



American Views on Nuclear Security and Terrorism

Comparing Phone and Internet Surveys: 2005

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March 2006

Conducted with funding and institutional support from
Sandia National Laboratories, Texas A&M University,
and The University of New Mexico.

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Acknowledgments

The authors wish to express appreciation to the following organizations and individuals whose support made this project possible.

Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM

Alton D. Romig, Jr., Ph.D.

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Abstract

We analyze and compare findings from identical surveys administered by telephone and Internet in mid-2005. We also report results from a follow-up panel survey of Internet participants conducted immediately following the London suicide terrorist bombings of 7 July 2005. Key areas of investigation include US public views of the post-Cold War security environment, nuclear security risks and benefits, preferences for a variety of nuclear security policy options (including new smaller yield nuclear weapons, investment preferences, and stockpile modernization) and assessments of terrorism (including risks, preferences for responding to terrorist attacks, and tradeoffs in individual liberties vs. increased security).

Both respondent groups consider terrorism to pose the greatest threat to the US today. Risks of strategic nuclear conflict with Russia or China are rated much lower, on average. Risks of further nuclear proliferation are rated high, especially the potential for terrorists to acquire weapons of mass destruction.

US nuclear weapons remain important, and nuclear deterrence continues to be seen as a vital component of US security. Both groups support reducing operational US nuclear weapons to a level between 1,700 and 2,200. Support for developing new smaller-yield nuclear weapons is moderate, and support declines when a requirement for nuclear testing is specified.

Effectiveness of the ongoing war on terrorism and confidence in eventually prevailing in that struggle are rated slightly below midscale. Support for forceful responses to acts of terrorism in the US increases as assumed levels of deaths increase. Respondents are cautious and support is mixed for a range of domestic measures with varying levels of intrusiveness that are designed to prevent terrorism. The London suicide bombings in July 2005 apparently did not change most views significantly among a panel of Internet participants who answered the same questions before and after the bombings.

Causal modeling of beliefs among phone and Internet participants show similar hierarchical structures, and policy relevant findings deriving from phone and Internet collections are directionally consistent and similar in magnitude.

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Executive Summary

Chapter One: Introduction and Overview

We report findings from parallel telephone and Internet surveys conducted simultaneously in mid 2005 of US general public views on nuclear security and terrorism issues. Distributions and central tendencies of responses from the two collection modes are compared using both unweighted data and data weighted to national population parameters for age, gender, and race/ethnicity. We also include results from a panel study of Internet participants conducted shortly following the July 2005 suicide bombing attacks in London. Where possible, findings are related to those from previous surveys of mass and elite publics conducted in this series between 1993 and 2003.

Chapter Two: Security Environment

Systemic and National Security (p. 13–19): International security and US security are rated significantly higher, on average, by phone respondents as compared to Internet participants. Both survey groups consider terrorism to pose the biggest threat to US security today. On average, phone respondents rate the effects for US security of the ongoing war in Iraq just above midscale (positive effects), while most internet participants place the effects just below midscale (negative effects).

Strategic Nuclear Risks (p.19–20): Both respondent groups rate the risks of nuclear war between the US and China in the next ten years below mid-scale, but Internet participants place those risks significantly higher than do phone respondents. Both groups consider the risks of nuclear war between the US and Russia to be low (below a value of three on a zero to ten scale), and both groups agree that China poses a substantially greater relative risk of nuclear conflict with the US than does Russia.

Nuclear Proliferation (p. 20–26): Respondents from both groups consider the risks to US security of further nuclear proliferation to be substantial, with means above seven on a zero to ten scale. A nuclear-armed North Korea is judged to pose a greater risk of war with the US than a nuclear-armed Iran. On

average, both groups judge the risks of North Korea or Iran providing nuclear weapons capabilities to terrorists to be very substantial, and, in principle, both groups support the use of US military force to prevent such transfers.

Chapter Three: US Nuclear Weapons Capabilities

Nuclear Deterrence (p. 29–33): On average, both groups rate the importance of US nuclear weapons for preventing nuclear conflict above seven on a zero to ten scale. Similarly, both groups rate the mean value of US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from providing nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons to terrorists above six on the same scale.

Relevance of US Nuclear Weapons (p. 33–38): Both survey groups place the mean importance of nuclear weapons for US influence and status above 6.7 on a scale from zero to ten, and both groups rate the mean importance of nuclear weapons for maintaining US military superiority above seven on the same scale. While large majorities of both groups consider it desirable to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide, neither group considers it feasible to do so. Both groups rate the mean importance of retaining US nuclear weapons above seven on a scale from zero (not at all important) to ten (extremely important).

Modernizing US Nuclear Weapons (p. 38–44): On average, Internet participants are significantly more supportive of developing new smaller-yield nuclear weapons than their counterparts who responded by phone. Support for developing such weapons declines significantly among both respondent groups if underground nuclear test explosions are required.

Nuclear Force Capabilities (p. 44–47): Respondents support reducing the number of operational US nuclear weapons to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 as agreed with Russia. Neither group supports unilaterally reducing below 1,700, preferring that future decisions about US nuclear weapons capabilities partially be based on Russian and Chinese actions. But both groups prefer that US nuclear force modernization primarily be based on future threat assessments, regardless of what Russia and China do with their nuclear forces.

Nuclear Security Investment Preferences (p. 47–51): Mean support for spending for developing and testing new US nuclear weapons is below mid-

scale for both groups, but Internet participants are significantly more supportive than phone respondents. On average, Internet participants also are more supportive of spending for maintaining the ability to develop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future than phone respondents (phone = 3.94; Internet = 4.15 on a scale from one to seven), and the trend in mean support declines significantly from levels reported on the same scale by phone in 2003 (4.07) and 2001 (5.02). Mean support for spending to help Russia secure its nuclear assets is below midscale for both groups. Mean support is somewhat higher (and above midscale) among both groups for spending on research and development that may help Russia reduce its nuclear stockpile.

Chapter Four: Terrorism Policy Issues: Part One

Confidence in Threat Assessments (p. 55–57): Mean confidence in US government abilities to accurately assess the threat of terrorism occurring in the US is near midscale, with phone respondents expressing significantly higher levels of confidence than Internet participants. Mean confidence in US government abilities to accurately assess the threat of terrorism elsewhere in the world is substantively lower and below midscale for both respondent groups. Both groups believe that when government estimates are wrong, they tend to overestimate the actual threat from terrorism.

Preventing Terrorism (p. 57–78): Compared to measurements from 1995, respondents in 2005 disagree more with assertions that government can stop determined terrorists only with unacceptable intrusions into individual rights and privacy and that government must try to stop terrorism, even if doing so intrudes on some people's rights. Mean confidence in preventing large-scale terrorist attacks in the US over the next ten years is near midscale, but mean confidence in preventing large-scale attacks elsewhere and confidence in preventing small-scale terrorist attacks in the US or anywhere else is substantially below midscale for both groups. Though opinion is polarized, substantial support exists for issuing national identification cards to prevent terrorism. High levels of support exist for further restricting immigration, but support is mixed for holding suspected terrorists for up to one year without charging them with a crime.

Regarding tradeoffs in personal liberties for enhanced security, little support is evident for collecting behavioral information about shopping patterns,

memberships, travel, etc., photographing individuals without their knowledge, or taking DNA samples. Support is more mixed about collecting personal information (name, address, phone number, etc.), conducting pat-down searches, and taking biometric measures of hands or faces. For most of these options, mean support is stronger among Internet participants than among phone respondents.

Very strong levels of support exist for spending to prevent WMD from entering through US ports, for improving border security, and for government capabilities for responding domestically to large-scale acts of terrorism in the US.

Progress in Combating Terrorism (p. 78–82): On average, phone respondents rate the effectiveness of the ongoing war on terrorism at midscale, while Internet participants place it just below midscale. Both groups place confidence in eventually winning the war on terrorism slightly below midscale. Both groups rate government efforts to improve security at US borders and at US seaports and harbors well below midscale, on average, but efforts to improve security at US airports are judged substantially higher by both groups.

External Responses to Terrorism (p. 83–86): Assuming a high degree of confidence in determining responsibility for terrorist attacks, mean support for forcefully responding increases with assumed deaths attributed to the attacks. Support for using US nuclear weapons to attack a country determined to have materially supported terrorists is low (below three on a scale from one to seven), even when told to assume the terrorist attacks cause 10,000 deaths. On average, Internet participants express greater support for the use of military force than do phone participants in responding to terrorist attacks at lower assumed levels of casualties (10 deaths or 1,000 deaths), but support for forceful responses do not differ substantively between survey groups when told to assume 10,000 deaths from the terrorist attacks.

Internal Responses to Terrorism (p. 86–88): Mean confidence in varying levels of government to respond domestically to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US vary from above midscale for the Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security to near midscale for state governments, and below midscale for city and county governments. Phone respondents are substantially more confident, on average, in the disaster response capabilities of all levels of government than are Internet participants.

Chapter Five: Terrorism Policy Issues: Part Two

Changes in Panel Views on Terrorism (p. 91–101): Changes in responses to about 30 percent of the terrorism questions posed to the same respondents in wave one and wave two of our Internet survey on terrorism exceed the expected variation associated with chance. Taken together, the changes suggest that the London bombings had relatively minor implications for US opinion on terrorism. For those questions that do exhibit statistically significant changes, movements are logical directionally (i.e., indicating greater concerns about terrorism after the bombings) and of an absolute magnitude that suggests modest policy implications.

New Questions on Terrorist Suicide Attacks (p. 101–117): Among eight countries specified, highest mean risks of terrorist suicide bombings are judged to exist for Britain, the US, and Pakistan. Relatively lower risks are estimated for Russia, France, Germany, Japan, and Canada, but mean risks are rated above midscale for all of the eight countries named.

Of four named sources, highest mean risks for suicide bombings in the US are judged to stem from foreign terrorists living in the US, followed by American members of terrorist cells, and foreign terrorists living outside the US. The two remaining categories, illegal immigrants and Americans who are not members of terrorist cells, were rated lowest. However all were assessed as presenting mean risks near or above midscale.

Eight settings for potential suicide bombings in the US are rated above midscale in terms of mean risk and are ordered from greatest to least risk as follows: (1) subways; (2) trains; (3) sporting events; (4) office buildings; (5) airlines; (6) malls; (7) buses; and (9) school buildings.

Five alternative methods of entry into the US for terrorists are each judged to pose substantial risk (from 6.95 to 8.31 on a scale from zero to ten). In order from highest to lowest they are: (1) from Mexico by land; (2) through harbors or seaports; (3) from Canada by land; (4) via commercial airliners; and (5) by small planes.

Support was strong for a variety of methods for preventing suicide bombings in the US, even when some options could infringe on individual rights.

Indications are strong that suicide bombings in the US would elicit stronger public support for military actions against foreign terrorist groups.

Very strong levels of support are reported for increasing security of subway and train transportation in the US. Even though named measures would delay travel, each of the following received strong support: screening all persons entering train/subway terminals with metal detectors; checking ID cards before entering boarding areas; x-raying all hand-carried items and checked luggage; videotaping all persons entering and leaving terminals; and employing biometric identification methods

Little tolerance is evident for religious extremism that incorporates either advocacy or active support of terrorism, and support is reported for spying on religious groups suspected of association with terrorism and closing down those groups found to advocate or support terrorism.

Respondents consider illegal immigration to be a potential source of terrorism and support much stronger efforts to control illegal immigration. Participants disagree that, on the whole, illegal immigration does more good than harm. It appears that participants are dissatisfied with multiple aspects of the immigration issue and are concerned that terrorists may gain illegal entry using routes and methods commonly used for those seeking employment.

Chapter Six: Measures of Beliefs

Political Beliefs (p. 121–125): Phone and Internet respondents identify with each of the two major political parties in similar proportions within each group, but about twice as many Internet participants consider themselves to be political independents. The two respondent groups do not differ significantly on self-rated ideology, and measures of ideology and political partisanship are predictably and consistently related among both groups.

Trust in Government (p. 125–126): Phone respondents report significantly higher mean levels of trust than do Internet respondents in the federal government to do what is right for the American people.

Beliefs About the Natural World (p. 126–128): On average, phone respondents consider nature to be more fragile and the environment to be more threatened than do Internet participants.

Beliefs About Internationalism (p. 128–133): On our index of responses to three statements measuring beliefs about cooperative internationalism, phone respondents report greater mean support than do Internet participants. On our index of responses to three statements measuring beliefs about militant internationalism, phone and Internet respondents do not differ significantly, on average.

Beliefs About Social Equity (p. 133–134): On our index formed by responses to three statements designed to measure egalitarianism, phone respondents exhibit higher mean support than do Internet participants.

Moral Dimensions of Beliefs (p. 134–137): Phone respondents are significantly more supportive of the assertion that spreading democracy is the best way to create a peaceful world. On average, both respondent groups agree that if a nuclear weapon is used by terrorists against the US, we would be justified in using nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism. Both groups report correspondingly high mean levels of religiosity.

Chapter Seven: Belief Structures

Mass Belief Structures (p. 140–143): Demographic attributes such as age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, and income serve as predispositions that may causally affect hierarchical beliefs. Hierarchically ordered belief structures consisting of core beliefs, policy domain beliefs, and policy preferences provide the framework for and help explain why members of the public hold specific views on security issues.

Modeling Beliefs About Nuclear Security (p. 143–153): Employing a hierarchical causal model consisting of five measures of demographic predispositions, three measures of core beliefs, and five measures of policy domain beliefs, we explain 61 percent (Internet respondents) and 53 percent (phone respondents) of variation in judgments of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons today. Using the same structure of belief measures, we explain 44 percent (Internet) and

32 percent (phone) of variation in preferences for how spending should change for maintaining the ability to develop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future.

Modeling Beliefs About Terrorism (p. 153–161): Employing a hierarchical causal model consisting of the same five measures of demographic predispositions, the same three measures of core beliefs, and four measures of policy domain beliefs, we explain 41 percent (Internet) and 32 percent (phone) of variation in preferences for how the US should respond to terrorist attacks in the US that result in 10 deaths, 1,000 deaths, and 10,000 deaths. Using the same structure of demographic predispositions and core beliefs, with four different measures of policy domain beliefs, we explain 31 percent (Internet) and 28 percent (phone) of variation in willingness to accept a composite of various intrusive domestic measures to prevent future terrorist acts in the US.

Chapter One

Introduction and Overview

This report presents findings from parallel telephone and Internet surveys conducted in 2005 of US general public views on nuclear security and terrorism issues. It also includes results from a panel study of Internet participants conducted shortly following the July 2005 suicide bombing attacks in London. The purpose of the panel study is to examine potential implications of those attacks for US attitudes and opinions about terrorism, and to sample US views on the potential for suicide terrorist attacks in the US. This research builds on results from 15 previous studies conducted with mass and elite publics between the years 1993 and 2003.¹ Earlier surveys of general publics in this series include a baseline of questions carried forward from 1993 to support trend analyses. In this study, we establish a new baseline to serve for comparative purposes in future studies. This on-going project constitutes the largest and most sustained research into public views on nuclear security ever conducted. It has received financial and institutional support from Sandia National Laboratories, the National Science Foundation, Texas A&M University, and the University of New Mexico.

Section 1.1: Research Goals and Objectives

Our primary research goals are to analyze public views about the evolving nature of security (especially nuclear security and terrorism) in the post-Cold War era and to identify trends in public perceptions and preferences relevant to the evolution of US security policies. Specific research objectives include the following:

- Develop a split survey design that compares telephone and Internet data collections to meet two methodological objectives.

¹ Findings from previous surveys in this project are reported in Jenkins-Smith, Barke, and Herron, 1994; Herron and Jenkins-Smith, 1996; Herron and Jenkins-Smith, 1998; Herron, Jenkins-Smith, and Hughes, 2000; Herron, Jenkins-Smith, Hughes, Gormley, and Mahnken, 2000; Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2002a; Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2002b; and Jenkins-Smith and Herron, 2004.

- Where appropriate, map backward to selected baseline questions asked in previous surveys in this series for continued trend analyses and develop new questions intended for repeated application in future surveys.
- Compare responses collected by telephone with responses to the same questions collected via the Internet to evaluate the comparability and validity of telephone and Internet survey methods.
- Identify and analyze emerging changes and trends in public perceptions of US nuclear weapons policies and selected national and international security issues. Examine evolving US public assessments of risks, benefits, policy preferences, and research and investment priorities associated with nuclear weapons, strategic security, and terrorism.
- Analyze trends in US public concerns about the threat of terrorism, evaluate public assessments of US policies to prevent terrorism, and assess contemporary views of the ongoing war on terrorism.
- Analyze belief systems among members of the US general public and their relationships to views on nuclear security and terrorism and public preferences about nuclear technologies and security policies.

Section 1.2: Conceptual Approach

We designed this research to support multidimensional analyses, including quantitative methods such as descriptive, relational, and trend analyses. The split survey design includes telephone interviews conducted between April 12 and June 14, 2005 with 1,471 respondents randomly chosen nation-wide and 1,535 surveys employing the same questions administered via the Internet May 19–26, 2005. Details of sampling methods, collection procedures, and cooperation rates are provided in Appendix 1.

By conducting identical surveys concurrently using telephone and Internet collections, we are able to compare results from the two modes of data collection. Because telephone participants are randomly invited to participate and Internet participants are self-selected, we expect some statistically significant differences among the two respective groups of participants. To provide greater comparability, we show both unweighted comparisons and comparisons after statistical weighting procedures are used that normalize both samples demographically to US census data. We report both un-

weighted raw phone and Internet data and the corresponding data weighted to national population projections for age, gender, and race/ethnicity. While distributions and central tendencies vary for some questions among respondents to the two collection methods, most descriptive and relational analyses suggest broad comparability.

For questions in this study that also have been asked in previous surveys—all of which were conducted via telephone interviews—we compare unweighted phone data with previously collected unweighted phone data.

After the parallel phone and Internet collections were complete, suicide bombing attacks occurred on July 7, 2005 against London public transportation systems. To investigate potential implications of those attacks for US public views, we resubmitted the same battery of terrorism questions via the Internet, plus additional questions probing beliefs about suicide terrorist attacks in the US to a panel of 555 respondents to the first Internet survey, plus 395 additional respondents who did not previously participate. Comparisons of pre- and post-attack response frequencies and central tendencies among panel members are provided in Appendix Three. Responses from the 555 panel members and 395 new participants to additional questions about the potential for suicide bombings in the US are summarized in Appendix Four.

Section 1.3: Comparing Survey Collection Modes

All surveys, regardless of collection mode, make tradeoffs in comprehensiveness (accuracy) vs. costs. The process of measuring fractional samples of a population from which the characteristics of a larger population can be inferred with some degree of acceptable inaccuracy is necessary because of the operational impracticality, time, and expense associated with attempting to interview each individual member of a large population. For most surveys, data collection continues to be the most expensive aspect, and it drives much of the expense of doing large population surveys. Because the survey process inherently involves tradeoffs in accuracy vs. costs, and since the costs of most surveys largely are driven by data collection methods, it follows that changes in methods for data collection should be evaluated both by their implications for accuracy and associated costs.

Early survey work in the US was limited to face-to-face interview collections and the use of printed surveys distributed and collected via postal services.² As telephones became more widespread, survey interviews by phone became feasible, with drastically reduced collection costs. Successive innovations include the introduction of computer assisted telephone interviewing in the 1970s, computer assisted in-person interviewing in the late 1980s, and Internet surveys in the late 1990s. Each change was facilitated by advancements in technologies that widened the range of possibilities and opportunities for data collections, while at the same time introducing new methodological challenges. For Internet surveys, the introduction of Hyper-Text Markup Language (HTML) in the mid 1990s provided the breakthrough that made the World Wide Web an interactive medium through which targeted participants could directly and easily interact with survey entities, making data collection easy and nonthreatening via the Internet (Cook, Heath, and Thompson 2000).³

Key Trends in Public Accessibility

As access to computers and the Internet continues to spread, surveys conducted via the World Wide Web are becoming the data collection mode of choice for many survey applications, especially for marketing purposes. For any medium to be considered a mass medium, a critical mass of about 16 percent of the population has to adopt an innovation (Markus 1990). In mass media, 50 million users seems to be a key milestone (Neufeld 1997). Radio took 38 years to hit the 50 million mark; television took only 13 years; cable television only 10 years, and Internet adoption took even less time. From its emergence as a consumer medium in 1994, Internet penetration in the US had more than doubled the magic 50 million mark (113 million) only five years later in 1999 (Kay and Johnson 1999; Lenard and Pickford 2005). The proportion of the US population with access to the Internet has since grown steadily, and a survey completed in April 2005 by Harris Interactive estimated that 163 million US adults, nearly three-fourths of the total population, now have access to the Internet (Harris Interactive 2005).⁴ When Harris began tracking Internet use in 1995, only nine percent

² For a review of the evolution of survey research in the US, see Converse 1987.

³ For a recent review of technology trends in survey data collections, see Couper 2005.

⁴ Harris Poll #40, May 12, 2005. Data based on July 2004 Census estimate of 220,000,000 persons 18 years or older in the US.

of adults had access, and only 18 percent of computer users were online. By 2005, 74 percent of the total population and 94 percent of computer users were online.⁵ Approximately 43 percent of online households in the US connected to the Internet via broadband in 2004, and the number is predicted to grow to 78 percent of US online homes using broadband connections by 2010 (Lenard and Pickford 2005). Clearly, the Internet (and its most widely used resource, the World Wide Web) has exceeded critical mass in the US.

During roughly the same period, communications by telephone in the US and around the world has undergone its own technology revolution with the rapid spread of wireless communications. According to the Cellular Telecommunications and Internet Association (CTIA- The Wireless AssociationTM), wireless subscribers in the US grew expansively from 91,600 in 1984 to approximately 24 million subscribers in 1994 and reached approximately 170 million subscribers by 2004.⁶ During this period, the number of telephone lines in the US peaked in the year 2000 and have been declining at an increasing percentage rate since (2001: $-.04$; 2002: -1.2 ; 2003: -3.4). The Federal Communications Commission reports that in 2003, just over 183 million wirelines were in use.⁷ Available data do not show how many wireline subscribers also are wireless subscribers. The point is that the trend in wireless usage is rapidly increasing while the trend in wireline usage is slowly declining, even as the US population grows. These trends are particularly significant for the utility of telephone surveys of the national population. Recent estimates are that approximately 91 percent of US households have wireline service, two percent have no phone service, and seven percent have wireless service only.⁸ Since telephone sample frames typically do not include known wireless numbers,⁹ this means that only 91 percent of US households can be reached by phone, and that proportion is likely to decrease as the number of wireline subscribers declines while the total population grows. These two trends in public accessibility via wired telephony vs. Internet suggest that Americans may at some future point become more accessible via the Internet than via wired residential telephones. Regardless of when that point may be

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ As cited in *Trends in Telephone Service*, a report published in April 2005 by the Federal Communications Commission Information Center.

⁷ Ibid.

⁸ Estimates provided by Survey Sampling International.

⁹ Because of the mobility and cost structure of wireless service, conducting lengthy phone surveys using wireless numbers for initial contact calls is not feasible.

reached, these trends have important implications for the future of survey research of mass opinions.

Comparing Relative Merits of Collection Modes

Because printed surveys and face-to-face surveys of large samples are both more expensive and less responsive than phone or Internet surveys, they seem likely to remain less practical for mass surveys of the general public. For the foreseeable future, telephone and Internet surveys are likely to be the most practical and efficient ways to conduct mass surveys. Each of the two modes has its own merits and limitations.

Relative to telephone surveys, Internet collections offer the advantages of lower collection costs per completed response, capabilities for providing respondents with large quantities of information (including elaboration experiments and visual stimulation), the ability to ask more complex questions, faster contact and response speeds, the elimination of interviewer induced bias, and the feasibility of identifying respondents with relatively rare characteristics (Berrens, et al. 2003). The chief advantages of phone surveys relative to those conducted via the Internet are greater representativeness of samples relative to the general population and higher response rates. Both can be important for controlling various types of errors.

Survey Representativeness

The representativeness of survey samples relative to their parent populations is a probability function and provides the basis for extrapolating results from samples to populations. For a sample to be representative, every unit in the target population must have some known (non-zero) chance of being selected so that the statistical likelihood of selecting each population unit can be computed (Babbie 1990; Best, et al. 2001). Because the total population of households having telephone wireline subscriptions is known, probabilistic samples can be drawn such that each household has an equal and known chance of being selected. Additional techniques such as interviewing only the household resident over the age of 17 having had the most recent birthday can extend random selection within a sampled household. This is the basis for probabilistic sampling of mass populations based on wired residential

phone lines. But even these samples omit the approximately two percent of households without any phone service and the approximately seven percent of households having only wireless phone service. Unfortunately, no comprehensive list exists of Internet subscribers who may access the Internet via wireline connections, cable connections, or wireless connections, and which individuals can make those connections alternatively from home, work, or school. Because the total population of people who have Internet access is unknown, probabilistic sampling of Internet users currently is not possible.

Inferences to the general population from Internet samples rests on two assumptions: (1) that representative samples of Internet users can be drawn; and (2) that the decision-making processes of Internet users and those of the general population are similar (Best, et al. 2001). Today, the first assumption cannot be met, since probabilistic sampling of the total population of Internet users is not possible, but the second assumption can be tested, and we do so in this report. Other researchers have reported evidence that mechanisms underlying decision-making processes do not differ importantly between Internet users and the general population (Berrens, et al. 2003; Best, et al. 2001; Bimber 1998; Fricker, et al. 2005). Our findings support those conclusions and extend the policy domains having been investigated to security issues.

While we find that diverse samples of Internet users can be drawn, they are not necessarily representative of the general population.¹⁰ But the different uses for which surveys may be employed place varying degrees of importance on population representativeness. If surveys are used to estimate population characteristics (central tendencies and proportions), Internet surveys should be used in conjunction and comparatively with other survey modes that allow probabilistic sampling (such as phone, postal, or face-to-face collections). But if relationships among variables are a focus of interest, true probability samples may not be necessary to make valid inferences about relationships, especially when variables are based on “treatments” randomly applied to respondents (Berrens, et al. 2003). Since relationships among variables are key to understanding *why* respondents hold certain views, Internet collections may be no less useful than phone surveys for investigating underlying bases for opinions. Internet surveys also can be used to investigate a wide variety of methodological issues in survey design, and because of their

¹⁰ The implications of differences between diverse nonprobabilistic samples and their parent populations sometimes can be reduced through the use of weighting methods that “normalize” the samples to demographic characteristics of the broader populations.

lower collection costs per respondent, they may be useful for investigating alternative methodological options that can be treated reasonably as independent of collection mode (Berrens, et al. 2003). Finally, when broad inputs to policy processes are sought, directional inference from Internet surveys may suffice. We find statistically significant differences among central tendencies of policy belief measures between phone and Internet respondents for most identically worded questions. *But in none of the cases are the policy inputs derived from phone or Internet collections directionally different, and none of the statistically significant differences in central tendencies suggest operational relevance for policy processes.*

One other difference in survey collection modes should be noted. Hypothetically, a sample will be nearly perfectly representative of a population if a probability sampling method is employed and if the response rate is 100 percent (Krosnick 1999). Traditionally, survey response rates (or cooperation rates) have been used as one indicator the representativeness of survey participants to the entire sample from which they were drawn. Three points about relative response apply to our discussion.

First, response rates for Internet surveys are, on average, appreciably lower than those for most other collection modes. Most telephone surveys have difficulty achieving response rates higher than 60 percent (rates around 50 percent are common), and most face-to-face surveys have difficulty achieving response rates higher than 70 percent (Brehm 1993). Because the size of the sample frame for many Internet surveys is not known, response rates cannot be calculated, but when Internet surveys employing known sample frames are used, response rates typically are much lower, often below ten percent.

