
JP 4-09 Joint Doctrine for Global Distribution	Examination doctrinal guidance; propose changes to support SD/MD2
DOD 4140.1-R	UMMIPS Change Initiated
DOD 4500.9R Pt II	Incorporate SD process changes into the DTR
EUCOM Directive 64-1, Transportation Policy and Management	Incorporate SD/MD2 process changes
Joint Trans & TMO-Central Europe	Incorporate SD/MD2 process changes
SD Pamphlet 1-1	Collaborative partner update of evolved process changes
AMCI 24-101	Incorporate SD/MD2 process changes

Figure 2-2. SD/MD2 Institutionalization Efforts

(5) Indicate the metrics used to measure (a) progress and (b) success

The Military Door-to-Door effort followed the template for measuring and determining performance outlined in the SD Program Management Plan. The plan prescribes specific reporting procedures for all the collaborating partners, including a data collection and measurement appendix and a prototype improved process test plan. Recurring metrics reviews and reports of progress to the SD BOD underpinned the successes of Military Door-to-door by monitoring progress evaluation.

Key performance measures are depicted in **Figure 2-3**.



Figure 2-3. End-to-End View of CWT (-) Performance Measurement

The process measured by CWT (-) is further broken down into segments defined by specific time stamps that are captured by existing government standard automation systems and leave no time interval unaccounted for from beginning to end.

Metrics are based on the 50th, 75th, and 95th percentile. To reduce variability and improve distribution reliability, SD/MD2 strives to reduce the 95th and 75th percentile (*gray and yellow areas of the bars depicted on* ***Figure 2-4***). The primary focus for MD2 is the leg from CCP outbound movement or "ping time" until the receipt or "ping time" at the customer's inbound cargo yard.

Figure 2-4 below notes the favorable competitive status of MD2 performance compared to Premium, Commercial Door-to-Door, and Military Port-to-Port performance.



Figure 2-4. MD2 Pallet Movement Time

To gain further insight, SD/MD2 breaks down the overall time into segments in order to target process activities ripe for improvement. In the example depicted below (**Figure 2-5**) the variabilities with the time segments of MRO-to-Ship and Ship-to-POE are relatively large, providing participants with the initial signal to ascertain reasons for the high variability.



Figure 2-5. Segment metrics

(6) Document and Quantify Cost and Performance Benefits.

Financially, closely monitored costs to the customer ensured they did not exceed the cost of commercial competition (**Figure 2-6**). In a further demonstration of process maturation, AMC provided funding to pay for the surface movement where applicable. This enhanced door-to-door service with a streamlined bill to the customer.



	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	AVG
Pounds	500K	629K	413K	637K	1,165K	735K	404K	509K	742K	883K	662K
Pallets	86	100	75	102	184	128	85	96	118	135	111

Figure 2-6: Military Door-to-Door Financial Metrics

(7) Outline how the success of this effort supports the organizational objectives described in Section 1, Item 3.

As mentioned in Section 1, Military Door-to-Door goals are improved velocity, reliability, end-to-end service, and applicability in peace and war. To achieve these goals, the SD partners concentrated on scheduled synchronized intermodal service from the supply source to the warfighter. **Figure 2-7** illustrates service quality comparisons:



Figure 2-7. Commercial / MD2 Comparison to USCENTCOM Destinations

Specifically:

- Scheduled truck services linked to aircraft departures and arrivals provided end-to-end service and contributed to velocity and reliability
- Use of advance visibility for modal planning was key to ensuring synchronization and greatly contributed to velocity and reliability
- Commercially competitive pricing and performance. Price is benchmarked on equivalent commercial service. **Figures 2.7 and 2.8** depict performance.

As can be noted in **Figures 2.7 and 2.8,** MD2's performance favorably compares with the performances of FEDEX and Emery (now Menlo).



Figure 2-8 Commercial / MD2 Comparison to USEUCOM

Successful transition from peace to war is also a key objective of Military Door-to-Door. The events of 11 Sep 01 and the subsequent global war on terrorism provided opportunities to establish Military Door-to-Door success. Within 48 hours, USTRANSCOM and DLA surged the military airlift system to clear cargo backlog resulting from the grounding of commercial and air assets following 11 Sep 01. Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) reversed this relationship as military air assets were diverted to provide force projection. A flawless implementation of the commercial back-up plan expanded capacity to meet the growing demand for airlift to all regions in support of deploying forces and their sustainment.

Air distribution CWT (-) performance was not significantly affected following 11 Sep 01 due to established processes in Air Mobility Command to immediately procure commercial augmentation capability to replace organic assets. **Figure 2-9** depicts CWT (-) remained virtually unchanged, despite a virtual reversal in the proportion of commercial versus organic capability.



Figure 2-9. Customer Wait Time (-) before and after 9/11/01

Bottom line for measuring success relative to the goals and objectives of SD/MD2 is that the strategy is working. The keys to success remain **Reliable**, **Scheduled Service**, and **Synchronization**.

Section 3. Knowledge Transfer

(1) Describe the efforts to share lessons from this effort with other internal organizations

The SD organizational management construct was established for exactly this purpose—to share and communicate across the varying disciplines within DOD's supply chain. Additionally, representatives from this organization routinely participate in the OSD-led Future Logistics Enterprise (FLE) construct, and provide other participants with lessons learned from Military Door-to-Door and other SD initiatives. Through the implementation of efforts like Military Door-to-Door, best commercial practices are being applied as it makes sense to DOD's distribution chain.

The SD Council, composed of many our senior military logistics leaders, provide leadership, oversight, and vision. These senior leaders advocate for change among their peers in OSD, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Services, and the Combatant Commands. An essential ingredient of permanent success is collaborative teamwork

The SD BOD, a decision-making body charged with reviewing recommended changes and initiatives, is the "powerhouse" to work issues and provide aggressive oversight. The BOD is the change agent, responsible for developing recommendations and ensuring program integration. The global nature requires many external supply chain partners. The primary means of involving dozens of external supply chain partners and customers is through the SD interagency BOD, ensuring key players across DOD are involved in processes and decisions. The BOD represents literally hundreds of logistics/supply chain partners and customers. Quarterly meetings or video-teleconferences facilitate information exchange, lessons learned, and timeline decisions.

The Intermodal and Stockage Committees are responsive to BOD taskings and deliberations. They are process-oriented and organized to exploit core competencies within USTRANSCOM and DLA. Their job is to recommend, define, and execute BOD initiatives. The committees prepare business case analyses and detailed action plans, and are responsible for executing and institutionalizing change. Monthly video-teleconferences facilitate discussion, debate, and decision making; to include what is required to flow up for BOD review and interaction.

(2) Indicate how this initiative can be transferred to other organizations, and specify the likely candidates for transference.

As a key business process, the Military Door-to-Door effort communicates between and shares information with other ongoing distribution-related initiatives, studies, or tests. Efforts under the auspices of the FLE construct, including the End-to-End Collaborative Working Group, are actively evaluating, testing, and measuring various DOD distribution processes.

However, some of the most important external organizations in defining and implementing SD opportunities are the regional combatant commands and their components. SD generated proven process improvements in both Europe and Southwest Asia. The Pacific region was the most recent to come on line with Military Door-to-Door; however, expansion in these areas and other regions is on the horizon. The SD community is currently considering the expansion of door-to-door service to every military air channel customer—if it makes sense.

Many similar initiatives, under the auspices of SD or other DOD-led initiatives, all working to "fit all of the pieces together," are needed to realize improved performance within the distribution portion of the Supply Chain. **Figure 3.1** graphically illustrates this imperative.

Figure 3-1. End-to-End Distribution