Second, response rates for many general population surveys in the US, whether phone or face-to-face, have been falling during the last five decades (Brehm 1993; Steeh 1981). Given the increasing number of media, advocacy, and advertising polls in recent years, public resistance to participating in opinion polls appears to be increasing, and the prospect is for continued declines in survey response rates.

Third, the traditional assumption is that for a sample to be representative, response rates need to be high, but representativeness does not necessarily increase monotonically with increasing response rate. In some cases, surveys with very low response rates can be more accurate than surveys with much

higher response rates. Visser et al. (2000) compared postal surveys having about a 20 percent response rate to telephone surveys having response rates of about 60 percent over a 15 year period, and the postal surveys predicted election outcomes and documented voter demographic characteristics more accurately. Krosnick (1999) cites research done using telephone surveys of general public samples just before elections that included follow-up checks of official voting records after elections to determine whether each respondent voted. The more difficult it was to contact a respondent, the less likely he or she was to have voted. Thus the more researchers worked at boosting the response rate, the less representative of voters the sample became. Brehm (1993) reported from an extensive set of analyses that statistically correcting for demographic attributes in sample composition had little impact on substantive findings based on relational analyses. Also, substantive findings from a survey are not necessarily altered in policy relevant ways by an improved response rate (Pew Research Center 1998; Traugott, Groves, and Lepkowski 1987). These and other findings challenge the conventional wisdom that high response rates are necessary for polling accuracy.

Implications for Future Research

Methodological differences in survey collection modes must be balanced against other limitations such as accessibility, responsiveness, flexibility, and cost. No single survey mode is preferable for all types of surveys. Our previous work conducting multiple postal and phone surveys, and the findings from the comparative phone and Internet surveys presented in this report, suggest that a mix of phone, Internet, and postal surveys should be considered, depending on research objectives, target populations, available resources, and time frames. When surveying mass populations, phone collections or some combination of phone and Internet methods should be considered for measuring population characteristics. For investigating relationships among beliefs that may help explain why various policy preferences are held, Internet surveys may suffice. Internet surveys alone also may suffice for testing alternative survey designs. For surveys of elite populations, collection mode options may be useful that allow respondents to participate using their preference for postal or Internet instruments. Finally, alternative combinations of collection modes may provide a balance between cost and implementation that works best. For example, comparative phone and Internet surveys could be done in one cycle, followed by an Internet only survey the next cycle, and returning to

both phone and Internet surveys the following cycle. Short cycle panel surveys of the same respondents may be more operationally feasible and cost effective when done via the Internet. Certainly the Internet provides much faster response times, and may be the mode of choice when fast turnarounds are needed or when immediate public reactions to a signal event (such as a mass casualty terrorist attack) are sought. The best way to employ alternative survey collection modes is to understand the merits and limitations of each mode, and to be ready to employ the collection mode most suitable to the research objectives, available resources, and time frame.

Section 1.4: Organization of the Report

Chapter Two describes and analyzes trends in public responses over time to questions about the post-Cold War security environment, strategic threats, and assessments of risks and benefits of nuclear weapons.

In Chapter Three, we examine trends in selected policy and spending preferences about nuclear security issues, including nuclear force structure and posture, nuclear deterrence, and investments in nuclear weapons infrastructure.

Chapter Four compares public views on terrorism to include confidence in threat assessments, beliefs about preventing terrorism, tradeoffs in individual liberties vs. increased security, and external and domestic responses to terrorism.

In Chapter Five, we report findings from a panel study of Internet participants conducted shortly following the suicide bombings in London that occurred in July 2005. Results show the implications of those attacks for American attitudes about terrorism and the potential for suicide terrorist attacks in the US.

Chapter Six describes findings about key beliefs that may be related to public attitudes about security. We report beliefs about political ideology and partisanship, the environment, internationalism, social equity, and selected dimensions of morality.

In Chapter Seven we use those belief measures to help explain security policy preferences. Using casual modeling, we employ demographic predispositions, core beliefs, and policy domain beliefs to explain preferences about two nuclear security policy issues and two terrorism policy issues.

Appendix One describes research methods and reports cooperation rates.

In Appendix Two, we provide a comprehensive listing of questions asked in our parallel phone and Internet surveys. Response frequencies and central tendencies are included.

Appendix Three provides distributions and central tendencies for responses by our 555 Internet panel members before and after the London bombings.

In Appendix Four, we show distributions and mean responses to new questions about the potential for suicide bombings in the US provided by the full sample of 950 participants (555 panel members plus 395 new respondents) to our Internet survey following the London bombings.

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Chapter Two

Security Environment

In this chapter, we analyze public views of how the strategic security environment is evolving, to include assessments of strategic nuclear threats and implications of the ongoing war in Iraq for US security. Also we examine respondents' beliefs about risks posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons generally, and more specifically about nuclear weapons risks associated with North Korea and Iran.

Section 2.1: Systemic and National Security

We begin our analysis with responses to the following two broad questions about security in general.


- Q4: Considering international security as a whole, using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all secure* and ten means *completely secure*, how do you rate international security today?
- Q5: Using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all secure* and ten means *completely secure*, how do you rate the security of the United States today?

We examine responses to each question using raw unweighted data and using data weighted to national population projections for age, gender, and race/ethnicity based on US census data.¹ In Figure 2.1 we chart unweighted and weighted comparisons of phone and Internet responses to the first question (Q4). Comparable displays of weighted and unweighted responses to the second question (Q5) are charted in Figure 2.2.

¹ Weighting methods are discussed in Appendix 1.

almost all cases, regression results are consistent with the statistical significance of the difference of means tests we report.³

Figure 2.2: Rating US Security Today



While participants judge US security to be higher, on average, than the security of the international system, our phone respondents rate mean US security significantly higher than do Internet respondents in both the unweighted and weighted comparisons.


Next, we asked participants to indicate which of six different categories of issues poses the biggest security threat to the United States.

- Q6: Which of the following would you say poses the single biggest threat to security in the United States today? Is it: (1) poverty and economic inequality; (2) threats to the environment; (3) religious and political extremism; (4) war between nations; (5) acts of terrorism; (6) crime and corruption; or (7) something else?

We chart the distributions of unweighted responses in Figure 2.3.

³ This suggests that our weighting procedures are capturing relevant demographic implications and are normalizing responses to projections for the national population.

Figure 2.3: Biggest Threat to US Security Today (Q6)




In the judgment of both groups of respondents, terrorism clearly is believed to be the greatest threat to the US today, with about one-third of all respondents choosing that category. The second highest category of religious and political extremism is closely related to the issue of terrorism, and together, these two categories account for about half of all responses. Crime and corruption is the third rated threat, followed closely by poverty and economic inequality. The environment is the lowest named threat. In the category of “something else,” a variety of issues were identified, with illegal immigration and border control being the most often cited. Other threats varied from concern about morals to a variety of political complaints. Some respondents found it too difficult to name a single greatest threat, and wanted to mention two or more of equal concern.

Next we inquired about perceptions of how the ongoing conflict in Iraq may be affecting US national security with the following question.

Q7: Using a scale from one to seven, where one means the ongoing conflict in Iraq is *greatly decreasing* US security and seven means it is *greatly increasing* US security, what kind of effect do you think the conflict in Iraq is having on US security?

We compare unweighted and weighted responses in Figure 2.4.

Figure 2.4: How Conflict in Iraq is Influencing US Security



Judgments about how the conflict in Iraq is influencing US security vary considerably between our phone and Internet respondents, with phone participants placing both unweighted and weighted means slightly above mid-scale, and Internet respondents placing means slightly below mid-scale. Note that the median response for Internet respondents is a value of four (mid-scale), while the modal response for phone respondents is at values of five (unweighted) and five and seven (weighted). Clearly, most phone respondents see the war in Iraq as producing more benefits (or fewer risks) for the US than do most Internet participants.

Another aspect of the war on terrorism relates to the threat of mass casualty attacks that employ weapons of mass destruction. The two following questions probe public assessments of risks associated with these kinds of terror threats. We chart responses in Figures 2.5 and 2.6.⁴

- Q10: Now I want you to assess the risk of nuclear terrorism. Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of terrorists using nuclear weapons against us, including so called dirty bombs, within the next ten years?

⁴ Respondents were asked to consider both the likelihood and potential consequences of an event when assessing associated risks.

- Q11: On the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk that terrorists will use chemical or biological weapons against us within the next ten years?

Figure 2.5: Risk of Nuclear Terrorism in Next Ten Years





Figure 2.6: Risk of Chemical or Biological Terrorism in Next Ten Years



Few if any policy relevant differences seem apparent between phone and Internet respondents. Both groups rate the risks of terrorist attacks in which weapons of mass destruction are used well above midscale, on average. Unweighted and weighted mean estimates of the risks of nuclear terrorism are above a scale value of 6.3, and mean assessments of the risks of chemical or biological terrorism are above a scale value of 6.8, whether weighted or not.

Section 2.2: Strategic Nuclear Risks

To help gage public perceptions of the nuclear threat environment, our next two questions asked participants to assess the risks of nuclear war between the United States and China or Russia within the next decade. We chart results in figures 2.7 and 2.8.

Lead-in: The following questions ask you to assess the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with different countries in the next ten years. Please consider both the likelihood and potential consequences of such conflicts when evaluating the level of risk on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*.

- Q8: How do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with China in the next ten years?
- Q9: How do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with Russia in the next ten years?

Figure 2.7: Risk of Nuclear War with China in Next Ten Years





Figure 2.8: Risk of Nuclear War with Russia in Next Ten Years



Several points are apparent. First, phone and Internet participants rate the risks of nuclear war in the next ten years with China (Figure 2.7) just above midscale, with Internet respondents perceiving significantly more risk, on average, than their phone counterparts. Second, both groups of respondents rate the risks of nuclear war in the next decade with Russia (Figure 2.8) well below midscale. Note that from 15 to 25 percent of participants place the risk of nuclear war with Russia at zero, and both groups do not differ, on average, whether responses are demographically weighted or not. Finally, both groups of respondents clearly view China as posing a relatively greater nuclear threat to the US than does Russia. This finding is consistent with results from similar questions asked in earlier surveys for this project.

Section 2.3: Nuclear Proliferation


We began our inquiries into public views of nuclear proliferation by asking a general assessment question about the risk of further horizontal nuclear proliferation. We then asked participants to consider the implications of two specific potential cases: North Korea and Iran. We start our analysis with a summary of responses to the general risk question about nuclear proliferation.

Lead-in: Now I want you to consider that eight countries are currently known to possess nuclear weapons. They are the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel.

- Q12: Using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk that nuclear weapons will spread to other countries within the next ten years?

We show responses in Figure 2.9.

Figure 2.9: Risk of Further Nuclear Proliferation in Next Ten Years



Though means between phone and Internet respondents differ significantly by statistical test, the policy relevance of both groups of responses are similarly distributed and similarly unambiguous. With all four means above a value of seven, and with the modal response for both groups (unweighted and weighted) being the highest scale value, our respondents clearly indicate that they consider further nuclear proliferation to pose substantial risk to the United States. These response patterns illustrate how statistically significant differences in means among large samples do not necessarily translate to policy relevant differences.

To provide additional insights, we asked two sets of three questions each about implications if North Korea or Iran acquire nuclear weapons. The first

question in each set instructs participants to assume that North Korea (Iran) possesses nuclear weapons and then asks them to rate the risk of the US becoming involved in a nuclear war with that state. The second question inquires about the risk that each state might provide nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorist groups. The third question of each set inquires about willingness to use force to prevent those kinds of proliferation threats. Following is the first set of three questions about North Korea. Responses are in Figures 2.10–2.12.

- Q13: For this question, I want you to assume that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with North Korea within the next ten years?
- Q14: Again, assuming that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of North Korea providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists?
- Q15: On a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how would you feel about the US using military force to prevent North Korea from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorist groups if diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to achieve this goal?

Figure 2.10: Risk of War with a Nuclear Armed North Korea in Next Ten Years




Figure 2.11: Risk of North Korea Providing Nuclear Capabilities to Terrorists





Figure 2.12: Using Military Force to Prevent North Korea from Providing Nuclear Capabilities to Terrorists



Whether the data are weighted or not, Internet participants, on average, assess the risk of future conflict with North Korea in which nuclear weapons are used, and the risk that a nuclear-armed North Korea will provide nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorist groups significantly higher than do

respondents to the phone survey. However, distribution patterns are similar and differences in means do not suggest policy relevant differences between the two groups, with unweighted and weighted means for both being well above midscale. Also, both groups of respondents are equally willing to support the use of US military forces to prevent North Korea from providing nuclear capabilities to terrorists.

Next we asked the same three questions about a nuclear-armed Iran. We compare results in Figures 2.13–2.15.

- Q16: For this question, I want you to assume that Iran possesses nuclear weapons. On the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with Iran within the next ten years?
- Q17: Again, assuming that Iran possesses nuclear weapons and using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of Iran providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists?
- Q18: On a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how would you feel about the US using military force to prevent Iran from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorist groups if diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to achieve this goal?

Figure 2.13: Risk of War with a Nuclear Armed Iran in Next Ten Years




Figure 2.14: Risk of Iran Providing Nuclear Capabilities to Terrorists





Figure 2.15: Using Military Force to Prevent Iran from Providing Nuclear Capabilities to Terrorists



While very similar patterns are apparent with regard to risks associated with a nuclear-armed Iran as are shown for a nuclear-armed North Korea, respondents to our phone and Internet surveys rate the risks of nuclear war with Iran somewhat lower than the risks of nuclear war with North Korea,

but consider the risks of Iran providing nuclear weapons capabilities to terrorist groups to be higher, on average, than the proliferation risks associated with North Korea. Again, both groups place mean support for using military force to prevent proliferation to terrorist groups above midscale. While some mean differences between survey modes among unweighted and weighted comparisons reach statistical significance (with Internet participants rating associated risk higher than do phone participants), response distribution patterns are quite similar, and differences in means do not suggest substantial differences in policy preferences.

Clearly, both our phone and Internet respondents consider risks associated with the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea and Iran to be serious, and participants judge the risks of further nuclear proliferation from both North Korea and Iran to terrorist groups to be of concern. While extant circumstances are likely to constrain support for the use of US military force to prevent North Korea or Iran from providing nuclear weapons capabilities to terrorists, these findings suggest that substantial portions of the US public may, in principle, support such preventive action by the US.

Summary of Key Points from Chapter Two

- *Systemic and National Security (pp. 13–19)*
 - International security is rated significantly and substantively higher, on average, by phone respondents than by Internet participants. These differences hold when data are weighted for age, gender, and race/ethnicity.
 - Similarly, mean US security also is rated substantively higher by phone participants. Both survey groups rate overall US security higher, on average, than overall international security.
 - Both survey groups consider terrorism to pose the biggest threat to US security today, followed by religious and political extremism.
 - When asked to judge the implications of the ongoing war in Iraq for US security, phone respondents rate the effects just above midscale, while Internet participants place the effects just below midscale.
- *Strategic Nuclear Risks (pp. 19–20)*
 - Both respondent groups rate the risks of nuclear war between the US and China in the next ten years below midscale, but Internet respondents place those risks significantly higher than do phone respondents.
 - The two respondent groups consider the risks of nuclear war between the US and Russia to be remote (below a value of three on a zero to ten scale).
 - Both groups are in agreement that China poses a substantially greater relative risk of nuclear conflict with the US than does Russia.
- *Nuclear Proliferation (pp. 20–26)*
 - Both groups consider the risks to US security of further nuclear proliferation to be substantial, with means above seven on a zero to ten scale.
 - A nuclear-armed North Korea is judged to pose a greater risk of war with the US than a nuclear-armed Iran.
 - On average, both groups judge the risks of North Korea or Iran providing nuclear weapons capabilities to terrorists to be very substantial.
 - In principle, both groups support the use of US military force to prevent North Korea or Iran from providing nuclear weapons capabilities to terrorists.

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Chapter Three

US Nuclear Weapons Capabilities


In this chapter we analyze public views of US nuclear weapons capabilities, to include relevance of nuclear deterrence, the functions and importance of US nuclear weapons, prospects for eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide, and preferences about options for modernizing US nuclear weapons capabilities.

Section 3.1: Nuclear Deterrence

We investigate the aspects of nuclear deterrence by asking participants to evaluate the importance of US nuclear weapons for deterring the use of nuclear weapons by other countries, deterring other countries from providing nuclear weapons capabilities to terrorist groups, and preventing other countries from employing chemical or biological weapons against us. We begin with the following question about contemporary interstate nuclear deterrence. Response patterns are shown in Figure 3.1.

Q19: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important do you believe US nuclear weapons are for preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against us today?


Figure 3.1: Importance of Deterrence for Preventing Nuclear Conflict Today



Differences among survey modes is small, with unweighted and weighted means at or above a value of seven, and distribution patterns very similar. Note that the median response for both respondent groups, whether weighted or not, is the highest scale value of seven (extremely important).

Because we asked this question using the same wording in previous studies in this series, we are able to show trends in mean responses. Our earliest measure of this question was made in 1995, less than four years after the dissolution of the USSR. Subsequent measures of the same question were made at two year intervals between 1995 and 2005. We compare trends in mean responses in Figure 3.2.¹

Figure 3.2: Trends in Mean Importance of Deterrence for Preventing Nuclear Conflict Today: 1995—2005 (Scale Midpoint = 5.0)




Note that the vertical scale is truncated to show only values between 6.5 and 8.5. While all valuations over the course of the measured decade have been above a mean value of seven, there is a statistically significant trend toward lower valuations of nuclear deterrence since 1999. The mean in 2005 is significantly lower than all other previous mean values. While the policy relevance of the trend may be small, since nuclear deterrence still is highly valued by the American public in absolute terms, the trend appears to be declining.

¹ Our surveys of the US general public prior to 2005 were conducted using only telephone interviews. For comparative purposes we display unweighted phone means.

To further investigate public assessments of nuclear deterrence, we inquired about the value of US nuclear weapons for deterring proliferation to terrorist groups using the following question. Results are graphed in Figure 3.3.

Q20: On the same scale from zero to ten, how important are US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists today?

Figure 3.3: Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Preventing Proliferation to Terrorists



Phone and Internet respondents do not differ in their valuation of the importance of US nuclear weapons for preventing other states from providing nuclear weapons capabilities to terrorists. Mean values above midscale suggest that participants place substantial value on US nuclear deterrence for these purposes.

Our final deterrence question in this series asked respondents to rate the importance of US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using chemical or biological weapons against us today. Having previously asked this question in earlier surveys, we are able to show the trend in mean re-

sponses since 1999. In Figure 3.4 we chart responses in 2005, and in Figure 3.5 we examine the trend in public valuations.²

Figure 3.4: Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Preventing Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons Against Us Today





Figure 3.5: Trend in Mean Importance of US Nuclear Weapons for Preventing Use of Chemical or Biological Weapons Against Us Today: 1999–2005
(Scale Midpoint = 5.0)



² Over-time comparisons are of unweighted mean values from surveys administered by phone. Note that the vertical scale in Figure 3.5 is truncated to better illustrate change.

Responses do not vary significantly by survey mode, with unweighted and weighted means slightly above a value of six. The trend in mean phone responses since we first asked this question in 1999 declines in 2001, then slowly increase in 2003 and 2005.

Section 3.2: Relevance of US Nuclear Weapons

The next series of questions is designed to measure public views about three issues: (1) the utility of US nuclear weapons in the contemporary post-Cold War environment; (2) prospects for nuclear weapons abolition, and (3) the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons today. We begin with the following two questions about the political and military relevance of nuclear weapons. Each is answered on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* ten means *extremely important*.

- Q22: How important are nuclear weapons for maintaining US influence and status as a world leader?
- Q23: How important are nuclear weapons for maintaining US military superiority?

We chart responses to each in Figures 3.6 and 3.7.

Figure 3.6: Importance of Nuclear Weapons for US Influence and Status





Figure 3.7: Importance of Nuclear Weapons for Maintaining US Military Superiority



Assessments of the utility of US nuclear weapons for maintaining US status and influence and for maintaining US military superiority do not differ significantly between groups. Unweighted and weighted means are near a scale value of seven for both questions, and the modal value for each is the highest value available.

Our next two inquiries address the twin dimensions of nuclear abolition. The first asks about the feasibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide, and the second addresses the issue of desirability.

Lead-in: Using a scale from one to seven where one means you *strongly disagree* and seven means you *strongly agree*, please respond to the following two statements.

- Q24: It is *feasible* to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide within the next 25 years.
- Q25: It is *desirable* to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide within the next 25 years.

In Figure 3.8 we chart reactions to the feasibility statement, and in Figure 3.9 we compare those responses to findings from earlier surveys in which

the same inquiry was posed. In Figure 3.10 we show reactions to the statement about the desirability of nuclear abolition.

Figure 3.8: Feasibility of Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons Worldwide





Figure 3.9: Mean Feasibility of Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons: 1993–2005




In Figure 3.8, note the distinctly bimodal nature of views from both samples about the feasibility of eventually eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide. Though the modal response for both groups of respondents is a scale value of one (strongly disagree that it is feasible to eliminate nuclear weapons), substantial distributions also are at the opposite end of the scale (strongly

agree that nuclear abolition is feasible). While phone respondents are somewhat more optimistic than Internet participants, unweighted and weighed means for both groups are below midscale.

We asked this same question in each of our phone surveys of the US general public since 1993. As shown in Figure 3.9, the unweighted mean judgment of our phone sample in 2005 continues a gradually declining trend in central tendencies of public assessments of the feasibility of nuclear abolition in the post-Cold War era.³

The schism in public opinions about the *feasibility* of eliminating nuclear weapons disappears when the inquiry is changed to ask about the *desirability* of nuclear abolition, as shown in Figure 3.10.

Figure 3.10: Desirability of Eliminating All Nuclear Weapons Worldwide



The modal value is seven for both survey groups and means are well above midscale, whether weighted or not, indicating a high degree of agreement that it would be desirable if all nuclear weapons somehow could be eliminated.

³ Over-time comparisons are of unweighted mean values from surveys administered by phone. Note that the vertical scale in Figure 3.9 is truncated to better illustrate change.

Given these views about the utility of US nuclear weapons and beliefs about the feasibility and desirability of nuclear abolition, we conclude this series by posing the following question about retaining US nuclear weapons today.

Q26: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important is it for the US to retain nuclear weapons today?

In Figure 3.11 we show response patterns for 2005, and in Figure 3.12 we illustrate mean responses since this question was first asked in 1993, about 18 months after the end of the Cold War.

Figure 3.11: Importance of Retaining US Nuclear Weapons Today





Figure 3.12: Trend in Mean Importance of Retaining US Nuclear Weapons: 1993–2005 (Scale Midpoint = 5.0)



As shown in Figure 3.11, differences between phone and Internet survey groups are small and not statistically significant when demographically weighted. The modal response for both samples is a value of ten, and the means are well above a value of seven, whether weighted or not.

Notice in Figure 3.12, the overall trend in means for this measure is upward, with some decline after 2001.⁴ This suggests that rather than the end of the Cold War producing a declining valuation of nuclear weapons, the early post-Cold War era is one in which the public sense of importance associated with retaining US nuclear weapons increases significantly and substantively.

Section 3.3: Modernizing US Nuclear Weapons

The issue of whether US nuclear weapons should be modernized in the post-Cold War era has yet to be determined. Many investments have been made in programs to ensure the reliability of the existing nuclear weapons inventory, but it is not yet clear for how long such efforts may remain effective. One of the potential developmental issues involves replacing older and much larger US nuclear warheads with new, smaller, and more operationally flexible designs. The debate centers around the advisability of upgrading the US nuclear arsenal to make it potentially more effective for deterring contemporary threats. The arguments are complex, and evolving, and the debate may not yet have penetrated deeply into public consciousness.

To gain some insight into early public views on nuclear weapons modernization, we chose to investigate one option that has been discussed in policymaking circles—that of smaller-yield nuclear warheads. Because the issue is in the early stages of conceptualization and discussion, we presented very brief arguments for and against modernization before asking for related opinions. Following are the argument summaries that were used to lead-in to the associated questions. The order of the pro and con arguments was rotated so that approximately one-half of survey participants heard the pro argument first, and the other half heard the con argument first.

⁴ Over-time comparisons are of unweighted mean values from surveys administered by phone. Note that the vertical scale in Figure 3.12 is truncated to better illustrate change.

Lead-in: Now I want to shift the focus to the US nuclear stockpile. The kinds of weapons in the US nuclear stockpile are large weapons designed during the Cold War to attack hardened targets such as missile silos. However, evolving security threats have led to a debate about whether the mix of US nuclear weapons should be changed. One option is to develop new smaller-yield nuclear weapons.

Those who support the development of smaller-yield nuclear weapons argue that existing weapons are too large, and are not effective in regional conflicts. Supporters also argue that the new small weapons will serve as effective deterrents to other countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons (order rotated with following paragraph).

Those who oppose development of smaller-yield nuclear weapons argue that these new weapons will encourage other countries to develop new nuclear weapons, or those without them will attempt to acquire such weapons. Opponents also argue that these new small weapons are more likely to be used in combat, which could increase the chance of widespread nuclear war (order rotated with preceding paragraph)

With these arguments in mind, please tell me how you feel about each of the following using a scale from one to seven, where one means you *strongly disagree* with the statement and seven means you *strongly agree* with it.⁵

Q27: New, smaller-yield US nuclear weapons would increase the danger of widespread nuclear war.

Q28: New, smaller-yield US nuclear weapons would stimulate a new nuclear arms race.

Q29: New, smaller-yield nuclear weapons would increase the capability of the US military to destroy deeply buried targets, such as command bunkers and facilities associated with weapons of mass destruction.

Q30: New, smaller-yield nuclear weapons would increase our ability to deter terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction against us; these include nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

We compare responses in Figures 3.13–3.16.

⁵ Questions 27–30 were presented in random order to minimize unintended order effects.

Figure 3.13: New US Nuclear Weapons Would Increase Danger of Nuclear War




Figure 3.14: New US Nuclear Weapons Would Stimulate a New Arms Race




Figure 3.15: New US Nuclear Weapons Would Increase Capabilities for Destroying Deeply Buried Targets





Figure 3.16: New US Nuclear Weapons Would Better Deter Terrorists From Using Weapons of Mass Destruction



Our phone respondents seem more divided on these issues than do our Internet participants. Note that the modal response for questions 27–29 among phone respondents is a value of seven (strongly agree). Internet responses are more widely distributed. Weighting does little to change differ-

ences between groups. On the whole, however, means for the first three items are just above midscale, suggesting that most respondents in both groups agreed with the assertions that while new, smaller-yield US nuclear weapons would increase US capabilities for destroying deeply buried targets (Q29), the increase in capabilities would be accompanied by greater danger of nuclear conflict (Q27), and an increased chance for a new nuclear arms race (Q28).

On average, respondents generally disagreed that new US nuclear weapons capabilities would deter terrorist groups from employing nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. While the opinions of our phone respondents are more bimodal than those of Internet participants, neither group seems convinced that new nuclear weapons would be of much help for this issue.

One of the factors that might play a role in deciding to develop new types of US nuclear weapons relates to potential nuclear testing that might be associated with development. Earlier research in this series suggests substantial public support for efforts to prevent future nuclear weapons testing.⁶ To determine how the testing issue might affect support for developing new US nuclear weapons, we asked the two following questions in the sequence shown.

Q31: On a scale from one to seven where one means the US *definitely should not* develop new smaller-yield nuclear weapons, and seven means the US *definitely should* develop such weapons, what is your view?

Q32: Now consider that the US has not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1992, but if we develop new smaller-yield nuclear weapons, a limited number of underground nuclear tests might be required. Using a scale from one to seven, where one means the US *definitely should not* develop new smaller-yield nuclear weapons if underground nuclear tests are required, and seven means the US *definitely should*, what is your view?

We compare responses to each question in Figures 3.17 and 3.18.

⁶ See Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2004, pp. 40–42.

midscale, while mean support for phone participants is just below midscale. Note that opinion among phone respondents is more divided, with more than one-third strongly opposed, while the modal value among Internet respondents is at midscale. Among phone participants, unweighted proportions are 42 percent supportive, 48 percent opposed, and ten percent undecided. Among Internet respondents, 49 percent are supportive, 29 percent opposed, and 22 percent undecided. These results suggest that while some members of the public are likely to strongly oppose nuclear force modernization, on average, most seem open to debate

However, when the potential need for a limited number of underground nuclear test explosions is identified, mean support among both groups of respondents drops significantly to below midscale, with a majority of phone respondents and a plurality of Internet participants opposed. These results suggest that future efforts to modernize the US nuclear stockpile, such as developing smaller-yield warheads, may be supported by the American public, but the issue of nuclear testing is likely to have a polarizing and negative effect on public support.

Section 3.4: Nuclear Force Capabilities

With the end of the Cold War, nuclear arms control and reduction efforts that were the subject of intense bilateral negotiations between the US and the USSR have assumed less prominence in the relationship between the US and Russia, as both sides reduce nuclear forces substantially. The Treaty on Strategic Offensive Reductions, signed by President George W. Bush and President Vladimir Putin in Moscow on May 24, 2002, requires the United States and the Russian Federation to reduce and limit aggregate strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700–2,200 for each party by December 31, 2012. China, which fields the third most significant nuclear force, has never participated in agreements constraining its nuclear force levels or composition. To gain insight into public views of how nuclear relationships among the US, Russia, and China should influence future US nuclear weapons capabilities, we asked participants to respond to the following series of four assertions presented in random order.

Lead-in: Turning to another issue, at the peak of the Cold War, the United States and Russia maintained stockpiles with tens of thousands of nuclear

weapons. However, since the end of the Cold War the US and Russia have been decreasing the size of their nuclear stockpiles and are working toward an agreed level between 1,700 and 2,200 nuclear weapons in each country. China has not made any agreements with the US about nuclear weapons and is currently modernizing its nuclear forces.

With this in mind, please respond to each of the following using a scale from one to seven, where one means you *strongly disagree* and seven means you *strongly agree*.

- Q33: The US should reduce the number of operational nuclear weapons in its stockpile to between 1,700 and 2,200, as agreed with Russia, regardless of what China is doing.
- Q34: The US should make decisions about its nuclear weapons stockpile based on actions taken by both Russia and China.
- Q35: The US should modernize its nuclear stockpile by designing new nuclear weapons that meet the requirements of the new security environment regardless of what Russia and China are doing.
- Q36: The US should reduce its nuclear weapons below 1,700 in the hope that Russia and China will make similar reductions in their nuclear weapons.

We compare responses in Figures 3.19–3.22.

Figure 3.19: US Should Reduce to 1,700–2,200 Nuclear Weapons Regardless of China’s Actions




Figure 3.20: US Should Decide About Nuclear Weapons Based on Actions by Both Russia and China




Figure 3.21: US Should Modernize Nuclear Capabilities Based on Threat Regardless of What Russia and China Do





Figure 3.22: US Should Unilaterally Reduce Below 1,700 Nuclear Weapons to Induce Russia and China to Follow Suit



As shown in Figure 3.19, both groups of phone and Internet respondents, on average, concur that the US should continue reducing the number of its operational nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200, as agreed with Russia, regardless of what China does with its nuclear forces. Beyond that point, a majority of phone and Internet participants also agree that the US should base its decisions about the future of its nuclear arsenal based on actions taken both by Russia *and* China (Figure 3.20), and that future of US nuclear weapons capabilities should be based on the evolving security environment and the nature of threats to US security, irrespective of what Russia and China are doing with their nuclear forces (Figure 3.21). Finally, most respondents from both groups disagree with the idea that the US should lead the way in arms reductions by unilaterally reducing below the agreed level of 1,700 nuclear weapons in the hope that Russia and China will make similar reductions in their nuclear arsenals (Figure 3.22).

Section 3.5: Nuclear Security Investment Preferences

Our next series of questions investigates public views about various investment options related to US security. We begin with the following two measures of preferences about US nuclear weapons investments.

Figure 3.24: Spending for Maintaining Ability to Develop and Improve Nuclear Weapons in the Future





Figure 3.25: Trends in Mean Support for Nuclear Weapons Investments: 1993–2005



Internet respondents to our 2005 survey are somewhat more supportive of nuclear weapons investments than are participants in the phone survey. While mean support in 2005 for investments in current and future nuclear weapons capabilities has increased significantly over that reported when we began this series of questions in 1993, mean support for spending to develop and test nuclear weapons has not reached midscale in any of our surveys, and remains

level in 2005 compared to the most recent prior measurement two years earlier. Support has been comparatively higher, on average, for investments in infrastructure to ensure US abilities to develop and improve nuclear weapons capabilities in the future, but after trending upward rather consistently between 1993 and 2001, mean support in our 2003 and 2005 surveys drops toward midscale. These trends suggest that following the terror attacks of 9/11 and over the course of the ongoing war on terrorism, public support for investing in US nuclear weapons capabilities has weakened. While we cannot know from these data why support for nuclear weapons investments may be declining, it is not unreasonable to speculate that public perceptions relating to the relevance and utility of US nuclear weapons for contributing to national efforts to combat terrorism may be contributing factors.

In the next series of questions, we shift focus to investments in other security categories. Since the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States and some allies have helped fund efforts to safely dismantle Russian nuclear weapons and to help secure Russian nuclear assets, including nuclear materials. The following two questions inquire about public willingness to invest in continuing efforts to help secure Russia's nuclear weapons and materials. Both use the same response scale from one to seven where one means *substantially decrease* and seven means *substantially increase*. We chart responses in Figures 3.26 and 3.27.

- Q42: How should government spending change for helping Russia secure its nuclear weapons and materials?
- Q43: How should government spending change for research and development that helps Russia reduce its nuclear stockpile more quickly and safely?

Figure 3.26: Spending for Helping Secure Russian Nuclear Weapons





Figure 3.27: Spending for R&D That Helps Russia Reduce Nuclear Stockpile



Differences in central tendencies between phone and Internet modes of collection are small and do not appear to be policy relevant. Respondents are somewhat more supportive of investing in research and development that could help Russia more quickly reduce its nuclear stockpile than they are of helping to pay to secure Russian nuclear assets. Presumably, those difference may be associated with assumptions about where the investments in research and development would be made.

Summary of Key Points from Chapter Three

- *Nuclear Deterrence (pp. 29–33)*
 - Both respondent groups rate the mean importance of US nuclear weapons for preventing nuclear conflict above seven on a scale from zero to ten (phone = 7.03; Internet = 7.28), but the mean for phone respondents is significantly lower than that reported by phone in 2003 (7.47).
 - Both groups rate the mean value of US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from providing nuclear weapons to terrorists above six on the same zero to ten scale.
 - Similarly, both groups also rate the mean value of US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from providing chemical or biological weapons to terrorists above a value of six.
- *Relevance of US Nuclear Weapons (pp. 33–38)*
 - Both survey groups rate the mean importance of nuclear weapons for US influence and status above 6.7 on a scale from zero to ten, and both groups place the mean importance of nuclear weapons for maintaining US military superiority above a value of seven on the same scale.
 - While large majorities of both groups consider it desirable to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide, neither group considers it feasible to do so. However, phone respondents are somewhat more optimistic about the feasibility of nuclear abolition, on average. Response patterns about the feasibility issue are bimodal, indicating polarization.
 - Both groups rate the mean importance of retaining US nuclear weapons today above seven on a scale from zero to ten (phone = 7.33; Internet = 7.56), and the modal response for both groups is a value of ten (extremely important).
- *Modernizing US Nuclear Weapons (pp. 38–44)*
 - On average, Internet participants are significantly more supportive of developing new smaller-yield nuclear weapons than their counterparts who responded by phone.
 - Support for developing new smaller yield nuclear weapons declines significantly among both respondent groups if underground nuclear test explosions are required for developing such weapons.

Key Points (Continued)

- *Nuclear Force Capabilities (pp. 44–47)*
 - Both groups support reducing the number of operational US nuclear weapons to a level between 1,700 and 2,200 as agreed with Russia. However, both groups also prefer that future decisions about US nuclear weapons capabilities be based on Russian and Chinese actions, and neither group, on average, supported unilaterally reducing US nuclear weapons below 1,700.
 - Phone respondents report higher mean levels of support for reducing the numbers of US nuclear weapons, regardless of what Russia and China do, and phone respondents are more divided on the issue of unilateral reductions below 1,700.
 - On average, both groups prefer that US nuclear force modernization be based on threat assessments, regardless of what Russia and China do with their nuclear forces.
- *Nuclear Security Investment Preferences (pp. 47–51)*
 - Though mean support for spending for developing and testing new US nuclear weapons is below midscale, Internet respondents are significantly more supportive than are phone respondents.
 - On average, Internet participants also are more supportive of spending for maintaining the ability to develop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future (nuclear infrastructure) than phone respondents (phone = 3.94; Internet = 4.15 on a scale from one to seven).
 - The trend in mean support for spending on nuclear infrastructure declines significantly from levels reported by phone in 2001 and 2003.
 - Mean support for spending for helping Russia secure its nuclear assets is below midscale for both groups.
 - Mean support is somewhat higher (and above midscale) among both groups for spending on R&D that may help Russia reduce its nuclear stockpile.

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Chapter Four

Terrorism Policy Issues: Part-A

Next we shift our primary focus from nuclear security issues and capabilities to examining public views on terrorism and related US policies. In Section 4.1, we report public confidence in government assessments of the threat of terrorism. We analyze prospects for preventing terrorism, trade-offs between increased security and curtailing individual freedoms, and willingness to invest in preventing terrorism in Section 4.2. We report assessments of progress to date in the struggle against terrorism in Section 4.3, and in Section 4.4, we examine preferences for responding to terrorist attacks.

Section 4.1: Confidence in Threat Assessments

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11, much official inquiry has been made into US capabilities for evaluating the threat of terrorism. To gain insight into public confidence in US government abilities to adequately assess the continuing threat of terrorism, we posed the following three questions. The first two inquiries ask participants to express their confidence in the US abilities to assess the ongoing threat of terrorism at home and abroad. The third question asks whether the public thinks government assessments are systematically higher or lower than the actual threat from terrorism.

- Q72: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means you have *no confidence* and ten means you have *complete confidence*, how much confidence do you have in our government's ability to accurately assess the threat of terrorism occurring in the US?
- Q73: Again, using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no confidence* and ten means *complete confidence*, how much confidence do you have in the US government's ability to accurately assess the threat of terrorism occurring elsewhere in the world?
- Q74: When US government assessments of threats of terrorism are wrong, do you believe they tend to assess the threats as *lower* than they really are, or do they tend to assess the threats as *higher* than they really are?

In Figures 4.1–4.3, we chart response patterns and compare means.

Figure 4.1: Confidence in Assessments of Terrorist Threat to US





Figure 4.2: Confidence in Assessments of Terrorist Threat Elsewhere




As shown in Figure 4.1, public confidence in federal assessments of the threat of terrorism in the US is near midscale, with phone respondents placing it somewhat higher than Internet participants. Note that only seven per-

cent of phone respondents and five percent of Internet respondents indicate high levels of confidence (scale values of nine or ten). When the focus shifts to US capabilities for assessing the threat posed by terrorism to other parts of the world (Figure 7.2), both respondent groups report substantially lower levels of mean confidence, with Internet participants again showing the most skepticism. Even among phone respondents, only 23 percent place their confidence in US worldwide assessments of terrorism above midscale.

To determine if participants believe US estimates are systematically biased, our last inquiry asked respondents to indicate whether government estimates tend to overestimate or underestimate the actual terrorist threat.

Figure 4.3: When Government Estimates of the Terrorist Threat are Wrong, Do They Tend to Be Higher or Lower Than the Actual Threat?



A majority of both respondent groups believe that when government estimates are wrong, they tend to state the terrorist threat somewhat higher than is the actual threat. We should note that this does not suggest that our respondents think it unwise to err on the side of caution, nor that they prefer estimates that tend to underrate the threat.

Section 4.2: Preventing Terrorism

In this section, we examine respondents' beliefs about preventing terrorism, to include conceptual issues, confidence in government capabilities, tradeoffs in individual liberties vs. increased security, and

support for selected investments in prevention. Where questions have been asked in previous studies, we include over time comparisons.

Conceptual Issues

We begin by asking participants to respond to the following three conceptual statements designed to assess public expectations about government's ability to stop terrorism and to assess general implications for individual rights and privacy.

Lead-in: The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 have raised questions about what can be done to stop terrorism in the US. Using a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*, please respond to the following statements:

- Q45: There is nothing government can do to stop determined terrorists.
- Q46: The government could stop terrorists, but only with unacceptable intrusions on people's rights and privacy.
- Q47: The government must try to stop terrorists, even if it intrudes on some people's rights and privacy.

We compare responses in Figures 4.4, 4.6, and 4.8. Because we posed these same inquiries in previous surveys, we can illustrate trends in mean responses to each in Figures 4.5, 4.7, and 4.9.¹

¹ Note that vertical scales of the three trend displays vary to better illustrate change.

Figure 4.4: Nothing Government Can Do to Stop Determined Terrorists





Figure 4.5: Nothing Government Can Do to Stop Determined Terrorists: Trends in Means 1995–2005 (Phone)



While our Internet participants in 2005 seem somewhat more divided (note the concentrations at the end points of the scale in Figure 4.4), the mean for Internet respondents is only slightly higher than that for phone participants. Most people in each of the four telephone surveys in which this statement has been posed since 1995 disagree with the assertion that government cannot stop determined terrorists. Note that we first measured reactions to this

assertion six years prior to 9/11, and that disagreement was greatest immediately following the 9/11 attacks. Since then, mean responses have increased to the pre-9/11 level.

Reactions to the second of our three statements in this series, asserting that while government can stop terrorists, it can do so only by intruding unacceptably on individual rights and privacy, are summarized in Figures 4.6 and 4.7.

Figure 4.6: Can Stop Terrorists Only With Unacceptable Intrusions





Figure 4.7: Can Stop Terrorists Only With Unacceptable Intrusions: Trends in Means 1995–2005 (Phone)



Though responses in 2005 are widely distributed and means are near mid-scale, reactions to this statement among our phone participants are more bimodal, with larger groupings at the end values. Mean response patterns to this statement over time (Figure 4.7) show distinct differences between our pre-9/11 survey and the three means measured after 9/11, all of which are grouped very near the scale midpoint, and show little variation.

Our final statement in this series asserts that government must try to stop terrorists, even if doing so requires intruding on some people's rights and privacy. We chart reactions in Figures 4.8 and 4.9.

Figure 4.8: Government Must Try to Stop Terrorism Even If Intrusive






Figure 4.9: Government Must Try to Stop Terrorism Even If Intrusive: Trends in Means 1995–2005 (Phone)



There is somewhat more convergence of opinion in reaction to this statement compared to the two preceding statements in this series, and the modal value for both phone and Internet participants in 2005 (whether weighted or not) is a value of seven (strongly agree). Nevertheless, as shown in Figure 4.9, there are substantial differences in means two and four years after 9/11 compared to measurements in 1995 and immediately following 9/11. The drop of about one point in means from 5.49 in 2001 to 4.55 in 2003 and to 4.50 in 2005 is statistically significant ($p < .0001$), and suggests that experience during the subsequent war on terrorism (which includes more restrictive US domestic policies), may have moderated support for restrictive government measures to prevent terrorism.

To better understand how combined trends in public views about preventing terrorism are evolving, we create a preventing terrorism index by reversing the scales to Q45 and Q46 and combining responses with those from Q47.² On the resulting continuous scale from one to seven, a value of one reflects minimum confidence that government can prevent terrorism, and a value of seven represents maximum confidence in government's ability to prevent terrorism. In Figure 4.10 we comparatively graph distributions and compare means of phone respondents over time.

Figure 4.10: Preventing Terrorism Index: 1995–2005 (Phone)



² After reversing the scales to questions 45 and 46, responses are averaged with those to question 47 to create the preventing terrorism index.

These patterns of distribution suggest that most respondents are moderately confident in government's abilities to prevent terrorism in the future. Most composite measures in each survey period, whether prior or subsequent to 9/11 are grouped in the middle range from scale values of three to values of five, but subtle trends are apparent. Notice the declining rate at which the value five is represented, and the increasing rate at which the value three is reported. While the differences in means have not yet reached statistical significance, these composite results suggest a slowly declining confidence in our abilities to prevent terrorism as measured by public reactions to our three assertions. Should a future terrorist act of substantial magnitude occur in the US, it seems reasonable to expect further decline in these indicators.

Confidence in Preventing Terrorism

We continue our investigation of public confidence in efforts to prevent terrorism with the following series of questions that probe beliefs about our abilities to prevent large- and small-scale terrorist acts at home and abroad:

Lead-in: On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all confident* and ten means *completely confident*, how confident are you that the US can achieve each of the following in the next ten years?

- Q60: How confident are you that the US can prevent large-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill thousands of people from occurring in the US in the next ten years?
- Q61: How confident are you that the US can prevent large-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill thousands of people from occurring anywhere in the world in the next ten years?
- Q62: How confident are you that the US can prevent small-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill a few people from occurring in the US in the next ten years?
- Q63: How confident are you that the US can prevent small-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill a few people from occurring anywhere in the world in the next ten years?

We compare telephone and Internet responses in Figures 4.11–4.14.

Figure 4.11: Confidence in Preventing Large-Scale Terrorist Attacks in US





Figure 4.12: Confidence in Preventing Large-Scale Attacks Anywhere in World



While respondents from both the phone and Internet surveys are reasonably confident in US abilities to prevent large-scale terrorist events that kill or injure thousands of people within the US in the next decade, they are rather

doubtful about US abilities to prevent such large scale attacks elsewhere. As to differences based on survey mode, our Internet participants are significantly more pessimistic about preventing large-scale terrorist attacks than are those we surveyed by phone. Demographic weighting moves means slightly higher for both groups.

In Figures 4.13 and 4.14, we show comparable public assessments of US abilities to deter small-scale terrorist events in the US and abroad over the next decade.

Figure 4.13: Confidence in Preventing Small-Scale Terrorist Attacks in US





Figure 4.14: Confidence in Preventing Small-Scale Attacks Anywhere in World




Clearly, respondents are less confident of our abilities to prevent smaller-scale acts of terrorism either within the US or elsewhere in the world. Again, Internet respondents are a bit more pessimistic than telephone participants, and the modal response to both questions is a value of zero (not at all confident) among Internet responders. Unsurprisingly, results suggest a realistic differentiation by the public regarding US prevention efforts at home and abroad, with substantially higher confidence in our abilities to prevent terrorism within the US as compared to elsewhere, and greater confidence in our abilities to prevent large-scale terrorist attacks.

Our final question in this series narrows the focus to preventing terrorist attacks against critical US infrastructures.

- Q64: How confident are you that the US can prevent terrorist attacks that destroy critical US infrastructures, like water and power plants in the next ten years?

We compare responses in Figure 4.15.

Figure 4.15: Confidence in Preventing Attacks on Critical US Infrastructures



Both groups of respondents place mean confidence below midscale, and the same kind of patterns observed in responses to the previous questions in this series are again apparent. Internet participants are significantly less confident than phone respondents, with nearly 30 percent expressing little confidence (scale values 0–2) in our abilities to prevent terrorist attacks against critical US infrastructures in the next ten years.

Tradeoffs in Individual Liberties vs. Security

One of the most profound implications of terrorism for open societies is the relationship between efforts to prevent or combat terrorism and protection of individual liberties. While individual liberties cannot be fully pursued and enjoyed in the absence of minimum levels of societal security, efforts to provide necessary security sometimes can be achieved only at the cost of reducing some of the individual liberties they are designed to protect. The ways in which publics and governments assess tradeoffs in personal liberties for enhancements to national and individual levels of security are key to developing policies for preventing and combating terrorism. To probe the relationship between security and liberty, we ask two types of trade-off questions. In the first set, we ask about broader society-wide and somewhat abstract issues


not having a personal focus for most of our respondents. Only one of the three questions has obvious implications for the respondents themselves (national ID cards). The other two measures are the kinds of tradeoffs that would most likely affect others. In the second set of questions, presented later in the survey, we narrow the focus to preventive measures that might be seen as more personally intrusive to individual respondents. But we begin our analyses with the following three broader questions.

Lead-in: Using a scale where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how would you feel about the following measures for preventing terrorism in the US?


- Q48: Requiring national identification cards for all US citizens.
- Q49: Restricting immigration into the US to prevent terrorism.
- Q50: Permitting government officials to hold and interrogate suspected terrorists within the US for a period of one year without charging the suspect with a crime.

Figures 4.16, 4.18, and 4.20 compare responses in 2005. Because questions 48 and 49 were asked in earlier surveys, we also show trends in mean responses to them over time in Figures 4.17 and 4.19.

Figure 4.16: Require National Identification Cards for All US Citizens



**Figure 4.17: Require National Identification Cards for All US Citizens:
Trend in Means: 1995–2005 (Phone)**



Notice in Figure 4.16 that the modal response for both survey groups in 2005 is the highest scale value of seven, but the next highest distribution for both groups is a scale value of one, indicating polar opposition. Means for both groups in 2005 are above mid-scale, with 62 percent of phone respondents and a similar 61 percent of Internet participants indicating support for national ID cards. As shown in Figure 4.17, mean support spikes in 2001, immediately following the terrorist attacks of 9/11, but, notwithstanding that temporary spike in support, the trend among phone respondents since we first asked this question in 1995 clearly is upward, with mean support in 2005 having increased approximately 13 percent over that reported in 1995. While opinions remain divided, most of our participants in four national phone surveys and one Internet survey support the use of national identification cards.

Our next question in this series inquires about public support for restricting immigration into the US to help prevent terrorism. Results for 2005 are in Figure 4.18, with trends since 2001 shown in Figure 4.19.

Figure 4.18: Restricting Immigration Into the US to Prevent Terrorism





Figure 4.19: Restricting Immigration Into the US to Prevent Terrorism: Trend in Means: 2001–2005 (Phone) (Scale Midpoint = 4.0)




Mean support levels are well above midscale for both phone and Internet respondents in 2005, and have remained above midscale since we first asked this question four years ago. More than two-thirds of all respondents in 2005 support the measure, and modal responses for both survey groups is the highest scale value.

Our third broad question in this series relates to authorization in the Patriot Act that allows detention and interrogation of suspected terrorists for up to

one year without charging them. Without identifying any existing authorization or mentioning the Patriot Act, we asked participants in 2005 whether they would support such a measure. Results are in Figure 4.20.

Figure 4.20: Holding and Interrogating Suspected Terrorists in the US Up to One Year Without Charging Them With a Crime



While the means for both groups are near midscale, the distributional patterns show that opinions are highly divided, with the two greatest distribution percentages being at the opposite ends of the response scale. Such a bimodal distribution suggests that this has potential to be a polarizing issue about which strong advocates and strong opponents starkly disagree. Even when the objective is to prevent terrorism (and even when the focus is on others), protections of due process and civil liberties are important freedoms whose compromise can become contentious, and these data illustrate how some fault lines may form.

After having surveyed these broader kinds of policy trade-offs, we returned later in the survey to this area of policy with more specific and narrowly tailored questions suggesting a wider range of invasive policies. For the following set of six questions, we personalize implications by using pronouns and directing the potential actions to the individual respondents themselves (i.e. “*your*” personal information, behavior, image, biometrics, DNA, etc.).

Figure 4.22: Collecting Information About Your Behavior




Figure 4.23: Conducting Pat-Down Searches of Your Clothing and Belongings




Figure 4.24: Taking Photographic Images of You Without Your Knowledge




Figure 4.25: Taking Electronic Scans of Your Hands and Face





Figure 4.26: Taking a Sample of Your DNA



Two types of patterns among responses to this set of six questions are notable. First, as to relative levels of support and opposition among the policy options for preventing future acts of terrorism, opinion within each survey group is most divided about the first issue (Q65; Figure 4.21) involving collecting various types of personal information. A classic bimodal distribution at opposite ends of the response scale suggests polarized views not unlike those present in some of the previous more general policy options. Wide differences in opinion also are apparent in responses to the issue of conducting pat-down searches of clothing and belongings (Q67; Figure 4.23), though views appear less polarized and somewhat more evenly distributed across the response spectrum. A similarly distributed pattern of preferences is evident in responses to the issue of taking harmless electronic scans of hands and faces (Q69; Figure 4.25). For the remaining three issues, opinion is much less divided and much more aligned in opposition. On the issue of collecting information about one's patterns of behavior such as consumption, memberships, and travel (Q66; Figure 4.22), the issue of taking photographic images without the subjects' knowledge (Q68; Figure 4.24), and the issue of DNA sampling (Q70; Figure 4.26), the modal response to each is a scale value of one (strongly oppose), and clear majorities of respondents from both groups are opposed.

Next, with regard to differences between the two respondent groups, Internet participants are significantly more supportive or less opposed, on aver-

age, to four of the six policy options (Q67–70), though in none of the cases do those differences in means reach policy relevance. Differences between survey modes suggest varying degrees of emphasis, but not substantially different policy preferences.

The greatest mean levels of opposition are evident in responses to options for collecting behavioral information (Q66), followed by taking photographic images without the individual’s knowledge³, and taking DNA samples. Clearly, our respondents are wary of all the suggested options, and their patterns of responses do not suggest a broadly-based willingness to achieve higher levels of security if the personal cost involves what they perceive to be intrusions on their individual liberties. We expect that these levels of intolerance may be sensitive to the severity of future acts of terrorism and to the proximity of surveys to the most recent terrorist event.

Investing in Terrorism Prevention

We asked the following three questions about willingness to invest in enhancing security at US ports and borders and capabilities for responding to large-scale terror attacks. The response scale for each is from one to seven, where one means spending should *substantially decrease* and seven means it should *substantially increase*.

- Q38: How should government spending change for preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering through US ports?
- Q40: How should government spending change for improving US border security?
- Q41: How should government spending change for improving our capabilities for responding to large-scale acts of terrorism in the US?

We chart responses in Figures 4.27–4.29.

³ Opposition to this option is higher than we expected, leading us to speculate that the policy option as worded might not have been interpreted by respondents to include surveillance cameras in public places where their use does not require individuals’ permission but is publicly known. The phrase “without your knowledge” may have been interpreted to mean surreptitious photography.

Figure 4.27: Spending for Preventing WMD From Entering Through US Ports




Figure 4.28: Spending for Improving US Border Security





Figure 4.29: Spending for Improving Capabilities to Respond to Large-Scale Terrorist Attacks



Similar response patterns are evident for each of these three questions, with few policy relevant differences between survey modes. Unweighted and weighted means are well above midscale, suggesting substantial support for increasing investments to better secure US ports and borders, as well as improving our capabilities to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks.

Section 4.3: Progress in Combating Terrorism

We posed two questions about current efforts to combat terrorism by asking participants to rate the effectiveness of the ongoing war on terrorism, and to express their confidence in eventually prevailing. We report results in Figures 4.30 and 4.31.

Q56: On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all effective* and ten means *extremely effective*, overall, do you believe US efforts in the war on terrorism have been thus far?

Q44: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all confident* and ten means *extremely confident*, how confident are you that we will eventually win the war on terrorism?

Figure 4.30: Effectiveness of War on Terrorism





Figure 4.31: Confidence in Winning the War on Terrorism Eventually



Opinion is widely distributed among both respondent groups about antiterrorism efforts to date, with about 44 percent of phone participants and 43 percent of Internet respondents rating the effectiveness of ongoing efforts

above midscale. The mean response to this question in our 2003 survey was significantly higher at 5.60, suggesting that public assessments of progress in the war on terrorism may be declining.

Though distributions of responses among phone and Internet participants to the second question about confidence in eventually prevailing in the war on terrorism show some differences in patterns (note the modal response for Internet participants is at a scale value of zero, indicating no confidence), central tendencies do not differ in policy relevant ways between survey modes. Both groups report mean confidence levels just below midscale. These assessments also are significantly lower than the mean responses of phone participants when asked the same question two years ago. The mean response to this question in our 2003 survey was above midscale at 5.49. These results suggest that public confidence in our abilities eventually to prevail in the war on terrorism also may be weakening.

In the following series of questions we asked participants to assess the effectiveness of US efforts to secure borders, seaports and harbors, and airports.

- Q57: On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all effective*, and ten means *completely effective*, how effective have efforts been to improve security at US borders?
- Q58: Using the same scale from zero to ten, how effective have efforts been to improve security at US seaports and harbors?
- Q59: And again on the same scale from zero to ten, how effective have efforts been to improve security at US airports?

We compare response patterns and means in Figures 4.32–4.34.

Figure 4.32: Effectiveness of Efforts to Improve Security at US Borders




Figure 4.33: Effectiveness of Efforts to Improve Security at US Seaports and Harbors





Figure 4.34: Effectiveness of Efforts to Improve Security at US Airports



These response patterns reflect a clear hierarchy in perceived effectiveness of homeland security efforts to protect methods of entry into the US. Efforts to secure US borders are perceived to be least effective, with 57 percent of phone respondents and 58 percent of Internet participants rating effectiveness of border security below midscale. Mean values are near a value of four. Judgments of the effectiveness of efforts to improve security at US seaports and harbors are slightly higher, but still show means below midscale. Of these three questions, only the effectiveness of efforts to improve US airport security are rated above midscale, on average. For this question, the modal response is a value of seven for both respondent groups, and the mean is significantly higher than the value of 5.40 recorded by phone in 2003. But four years after 9/11, most of our respondents judge efforts to secure US borders and seaports largely to be ineffective.

Section 4.4: Responding to Terrorism

We inquire into public views about responding to acts of terrorism from two perspectives. One approach investigates external response options when a high degree of certainty about culpability has been achieved, while the other line of inquiry investigates public confidence in internal capabilities for domestic response to terrorist attacks.

External Response to Terrorism

We told participants to assume the US had determined to a high degree of certainty that a country had materially supported a deadly terrorist attack against the US. To gauge implications of differing levels of casualties on considerations of external response measures, each participant was randomly assigned one of three levels of resulting deaths: 10 deaths; 1,000 deaths, or 10,000 deaths. Then we asked respondents to indicate their support or opposition to each of five response options varying from non-violent measures such as diplomacy and economic sanctions to options involving conventional military forces, and finally the use of nuclear weapons. This approach allows us to investigate the interaction between the severity of the terrorist act (measured in resulting deaths) and the severity of preferred responses. Following is the lead-in and response options.

Lead-in: Responding to terrorist attacks against the US poses difficult choices involving a range of options. If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country actively supported acts of terrorism in the US by providing personnel or training for terrorists, and it resulted in *<randomly insert: 10; 1,000; or 10,000>* deaths, please tell me if you would support the following responses by the US. Use a scale from one to seven, where one means you *strongly oppose* such actions and seven means you *strongly support* them.

- Q51: First, how do you feel about applying strong diplomatic and political pressures against that country?
- Q52: How do you feel about applying strong economic and trade sanctions against that country?
- Q53: How do you feel about conducting air strikes against that country using conventionally armed weapons, such as bombs and cruise missiles?
- Q54: How do you feel about using US military forces to invade that country?
- Q55: How do you feel about attacking that country using US *nuclear* weapons?

In Tables 4.1–4.5, we compare mean levels of support among phone and Internet respondents for each of the five response options at each of three assumed levels of deaths resulting from the terrorist strike. Table rows show unweighted and weighted mean values for the two survey modes and the p-value for un-

paired comparisons of means. In the table columns reporting means, we show the p-value of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) across the three different levels of assumed deaths. Thus reading horizontally compares mean values for the two survey modes, and reading vertically compares mean values at differing levels of assumed deaths for each collection mode.

Table 4.1: Mean Support for Strong Diplomatic and Political Pressures
(Q51: 1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

Deaths From Terrorist Act	Phone Raw	Web Raw	p Value	Phone Wtd.	Web Wtd.	p Value
10	6.17	6.12	.5840	6.05	6.03	.8092
1,000	6.25	6.31	.4782	6.05	6.16	.2451
10,000	6.20	6.15	.6260	6.13	5.96	.0792
ANOVA (p-value)	.7954	.0988		.7105	.1465	

Table 4.2: Mean Support for Strong Economic and Trade Sanctions
(Q52: 1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

Deaths From Terrorist Act	Phone Raw	Web Raw	p Value	Phone Wtd.	Web Wtd.	p Value
10	5.96	6.12	.0995	5.90	6.08	.0630
1,000	6.18	6.35	.0550	6.01	6.21	.0314
10,000	6.06	6.21	.1062	5.95	6.06	.2431
ANOVA (p-value)	.1405	.0309		.5837	.3004	

Table 4.3: Mean Support for Conventional Air Strikes
(Q53: 1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

Deaths From Terrorist Act	Phone Raw	Web Raw	p Value	Phone Wtd.	Web Wtd.	p Value
10	3.94	4.58	< .0001	4.04	4.30	.0622
1,000	4.29	4.74	.0020	4.21	4.64	.0022
10,000	4.70	4.77	.5852	4.73	4.68	.7056
ANOVA (p-value)	< .0001	.2485		< .0001	.0075	

Table 4.4: Mean Support for Military Invasion
(Q54: 1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

Deaths From Terrorist Act	Phone Raw	Web Raw	p Value	Phone Wtd.	Web Wtd.	p Value
10	3.43	3.88	.0014	3.36	3.76	.0026
1,000	3.78	4.10	.0292	3.76	4.03	.0555
10,000	4.12	4.25	.3507	4.16	4.26	.4392
ANOVA (p-value)	.0001	.0118		< .0001	.0005	

Table 4.5: Mean Support for Attack With Nuclear Weapons
(Q55: 1 = Strongly Oppose—7 = Strongly Support)

Deaths From Terrorist Act	Phone Raw	Web Raw	p Value	Phone Wtd.	Web Wtd.	p Value
10	2.05	2.69	< .0001	1.98	2.61	< .0001
1,000	2.35	2.82	.0004	2.30	2.73	.0006
10,000	2.59	2.79	.1340	2.63	2.80	.1570
ANOVA (p-value)	.0005	.1148		< .0001	.1789	

Reading horizontally, differences between survey modes for the two response options not involving military force (Q51–52) are not substantively different. For the three more forceful response options (Q53–55), Internet participants, on average, more strongly support the use of military force in responding to terrorist attacks that result in either of the two lower casualty categories, but support for forceful responses to attacks resulting in 10,000 deaths do not differ significantly between the two survey groups. Notice that mean support across both groups for a nuclear response is below a scale value of three for each of the levels of assumed deaths.

Reading vertically, mean support for most response options increases predictably with numbers of assumed deaths from the terrorist attacks, with our phone respondents showing somewhat greater variability in mean support across the three more forceful response options as casualties increase. As expected, these data confirm that public support for the use of military force to respond to acts of terrorism is likely to vary with severity of the terrorist attacks.

Figure 4.36: Confidence in DoD to Respond to Large-Scale Terrorist Attacks




Figure 4.37: Confidence in Your State Government to Respond to Large-Scale Terrorist Attacks





Figure 4.38: Confidence in Your City and County Government to Respond to Large-Scale Terrorist Attacks



While Internet respondents express significantly less confidence in each of the four different levels of government, both respondent groups place their highest mean levels of confidence in the Department of Defense to respond domestically in the aftermath of large-scale terrorist attacks. Decreasing mean levels of confidence are reported (in order) for the Department of Homeland Security, state government, and local city/county government. On average, confidence levels are above mid-scale for both federal departments and at or below midscale for state and local governments.

Summary of Key Points from Chapter Four

- *Confidence in Threat Assessments (pp. 55–57)*
 - Mean confidence in US government abilities to accurately assess the threat of terrorism in the US is near midscale, with phone respondents expressing significantly higher levels of confidence than Internet participants.
 - Mean confidence in US government abilities to accurately assess the threat of terrorism elsewhere in the world is substantively lower and below midscale for both respondent groups. Again phone respondents expressed somewhat greater confidence than did Internet participants.
 - Both respondent groups believe that when government estimates are wrong, they tend to overestimate the actual threat from terrorism.
- *Preventing Terrorism (pp. 57–78)*
 - Compared to measurements from 1995, respondents in 2005 disagree more with assertions that government can stop determined terrorists only with unacceptable intrusions into individual rights and privacy and that government must try to stop terrorism even if it does intrude on some people's rights.
 - Mean confidence in preventing large-scale terrorist attacks in the US over the next ten years is near midscale, but mean confidence in preventing large-scale attacks elsewhere and confidence in preventing small-scale terrorist attacks in the US or anywhere else is substantially below midscale.
 - Though opinion is polarized, substantial support exists for issuing national identification cards to prevent terrorism. High levels of support exist for further restricting immigration, but support is mixed for holding suspected terrorists for up to one year without charging them with a crime.
 - Regarding tradeoffs in personal liberties for enhanced security, little support is evident for collecting behavioral information about shopping patterns, memberships, travel, etc., photographing individuals without their knowledge, or taking DNA samples. Support is more mixed about collecting personal information (name, address, phone number, etc.), conducting pat-down searches, and taking biometric measures of hands or faces. For most of these options, mean support is stronger among Internet participants than among phone respondents.

Key Points (continued)

- Strong levels of support exist for spending to prevent WMD from entering through US ports, for improving border security, and for government capabilities for responding domestically to large-scale acts of terrorism in the US.
- *Progress in Combating Terrorism (pp. 78–82)*
 - On average, phone respondents rate the effectiveness of the ongoing war on terrorism at midscale, while Internet participants place it just below midscale. Both groups place confidence in eventually winning the war on terrorism slightly below midscale.
 - Both groups rate government efforts to improve security at US borders and at US seaports and harbors well below midscale on average, but efforts to improve security at US airports are judged substantially higher by both groups.
- *External Responses to Terrorism (pp. 83–86)*
 - Assuming a high degree of confidence in determining responsibility for terrorist attacks, mean support for forcefully responding increases with assumed deaths attributed to the attacks.
 - Support for using US nuclear weapons to attack a country determined to have materially supported terrorists is low (below a value of three on a scale from 1–7), even when told to assume the terrorist attacks cause 10,000 deaths.
 - On average, Internet participants more strongly support the use of military force in responding to terrorist attacks at lower assumed levels of casualties, but support for forceful responses do not differ substantively between survey groups when told to assume 10,000 deaths from the terrorist attacks.
- *Internal Responses to Terrorism (pp. 86–88)*
 - Mean confidence in varying levels of government to respond domestically to large-scale terrorist attacks vary from above midscale for the DOD and DHS to near midscale for state governments and below midscale for city and county governments.
 - Phone respondents are substantially more confident, on average, in disaster response capabilities at all levels of government than are Internet participants.

Chapter Five

Terrorism Policy Issues: Part-B

Shortly after we completed the phone and Internet surveys on terrorism reported in Chapter Four, a wave of suicide terrorist bombings were conducted against public transportation systems in London on July 7, 2005, followed two weeks later by a second wave of attempted (but unsuccessful) London bombings. To investigate potential implications of these events for US public views, we conducted a follow-up Internet survey on terrorism issues July 19–31, 2005.¹ We attempted to contact all 1,535 respondents to the previous Internet survey to invite them to participate in the follow-up study. We received 950 responses of which we could reliably determine 555 to be previous participants.² By comparing responses to the same questions among these 555 respondents (panel members) prior to the London bombings and again after the bombings, we gain insight into potential effects on the US public when a close ally is attacked by terrorists. The second survey also provides an opportunity to pose new questions about US vulnerabilities to suicide bombings among the full compliment of 950 participants. In Section 5.1 we examine views among our 555 panel members, and in Section 5.2 we report responses to the new questions on suicide bombings among the total sample of 950 participants.

Section 5.1: Changes in Panel Views on Terrorism

Before presenting data, we should note several important conceptual points. First, the reasons differences in panel responses occur between survey waves cannot be known definitively. In some cases they may be unrelated to specific events hypothesized to affect opinions. Nevertheless, when events of the nature of the London bombings occur, it is both feasible and reasonable to expect that they *may* have implications for public attitudes about terrorism. We can measure differences in views among the same respondents before and after the London bombings, but we cannot

¹ No questions on nuclear security were asked.

² Apparently different members of the same household may have participated in the remaining 395 responses. We accepted as panel members only those participants whose demographic data closely matched participants in the original Internet survey.

say to what degree observed differences are the result of the bombings. Second, the statistical significance of observed differences is sensitive to sample size; the larger the sample, the smaller the absolute differences between waves necessary to reach statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level. Given the size of our 555 member panel, relatively small differences in means can reach statistical significance. This point is closely related to a third concept. Statistical significance, which attempts to express probabilities that observed differences would have occurred by chance, does not necessarily imply policy-relevant or operational significance. Some statistically significant changes can have important implications for policy, while others have little if any. Potential implications should be judged in the context of the variables being measured, the groups being compared, and the policy environment. Finally, the absence of statistically significant differences in central tendencies and associated distributions can be as useful for informing policy processes as observing large differences. That is, if panel members hold to pre-event views after an event occurs, this suggests stability of views and resistance to volatility, overreaction, or public “mood swings” that can be detrimental to policy stability. In other words, some changes may have policy relevance, but lack of change also informs policy processes.

Paired t-tests of differences in means among our panel members between wave one (before the London attacks) and wave two (after the London attacks) reveal changes of statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level in responses to 15 of 43 questions relating to terrorism (34.8 percent).³ Since significant differences in means at the 95 percent confidence level can be expected to occur by chance five percent of the time, we find that changes in responses to about 30 percent of the terrorism questions posed to the same respondents in both surveys exceed the expected variation associated with chance.

Levels of Awareness (Panel)


To help gauge the degree of awareness respondents had regarding the London attacks, we asked participants in the second wave the following question about media exposure.

³ For the two questions in this group that had nominal response categories, chi-square tests are used to test for statistical significance.

- C101: We would like to know how closely you have been following news about the terrorist attacks against subways and a bus in London on July 7, 2005. Considering television, newspapers, and magazines, how many reports on those bombings do you estimate that you have seen, read, or heard from all types of media?

In Figure 5.1 we show the distribution of responses and the median range.

Figure 5.1: Exposure of Panel Members to Reports of London Bombings




All but five of our panel members acknowledge having seen, read, or heard reports of the London bombings, with 27 percent reporting having been exposed to more than 25 reports, and the median range of exposure being 11–15 reports. This yields a high degree of confidence that panel members at least knew of the attacks in London and affords some differentiation of how closely respondents were following reports of the events.

Changes in Security Assessments (Panel)

Responses from panel members to three of our questions concerning assessments of the security environment and the threat posed by terrorism changed significantly between waves one and two. Two questions asked respondents to rate international security (Q4) and US security (Q5) on a scale from zero (not at all secure) to ten (completely secure).⁴ Panel members did not judge US security differently between waves, but did differentiate international security as shown in Figure 5.2.

⁴ Complete question wording is provided in Chapter Two and in Appendix 2.

Figure 5.2: Rating International Security Today (Panel)



Though small in absolute terms, the statistically significant shift in panel members' assessments of the international security environment is in the expected direction.

Panel members were asked in both survey waves to choose the single biggest threat to security in the United States today from among the following categories: (1) poverty and economic inequality; (2) threats to the environment; (3) religious and political extremism; (4) war between nations; (5) acts of terrorism; (6) crime and corruption; and (7) something else.⁵ Re-grouping responses into two categories: (1) terrorism, and (2) all other options, allows us to focus on changes among those panel members who identify terrorism as the biggest security threat prior to and following the London bombings. We compare proportions in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1: Biggest Threat to Security in US Today (Panel)

%	Terrorism	All Other Options	Chi-Square: p-value
Before London	39.5	60.5	< .0001
After London	41.8	58.2	

A marginal increase in the proportion of panel members identifying terrorism as the biggest threat to US security is apparent after the London attacks.

⁵ Ibid.

Though small, the shift is in the expected direction and is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

Differences in means between the two survey waves are not significant for other general questions about security: the implications of the war in Iraq for US security (Q7); confidence that the US eventually will prevail in the war on terrorism (Q44); and assessments of the risks of terrorist attacks in which chemical or biological weapons are used (Q11). Surprisingly, assessments of the risk of terrorists using nuclear weapons within the next ten years (Q10) decline from a mean of 6.66 in wave one to a mean of 6.29 in wave two ($p = .0033$).

Regarding confidence in the US government’s abilities to accurately assess the threat of terrorism, mean judgments do not vary significantly between survey waves, but when asked whether government assessments tend to overestimate or underestimate the actual threat from terrorism, a marginal shift occurs as shown in Table 5.2.⁶

Table 5.2: Do Government Estimates of Terrorist Threats Tend to Be Higher or Lower Than Actual Threats

%	Lower	Higher	Chi-Square: p-value
Before London	44.6	55.4	< .0001
After London	47.6	52.4	


The majority of panel members who think the US government tends to overestimate the threat of terrorism declines by about three percent after the London attacks.

⁶ Complete question wording is provided in Chapter Four and in Appendix 2.

Preventing Terrorism (Panel)

Of the three conceptual inquiries about preventing terrorism that we combine to form a terrorism prevention index described in Chapter Four (Q45, Q46, Q47), only responses to Q46, the statement that “The government could stop terrorists, but only with unacceptable intrusions on people’s rights and privacy” (1 = strongly disagree—7 = strongly agree), change significantly in our survey following the London attacks. We compare response patterns and means in Figure 5.3.

Figure 5.3: Can Stop Terrorists Only With Unacceptable Intrusions (Panel)




Though the marginal shift is significant statistically, it seems unlikely to have important policy implications. Note that the largest shift occurs at the “strongly disagree” position which declines by about five percent in wave two. Mean reactions to the other two statements in this series asserting that there is nothing the government can do to stop determined terrorists (Q45), and the statement that government must try to stop terrorists, even if it intrudes on some people’s rights and privacy (Q47) do not change significantly.

In other questions about tradeoffs between security and individual liberties, mean support for requiring national identification cards for all US citizens (Q48) and restricting immigration into the US to prevent terrorism (Q49) remain steady between survey waves. However, mean support for holding and interrogating suspected terrorists within the US for a period of one year without charging the suspects with a crime (Q50) increased as shown in Figure 5.4.⁷

⁷ Ibid.

Figure 5.4: Holding and Interrogating Suspected Terrorists in the US Up to One Year Without Charging Them With a Crime (Panel)



Support for confining suspected terrorists for up to a year without charging them increases somewhat after the London attacks, with most of the change occurring in a decrease of about five percent of panel members who strongly oppose such measures. Again, while the shift is statistically significant, it may have little policy relevance.

Regarding our series of six questions about willingness to accept personally intrusive measures in efforts to prevent terrorism, responses do not change significantly for the following three issues (1 = strongly oppose—7 = strongly support):

- Q65: Collecting personal information about you, such as name, address, phone number, income, and social security number.
- Q67: Conducting pat-down searches of your clothing and inspections of your belongings.
- Q69: Taking electronic scans of your hands and face.

But mean responses do shift significantly for the remaining three issues.

- Q66: Collecting information about your behavior, such as where you shop, what you buy, what organizations you belong to, and where you travel.
- Q68: Taking photographic images of you without your knowledge.
- Q70: Taking a sample of your DNA.

We compare responses to these three questions in Figures 5.5–5.7.

Figure 5.5: Collecting Information About Your Behavior (Panel)




Figure 5.6: Photographing You Without Your Knowledge (Panel)





Figure 5.7: Taking a Sample of Your DNA (Panel)



Though small in absolute terms, the direction of changes in response patterns for each of these three questions is consistent, and together, they suggest marginally greater tolerance for some intrusive measures to prevent terrorism after the London bombings.

Responding to Terrorism (Panel)

As reported in Chapter Four, we asked respondents to consider a range of response options to terrorist attacks in the United States for which it could be determined to a high degree of confidence that another country provided material support. Participants randomly were told to assume one of three levels of deaths resulting from the terrorist attacks: 10 deaths; 1,000 deaths; or 10,000 deaths. Options for five alternative levels of responses against the country that supported the terrorist attacks are provided as follows: (Q51) strong diplomatic and political pressures; (Q52) applying strong economic and trade sanctions; (Q53) conducting air strikes using conventionally armed bombs and cruise missiles; (Q54) militarily invasion; and (Q55) attacking using US nuclear weapons. Support for each option is measured on a continuous scale from one (strongly oppose) to seven (strongly support).

The combination of five response options and three levels of deaths randomly assumed to have occurred from the terrorist attacks provided 15 response categories for comparison among our panel members. Paired comparisons of mean preferences reveal a high degree of stability, with only one of the 15 options varying significantly between wave one and wave two surveys. Only the option for employing US nuclear weapons to respond to a terrorist attack that kills 1,000 people varies significantly, with mean support declining from 2.87 prior to the London attacks to 2.56 after the London bombings ($p = .0164$).

These results suggest two things. First, opinion among panel members about how to respond to terrorist attacks causing varying levels of assumed deaths in the US is extremely stable temporally across the two surveys. Second, successful terrorist bombings against a close ally do not substantively influence policy preferences for responding to postulated terrorist attacks of varying consequences against the US. In sum, these data suggest that while views about the appropriateness of different kinds of responses to future terrorist attacks in the US vary among different respondents, central

tendencies do not exhibit high levels of volatility or overreaction. Of course public reactions to actual events (as opposed to hypothetical assumptions of casualties) can perhaps reasonably be expected to exhibit more variation, but within the limits of inquiry about possible future attacks, our panel results seem remarkably stable during a period of heightened awareness of the potential implications of terrorist suicide bombings.

As to respondent confidence in government capabilities for responding to terrorist attacks in the US, in Chapter Four we describe expressed confidence levels in the Department of Homeland Security (Q75), the Department of Defense (Q76), state governments (Q77), and city and county governments (Q78).⁸ Of these, only confidence in city and county governments changes significantly among panel members, increasing from a mean of 3.80 in wave one to a mean of 4.06 in wave two. While reaching statistical significance ($p = .0131$), this change does not appear to be policy relevant.

Belief Measures (Panel)

In our surveys before and after the London bombings, we incorporated a variety of questions designed to measure beliefs about political orientations, the natural world, internationalism, social equity, and moralism. We describe the questions and analyze responses to each in Chapter Six. Mean panel responses to all but three belief questions do not change significantly between survey waves. This is not surprising, since belief measures generally are expected to exhibit stability, and the three measures that do show change among panel members are most closely related to views about internationalism and security. Each is posed as an assertion to which participants are asked to react on a continuous scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree).⁹

As shown in Table 5.3, mean support among panel members increases significantly for each of these assertions in wave two, suggesting possible implications from the London bombings.

⁸ We note that these confidence measures were applied prior to federal, state, and local responses to Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, which occurred after our surveys were completed and may have consequences for subsequent public confidence in disaster response capabilities of governments at all levels.

⁹ Question wordings, distributions, and means are shown in Chapter Six and in Appendix 2.

Table 5.3: Changes in Mean Beliefs About Internationalism (Panel)

Assertion	Before London	After London	p Value
Q81: It is vital to enlist the cooperation of other countries in dealing with international security and terrorism.	5.84	6.00	.0040
Q84: The US can never entrust its security to international organizations such as the United Nations.	4.95	5.16	.0022
Q86: The US must be willing to act preemptively by using military force against those that threaten us before they can attack us.	4.28	4.45	.0127

Responses seem to reflect increased emphasis among panel members on cooperation in combating terrorism while acknowledging, nevertheless, that US security will depend largely on US initiatives.

Panel Summary

Taken together, the changes in central tendencies among panel members to our extensive battery of terrorism questions suggest that the London bombings had relatively minor implications for US opinion on terrorism. For about two out of three questions, mean opinion does not change significantly among panel members. For those questions that do exhibit statistically significant changes, movements are logical directionally and of an absolute magnitude that suggests modest policy implications.

Section 5.2: New Questions on Terrorist Suicide Attacks

As previously noted, our survey following the London attacks afforded not only the opportunity to investigate implications of the events among panel members, but also provided the opportunity to introduce additional questions inquiring more broadly about the potential for future terrorist suicide bombings. In this section, we investigate responses to an extensive battery of new questions on this issue among all 950 participants to the second wave survey. As previously noted, these respondents include our 555 panel members plus 395 other respondents to our Internet

survey who appear to be different household members who did not previously participate.

Assessing the International Risks of Suicide Bombings

Respondent assessments of the risks of terrorist suicide bombings across the international system are measured with the following questions.

Lead-in: Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of one or more terrorist suicide bombings occurring in each of the following countries in the next five years? (random order)

- C103: Britain
- C104: France
- C105: Germany
- C106: Russia
- C107: Japan
- C108: Canada
- C109: United States
- C110: Pakistan

In Figure 5.8, we chart response distributions for Britain, the United States, and Pakistan, the three countries for which participants rate the risk of suicide terrorist attacks highest, and in Figure 5.9 we compare mean assessments of risk for each of the eight countries in descending order.

Figure 5.8: Risks of Suicide Bombings in Next Five Years (Top Three)





Figure 5.9: Relative Risks of Suicide Bombings in Next Five Years¹⁰



While the risk of suicide bombings to Britain is judged significantly higher than any other country ($p < .0001$), risks to the US and Pakistan follow in second and third positions. Note in Figure 5.8 that the modal response for each is a value of ten, the highest scale value. We also note in Figure 5.9 that the mean risk to each of the eight countries is above midscale, indicating that our participants consider suicide bombings to pose a substantial threat to all the listed countries.

Assessing the Sources of Suicide Bombings in the US

To examine public perceptions of which groups might pose serious risks of suicide bombings within the US, we asked the following series.

Lead-in: Using the same scale from zero to ten where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, please rate the risk each of the following poses as a source of suicide attacks within the United States. (random order)


- C111: Foreign terrorists who live outside the US.
- C112: Foreign terrorists who live in the US.
- C113: American citizens who are dissatisfied with their lives or with the government but are not members of a terrorist group.

¹⁰ Weighted means are shown in parentheses.

- C114: American citizens who are members of terrorist cells within the US.
- C115: Illegal immigrants who feel they are being unfairly treated.

We compare mean responses in Figure 5.10.

Figure 5.10: Potential Sources of Suicide Attacks Within the US¹¹



On average, foreign terrorists living in the US and American members of terrorist cells in the US are rated significantly higher than the remaining categories. All potential sources are rated above midscale except for domestic individuals/groups not organized in terrorist cells.

Assessing Suicide Bombings in Different Settings

Our next series of questions inquires about the likelihood of suicide bombings in various locales within the US.

Lead-in: Please rate the likelihood of terrorist suicide attacks occurring in each of the following settings in the US using a scale from one to seven where one means *not at all likely* and seven means *extremely likely*. (random order)

¹¹ Ibid.

- C116: Airlines
- C117: Trains
- C118: Subways
- C119: Buses
- C120: Malls
- C121: Office buildings
- C122: Sporting events
- C123: School buildings

In Figure 5.11, we show distributions and mean responses for the top four locales, and in Figure 5.12 we compare distributions and means for the remaining four settings.

Figure 5.11: Likely Settings for Suicide Bombings in the US (1–4)





Figure 5.12: Likely Settings for Suicide Bombings in the US (5–8)



Unsurprisingly, subways are judged the most likely settings for suicide attacks in the US, followed closely by other rail transportation systems. Sport-

ing events and offices comprise the next most likely quartile. Risks for all but schools, which are rated least most likely venues, are scored above midscale.

Methods of Entry Into the US for Terrorists


To provide public perspectives of the relative risks of alternative entry methods that might be used by terrorists to infiltrate the US, we asked the following series of questions.

Lead-in: Foreign terrorists could try to gain entry to the US by air, land, or sea. Please rate the risk of each of the following as a means for terrorists to enter the US on a scale from zero to ten where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*. (random order)

- C132: Crossing the border from Canada by land.
- C133: Crossing the border from Mexico by land.
- C134: Flying in commercial airliners.
- C135: Flying in small planes.
- C136: Entering through harbors or seaports.

We compare relative mean risk assessments in Figure 5.13.

Figure 5.13: Risks of Terrorist Entry Into the US¹²



¹² Ibid.

The mean risk of terrorists gaining entry into the US by crossing the border with Mexico by land, rated at 8.31, is considered by our respondents to be significantly higher than all other entry methods listed as response options ($p < .0001$). Entry through US harbors and seaports (7.97) and entry by crossing the border with Canada by land (7.95) are closely ranked as posing the second and third greatest risks of terrorist entry. Entries via airlines or by small planes are considered lower risks, though each of the five avenues of entry are rated near or above a value of seven on the scale from zero to ten. Clearly, our participants consider all five entry options to pose very substantial risks of infiltration by terrorists.

Preventing Suicide Bombings in the US

Because terrorist suicide bombings had yet to occur in the United States, we asked the following series of questions to probe beliefs about preventing such attacks in the future. If enacted, some of the statements could infringe on individual rights and liberties for some segments of the US population.

Lead-in: Please respond to the following statements using a scale from one to seven where one means you *strongly disagree* and seven means you *strongly agree*. (random order)

- Q124: It is not possible to prevent all suicide bombings by terrorists.
- Q125: If suicide bombings occur in the United States, I would support new restrictions on immigration.
- Q126: Since the vast majority of suicide bombings by terrorists are conducted by young Arab men, I support increasing surveillance of that segment of the US population.
- Q127: If suicide bombings occur in the United States, I would support increased military action against foreign terrorist groups.

We chart distributions and mean responses in Figures 5:14–5.17.

Figure 5.14: Not Possible to Prevent All Suicide Bombings by Terrorists




Figure 5.15: Support New Restrictions on US Immigration




Figure 5.16: Support Increasing Surveillance of Young Arab Men





Figure 5.17: Support Increasing Military Action Against Foreign Terrorist Groups



Results show that most participants agree that it is not possible to prevent all terrorist suicide bombings, but if such bombings do occur in the US, they may produce some effects not intended by their sponsors. Notice that the median response to each of these four questions is the highest scale value of seven (strongly agree). While there noticeably is less support for increasing surveillance of young Arab men than for the other options, the mean for each is above a value of five on a scale from one to seven. These findings suggest that, should terrorist suicide bombings occur in the US, the result may be increased public support for preventive measures that would encroach on civil liberties and reinvigorate public support for military action against terrorist groups.

Enhancing Security of Subway and Rail Travel

Because of the nature of post-9/11 attacks in Spain and Britain against public rail transportation systems, we investigate willingness among our respondents to consider enhanced security measures for travel on trains and subways in the US. We made the following series of related inquiries.

Lead-in: In recent years, the US has taken a number of measures to increase the security of airline travel, to include more stringent screening and searches of passengers, carry-on items, and checked luggage. Less comprehensive measures have been taken to increase security of other modes of public transportation such as passenger trains and subways. Please rate each of the following options for improving the security of US *passenger trains* and *subways* on a scale from one to seven where one means you *strongly oppose* the measure and seven means you *strongly support* it.

- C141: Require all persons to pass through metal detectors before entering terminals.
- C142: Require all passengers to show identification before entering boarding areas.
- C143: Require all hand-carried items to be x-rayed.
- C144: Install video cameras that take images of all persons entering and leaving terminals.
- C145: Require all checked luggage to be x-rayed.
- C146: Use biometric measures such as facial features to help identify suspected terrorists.

We show responses in Figures 5.18–5.23.

Figure 5.18: Screen All Persons With Metal Detectors Before Entering Train/Subway Terminals




Figure 5.19: Require ID Before Entering Train/Subway Boarding Areas




Figure 5.20: X-Ray All Hand-Carried Items on Trains/Subways




Figure 5.21: Videotape All Persons Entering/Leaving Train/Subway Terminals




Figure 5.22: X-Ray All Checked Luggage on Trains





Figure 5.23: Use Biometric Features to Help Identify Suspected Terrorists



Our participants clearly reflect very strong majority support for each of the suggested measures to improve security of rail travel in the US. These data should be qualified by noting that many of our respondents (perhaps most) probably are not frequent users of rail systems, since most rail users are concentrated largely in the northeast and in large cities. Nevertheless, our findings suggest a deeper level of support for improving the security of rail transportation systems than some critics of such measures might assume.

Religious Extremism and Preventing Terrorism

One of the most contentious issues associated with preventing terrorism relates to possible connections between religious extremism and advocacy of or support for acts of terrorism. To probe this area of public sentiment, we posed the following series of questions.

Lead-in: Religious extremism represents a small fraction of people who practice any of the world's major religions. Sometimes religious extremists use churches, mosques, temples, religious schools or other religious facilities to incite violence. In countries where religious freedoms are protected, preventing religious extremists from promoting terrorism can conflict with individual rights, posing difficult tradeoffs among legal protections, moral beliefs, and requirements to provide security for citizens. Please respond to each of the following statements on a scale from one to seven where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*. (random order)

- C128: If someone *advocates* terrorism, but they do not actively participate in terrorist acts, they should be arrested and tried in a court of law, even if they are a religious leader or teacher.
- C129: If someone *actively supports* terrorism, they should be arrested and tried in a court of law, even if they are a religious leader or teacher.
- C130: Government law enforcement agencies should never infiltrate or spy on religious groups, even if they are suspected of advocating or supporting terrorism.
- C131: If a particular religious sect or group is determined to be advocating or promoting terrorism, that organization should be shut down by the government.

We compare response patterns and means in Figures 5.24–5.27.

Figure 5.24: Prosecute *Advocates* of Terrorism Even if Religious Leaders




Figure 5.25: Prosecute *Active Supporters* of Terrorism Even if Religious Leaders




Figure 5.26: Never Spy on Religious Organizations Even if Suspected of Terrorism





Figure 5.27: Shutdown Religious Groups That Advocate or Support Terrorism



Given that the modal response for each is at an end value indicating strongly agree or disagree, and given that means are all well above (or below) midscale, indicating support for government action against religious organizations associated with the advocacy or support of terrorism, the weight of opinion clearly reflects intolerance for the promotion of terrorism under the guise of freedom of religion and freedom of speech. The strength of some of the response patterns also may suggest a receptivity to certain policies, such as spying on religious groups, that could prove troubling to traditional protections and separations.

Illegal Immigration and Preventing Terrorism

Because the immigration issue in the US is a complex social and economic dynamic, and because combating terrorism has risen in national priority since the attacks of 9/11 and the advent of US led international efforts to prevent terrorism, the nexus of illegal immigration and terrorism is becoming a focus of public concern and political commentary. The concerns seem less associated with illegal immigrants/undocumented workers seeking employment and economic opportunity in the US than with the potential for terrorists to take advantage of associated infiltration methods for the purposes of gaining entry to the US and opportunities to conduct acts of terrorism. Though both issues are related, they are conceptually different and may require different kinds of policies for their resolution. To gain insight into public views of illegal immigration and the potential for terrorism, we asked the following series of questions.

Lead-in: Illegal immigration into the United States poses difficult issues, many of which have little if anything to do with terrorism. But some people are increasingly concerned that terrorists may illegally enter the US employing means and methods that other illegal immigrants use to seek economic opportunities. Please respond to the following statements about illegal immigration using a scale from one to seven where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*. (random order)

- C137: Illegal immigration poses a significant threat of terrorism to the US.
- C138: Because the issue of illegal immigration is so complicated, there is little we can do to prevent terrorists from illegally entering the US.
- C139: The US must do more to stop illegal immigrants, regardless of their objectives.
- C140: The United States is dependent on immigration, and even when people enter the country illegally, they do more good than harm.

We show responses and central tendencies in Figures 5.28–5.31.¹³

¹³ Note that vertical scales vary.

Figure 5.28: Illegal Immigration Poses Serious Threat of Terrorism




Figure 5.29: Little We Can Do to Prevent Terrorists From Illegally Entering US




Figure 5.30: Must Do More to Stop Illegal Immigrants Regardless of Their Objectives





Figure 5.31: Illegal Immigrants Do More Good Than Harm



Clearly, the issue of immigration resonates with our respondents, as noted by the modal response to each of the four assertions in this series being an end scale value. Nearly three out of four participants (72 percent) agree that illegal immigration poses a threat of terrorism, and 78 percent think the US must do more to stop illegal immigration. A majority (52 percent) disagree that there is little we can do to prevent terrorists from illegally entering the US, and 59 percent disagree with the assertion that illegal immigrants do more good than harm. While this complex issue has many more policy implications beyond the risk of terrorism, our respondents clearly consider terrorism to be a component of illegal immigration, and these data suggest that a public already dissatisfied with other dimensions of the immigration issue may be poised to bring heavy consensus to bear should a future terrorist event be shown to have been connected with illegal immigration. This is a loaded political issue that has an important security component. It also may be one for which technical applications may have considerable utility.

Summary of Key Points from Chapter Five

- *Changes in Panel Views on Terrorism (pp. 91–101)*
 - Changes in responses to about 30 percent of the terrorism questions posed to the same respondents in wave one and wave two of our Internet survey on terrorism exceed the expected variation associated with chance.
 - Taken together, the changes suggest that the London bombings had relatively minor implications for US opinion on terrorism. For those questions that do exhibit statistically significant changes, movements are logical directionally and of an absolute magnitude that suggests modest policy implications.
- *New Questions on Terrorist Suicide Attacks (pp. 101–117)*
 - Among eight countries specified, highest mean risks of terrorist suicide bombings are judged to exist for Britain, the US, and Pakistan. Relatively lower risks are estimated for Russia, France, Germany, Japan, and Canada, but mean risks are rated above midscale for all of the eight countries named.
 - Of four named sources, highest mean risks for suicide bombings in the US are judged to stem from foreign terrorists living in the US, followed by American members of terrorist cells, and foreign terrorists living outside the US. The two remaining categories, illegal immigrants and Americans who are not members of terrorist cells, are rated lowest. However all are assessed as presenting mean risks near or above midscale.
 - Eight settings for potential suicide bombings in the US are rated above midscale in terms of mean risk and are ordered from greatest to least risk as follows: (1) subways; (2) trains; (3) sporting events; (4) office buildings; (5) airlines; (6) malls; (7) buses; and (9) school buildings.
 - Five alternative methods of entry into the US for terrorists are each judged to pose substantial risk (from 6.95 to 8.31 on a scale from zero to ten). In order from highest to lowest they are: (1) from Mexico by land; (2) through harbors or seaports; (3) from Canada by land; (4) via commercial airliners; and (5) by small planes.
 - Support is strong for a variety of methods for preventing suicide bombings in the US, even when some options could infringe on individual rights. Indications are strong that suicide bombings in the US would elicit stronger public support for military actions against foreign terrorist groups.

Key Points (continued)

- Very strong levels of support are reported for increasing security of subway and train transportation in the US. Even though named measures would delay travel, each of the following receives strong support: screening all persons entering train/subway terminals with metal detectors; checking ID cards before entering boarding areas; x-raying all hand-carried items and checked luggage; videotaping all persons entering and leaving terminals; and employing biometric identification methods
- Little tolerance is evident for religious extremism that incorporates either advocacy or active support of terrorism, and support is reported for spying on religious groups suspected of association with terrorism and closing down those groups found to advocate or support terrorism.
- Respondents consider illegal immigration to be a potential source of terrorism and support stronger efforts to control illegal immigration. Participants disagree that, on the whole, illegal immigration does more good than harm. It appears that participants are dissatisfied with multiple aspects of the immigration issue and are concerned that terrorists may gain illegal entry using routes and methods commonly used for workers.

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Chapter Six

Measures of Beliefs

This chapter describes responses to questions that explore different dimensions of respondent beliefs. Belief systems are complex, multidimensional sets of interactive variables that exert powerful *influences* on individuals and groups. As collections of schema for relating ideas and setting normative standards, beliefs provide guidance about how to choose and what to do that help form the basis for individual and group decisions, and they help shape the language in which debate is conducted. As lenses ground to the prescriptions of individual beliefs, they provide prisms through which we view reality, helping us merge ideas and convictions with empirical observations and facts. As filters, they cause us to subjectively sift information and observations, assigning greater validity to those things that conform more closely to our beliefs, and relegating those that do not to skepticism or discredit.

Public policies are influenced by underlying belief structures and their components. Future debate and evolution of nuclear security and terrorism policies will be shaped both directly and indirectly by belief structures held by policy elites and mass publics. To gain insight into the roles of beliefs in security policy, we included a wide variety of belief measures in earlier studies in this series.¹ In this chapter, we continue our investigation into the role of beliefs as they relate to nuclear security and terrorism by examining measures of respondent beliefs about political orientation, the natural world, internationalism, social equity, and concepts of morality. In Chapter Six, we relate some of those belief measures to policy preferences about nuclear security and terrorism.

Section 6.1: Political Beliefs

¹ In this series of studies, see Herron and Jenkins-Smith 1996; Herron and Jenkins-Smith 1998; Herron, Jenkins-Smith, and Hughes 2000; Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2002a; Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2002b; and Herron, Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Whitten 2003. For more extensive treatment of public belief systems and security policy published elsewhere, see Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2002, Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Herron 2004, and Herron and Jenkins-Smith 2006 (forthcoming).

We asked participants three questions designed to help identify their political orientation. We asked them to name the political party with which they most identify, and we asked them to classify the degree to which they align with that political party. When combined, responses to these two questions provide a measure of political partisanship. Additionally, we asked them to characterize their overall political ideology. Together, these three inquiries provide valuable information about individual level political beliefs. We begin with the following two questions on political partisanship, the responses to which are displayed in Figures 6.1 and 6.2.

- Q96: With which political party do you most identify?
- Q97: Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with that political party?

Figure 6.1: Political Party of Choice






Figure 6.2: Identification With Political Party of Choice



By combining responses to these two questions, we create a partisanship index having the following values: (1) identify completely with the Democratic Party; (2) identify somewhat with the Democratic Party; (3) identify slightly with the Democratic Party; (4) identify slightly with the Republican Party; (5) identify somewhat with the Republican Party; (6) identify completely with the Republican Party.² In Figure 6.3, we graph the partisanship index.

Figure 6.3: Democratic–Republican Partisanship Index




The modal response for both groups of participants is a scale value of five, indicating somewhat Republican, but the next greatest distribution is at a scale value of two, indicating somewhat Democratic. In the aggregate, partisanship is relatively balanced, and after weighting for demographics, mean differences in partisan alignment between our two groups of respondents is not statistically significant. At the ends of the scales where political partisanship is greatest, strong Republicans are evenly balanced between phone and Internet participants, but more strong Democrats are found among phone participants. Overall, of those who expressed alignment with either of the two major political parties, partisanship differences are distributed similarly among our two groups of respondents.

² Respondents who are politically independent or who identified with another political party are omitted from this index.

Our third indicator of political beliefs is ideology. We display responses to the following question in Figure 6.4.

- Q98: On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from *strongly liberal* to *strongly conservative*. Which of the following categories best describes your views? Would you say that you are: (1) strongly liberal, (2) liberal, (3) slightly liberal, (4) middle of the road, (5) slightly conservative, (6) conservative, or (7) strongly conservative?

Figure 6.4: Political Ideology



Both respondent groups report very similar patterns of ideological placement, with the modal value for each at midscale, and means for both just slightly above midscale. Differences in means are not statistically significant whether weighted demographically or not.

One aspect of the public's abilities to employ ideology relates to the degree to which citizens consistently associate ideology with attachments to political parties and gradations of partisanship. Sensible understandings of ideological implications should be observable in organized associations between positions on the ideology continuum and varying levels of identity with major political parties. To examine this association, in Table 6.1 we compare distributions of self-rated ideology with self-identified partisan preferences.

Tale 6.1: Mean Ideology Values by Political Partisanship (Unweighted)


Survey Mode	Strong Dem	Somewhat Dem	Slightly Dem	Slightly Repub	Somewhat Repub	Strongly Repub	All Others
Phone	2.98	3.36	3.47	4.65	5.21	5.89	3.85
Web	2.58	3.28	3.64	4.16	5.09	5.82	4.04

Note that mean ideology relates monotonically and predictably to affinity for the two major political parties across both samples. These patterns illustrate that respondents in both groups are able systematically to organize political ideology along a liberal–conservative continuum within the context of partisan political orientations. Results suggest that self-rated ideology should serve as a useful metric approximating broad political orientations.

Our final measure in this section is not a direct measure of political beliefs, but explores external political efficacy by measuring respondent trust in government. We show responses to the following question in Figure 6.5.

- Q71: On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *none of the time* and ten means *all of the time*, how much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right for the American people?

Figure 6.5: Trust in Federal Government to Do What Is Right for the American People



Though neither respondent group evidences high levels of trust in the federal government to do what is right for the American people, phone participants report expectations that government will do the right thing more often than do Internet respondents. The modal response for both groups is at midscale, with overall patterns suggesting modest confidence in government.

Section 6.2: Beliefs About the Natural World

Issues posed by nuclear and other complex technologies are sensitive to beliefs about the relationships and responsibilities of humankind toward nature and the earth’s ecosystems. To gain a measure of respondent beliefs about the fragility of nature and the current state of the world’s environment, we posed the following two questions.

- Q79: On a scale where zero means nature is *robust and not easily damaged* and ten means nature is *fragile and easily damaged*, how do you view nature?
- Q80: On a scale where zero means the natural environment is *not at all threatened* and ten means the natural environment is on the *brink of disaster*, how do you assess the current state of the natural environment?

We compare responses in Figures 6.6 and 6.7.

Figure 6.6: Fragility of Nature





Figure 6.7: Current State of Natural Environment

Q80: 0 = Environment Not At All Threatened—10 = Environment on Brink of Disaster




Response patterns show that, on average, our phone respondents consider nature to be more fragile and easily damaged and the current state of the natural environment to be more threatened than do our Internet participants.

Given that both of these questions measure related but different aspects of beliefs about the natural world, by combining them we produce an index for which a value of zero indicates a belief that nature is robust and not easily damaged, and that the natural environment is not at all threatened. An index value of ten reflects a belief that nature is fragile and easily damaged, and that our natural environment is on the brink of disaster.³ We graph the index for both respondent groups in Figure 6.8.

³ Responses to the two component questions are averaged, ignoring missing values, to form an index of beliefs about the natural world.

Figure 6.8: Index of Beliefs About the Natural World



On our composite index of beliefs about the natural world, means for both respondent groups are well above midscale, indicating that most consider nature to be vulnerable and the current state of the environment to be threatened. On average, those who participated by phone register more pessimistic beliefs about nature and the environment than our Internet respondents.

Section 6.3: Beliefs About Internationalism

One of the policy considerations playing an increasing role in today's more interconnected world relates to how issues that have important global implications should be addressed. At the center of the debate is how and to what degree and for what issues should national policy processes be influenced by or coordinated with policies of the broader international community. In a world in which economies are increasingly linked, transportation systems are interconnected, and communications are possible among citizens from almost any parts of the international system, older concepts envisioning world views along a unidimensional continuum from isolationism to internationalism are of decreasing utility. Today, proportions of populations in developed and developing states that view the world through isolationist lenses is vanishingly small. Outside of the hermit re-


gime of North Korea or the most undeveloped remote areas elsewhere, populations increasingly understand that “splendid isolation” is a notion of the past. This is especially true for Americans. For contemporary generations in most parts of the world today, the issue is not one of isolationism or internationalism, but rather one of the degree and type of internationalist outlook that is preferred for guiding commerce, enterprise, health, environmental concerns, and foreign policies.

Among many scholars who have explored these changing views of the world, Eugene Wittkopf has made some of the most useful contributions to the study of related beliefs, including a typology for better differentiating among beliefs about internationalism.⁴ Adapting questions from surveys conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, Wittkopf and Maggiotto developed measures for analyzing internationalism along two dimensions they term cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism. Individuals who score high on the cooperative internationalism dimension emphasize the value of diplomacy, negotiation, international organizations, treaties, and cooperation, while strongly rejecting a view that the United States (or any other country) can go it alone, and being hesitant to resort to force to resolve interstate disputes. Individuals who score high on the militant internationalism dimension typically are more suspicious of international organizations and agreements, do not place great faith in diplomacy when desired objectives are frustrated, ascribe to a view that the United States has unique global responsibilities for leadership, are loath to depend on other countries for US security, and are more willing to support the use of US military force.

As illustrated conceptually in Figure 6.9, measures of cooperative internationalism and militant internationalism can be used to create a matrix yielding four partitions. Maggiotto and Wittkopf (1981) classified these divisions as follows. *Isolationists* oppose both militant and cooperative involvement in foreign affairs. *Internationalists* support active involvement in world affairs, favoring a combination of cooperative and conflictual strategies. *Hardliners* support militant internationalism, but oppose cooperative internationalism. Finally, *accommodationists* support cooperative internationalism while opposing militant internationalism.

⁴ See, for example, Wittkopf 1981; Maggiotto and Wittkopf 1981; Wittkopf and Maggiotto 1983a, 1983b; Wittkopf 1986, 1987, 1994.

Figure 6.9: Classifying Beliefs About Internationalism



To fully operationalize this model, we would need a broader battery of questions than could be asked in this survey, so we explore limited classifications of the two dimensions by asking participants to respond to three assertions relating to each continuum. We describe those statements and responses below, and then we combine them to form a single composite measure of cooperative internationalism and a single composite measure of militant internationalism. Following are the questions intended to help measure cooperative internationalism, and in Figure 6.10 we combine responses to form an index.⁵


Lead-in: Please respond to each of the following statements using a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*.

- Q81: It is vital to enlist the cooperation of other countries in dealing with international security and terrorism.
- Q82: Widely shared problems such as energy, disease, and protecting the environment can best be handled by fostering international cooperation.

⁵ Responses to the three component questions are averaged, ignoring missing values, to form the cooperative internationalism index.

- Q83: The free flow of trade and economic investments between countries is essential.

Figure 6.10: Cooperative Internationalism Index




Our phone respondents are somewhat more supportive of the measures we used to calculate the cooperative internationalism index, with 85 percent scoring above midscale, as compared to 70 percent of Internet participants. Demographic weighting has little effect.

To gain insights into beliefs about militant internationalism, we asked respondents to respond to the following three assertions using the same continuous scale from one to seven where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*.

- Q84: The US can never entrust its security to international organizations such as the United Nations.
- Q85: Even though allies are important, the US must be willing to act alone to protect American interests.
- Q86: The US must be willing to act preemptively by using military force against those that threaten us before they can attack us.

We combine responses to form the militant internationalism index as shown in Figure 6.11.⁶

Figure 6.11: Militant Internationalism Index



Several points are noteworthy. First, mean support levels for militant internationalism are significantly below those reported for cooperative internationalism among both groups of respondents. Also note that while our Internet participants, on average, evidence somewhat less support for cooperative internationalism than phone respondents, intergroup differences in mean support for militant internationalism are not statistically significant. About 55 percent of phone respondents and about 56 percent of Internet participants are above midscale on our index of support for militant internationalism.

When the two internationalism indices are overlaid to form the grid portrayed in Figure 6.8, we can type those respondents who do not score scale values of four (midscale) on either the cooperative or militant internationalism indices. Of those who clearly can be categorized, a majority of both respondent groups fall in the internationalist category (67 percent of phone and 70 percent of Internet participants). About one in five of those who can be classified are in the accommodationist category, about five percent are

⁶ Responses to the three component questions are averaged, ignoring missing values, to form the militant internationalism index.

hardliners, and only about two percent are isolationists. Proportions are similar for both respondent groups. These findings must be considered preliminary until component questions can be refined, and until future circumstances allow a more comprehensive list of qualifying questions, but these early results suggest that the US public may exhibit a much more internationalist perspective than some critics of mass opinion might expect.

Section 6.4: Beliefs About Social Equity

Extensive research into political culture and our earlier work in this project relating political culture to security, shows that beliefs about social equity can be powerful predictors of public policy preferences.⁷ We included the following three measures investigating beliefs about equity that were developed and tested during the 1990s at the University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy.⁸

Lead-in: Please respond to the following statements using a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*.


- Q87: What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.
- Q88: Society works best if power is shared equally.
- Q89: It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor.

By combining responses to these three assertions, we create the index of egalitarianism shown in Figure 6.12.

⁷ Mary Douglas helped pioneer cultural theory by introducing a grid/group typology identifying four primary classifications: egalitarians, individualists, hierarchists, and fatalists (Douglas 1970). Subsequently the typology was applied to risk analysis (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982). Other important contributors to the study of political culture include Thompson and Wildavsky, 1982, and Wildavsky and Dake 1990. For a quantitative test of cultural theory hypotheses see Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994. For the evolution of cultural theory as it applies to risk analysis, see Rayner 1992. For our earlier investigations relating the four cultural types to beliefs about security, see Herron and Jenkins-Smith 1996, and Herron, Jenkins-Smith, Mitchell, and Whitten 2003. For additional investigations into the utility of measures of egalitarianism see Herron and Jenkins-Smith 1998.

⁸ For example, see Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994, and Jenkins-Smith et al. 1994.

Figure 6.12: Egalitarianism Index



Phone respondents, on average, exhibit somewhat stronger egalitarian beliefs than do Internet participants. Of particular note are the proportions scoring the highest scale value of seven. The twelve percent of phone respondents at this value is more than twice the five percent of corresponding Internet participants.


Section 6.5: Moral Dimensions of Beliefs

Our remaining three measures are designed to provide insights into three different dimensions of moralistic beliefs: the peaceful nature of democracy; justification for using nuclear weapons in the war against terrorism; and personal religiosity.

As shown below, the first assumes a relationship between democracy and peace and investigates beliefs about spreading democracy to help create a more peaceful world. It is posed in the now familiar form of an assertion to which participants are asked to express reactions on a continuous scale from one to seven where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*. We chart responses in Figure 6.13.

- Q90: In the long run, spreading democracy is the best way to create a peaceful world.

Figure 6.13: Spreading Democracy Is Best Way to Create a Peaceful World




While means are above midscale for both respondent groups, phone participants agree more strongly with the assertion than do Internet respondents. Again, distinctions are most dramatic at the upper end of the response scale where about 35 percent of phone respondents strongly agree, compared to 20 percent of Internet participants. While the modal response for phone participants is a value of seven, the mode for Internet respondents is a value of four.

Our next measure of moral beliefs investigates the degree to which participants believe the use of US nuclear weapons can be justified in the war against terrorism. It is answered using the same scale from strongly disagree (a value of one) to strongly agree (a value of seven). We compare responses in Figure 6.14.

- Q91: If terrorists use a nuclear weapon against the US, we would be justified in using nuclear weapons to fight a war on terrorism.

Figure 6.14: Nuclear Terrorism Against US Would Justify Nuclear Retaliation




On average, both respondent groups agree that the use of nuclear weapons against the US by terrorists would justify the use of US nuclear weapons in the war against terrorism. Intergroup differences in means or differences when weighted are not statistically significant. Majorities of 60 percent of phone respondents and 57 percent of Internet respondents can justify using US nuclear weapons, and the modal value for both groups is seven (strongly agree). However, morally justifying the use of nuclear weapons in response to nuclear terrorism against the US should not be equated with supporting such actions, and the degree of public support or opposition to nuclear retaliation is likely to be highly dependent on circumstances, including such factors as certainty of attribution and expected consequences.

Our final question in this series inquires into individual religiosity by asking participants to rate the importance of religion in their lives.

- Q92: Now using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important is religious faith in your life?

We compare responses in Figure 6.15.

Figure 6.15: Importance of Religious Faith in Your Life



Clearly, both groups of respondents consider religious faith to be important, with means near a scale value of seven and 40 percent of phone respondents and 36 percent of Internet respondents rating the importance of religious faith at the highest scale value of ten.

In Chapter Seven we investigate how these various measures of beliefs are related to policy preferences about nuclear security and terrorism.

Summary of Key Points from Chapter Six

- *Political Beliefs (pp. 121–125)*
 - Phone and Internet respondents identify with each of the two major political parties in similar proportions within each group, but about twice as many Internet participants consider themselves to be political independents.
 - The two respondent groups do not differ significantly on self-rated ideology, and measures of ideology and political partisanship are predictably and consistently related among both groups.
- *Trust in Government (pp. 125–126)* Phone respondents report significantly higher mean levels of trust in the federal government to do what is right for the American people.
- *Beliefs About the Natural World (pp. 126–128)* On average, phone respondents consider nature to be more fragile and the environment to be more threatened than do Internet participants.
- *Beliefs About Internationalism (pp. 128–133)*
 - On our index of responses to three statements measuring beliefs about cooperative internationalism, phone respondents report greater mean support than do Internet participants.
 - On our index of responses to three statements measuring beliefs about militant internationalism, phone and Internet respondents do not differ significantly, on average.
- *Beliefs About Social Equity (pp. 133–134)* On our index formed by responses to three statements designed to measure egalitarianism, phone respondents exhibit higher mean support than do Internet participants.
- *Moral Dimensions of Beliefs (pp. 134–137)*
 - Phone respondents are significantly more supportive of the assertion that spreading democracy is the best way to create a peaceful world.
 - On average, both respondent groups agree that if a nuclear weapon is used by terrorists against the US, we would be justified in using nuclear weapons in the war on terrorism.
 - Both groups report correspondingly high mean levels of religiosity.

Chapter Seven

Belief Structures

In addition to the methodological validity and empirical accuracy with which opinions are measured, the relevance of public opinion to policy processes is a function of many other factors. Among them are the nature of the political system, the degree to which policy processes are accessible by members of the public, the sensitivity of policies to public support for funding, the degree to which policies depend on public cooperation and trust for implementation and sustainability, and the responsiveness of the policy process to public satisfaction or dissatisfaction with policy outcomes. All of these considerations are affected by the coherence of public opinions—the logical connectedness of related issue preferences and their internal consistency. The requirement for public coherence is particularly acute when the policy domain is security. Throughout our nation’s history, its security has always depended on the support of the American people, and often it has required their direct involvement and sacrifice. Security in the 21st century is likely to be no less dependent on public support and confidence. Given the potential for terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction, tensions between legitimate public concerns for security and equally legitimate concerns for preserving individual liberties may *increase* the relevance of public opinion to security processes and policies as compared to the latter years of the Cold War. But are aggregate American views on security sufficiently coherent to inform technical and policy elites charged with managing national and international security? Key measures of the coherence and reliability of public opinion include the extent to which predictable relationships among public views are evident and the degree to which those views are integrated into enduring belief structures that provide rationale, boundaries, and sustainability to public opinion.

In Chapters Two through Five, we employ coordinated Internet and telephone survey findings to describe contemporary public opinions about various dimensions of nuclear security and terrorism. In Chapter Six, we compare respondent beliefs about various political and social dimensions of policy. The primary purpose of those chapters is to describe *what* respondents believe. In this chapter, we turn to exploring causal relationships within structures of beliefs that can help explain *why* specific policy preferences are held. Insights into the underlying reasons why various policy pre-

scriptions are preferred are partially a function of understanding the structures of related beliefs that constrain policy choices and lend coherence to public views. One of the measures of coherence of public opinions is the degree to which they are structured hierarchically. To what degree do demographic predispositions and core values constrain domain level beliefs? To what degree do domain level and prior predispositions shape specific policy preferences? And what kinds of core and domain belief measures predict policy choices? To help address these kinds of questions and to gain insight into the coherence of mass beliefs, we investigate relationships among multiple levels of hierarchically structured beliefs about specific security policy issues.

Section 7.1: Demographic Predispositions

Findings from six previous national surveys conducted for this project from 1993 to 2003 identify systematic implications of some individual level demographic attributes for beliefs and preferences about security. For example, we find that increasing age is associated with decreasing assessments of nuclear weapons risks and increasing assessments of nuclear weapons benefits. We also find age to be positively related to the importance of retaining nuclear weapons and willingness to invest in associated nuclear infrastructures. Gender is another attribute predictably associated with certain dimensions of security. For example, women consistently rate risks associated with nuclear weapons and terrorism higher than do men. We find women to be more accepting of intrusive domestic policies designed to enhance security. And we find that men generally rate the benefits of nuclear weapons higher, on average, than do women. In another example, we find that levels of formal education are associated with specific policy judgments and preferences. Mean assessments of nuclear weapons risks *and* benefits tend to decline with higher levels of education, and support for investing in nuclear weapons infrastructure tends to decline as formal education increases. And there are empirical reasons for expecting that other demographic characteristics such as race/ethnicity and household income can sometimes contribute to predispositions about security policies.¹

¹ For a summary of the implications of individual level demographic attributes for security policy beliefs over time, see Jenkins-Smith and Herron 2003 (Chapter Six).

Based on these and other findings reported elsewhere, we consider selected demographic attributes to be among predispositions that should be considered in hierarchical models of public beliefs. Conceivably, it is possible that age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, or income may influence core beliefs directly, and may exert direct and indirect influence on lower level beliefs. For these reasons, we include key demographic characteristics in our model of hierarchical belief structures.

Section 7.2: Differentiating Levels of Beliefs


For our analyses, we borrow from literature that suggests multiple levels of hierarchically structured beliefs (Fiske and Taylor 1992; Hurwitz and Peffley 1987; Hurwitz, Peffley and Seligson 1993; Peffley and Hurwitz 1985; Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, 1999). In addition to demographic predispositions, we will model three levels of beliefs.

- *Core beliefs* are the most general and abstract, consisting of fundamental underlying normative dispositions that transcend specific policy domains. Examples include ideology, political culture, beliefs about social equity, and trust in government.
- *Domain beliefs* reflect fundamental orientations and strategies that apply across a specific policy domain such as nuclear security or terrorism. Examples include evaluations of associated risks and benefits, views on internationalism, and beliefs about the possibility of preventing terrorism.
- *Policy preferences* are beliefs that reflect preferred policy choices within a given policy domain. Examples include whether or not the US should retain nuclear weapons, what level of investments should be made in nuclear capabilities, how the US should respond to acts of terrorism, and the acceptability of tradeoffs in individual prerogatives for increased security.

We expect that demographic attributes will help shape all levels of beliefs, sometimes acting directly on core beliefs and sometimes acting directly or indirectly on lower level beliefs and preferences as well. Acting in conjunction with demographic characteristics, we expect core beliefs to constrain domain level beliefs and policy preferences. We expect beliefs at the domain level about a broad issue area to exert the most powerful influence on policy preferences, but we also expect demographics and core beliefs to influence domain beliefs and policy preferences. The direct relationships expected in

the hierarchical structure described above are conceptually depicted in Figure 7.1. Indirect relationships also are expected, but are not shown in this conceptual model.

Figure 7.1: Conceptualizing Belief Structures



The implication from this model is that understanding *why* respondents prefer various policy alternatives partially can be explained by the structure of beliefs that act to shape and constrain policy choices. To the degree that we can measure demographic attributes and valid constructs representing core and domain level beliefs, we can explain variation in policy preferences. And to the degree that we find policy preferences constrained by demographic predispositions, core beliefs, and domain beliefs, we can demonstrate structure

in policy choices that can be expected to lend consistency and predictability to mass opinion. The more structure (constraint) evident in opinion, the less volatility and variation will be evident over time (absent traumatic or important events that cause members of the public to reevaluate prior beliefs). Thus the structure of predispositions and beliefs is a major indicator of the coherence and reliability of public opinion for policy processes.

Section 7.3: Modeling Beliefs About Nuclear Security

In this section we present causal models of two nuclear weapons policy measures: the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons (Q26); and preferences for how spending should change for maintaining the ability to develop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future (Q39). Because modeling outcomes are similar for both survey modes, we present causal models only for our Internet participants.²

Demographic Measures

In our model we include the five measures of demographic characteristics shown conceptually in Figure 7.1. Education is represented by a dummy variable measuring the influence of a college education. Gender is differentiated by a dummy variable measuring the influence of being male. Age is employed as a continuous variable in increments of one year from 18 to 86 years.³ Annual household income is represented in increments of 10,000 dollars, with corresponding scale values from one (less than 10,000 dollars) to 16 (more than 150,000 dollars). Race/ethnicity is included as a dummy variable measuring the influence of being Native American, African American, or Hispanic.⁴

² Though the models are similar for phone respondents, relationships are slightly less tightly constructed, and explanatory values are somewhat smaller.

³ Individuals below the age of 18 are not surveyed. Our oldest Internet participant is 86 years of age.

⁴ So-called “dummy” variables are dichotomous measures in which a value of one indicates the presence of an attribute (college degree; male gender; racial/ethnic minority), and a value of zero indicates its absence (no college degree; not male; not a racial/ethnic minority).

Core Belief Measures

We employ three measures of core beliefs. Political ideology is represented by responses to Q98, which asks respondents to locate their political ideology along a continuous scale from a value of one (strongly liberal) to a value of seven (strongly conservative).⁵ Trust in government is measured by responses to Q71, which asks participants to assess how much of the time they trust the federal government to “do what is right for the American people.” Responses are recorded on a scale from zero (none of the time) to ten (all of the time).⁶ Our final core belief measure is an index constructed from reactions to three assertions designed to measure egalitarianism. Responses to the three statements are averaged and results are defined by a continuous scale from one (not at all egalitarian) to seven (completely egalitarian).⁷

Domain Belief Measures

We employ four measures of beliefs at the domain level about nuclear security. The *Nuclear Benefit Index* is expressed on a continuous scale from zero (not at all important) to ten (extremely important) and is calculated by averaging responses to the following five questions.⁸

- Q19: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important do you believe US nuclear weapons are for preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against us today?
- Q20: On the same scale from zero to ten, how important are US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists today?
- Q21: How important are US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using chemical or biological weapons against us today?
- Q22: How important are nuclear weapons for maintaining US influence and status as a world leader?

⁵ See Chapter Six for descriptions of responses to the ideology question.

⁶ See Chapter Six for descriptions of responses to the trust in government question.

⁷ See Chapter Six for the distribution and mean value of the egalitarianism index.

⁸ See Chapter Three for descriptions of responses to each component question. Missing values are ignored in averaging responses.

- Q23: How important are nuclear weapons for maintaining US military superiority?

Our second domain level belief measure, the *Nuclear Risk Index*, is calculated by averaging responses to the following three questions, each of which is answered on a continuous scale from zero (no risk) to ten (extreme risk).⁹

- Q9: How do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with Russia in the next ten years?
- Q10: How do you rate the risk of terrorists using nuclear weapons against us, including so-called dirty bombs, within the next ten years?
- Q12: How do you rate the risk that nuclear weapons will spread to other countries within the next ten years?

The next domain belief measure is an index termed *Cooperative Internationalism*. It consists of an average of responses to the following three assertions, each of which is answered using a continuous scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). The resulting composite index is represented by a continuous scale from one (strongly oppose cooperative internationalism) to seven (strongly support cooperative internationalism).¹⁰

- Q81: It is vital to enlist the cooperation of other countries in dealing with international security and terrorism.
- Q82: Widely shared problems such as energy, disease, and protecting the environment can best be handled by fostering international cooperation.
- Q83: The free flow of trade and economic investments between countries is essential.

A companion domain level belief about internationalism is termed *Militant Internationalism*, and it is composed of an average of responses to the three following statements. Each is answered on the same continuous scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree), and the resulting index is

⁹ See Chapter Two for descriptions of responses to each component question. For their estimations of risk, participants were instructed to consider both the likelihood and potential consequences of the issue. Missing values are ignored in averaging responses.

¹⁰ See Chapter Six for the distribution and mean value for the cooperative internationalism index. Missing values are ignored in averaging responses to the three component questions.

expressed on a continuous scale from one (strongly oppose militant internationalism) to seven (strongly support militant internationalism).¹¹

- Q84: The US can never entrust its security to international organizations such as the United Nations.
- Q85: Even though allies are important, the US must be willing to act alone to protect American interests.
- Q86: The US must be willing to act preemptively by using military force against those that threaten us before they can attack us.

Our final domain level measure is an index representing respondent views about the desirability and feasibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide. It consists of an average of responses to the following two statements, each of which is answered on a continuous scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree). The resulting index is defined by a continuous scale from one (strongly oppose nuclear abolition) to seven (strongly support nuclear abolition).¹²

- Q24: It is *feasible* to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide within the next 25 years.
- Q25: It is *desirable* to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide within the next 25 years.

Dependent Variable

The first policy belief we model is Q26, which asks the following: “Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important is it for the US to retain nuclear weapons today?”¹³

¹¹ See Chapter Six for the distribution and mean value for the militant internationalism index. Missing values are ignored in averaging responses to the three component questions.

¹² See Chapter Three for descriptions of responses to each component question. Missing values are ignored when averaging responses.

¹³ See Chapter Three for the distribution and mean value of responses.

Interpreting Relationships

In figure 7.2 we model relationships incorporating demographic predispositions, core beliefs, and domain level beliefs about the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons (Q26). We calculate sequential multivariate regressions and identify standardized coefficients among those relationships that are statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level ($p < .05$). In the first stage, we use the five demographic measures previously described (education, gender, age, income, and race/ethnicity) as independent variables in multiple regressions to explain variation in each of our three core belief measures (ideology; trust in government; and egalitarianism).


In the second stage, we combine the five demographic predispositions with our three measures of core beliefs to explain each of five measures of domain level beliefs (nuclear benefit index; nuclear risk index; cooperative internationalism index; militant internationalism index; and the nuclear abolition index).

In the final stage, we complete the model by combining demographic attributes, core beliefs, and domain beliefs as independent variables to explain beliefs about the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons. This iterative process allows us to see which independent variables act through intermediate variables and which act directly on our final dependent variable. It also reveals the influence of each independent variable when all other independent variables are held constant.

As previously noted, only those relationships that are statistically significant are shown. The direction and size of the standardized regression coefficients are interpreted as follows: a change of one standard deviation in the independent variable results in the fractional change of a standard deviation in the dependent variable represented by the standardized coefficient. For example, a standardized coefficient of 0.25 means that a change of one standard deviation in the independent variable is associated with a positive change of 0.25 standard deviations in the dependent variable. In the case of a dummy variable, the coefficient represents the effect of the attribute coded as a value of one on the dependent variable. Because the coefficients are all standardized, they can be compared. Explanatory powers are shown as adjusted R^2 values. Solid lines represent first order relationships between independent and de-

pendent variables in adjacent echelons of the model; dashed lines depict relationships extending beyond the adjacent echelon..

Figure 7.2: Estimating Beliefs About Retaining US Nuclear Weapons (Internet Respondents)



Relating Demographic Predispositions:

- *Education:* Variation in formal education is not systematically related to any of our three core belief measures, but an increase of one standard deviation in education is linked to decreases of -0.12 standard deviations in assessments of nuclear weapons benefits, -0.06 standard deviations in assessments of nuclear risks, and -0.10 standard deviations in support for

militant internationalism. Conversely, one standard deviation in education is linked to an increase of 0.08 standard deviations in support for cooperative internationalism.

- *Gender:* Compared with women, men express less trust in government (by -0.07 standard deviations) and more political conservatism (by 0.11 standard deviations). For domain beliefs, men perceive lower nuclear risks (by -0.19 standard deviations), express greater support for cooperative internationalism (by 0.08 standard deviations), and score higher (by 0.07 standard deviations) on our militant internationalism index. Finally, gender also is related to our dependent variable such that men's assessments of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons are 0.05 standard deviations higher than assessments by women.
- *Age:* An increase of one standard deviation in respondent age is associated with an increase of 0.06 standard deviations in ideology (more conservative) and a decrease of -0.14 in respondent trust in government. One standard deviation increase in age also is associated with increases of 0.18 standard deviations in estimates of nuclear weapons benefits, 0.17 in support for cooperative internationalism, 0.10 in support for militant internationalism, and 0.07 in support for nuclear abolition. Finally, a standard deviation increase in age is associated with a decrease of -0.06 standard deviations in composite assessments of nuclear weapons risks.
- *Income:* As annual household income increases one standard deviation, trust in government increases 0.09 standard deviations and support for cooperative internationalism increases 0.07 . Conversely, the same increase of one standard deviation in income results in decreases of -0.05 standard deviations in nuclear risk assessments and -0.14 in egalitarianism.
- *Race/Ethnicity:* Identifying oneself as Native American, African American, or Hispanic is associated with an increase of 0.06 standard deviations in support for egalitarianism.

Relating Core Beliefs

- *Trust in Government:* As the proportion of time one trusts the federal government to do what is right for the American people increases by one standard deviation, assessments of nuclear weapons benefits increase 0.22 , support for cooperative internationalism increases 0.06 , and support for militant internationalism increases 0.20 standard deviations. The same change in government trust is linked to a decrease of -0.17 in composite assessments of nuclear risks.

- *Ideology*: Political ideology is directly linked to each of our measures of domain beliefs. One standard deviation increase in ideology (more conservative) is systematically related to increases of 0.23 standard deviations in assessments of nuclear benefits, 0.07 in assessments of nuclear risks, and 0.39 in support for militant internationalism. The same movement in ideology also results in decreases of -0.06 standard deviations in support for cooperative internationalism and -0.11 in support for nuclear abolition.
- *Egalitarianism*: An increase of one standard deviation in egalitarian beliefs (stronger egalitarianism) is linked to increases of 0.14 standard deviations in judgments of nuclear risks, 0.35 in support for cooperative internationalism, and 0.30 in support of nuclear abolition. The same level of change in egalitarianism also is associated with a decrease of -0.08 standard deviations in assessments of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons.

Relating Domain Beliefs


- *Nuclear Benefit Index*: As assessments of benefits associated with nuclear weapons increase one standard deviation, judgments of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons increases 0.62 standard deviations.
- *Nuclear Risk Index*: An increase of one standard deviation in assessments of nuclear risks produces an increase of 0.05 standard deviations in the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons.
- *Cooperative Internationalism Index*: As support for measures promoting cooperative internationalism increase one standard deviation, the retain issue increases 0.09.
- *Militant Internationalism Index*: An increase of one standard deviation in support for militant internationalist policies is linked to an increase of 0.14 standard deviations in the retain question.
- *Nuclear Abolition Index*: As judgments of the desirability and feasibility of eliminating all nuclear weapons worldwide increase one standard deviation, judgments of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons decrease by -0.14 standard deviations.

In social science, explaining 100 percent of the variation in human behaviors or policy beliefs is not a realistic expectation, but our model of demographic predispositions and hierarchically structured beliefs explains 61 percent of variation in the retain issue. These results illustrate and quantify

the kinds of substantial effects that may be exerted by belief structures on public opinion formation and policy preferences.¹⁴

To test this model using a different issue, in Figure 7.3 we use the same structure to explain variation in judgments of how spending should change for maintaining the ability to develop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future (Q39). Preferences are measured on a continuous scale from zero (strongly decrease) to seven (strongly increase).

Figure 7.3: Estimating Preferences for Investments in Nuclear Weapons Infrastructure (Internet Respondents)



¹⁴ The same model of responses among those who answered the survey by phone shows similar causal effects (all statistically significant relationships are consistent directionally), and the model of phone responses explains 53 percent of variation in the retain issue.

Of course, standardized relationships among demographics, core beliefs, and domain beliefs remain the same, but standardized relationships between those categories and the dependent variable do shift somewhat. Whereas in the previous model trust in government is not directly related to the dependent variable, in this model, as trust in government to do the right thing increases one standard deviation, support for spending on nuclear weapons infrastructure increases 0.10 standard deviations. Also, whereas egalitarianism is directly predictive of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons in the previous model, egalitarianism is not linked directly to preferences for how spending should change in this model. While age is related to the dependent variables in both models, here, as age increases one standard deviation, support for spending increases 0.10 standard deviations.

At the domain level of beliefs, as the nuclear benefit index increases one standard deviation, support for investing in nuclear weapons infrastructure increases 0.33 standard deviations. Our nuclear risk index also is related positively, with a standardized coefficient of 0.09. While beliefs about cooperative internationalism are systematically related to the retain issue, they are not predictive of our spending measure. However, beliefs about militant internationalism are predictably linked to spending preferences, with support for spending increasing 0.27 standard deviations for each increase of one standard deviation in support for militant internationalism. Finally, our nuclear abolition index is negatively related to spending preferences, with support for spending decreasing -0.14 standard deviations for each increase of one standard deviation in our abolition index.

Overall, our model explains 44 percent of deviation in preferences for how spending should change for maintaining the ability to develop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future.¹⁵

¹⁵ Modeling the same structure among phone respondents indicates relationships that are consistent directionally with Internet respondents, and the phone model explains 32 percent of variation in the dependent variable.

Section 7.4: Modeling Beliefs About Terrorism

In this section we explore relationships among beliefs about two key policy aspects of terrorism. Using the same techniques, but employing different measures of domain beliefs, we construct causal models to help explain variation in public preferences for (a) responding externally to large-scale acts of terrorism, represented by an index of responses to Q51–55; and (b) the acceptability of intrusive domestic measures intended to help prevent terrorism, represented by an index of responses to Q49–51 and Q65–70.

Demographic Measures

We continue to use the same five measures of demographic attributes described and employed in the previous section.

Core Belief Measures

Again, we employ the same three broad measures of trust in government, political ideology, and egalitarianism previously used to model beliefs about nuclear weapons.

Domain Belief Measures

For modeling preferences for external responses to major terrorist attacks, we employ four domain belief measures. The *WMD Terrorism Risk Index* is expressed on a continuous scale from zero (no risk) to ten (extreme risk) and is calculated by averaging responses to the following two questions.¹⁶

- Q10: Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of terrorists using nuclear weapons against us, including so called dirty bombs, within the next ten years?
- Q11: On the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk that terrorists will use chemical or biological weapons against us within the next ten years?

¹⁶ See Chapter Two for descriptions of responses to each component question. Missing values are ignored in averaging responses.

Our second domain level belief measure, the *Preventing Terrorism Index*, is calculated by averaging responses to the following three assertions using a scale from one (strongly disagree) to seven (strongly agree).¹⁷

- Q45: There is nothing the government can do to stop determined terrorists.
- Q46: The government could stop terrorists, but only with unacceptable intrusions on people's rights and privacy.
- Q47: The government must try to stop terrorists, even if it intrudes on some people's rights and privacy.

The preventing terrorism index is created by reversing the scales for Q45 and Q46 and averaging responses with Q47. The resulting continuous scale extends from a value of one (minimum confidence that government can prevent terrorism) to a value of seven (maximum confidence government can prevent terrorism).

Our remaining two domain level belief measures are the cooperative and militant internationalism indices described in the previous section. Each is expressed on a scale from one (strongly oppose cooperative/militant internationalism) to seven (strongly support cooperative/militant internationalism).

Constructing the Dependent Variable

The dependent variable in our first terrorism model is the *External Terrorism Response Index*, which is calculated by averaging responses to the following set of five questions.

Lead-in: Responding to terrorist attacks against the US poses difficult choices involving a range of options. If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country actively supported acts of terrorism in the US by providing personnel or training for terrorists, and it resulted in <randomly insert: 10; 1,000; or 10,000> deaths, please tell me if you would support the following responses by the US. Use a scale from one to seven, where one means you *strongly oppose* such actions and seven means you *strongly support* them.

¹⁷ See Chapter Four for the distribution and mean value for the preventing terrorism index. Missing values are ignored in averaging responses to the three component questions.

- Q51: First, how do you feel about applying strong diplomatic and political pressures against that country?
- Q52: How do you feel about applying strong economic and trade sanctions against that country?
- Q53: How do you feel about conducting air strikes against that country using conventionally armed weapons, such as bombs and cruise missiles?
- Q54: How do you feel about using US military forces to invade that country?
- Q55: How do you feel about attacking that country using US *nuclear* weapons?


The resulting scale ranges from one (strongly oppose any response option) to seven (strongly support all response options).¹⁸

Modeling Preferences for External Responses to Terrorism

In Figure 7.4 we show causal relationships incorporating the demographic predispositions, core beliefs, and domain level beliefs described above about preferences for responding to an act of terrorism against the US that results in 1,000 deaths. The implications of decreasing assumed deaths to ten or increasing them to 10,000 are modeled using dummy variables in which a value of one is used to reflect the alternate levels of assumed deaths.

¹⁸ See Chapter Four for a description of response to each question at varying levels of assumed deaths resulting from the precipitating act of terrorism.

Figure 7.4: Estimating Preferences for External Responses to a Terrorist Attack (Internet Respondents)



Interpreting Relationships

Standardized relationships among demographics and core beliefs shown in Figure 7.4 remain the same as described in previous models. In other relationships, increasing levels of formal education exert positive influence on support for cooperative internationalism and negative influence on militant internationalism at the levels indicated by the respective coefficients. Being male is positively related to both internationalism indices, and to our dependent variable, the terrorism response index. Being male is negatively

related to the preventing terrorism index. Age is related positively to the preventing terrorism index, both internationalism indices, and our dependent variable measuring preferences for responding to acts of terrorism. Increasing levels of household income are positively associated with support for cooperative internationalism.

Relating Core Beliefs

- Trust in government is positively related to our preventing terrorism index and the cooperative and militant internationalism indices at the levels shown by the respective coefficients. Increasing levels of trust also are positively linked to our dependent variable, the terrorism response index. Trust is negatively related to assessments of the risks of terrorism in which weapons of mass destruction are employed.
- Increasingly conservative ideology is positively linked to the terrorism risk index, the preventing terrorism index, and militant internationalism, but conservatism is negatively associated with cooperative internationalism. Conservatism is positively related to preferences for more forceful responses to terrorism.
- Increasing egalitarianism is associated with increases in the terror risk index and the cooperative internationalism index, decreases in the preventing terrorism index, and is not systematically related to militant internationalism.

Relating Domain Level Beliefs

- Increasing values of the WMD terrorism index, the preventing terrorism index, and the militant internationalism index are associated with preferences for more forceful response options.
- Increasing support for cooperative internationalism is associated with less support for forceful responses to terrorism.
- Lowering the level of assumed deaths attributed to the act of terrorism from 1,000 to ten is associated with reduced support for more forceful responses, but increasing the level of assumed deaths to 10,000 does not systematically affect response preferences.

Overall, our model explains 41 percent of variation in preferences for how to respond to serious acts of terrorism resulting in varying levels of deaths.¹⁹

Explaining Tradeoffs in Liberties vs. Security

Our final causal model explores some of the dynamics involved in public justification and acceptance of domestic measures that intrude on individual liberties for the purposes of preventing terrorism. We continue to employ the same sets of demographic measures and core beliefs, as well as two previously employed domain level measures—the WMD terrorism risk index and the preventing terrorism index. Because the focus of this issue is domestic policy, we drop our measures of cooperative and militant internationalism and introduce two new domain metrics.

The first is an assessment of the effectiveness of the ongoing war on terrorism measured by Q56, which asks the following: “On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all effective* and ten means *extremely effective*, how effective, overall, do you believe US efforts in the war on terrorism have been thus far?”²⁰

The second new domain belief measure is the *Domestic Terrorism Response Index*, which is calculated by averaging responses to the following four questions, each of which is answered on a scale from zero (not at all confident) to ten (extremely confident).²¹

- Q75: How confident are you in the ability of the Department of Homeland Security to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?
- Q76: How confident are you in the ability of the US department of Defense, including active, reserve, and National Guard forces, to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?
- Q77: How confident are you in the ability of your state government to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

¹⁹ The corresponding model for phone respondents explains 32 percent of variation in the same dependent variable. All significant relationships are consistent directionally with those found among Internet participants.

²⁰ See Chapter Four for a description of responses to this question.

²¹ See Chapter Four for the distribution and mean value of the domestic terrorism response index.

- Q78: How confident are you in the ability of your city and county government to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?


Our dependent variable for this model is the *Domestic Intrusion Index*, which is composed of mean responses to the following nine questions, each of which asked respondents to indicate how they would feel about the government taking various intrusive measures to prevent terrorism. Participants responded using a continuous scale from one (strongly oppose) to seven (strongly support).²²

- Q48: Requiring national identification cards for all US citizens.
- Q49: Restricting immigration into the US to prevent terrorism.
- Q50: Permitting government officials to hold and interrogate suspected terrorists within the US for a period of one year without charging the suspects with a crime.
- Q65: Collecting personal information about you, such as your name, address, phone number, income, and social security number.
- Q66: Collecting information about your behavior, such as where you shop, what you buy, what organizations you belong to, and where you travel.
- Q67: Conducting pat-down searches of your clothing and inspections of your belongings.
- Q68: Taking photographic images of you without your knowledge.
- Q69: Taking harmless electronic scans of your hands and face.
- Q70: Taking a sample of your DNA.

In Figure 7.5 we show the integrated model explaining responses to intrusion index.

²² See Chapter Four for distributions and mean values for each of the component questions.

Figure 7.5: Estimating the Acceptability of Intrusive Domestic Measures for Preventing Terrorism (Internet Respondents)



Interpreting Relationships

In addition to the previously noted relationships between the demographic measures and core beliefs, and between demographics and the WMD terrorism index and the preventing terrorism index, in this model, being male is related positively and increasing levels of income are related negatively to assessments of the ongoing war on terrorism. Increasing levels of formal

education, increasing age, and increasing levels of income are each related negatively to our domestic terrorism response index.

Looking at the influence of core beliefs on our two new domain measures, assessments of the effectiveness to date of the war on terrorism increase with increasing levels of trust in government to do the right thing and with increasing conservatism. Conversely, assessments of the war on terrorism decline with increasing levels of egalitarianism. Confidence in government abilities to respond domestically to acts of large-scale terrorism increase with increases in each of our core belief measures.

The acceptability of our index of intrusive domestic measures for preventing terrorism grows with increasing assessments of the risks of WMD terrorism, trust in government, the preventing terrorism index, increasing conservatism, assessments of the effectiveness of the war on terrorism, age, income, and confidence in government capabilities for responding domestically to large-scale acts of terrorism.

Overall, our model explains 31 percent of the variation in tolerance for intrusive domestic policies for preventing terrorism.²³

Section 7.5: Conclusions

Our investigations of estimated relationships associated with two belief measures about nuclear security and two belief measures about terrorism indicate that substantial proportions of the dependent variables are explained by examining belief structures consisting of demographic predispositions, core beliefs, and policy domain beliefs. The models show how preferences for different kinds of security policies are associated in ways that are consistent with the kinds of shaping and constraining that are predicted by theories of hierarchically structured beliefs. These associations partially explain *why* respondents hold various policy preferences; and they indicate the directions and magnitudes of influences exerted by selected predispositions on those policy preferences. More generally, the belief structures

²³ The corresponding model for phone respondents explains 28 percent of variation in the same dependent variable. All significant relationships are consistent directionally with those shown for Internet participants.

shown here illustrate how public preferences for security policies are patterned, and they suggest that rather than “non-attitudes” or illogical connections among opinions, mass beliefs are characterized by hierarchical structures that constrain and influence public beliefs about security.

Summary of Key Points from Chapter Seven

- *Mass Belief Structures (pp. 140–143)*
 - Demographic attributes such as age, gender, education, race/ethnicity, and income serve as predispositions that may influence hierarchical beliefs.
 - Hierarchically ordered belief structures consisting of core beliefs, policy domain beliefs, and policy preferences provide the framework for and help explain why members of the public hold specific views on security issues.
- *Modeling Beliefs About Nuclear Security (pp. 143–153)*
 - Employing a hierarchical causal model consisting of five measures of demographic predispositions, three measures of core beliefs, and five measures of policy domain beliefs, we explain 61 percent (Internet respondents) and 53 percent (phone respondents) of variation in judgments of the importance of retaining US nuclear weapons today.
 - Using the same structure of belief measures, we explain 44 percent (Internet) and 32 percent (phone) of variation in preferences for how spending should change for maintaining the ability to develop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future.
- *Modeling Beliefs About Terrorism (pp. 153–161)*
 - Employing a hierarchical model consisting of the same five measures of demographic predispositions, the same three measures of core beliefs, and four measures of policy domain beliefs, we explain 41 percent (Internet) and 32 percent (phone) of variation in preferences for how the US should respond to terrorist attacks in the US that result in 10 deaths, 1,000 deaths, and 10,000 deaths.
 - Using the same structure of demographic predispositions, core beliefs, two previous measures of policy domain beliefs, and with two new domain belief measures, we explain 31 percent (Internet) and 28 percent (phone) of variation in willingness to accept a composite of various intrusive domestic measures to prevent future terrorist acts in the US.

Appendix 1

Research Methodology

Section 1: Sampling

For the phone survey, a national sample frame of randomly selected and randomly ordered households having one or more telephones was purchased from Survey Sampling, International (SSI), of Fairfield, Connecticut. The sample frame was drawn from a random digit database, stratified by county, in which each telephone exchange and working block had a probability of selection equal to its share of listed telephone households. This was accomplished as follows. All blocks within a county were organized in ascending order by area code, exchange, and block number. After a proportional quota had been allocated to all counties in the frame, a sampling interval was calculated by summing the number of listed residential numbers in each eligible block within the county and dividing that sum by the number of sampling points assigned to the county. From a random start between zero and the sampling interval, blocks were systematically selected in proportion to their density of listed households. After a block was selected, a two-digit random number in the range 00–99 was appended to the exchange and block to form a ten digit telephone number. Known business numbers were eliminated.

The sample frame was loaded into a computer assisted telephone interviewing system at the Survey Research Center of the University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy that selected and dialed the individual numbers. Each household in each sample had an equal chance of being called. Probability sampling was extended within each household by interviewing only the member of the household over the age of 18 with the most recent birthday. Up to ten attempts were made to contact the individual selected for the sample. No substitutions were made.

The Internet sample does not have a precise frame that yields a representative sample of the US general population. This sample also was provided by SSI, and was derived as follows. Survey Sampling International maintains a multi-sourced Internet panel of people interested in participating in online research. The panel, titled SurveySpot, consists of volunteer members from

many sources, including banner ads, online recruitment methods, and RDD telephone recruitment. SurveySpot members are recruited exclusively using permission-based techniques. Unsolicited email is not employed. The membership of SurveySpot is continuously changing, but at the time of our sample, it consisted of approximately 1.6 million households with more than 4.25 million household members. SSI maintains a subpanel of approximately 400,000 members whose demographics are roughly proportioned to national census demographic characteristics. Our sample was randomly drawn from the 400,000 census balanced subpanel. Each member of the sample received an email invitation to participate in the survey describing the general nature and subject matter of the study. As an incentive to participate, each respondent who completed the survey was entered into a drawing for a \$300 cash award.

Table A1.1 compares key demographics characteristics of survey participants to national and regional population parameters.

Table A1.1: Demographic Representativeness of Respondents

Demographic Category	US National Population (%)	Phone 2005 (%)	Internet 2005 (%)
Gender¹			
Men	48.1 ²	41.4	53.8
Women	51.9 ³	58.6	46.2
Age⁴			
18–24	13.2	8.4	8.2
25–54	56.2	56.0	52.6
> 54	30.6	35.6	39.2
Education⁵			
H.S. Graduate or Higher	83.1 ⁶	94.7	98.8
College Grad. or Higher	24.3 ⁷	40.2	42.9

¹ U.S. Census Bureau, 2005a.

² The proportion of men 18 years old and above is used for comparison, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey.

³ The proportion of women 18 years old and above is used for comparison, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey.

⁴ U.S. Census Bureau, 2005a.

⁵ U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003b.

⁶ The proportion of the population 18 years of age and above having graduated high school or having attained higher levels of education is used for comparison, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey.

Table A1.1 (cont.): Demographic Representativeness of Respondents

Demographic Category	US National Population (%)	Phone 2005 (%)	Internet 2005 (%)
Race / Ethnicity⁸			
White, non-Hispanic	72.7	82.6	88.8
Black	11.5	4.8	3.3
Hispanic (any race)	11.0	4.3	3.3
Am. Indian / AK Native	0.7	2.2	1.2
Asian / Pacific Islander	4.0	1.8	2.1
Other	NA	4.3	1.8
Household Income⁹			
\$0–49,999	57.3	43.0	51.5
\$50,000–99,999	29.3	37.6	36.3
\$100,000 and above	13.4	19.4	12.2
Region¹⁰			
Northeast ¹¹	19.1	18.5	19.3
Midwest ¹²	23.3	24.7	26.5
South ¹³	35.7	35.4	34.1
West ¹⁴	21.9	21.4	20.1

⁷ The proportion of the population 18 years of age and above having a Bachelor's degree or higher is used for comparison, because by design we excluded individuals below the age of 18 from participating in our survey.

⁸ U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003c. National population data include all ages.

⁹ U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics and U.S. Census Bureau, 2001. National population data represent all ages.

¹⁰ U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2003d. Alaska, Hawaii, Micronesia, Guam, Marshall Islands, Northern Mariana Islands, Palau, Puerto Rico, Midway Islands, and the Virgin Islands were not included in the sample frame. Regional population data include all ages.

¹¹ States included in the *Northeast* region included Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont.

¹² States included in the *Midwest* region included Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin.

¹³ States included in the *South* region included Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.

¹⁴ States included in the *West* region included Arizona, California, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. Alaska and Hawaii are included in the Internet sample, but are excluded from the phone sample.

Section 2: Data Collection

The nationwide telephone survey was conducted by the University of New Mexico's Institute for Public Policy (IPP) between April 12 and June 14, 2005. Before data collection began, an extensive review of the survey instrument was conducted by the IPP's senior interviewing staff, survey research center supervisors, and the research design team. During this step the survey was checked for content that might be culturally insensitive or threatening to different socioeconomic or demographic groups. This process reduced the likelihood that the instrument would inadvertently induce respondents from different groups or classes to drop out before completing the survey. Also during this step, the skip patterns used were checked to ensure that the specified research parameters were met. Then a verbal protocol test was conducted with senior interviewers to identify any remaining problematic question wording or computer programming errors.

When the survey instrument was in final form, training was conducted with each of the interviewers and supervisors to ensure they were proficient in the standardized procedures and terminology. This process entailed oral reading of the survey instrument in group training sessions to make sure that proper and consistent emphasis was given to the various words and phrases specified in the survey, and to assure that respondents were interviewed using consistent phrasing, emphasis, and protocols during the data collection process. Data collection did not begin until each interviewer demonstrated thorough competence with the survey instructions and reading aloud the questions.

The interviews were conducted in the IPP Survey Research Center by experienced interviewers using a computer-assisted telephone interviewing system that recorded data in a centralized collection file. Rigorous supervision and quality control measures were applied throughout the data collection process. No interviews were conducted without the presence of a supervisor. A silent monitor was used by supervisors to evaluate individual interviewers and to ensure high quality and continuity in application of the survey protocols throughout the data collection phase. The quality of the data collected was continually monitored to assure that intended collection standards were maintained. These procedures included daily downloading and analysis of responses, and diagnostics such as the degree of "reluctance" of survey participants, the proportions of collections by region, and standardized recording of verbatim responses where appropriate.

The sample size and random selection procedures provide plus or minus 3.0 percent sampling error. Using calculation formulas in accordance with the American Association for Public Opinion Research guidelines, the cooperation rate was 52.5 percent.¹⁵

Data for the parallel Internet survey was collected May 19–26, 2005. Data for the Internet panel study was collected July 19–31, 2005. The Internet surveys were self-administered and data were automatically compiled by SSI and downloaded by the Computer Services Department at the Bush School, Texas A&M University. Comparable cooperation rates cannot be calculated for the Internet surveys.

Section 3: Weighting

Weighting is a statistical method for accounting for systematic differences when comparing groups. While the differences between our phone and Internet respondents and demographic characteristics of the general population generally are small, some differences could conceivably produce systematic differences that might bias findings. For example, compared to census estimations, women are overrepresented among our phone respondents and underrepresented among our Internet participants. Similarly, persons between the ages of 18 and 24 years of age are underrepresented among both phone and Internet respondents, and white, non-Hispanic racial/ethnic representation is higher among both respondent groups than in the general population. To correct for differences between each sample and the broader population base, as well as to correct in differences between our two respondent groups based on selected demographic attributes, we compare not only unweighted data between the two respondent groups, but also we compare distributions and central tendencies after each respondent group has been weighted to national census estimations for age, gender, and race/ethnicity. Where appropriate throughout this report, we display both unweighted and weighted comparisons. Most differences are small in absolute terms, and while some differences in raw data between respondent groups reach statistical significance at the 95 percent confidence level when weighted (and some intergroup differences in raw data lose statistical significance when weighted), most differences are not policy-relevant.

¹⁵ The American Association for Public Opinion Research, 2004.

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Appendix 2: Questions, Distributions, and Means: Comparative Phone and Internet Surveys

p1_edu What is the highest level of education you have completed?

%	Public 05 web	Public 05 ph	Public 03 ph	Public 01 ph	Public 99 ph	Public 97 ph	Public 95 ph	Public 93 ph
< High school graduate	1	5	5	5	5	7	6	6
High school graduate	15	26	24	26	25	27	28	24
Some college/voca. school	41	29	30	30	32	32	30	32
College graduate	24	25	22	22	22	18	20	20
Some graduate work	7	3	5	4	3	4	4	5
Master's degree	9	9	12	10	8	8	8	9
J.D. or higher law degree	NA	NA	NA	NA	1	1	NA	NA
Doctorate	2	3	3	2	2	1	3	3
Other degree	1	0	0	1	1	1	NA	1

p2_age How old are you?

		Means
Public	2005 web	49.4
Public	2005 phone	48.7
Public	2003 phone	47.6
Public	2001 phone	45.0
Public	1999 phone	44.0
Public	1997 phone	44.3
Public	1995 phone	42.2
Public	1993 phone	42.3

p3_gend As part of the survey, I am required to ask: are you male or female?

%		Female	Male
Public	2005 web	46.2	53.8
Public	2005 phone	58.6	41.4
Public	2003 phone	54.8	45.2
Public	2001 phone	55.2	44.8
Public	1999 phone	55.6	44.4
Public	1997 phone	54.6	45.4
Public	1995 phone	54.5	45.5
Public	1993 phone	50.8	49.2

Now I want to ask you some questions about today's security conditions.

p4_intnow Considering international security as a whole, using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all secure* and ten means *completely secure*, how do you rate international security today?

%	Not at All Secure										Completely Secure		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	5	3	8	13	13	23	13	13	6	1	1	4.64	
05 web wtd	5	3	7	11	13	26	13	14	7	2	1	4.81	
05 ph wtd	3	1	4	7	9	24	16	19	12	2	2	5.52	
05 phone	4	1	4	8	10	26	15	18	11	2	2	5.37	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p5_Usnow Using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all secure* and ten means *completely secure*, how do you rate the security of the United States today?

%	Not at All Secure										Completely Secure	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	4	3	5	10	11	18	15	17	12	3	1	5.21
05 web wtd	3	3	5	10	11	18	15	19	13	3	1	5.36
05 ph wtd	3	1	2	7	6	19	14	21	18	6	4	6.06
05 phone	4	1	2	7	7	19	13	21	18	5	4	5.95

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p6_big Which of the following would you say poses the single, biggest threat to security in the United States today? Is it:

Cause	% web	% web wtd	% phone wtd	% phone
1. Poverty and economic inequality	10	10	15	15
2. Threats to the environment	2	2	6	5
3. Religious and political extremism	24	22	17	17
4. War between nations	6	8	6	5
5. Acts of terrorism	36	35	33	34
6. Crime and corruption	14	15	16	15
7. Something else	8	8	8	9

Now I want you to consider the different arguments that people make about the effect of the conflict in Iraq on US security.

p7_Iraq Using a scale from one to seven, where one means the ongoing conflict in Iraq is *greatly decreasing* US security and seven means it is *greatly increasing* US security, what kind of effect do you think the conflict in Iraq is having on US security?

%	Greatly Decreasing US Security					Greatly Increasing US Security		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	15	9	17	25	18	9	7	3.78
05 web wtd	13	8	18	27	18	9	8	3.86
05 ph wtd	15	9	15	12	19	11	19	4.22
05 phone	15	9	15	11	20	12	18	4.21

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

The following questions ask you to assess the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with different countries in the next ten years. Please consider both the likelihood and potential consequences of such conflicts when evaluating the level of risk on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*.

p8_China How do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with China in the next ten years?

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	5	9	15	14	8	17	11	11	5	2	4	4.32
05 web wtd	5	8	15	12	9	17	12	11	5	3	4	4.45
05 ph wtd	14	8	11	13	11	15	7	7	7	2	6	4.07
05 phone	13	8	12	13	11	14	7	7	7	1	6	4.09

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0214] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0001]

p9_Rus How do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with Russia in the next ten years?

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	16	19	18	15	11	11	4	3	2	0	2	2.76
05 web wtd	15	17	17	16	10	13	5	3	2	0	3	2.99
05 ph wtd	25	13	16	12	9	9	4	3	3	0	5	2.84
05 phone	24	14	16	12	9	9	4	3	3	0	5	2.84

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .4056] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0975]

p10_nucter Now I want you to assess the risk of nuclear terrorism. Again, using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of terrorists using nuclear weapons against us, including so-called dirty bombs, within the next ten years?

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	1	1	3	5	6	13	15	20	16	6	13	6.60
05 web wtd	1	2	3	5	6	14	14	20	16	6	14	6.59
05 ph wtd	3	2	4	6	7	14	10	15	16	7	15	6.37
05 phone	2	2	3	6	7	15	10	16	16	7	15	6.46

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0943] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0105]

p11_chembio On the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk that terrorists will use chemical or biological weapons against us within the next ten years?

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	0	1	2	3	4	12	12	20	20	11	16	7.12
05 web wtd	1	1	2	3	4	12	12	21	18	10	16	7.07
05 ph wtd	2	1	3	5	5	13	10	14	20	9	19	6.85
05 phone	2	1	3	5	5	14	9	15	19	9	19	6.90

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0115] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0068]

Now I want you to consider that eight countries are currently known to possess nuclear weapons. They are the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain, France, India, Pakistan, and Israel.

p12_prolif Using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk that nuclear weapons will spread to other countries within the next ten years?

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	0	0	1	4	2	10	10	16	18	12	26	7.61
05 web wtd	0	0	2	4	2	12	10	15	18	11	25	7.50
05 ph wtd	2	1	3	4	5	12	9	13	17	10	25	7.17
05 phone	1	1	2	4	5	13	9	13	17	10	25	7.21

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p13_NKrisk For this question, I want you to assume that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons. On the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with North Korea within the next ten years?

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	2	3	6	8	9	14	13	16	13	8	9	5.99
05 web wtd	2	3	6	7	8	14	14	16	14	8	9	5.95
05 ph wtd	8	3	7	9	9	18	9	13	11	5	8	5.30
05 phone	7	4	7	10	9	17	9	12	12	6	8	5.37

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p14_NKprolif Again, assuming that North Korea possesses nuclear weapons and using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of North Korea providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists?

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	1	1	3	4	4	13	12	16	17	11	19	7.04
05 web wtd	1	1	2	5	6	14	12	16	17	9	17	6.87
05 ph wtd	3	2	5	5	6	14	9	15	16	9	17	6.59
05 phone	2	1	4	5	6	14	9	14	17	10	17	6.69

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0012$]

p15_NKforce On a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how would you feel about the US using military force to prevent North Korea from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorist groups if diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to achieve this goal?

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
05 web	10	7	9	16	18	13	28	4.76	
05 web wtd	9	6	10	18	18	13	26	4.73	
05 ph wtd	14	7	9	9	16	12	34	4.77	
05 phone	14	7	9	8	15	12	35	4.78	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .8457$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .5843$]

p16_IRrsk For this question, assume that Iran possesses nuclear weapons. On the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of the US being involved in a nuclear war with Iran within the next ten years?

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	3	5	8	9	9	16	14	14	10	5	8	5.46
05 web wtd	3	4	7	8	8	18	14	16	9	4	9	5.58
05 ph wtd	9	5	9	12	11	14	10	11	7	3	9	4.85
05 phone	9	5	9	11	11	15	10	11	8	3	9	4.88

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p17_IRprolif Again, assuming that Iran possess nuclear weapons and using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of Iran providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists?

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	1	1	2	4	4	10	10	16	17	12	23	7.25
05 web wtd	1	1	2	4	4	11	13	16	16	10	22	7.17
05 ph wtd	3	1	2	6	6	11	8	16	16	8	23	6.92
05 phone	2	1	2	5	6	11	9	16	16	9	23	6.99

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0053$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0034$]

p18_IRforce On a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how would you feel about the US using military force to prevent Iran from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorist groups if diplomacy and economic sanctions fail to achieve this goal?

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
05 web	10	7	8	16	17	15	28	4.81	
05 web wtd	9	5	10	18	17	15	26	4.78	
05 ph wtd	14	7	8	8	13	12	38	4.89	
05 phone	14	7	7	8	13	13	38	4.89	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .2756$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .1355$]

p19_detnuc Now, using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important do you believe US nuclear weapons are for preventing other countries from using nuclear weapons against us today?

%	<u>Not At All Important</u>										<u>Extremely Important</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	3	1	3	4	5	11	7	10	14	10	33	7.28
05 web wtd	3	1	3	3	7	13	8	10	13	10	29	7.08
05 ph wtd	5	3	3	4	4	11	7	10	14	6	33	7.00
05 phone	5	3	3	4	4	12	6	10	13	7	34	7.03
03 phone	2	1	3	3	3	10	8	11	18	9	31	7.47
01 phone	2	1	2	2	5	8	8	12	16	11	33	7.62
99 phone	1	1	2	3	4	10	7	12	19	11	31	7.66
97 phone	2	1	2	3	4	11	9	11	18	11	29	7.41
95 phone	2	1	2	3	3	10	8	13	16	8	34	7.60

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0208$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .4177$]

p20_detprolif On the same scale from zero to ten, how important are US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from providing nuclear weapons or nuclear materials to terrorists today?

%	Not At All <u>Important</u>										Extremely <u>Important</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	7	4	6	6	6	14	9	12	11	6	20	6.03	
05 web wtd	6	4	5	7	7	15	10	12	10	6	18	5.97	
05 ph wtd	7	5	5	7	6	14	6	11	12	5	22	6.04	
05 phone	7	6	5	7	6	14	6	11	12	5	22	6.04	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .9359] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .4194]

p21_detcb How important are US nuclear weapons for preventing other countries from using chemical or biological weapons against us today?

%	Not At All <u>Important</u>										Extremely <u>Important</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	7	3	6	7	7	12	8	12	11	7	20	6.07	
05 web wtd	6	3	5	7	9	13	8	13	11	7	19	6.13	
05 ph wtd	7	5	5	5	6	12	6	12	13	6	24	6.20	
05 phone	7	5	5	6	6	12	6	11	13	6	24	6.23	
03 phone	7	4	6	7	6	12	8	10	14	6	21	6.08	
01 phone	8	4	7	8	5	11	6	11	12	6	22	6.03	
99 phone	5	2	5	6	5	11	9	11	15	9	22	6.57	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .2866] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .3318]

p22_USstat How important are nuclear weapons for maintaining US influence and status as a world leader?

%	Not At All <u>Important</u>										Extremely <u>Important</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	5	2	4	5	4	12	7	12	15	10	24	6.76	
05 web wtd	5	2	4	5	6	12	7	13	15	9	21	6.62	
05 ph wtd	5	4	4	5	5	13	7	10	14	6	27	6.66	
05 phone	5	4	3	5	5	13	7	11	14	6	28	6.71	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .5999] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .6621]

p23_USsup How important are nuclear weapons for maintaining US military superiority?

%	Not At All <u>Important</u>										Extremely <u>Important</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	4	2	3	4	3	10	8	12	15	10	29	7.11	
05 web wtd	4	2	4	4	5	11	8	12	15	10	25	6.90	
05 ph wtd	4	2	3	4	3	11	7	13	13	8	31	7.08	
05 phone	4	3	3	4	3	11	7	13	14	7	31	7.05	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .6207] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0822]

Now, using a scale from one to seven where one means you *strongly disagree* and seven means you *strongly agree*, please respond to the following two statements.

p24_feas It is *feasible* to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide within the next 25 years.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
05 web	30	15	12	13	11	7	13	3.31	
05 web wtd	29	15	11	13	11	7	14	3.36	
05 ph wtd	35	11	7	5	11	5	26	3.64	
05 phone	36	11	8	5	10	4	25	3.56	
03 phone	35	10	9	7	9	7	24	3.62	
01 phone	37	10	9	7	10	6	22	3.48	
99 phone	33	10	9	8	12	5	23	3.64	
97 phone	31	11	9	6	11	6	26	3.76	
95 phone	26	9	10	9	13	8	24	3.95	
93 phone	29	14	8	6	11	7	25	3.78	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0034] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0009]

p25_desire It is *desirable* to eliminate all nuclear weapons worldwide within the next 25 years.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
05 web	5	4	4	9	11	13	55	5.75	
05 web wtd	6	3	4	11	12	12	52	5.63	
05 ph wtd	10	3	4	4	8	7	63	5.71	
05 phone	10	3	4	3	7	8	65	5.76	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .8309] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .2905]

p26_retain Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important is it for the US to retain nuclear weapons today?

%	<u>Not at All Important</u>					<u>Extremely Important</u>						Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	3	1	2	3	3	10	8	11	12	10	38	7.56
05 web wtd	4	2	2	3	4	11	8	11	13	9	34	7.32
05 ph wtd	4	3	2	3	3	11	8	12	13	6	36	7.30
05 phone	4	2	2	3	3	11	7	12	13	6	37	7.33
03 phone	3	2	2	3	3	11	9	15	14	7	32	7.30
01 phone	1	1	1	2	3	10	7	17	12	6	39	7.75
99 phone	2	2	1	3	3	9	9	14	15	7	34	7.50
97 phone	3	1	2	3	4	14	7	18	13	5	30	7.19
95 phone*	7	0	6	10	0	11	0	18	12	0	36	6.78
93 phone*	6	6	0	11	0	14	20	0	13	0	30	6.59

(*1-7 scale recoded to 0-10)

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0288]

[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .8064]

Now I want to shift the focus to the US nuclear stockpile. The kinds of weapons in the US nuclear stockpile are large weapons designed during the Cold War to attack hardened targets such as missile silos. However, evolving security threats have led to a debate about whether the mix of US nuclear weapons should be changed. One option is to develop new smaller-yield nuclear weapons.

Those who support the development of smaller-yield nuclear weapons argue that existing weapons are too large, and are not effective in regional conflicts. Supporters also argue that these new small weapons will serve as effective deterrents to other countries seeking to develop nuclear weapons.

Those who oppose development of smaller-yield nuclear weapons argue that these new weapons will encourage other countries to develop new nuclear weapons, or those without them will attempt to acquire such weapons. Opponents also argue that these new small weapons are more likely to be used in combat, which could increase the chance of widespread nuclear war.

[NOTE: The order of the pro and con arguments in the above lead-in was rotated so that approximately one-half of respondents heard the “con” argument first, and approximately one-half heard the “pro” argument first.]

With these arguments in mind, please tell me how you feel about each of the following using a scale from one to seven, where one means you *strongly disagree* with the statement and seven means you *strongly agree* with it.

p27_smallnuc1 New, smaller-yield US nuclear weapons would increase the danger of widespread nuclear war.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	8	7	8	20	19	16	22	4.70
05 web wtd	8	7	9	22	20	15	19	4.61
05 ph wtd	15	6	8	8	13	13	37	4.86
05 phone	15	6	8	8	13	13	37	4.84

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0631] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0009]

p28_smallnuc2 New, smaller-yield US nuclear weapons would stimulate a new nuclear arms race.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	10	9	9	21	18	15	18	4.45
05 web wtd	8	7	9	22	17	16	20	4.59
05 ph wtd	11	6	7	8	14	14	40	5.08
05 phone	11	6	8	8	14	13	41	5.10

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

p29_smallnuc3 New, smaller-yield nuclear weapons would increase the capability of the US military to destroy deeply buried targets, such as command bunkers and facilities associated with weapons of mass destruction.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	6	9	9	21	19	15	20	4.64
05 web wtd	5	8	10	23	18	15	22	4.73
05 ph wtd	18	7	10	8	15	13	30	4.54
05 phone	19	6	10	8	14	14	30	4.53

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .1634] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0108]

p30_smallnuc4 New, smaller-yield US nuclear weapons would increase our ability to deter terrorists from using weapons of mass destruction against us; these include nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons.

%	Strongly Disagree							Strongly Agree	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean	
05 web	16	12	10	20	15	12	16	4.06	
05 web wtd	16	12	11	20	14	12	14	3.97	
05 ph wtd	30	10	9	10	11	8	22	3.74	
05 phone	30	10	10	10	12	8	21	3.72	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0046$]

p31_newnuc On a scale from one to seven where one means the US *definitely should not* develop new smaller-yield nuclear weapons, and seven means the US *definitely should* develop such weapons, what is your view?

%	Definitely Should Not							Definitely Should	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean	
05 web	13	8	8	22	20	12	17	4.30	
05 web wtd	16	9	9	23	19	12	13	4.08	
05 ph wtd	33	7	9	11	11	8	21	3.70	
05 phone	32	7	9	10	12	8	22	3.75	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

Now, consider that the US has not conducted a nuclear test explosion since 1992, but if we develop new smaller-yield nuclear weapons, a limited number of underground nuclear tests might be required.

p32_newtest Using a scale from one to seven, where one means the US *definitely should not* develop new smaller-yield nuclear weapons if underground nuclear tests are required, and seven means the US *definitely should*, what is your view?

%	Definitely Should Not							Definitely Should	
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean	
05 web	20	11	10	20	14	9	15	3.84	
05 web wtd	22	12	11	21	15	8	12	3.66	
05 ph wtd	39	9	10	9	10	6	18	3.30	
05 phone	40	9	10	8	10	6	17	3.26	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

Turning to another issue, at the peak of the Cold war, the United States and Russia maintained stockpiles with tens of thousands of nuclear weapons. However, since the end of the Cold War the US and Russia have been decreasing the size of their nuclear stockpiles and are working toward an agreed level of between 1,700 and 2,200 nuclear weapons in each country. China has not made any agreements with the US about nuclear weapons and is currently modernizing its nuclear forces.

With this in mind, please respond to each of the following using a scale from one to seven, where one means you *strongly disagree* and seven means you *strongly agree*.

p33_stockpile1 The US should reduce the number of operational nuclear weapons in its stockpile to between 1,700 and 2,200, as agreed with Russia, regardless of what China is doing.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	13	10	12	19	16	12	18	4.22
05 web wtd	12	11	13	20	15	11	19	4.25
05 ph wtd	19	8	8	9	15	12	30	4.47
05 phone	18	8	8	10	14	12	31	4.53

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0044]

p34_stockpile2 The US should make decisions about its nuclear weapons stockpile based on actions taken by both Russia and China.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	11	7	8	19	18	15	23	4.60
05 web wtd	11	6	8	19	18	14	23	4.63
05 ph wtd	18	5	8	9	15	14	32	4.66
05 phone	17	5	8	9	15	13	34	4.75

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0731] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .6665]

p35_stockpile3 The US should modernize its nuclear stockpile by designing new nuclear weapons that meet the requirements of the new security environment regardless of what Russia and China are doing.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	10	8	8	20	18	13	22	4.55
05 web wtd	11	9	8	22	16	12	21	4.44
05 ph wtd	22	9	8	9	14	10	29	4.29
05 phone	22	8	8	9	15	10	29	4.32

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0037] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0511]

p36_stockpile4 The US should reduce its nuclear weapons below 1,700 in the hope that Russia and China will make similar reductions in their nuclear weapons.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	28	16	12	18	9	7	10	3.21
05 web wtd	27	15	12	19	10	7	11	3.34
05 ph wtd	30	10	9	8	11	8	24	3.82
05 phone	30	10	9	8	11	8	24	3.80

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

Next we want your views about investment priorities. Please indicate how you think government spending should change for each of the following using a scale from one to seven, where one means spending should *substantially decrease* and seven means spending should *substantially increase*.

p37_spend1 How should government spending change for developing and testing new nuclear weapons?

%	Substantially Decrease					Substantially Increase		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	11	9	16	31	19	7	7	3.86
05 web wtd	13	10	16	32	18	6	6	3.74
05 ph wtd	25	13	15	16	15	5	11	3.44
05 phone	24	13	15	15	16	6	11	3.45
03 phone	19	13	21	19	16	6	7	3.42
01 phone	13	13	19	19	19	6	11	3.79
99 phone	18	14	19	19	18	5	7	3.45
97 phone	25	16	20	15	13	3	7	3.13
95 phone	44	14	14	10	9	2	7	2.61
93 phone	40	16	12	9	11	3	8	2.77

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p38_spend2 How should government spending change for preventing weapons of mass destruction from entering through US ports?

%	Substantially Decrease					Substantially Increase		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	2	2	3	16	20	23	35	5.60
05 web wtd	2	2	4	18	21	23	31	5.49
05 ph wtd	5	2	5	9	15	16	49	5.71
05 phone	5	2	5	8	14	17	50	5.73

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0309$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0001$]

p39_spend3 How should government spending change for maintaining the ability to develop and improve US nuclear weapons in the future?

%	Substantially Decrease					Substantially Increase		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	8	7	14	33	19	9	10	4.15
05 web wtd	9	7	15	33	19	9	8	4.06
05 ph wtd	16	9	17	16	18	8	15	3.98
05 phone	17	10	17	15	18	8	16	3.94
03 phone	13	8	11	14	19	15	21	4.47
01 phone	7	7	8	10	21	14	32	5.02
99 phone	10	7	9	13	20	13	28	4.78
97 phone	13	9	12	13	19	10	24	4.45
95 phone	23	8	11	12	16	8	22	4.00
93 phone	23	12	16	12	14	8	16	3.68

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0022$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .1966$]

p40_spend4 How should government spending change for improving US border security?

%	Substantially Decrease					Substantially Increase		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	1	1	4	15	18	20	40	5.68
05 web wtd	1	1	5	17	19	19	37	5.56
05 ph wtd	4	3	5	9	17	17	45	5.63
05 phone	4	3	5	9	16	17	47	5.68

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .9148] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .2130]

p41_spend5 How should government spending change for improving our capabilities for responding to large-scale acts of terrorism in the US?

%	Substantially Decrease					Substantially Increase		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	2	2	5	20	24	21	27	5.32
05 web wtd	1	2	6	21	26	19	25	5.23
05 ph wtd	4	3	6	14	20	14	40	5.44
05 phone	4	3	6	12	19	14	41	5.48

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0102] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0002]

p42_spend6 How should government spending change for helping Russia secure its nuclear weapons and materials?

%	Substantially Decrease					Substantially Increase		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	11	11	14	30	19	7	8	3.89
05 web wtd	11	11	16	31	17	7	7	3.81
05 ph wtd	21	12	15	15	17	7	13	3.72
05 phone	21	12	14	15	18	8	13	3.74

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0365] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .1800]

p43_spend7 How should government spending change for research and development that helps Russia reduce its nuclear stockpile more quickly and safely?

%	Substantially Decrease					Substantially Increase		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	6	7	13	31	22	11	10	4.27
05 web wtd	6	7	15	32	21	10	9	4.20
05 ph wtd	11	8	14	15	20	12	20	4.42
05 phone	12	8	14	15	21	11	20	4.40

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0628] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0005]

Now lets focus more specifically on the issue of terrorism.

p44_winwot Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all confident* and ten means *extremely confident*, how confident are you that we will eventually win the war on terrorism?

%	Not At All Confident						Extremely Confident						Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	15	5	10	9	7	11	9	13	10	5	7	4.71	
05 web wtd	16	5	9	9	7	13	10	12	10	5	6	4.67	
05 ph wtd	10	9	9	8	6	15	8	12	9	4	10	4.91	
05 phone	10	9	9	8	7	15	8	12	9	4	10	4.85	
03 phone	7	5	7	7	8	17	10	11	11	5	12	5.49	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .2280] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0356]

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 have raised questions about what can be done to stop terrorism in the US. Using a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*, please respond to the following statements:

p45_stopter1 There is nothing the government can do to stop determined terrorists.

%	Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree				Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
05 web	18	15	10	12	17	14	13	3.91	
05 web wtd	17	15	10	15	17	12	14	3.92	
05 ph wtd	28	11	8	9	15	11	18	3.75	
05 phone	28	12	8	8	15	11	18	3.75	
03 phone	26	14	11	7	13	13	16	3.70	
01 phone	41	12	7	5	9	9	16	3.22	
95 phone	31	11	10	6	13	8	20	3.65	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0544] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0329]

p46_stopter2 The government could stop terrorists, but only with unacceptable intrusions on people's rights and privacy.

%	Strongly Disagree				Strongly Agree				Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
05 web	17	12	12	19	15	12	13	3.90	
05 web wtd	15	11	13	22	16	12	12	3.95	
05 ph wtd	21	11	10	8	16	12	23	4.13	
05 phone	22	11	10	8	15	12	21	4.05	
03 phone	21	12	14	7	14	12	21	4.02	
01 phone	20	11	12	9	15	11	21	4.07	
95 phone	16	10	8	9	17	12	28	4.48	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0570] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0208]

p47_stopter3 The government must try to stop terrorists, even if it intrudes on some people's rights and privacy.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	15	9	8	15	16	14	24	4.43
05 web wtd	14	10	8	18	15	13	22	4.37
05 ph wtd	18	9	9	10	15	12	28	4.45
05 phone	17	9	8	10	14	13	29	4.50
03 phone	16	8	9	10	14	12	30	4.55
01 phone	8	4	6	7	13	16	47	5.49
95 phone	10	5	8	8	17	15	38	5.12

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .3922] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .2907]

Using a scale where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how would you feel about the following measures for preventing terrorism in the US?

p48_intrude1 Requiring national identification cards for all US citizens.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>				<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	15	6	6	13	13	14	34	4.80
05 web wtd	14	6	5	13	12	15	34	4.87
05 ph wtd	21	6	7	6	11	10	39	4.68
05 phone	19	6	7	6	11	10	41	4.78
03 phone	24	7	5	7	11	11	34	4.46
01 phone	14	7	6	7	13	11	43	5.04
95 phone	27	6	7	8	13	7	32	4.23

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .8201] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0260]

p49_intrude2 Restricting immigration into the US to prevent terrorism.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>				<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	6	4	6	12	13	16	43	5.43
05 web wtd	6	5	7	13	13	16	42	5.34
05 ph wtd	11	7	9	7	13	13	41	5.08
05 phone	10	6	9	7	13	14	42	5.18
03 phone	12	6	8	8	13	13	40	5.03
01 phone	8	5	7	8	14	12	45	5.33

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0007] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0004]

p50_intrude3 Permitting government officials to hold and interrogate suspected terrorists within the US for a period of one year without charging the suspects with a crime.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>				<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	21	10	9	15	12	11	22	4.06
05 web wtd	20	10	10	18	11	11	21	4.07
05 ph wtd	29	10	10	7	12	7	24	3.81
05 phone	28	11	9	8	12	8	24	3.83

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0102] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0019]

Responding to terrorist attacks against the US poses difficult choices involving a range of options. If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country actively supported acts of terrorism in the US by providing personnel or training for terrorists, and it resulted in <randomly insert one of three following options> deaths, please tell me if you would support the following responses by the US. Use a scale from one to seven, where one means you *strongly oppose* such actions and seven means you *strongly support* them.

- a. 10
- b. 1,000
- c. 10,000

p51_dip First, how do you feel about applying strong diplomatic and political pressures against that country?

		<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>							
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean					
05 web	10	2	2	1	8	11	18	59	6.12					
05 web wtd	10	2	2	1	12	11	18	55	6.03					
05 ph wtd	10	5	2	5	3	8	12	65	6.05					
05 phone	10	4	2	3	3	7	14	67	6.17					
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .5840]					[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .8092]				
05 web	1,000	1	0	1	7	12	14	65	6.31					
05 web wtd	1,000	1	0	2	11	13	14	60	6.16					
05 ph wtd	1,000	6	2	3	4	9	9	68	6.05					
05 phone	1,000	5	2	2	3	7	9	73	6.25					
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .4782]					[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .2451]				
05 web	10,000	2	0	3	9	12	13	62	6.15					
05 web wtd	10,000	1	0	3	14	14	12	55	5.96					
05 ph wtd	10,000	5	2	3	3	8	11	68	6.13					
05 phone	10,000	4	2	3	3	8	10	70	6.20					
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .6260]					[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0792]				

p52_econ How do you feel about applying strong economic and trade sanctions against that country?

		<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>							
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean					
05 web	10	2	1	2	8	12	17	58	6.12					
05 web wtd	10	1	2	2	8	14	17	56	6.08					
05 ph wtd	10	5	3	3	6	12	11	60	5.90					
05 phone	10	4	3	3	5	11	13	60	5.96					
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0995]					[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0630]				
05 web	1,000	1	1	0	6	11	15	66	6.35					
05 web wtd	1,000	1	1	0	9	13	14	62	6.21					
05 ph wtd	1,000	4	2	3	8	9	12	63	6.01					
05 phone	1,000	3	2	2	6	8	12	68	6.18					
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0550]					[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0314]				
05 web	10,000	2	1	1	7	11	18	60	6.21					
05 web wtd	10,000	1	1	1	10	14	19	54	6.06					
05 ph wtd	10,000	5	2	5	3	11	14	60	5.95					
05 phone	10,000	4	3	4	2	11	12	64	6.06					
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .1062]					[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .2431]				

p53_bomb How do you feel about conducting air strikes against that country using conventionally armed weapons, such as bombs and cruise missiles?

	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	10	13	6	10	18	17	9	28	4.58
05 web wtd	10	17	5	10	21	16	8	23	4.30
05 ph wtd	10	21	10	11	13	15	4	26	4.04
05 phone	10	23	9	11	14	15	4	23	3.94
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]		[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0622]		
05 web	1,000	10	6	8	16	22	10	28	4.74
05 web wtd	1,000	11	7	7	18	21	9	27	4.64
05 ph wtd	1,000	19	12	9	12	13	5	30	4.21
05 phone	1,000	18	11	10	12	15	6	29	4.29
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0020]		[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0022]		
05 web	10,000	10	5	10	20	15	13	28	4.77
05 web wtd	10,000	11	4	12	19	15	12	27	4.68
05 ph wtd	10,000	11	11	10	11	12	9	36	4.73
05 phone	10,000	12	12	8	11	14	8	35	4.70
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .5852]		[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .7056]		

p54_invade How do you feel about using US military forces to invade that country?

	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	10	20	10	13	18	15	8	17	3.88
05 web wtd	10	20	12	12	20	15	6	15	3.76
05 ph wtd	10	33	14	9	10	14	5	16	3.36
05 phone	10	31	13	11	10	14	5	16	3.43
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0014]		[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0026]		
05 web	1,000	16	10	10	21	18	7	18	4.10
05 web wtd	1,000	17	10	10	23	17	7	17	4.03
05 ph wtd	1,000	26	13	9	11	14	5	22	3.76
05 phone	1,000	26	13	9	11	15	6	21	3.78
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0292]		[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0555]		
05 web	10,000	14	8	13	18	16	12	18	4.25
05 web wtd	10,000	13	7	13	19	17	15	15	4.26
05 ph wtd	10,000	20	11	12	8	17	7	25	4.16
05 phone	10,000	20	12	10	8	18	7	25	4.12
					[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .3507]		[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .4392]		

p55_nuke How do you feel about attacking that country using US *nuclear* weapons?

	Strongly Oppose						Strongly Support			Mean
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
05 web	10	42	16	10	13	8	4	8	2.69	
05 web wtd	10	45	15	9	13	8	3	8	2.61	
05 ph wtd	10	65	13	7	6	3	1	6	1.98	
05 phone	10	63	13	8	6	3	1	7	2.05	
[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]						[Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]				
05 web	1,000	38	16	10	16	10	3	7	2.82	
05 web wtd	1,000	41	14	11	16	10	3	6	2.73	
05 ph wtd	1,000	58	10	10	7	5	2	8	2.30	
05 phone	1,000	55	11	10	8	6	2	8	2.35	
[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0004]						[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0006]				
05 web	10,000	39	16	11	15	8	4	8	2.79	
05 web wtd	10,000	37	16	12	16	10	4	6	2.80	
05 ph wtd	1,0000	51	11	8	10	6	3	11	2.63	
05 phone	10,000	51	12	8	9	7	3	10	2.59	
[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .1340]						[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .1570]				

p56_WOT Now, on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all effective* and ten means *extremely effective*, how effective, overall, do you believe US efforts in the war on terrorism have been thus far?

%	Not At All Effective						Extremely Effective					Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	9	5	9	12	8	15	13	14	9	3	4	4.73
05 web wtd	8	4	9	13	10	16	12	15	8	2	4	4.74
05 ph wtd	6	6	7	9	11	17	13	15	10	2	5	5.05
05 phone	5	5	7	9	10	18	13	15	11	2	4	5.05
03 phone	3	3	5	8	9	18	14	18	12	3	6	5.60
[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0013]						[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0011]						

p57_borders1 How effective have efforts been to improve security at US borders?

%	Not At All Effective						Extremely Effective					Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	15	10	12	12	9	15	11	8	5	2	1	3.71
05 web wtd	13	9	11	12	9	16	13	8	5	3	1	3.98
05 ph wtd	7	8	11	14	12	17	12	9	6	1	3	4.26
05 phone	7	10	12	14	12	17	11	8	6	1	3	4.09
[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0002]						[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0030]						

p58_borders2 How effective have efforts been to improve security at US seaports and harbors?

%	Not At All Effective						Extremely Effective					Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	10	8	11	11	10	17	12	11	7	2	2	4.27
05 web wtd	7	6	11	10	11	18	13	11	7	3	2	4.54
05 ph wtd	4	8	10	12	11	20	13	13	4	1	4	4.61
05 phone	5	9	10	13	11	20	13	11	5	1	3	4.46
[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0518]						[Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .4338]						

p59_borders3 How effective have efforts been to improve security at US airports?

%	Not At All <u>Effective</u>										Extremely <u>Effective</u>	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	5	5	6	8	8	13	15	17	13	6	4	5.46
05 web wtd	4	5	6	8	8	12	15	18	13	6	5	5.62
05 ph wtd	2	3	5	7	9	14	13	20	14	5	9	5.97
05 phone	2	4	6	8	9	15	13	18	14	5	7	5.77
03 phone	4	3	6	8	10	22	13	16	10	2	5	5.40

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0015] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0001]

On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all confident* and ten means *completely confident*, how confident are you that the US can achieve each of the following in the next ten years?

p60_USlarge How confident are you that the US can prevent large-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill thousands of people from occurring in the US in the next ten years?

%	Not At All <u>Confident</u>										Completely <u>Confident</u>	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	13	4	10	11	9	13	12	14	9	3	3	4.53
05 web wtd	11	4	9	10	11	14	11	15	10	3	3	4.72
05 ph wtd	5	5	5	9	10	18	11	15	13	3	7	5.34
05 phone	5	6	5	9	10	18	11	15	12	3	6	5.26

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

p61_wldlarge How confident are you that the US can prevent large-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill thousands of people from occurring anywhere in the world in the next ten years?

%	Not At All <u>Confident</u>										Completely <u>Confident</u>	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	26	8	12	14	11	12	8	5	2	1	1	2.90
05 web wtd	25	9	10	15	11	12	8	5	2	1	1	3.03
05 ph wtd	12	12	15	15	13	16	5	6	3	1	3	3.46
05 phone	12	14	14	16	12	17	5	5	2	1	3	3.40

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

p62_USsmall How confident are you that the US can prevent small-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill a few people from occurring in the US in the next ten years?

%	Not At All <u>Confident</u>										Completely <u>Confident</u>	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	18	7	10	10	9	14	8	10	8	3	3	4.04
05 web wtd	16	6	9	10	9	15	10	10	8	3	4	4.28
05 ph wtd	10	11	9	11	10	17	8	10	7	3	6	4.41
05 phone	10	11	9	12	10	16	8	10	7	3	5	4.27

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0404] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .2201]

p63_wldsmall How confident are you that the US can prevent small-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill a few people from occurring anywhere in the world in the next ten years?

%	<u>Not At All Confident</u>										<u>Completely Confident</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	36	10	12	12	7	10	5	5	2	1	1	2.45	
05 web wtd	33	9	13	12	8	11	5	5	3	1	1	2.66	
05 ph wtd	20	23	13	12	8	10	4	4	2	1	3	2.75	
05 phone	21	24	14	11	8	10	3	4	2	1	3	2.66	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0354] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .3869]

p64_water How confident are you that the US can prevent terrorist attacks that destroy critical US infrastructures, like water and power plants in the next ten years?

%	<u>Not At All Confident</u>										<u>Completely Confident</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	14	5	10	11	10	15	10	12	8	3	2	4.33	
05 web wtd	12	5	9	11	10	15	11	13	8	3	4	4.51	
05 ph wtd	5	6	7	11	11	20	12	11	10	3	5	4.93	
05 phone	6	6	8	11	11	20	12	11	9	2	4	4.80	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

Efforts to prevent terrorism are causing debate about whether we should limit privacy and personal liberties in an effort to improve national security.

On a scale from one to seven where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how do you feel about the government taking the following measures in an effort to help prevent terrorism?

p65_bigbro1 Collecting personal information about you, such as your name, address, phone number, income, and social security number.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	24	11	9	17	14	10	14	3.75
05 web wtd	25	10	9	17	14	12	13	3.72
05 ph wtd	28	10	9	8	15	9	22	3.85
05 phone	29	8	8	8	14	9	23	3.89

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .1085] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .1006]

p66_bigbro2 Collecting information about your behavior, such as where you shop, what you buy, what organizations you belong to, and where you travel.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	38	14	11	14	11	5	7	2.88
05 web wtd	37	13	11	16	11	6	6	2.93
05 ph wtd	46	13	9	7	10	5	10	2.80
05 phone	45	12	9	7	11	5	11	2.86

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .7531] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0684]

p67_bigbro3 Conducting pat-down searches of your clothing and inspections of your belongings.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	23	10	10	18	15	10	14	3.79
05 web wtd	23	9	11	18	16	10	13	3.79
05 ph wtd	37	11	9	8	13	7	15	3.30
05 phone	37	11	9	7	13	7	16	3.34

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p68_bigbro4 Taking photographic images of you without your knowledge.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	38	14	9	15	11	5	8	2.93
05 web wtd	37	14	10	16	11	6	6	2.95
05 ph wtd	52	12	7	7	9	5	9	2.60
05 phone	51	11	7	7	9	4	10	2.65

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0004$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p69_bigbro5 Taking harmless electronic scans of your hands and face.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	21	8	8	16	17	13	18	4.10
05 web wtd	21	8	8	18	17	13	16	4.05
05 ph wtd	36	9	8	5	14	10	19	3.58
05 phone	35	9	8	5	14	9	20	3.60

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p70_bigbro6 Taking a sample of your DNA.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	34	9	8	15	12	9	14	3.45
05 web wtd	35	9	8	15	12	9	13	3.40
05 ph wtd	46	10	5	6	9	8	17	3.11
05 phone	46	9	6	6	9	7	17	3.13

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0002$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0005$]

In this next series of questions, I would like to ask about your views on the government in Washington. I am not asking about Democrats or Republicans in particular, just the government, in general.

p71_doright First, on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *none of the time* and ten means *all of the time*, how much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right for the American people?

%	None of the Time										All of the Time	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	9	10	13	13	10	15	10	11	6	2	1	4.05
05 web wtd	8	8	11	13	12	15	12	11	6	2	2	4.25
05 ph wtd	6	7	9	13	10	23	11	9	7	2	4	4.55
05 phone	6	8	8	12	10	23	12	10	7	2	3	4.58

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0009$]

p72_USest Now, using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means you have *no confidence* and ten means you have *complete confidence*, how much confidence do you have in our government's ability to accurately assess the threat of terrorism occurring in the US?

%	No Confidence										Complete Confidence	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	9	5	10	12	10	17	12	12	9	3	2	4.49
05 web wtd	9	4	8	11	11	18	12	12	10	3	2	4.68
05 ph wtd	4	4	7	11	10	18	13	16	11	3	4	5.20
05 phone	5	4	7	10	10	18	13	15	12	3	4	5.18

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p73_wrldest Again, using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no confidence* and ten means *complete confidence*, how much confidence do you have in the US government's ability to accurately assess the threat of terrorism occurring elsewhere in the world?

%	No Confidence										Complete Confidence	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
05 web	13	9	12	14	11	17	10	7	4	1	1	3.67
05 web wtd	12	8	12	14	12	17	11	8	4	1	1	3.79
05 ph wtd	7	7	13	15	17	18	9	8	4	1	2	4.03
05 phone	7	7	12	15	17	19	9	7	4	1	2	4.07

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0060$]

p74_hilow When US government assessments of threats of terrorism are wrong, do you believe they tend to assess the threats as lower than they really are, or do they tend to assess the threats as higher than they really are?

%	Lower	Higher
05 web	41	59
05 web wtd	39	61
05 phone wtd	40	60
05 phone	39	61

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .2298$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .8287$]

Now I want to know about the level of confidence you have in different agencies to respond to terrorist attacks that cause mass casualties like 9/11. Please use a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all confident* and ten means *extremely confident* when considering each of the following.

p75_respond1 How confident are you in the ability of the US Department of Homeland Security to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	10	6	8	8	9	14	12	14	10	5	4	4.87	
05 web wtd	8	5	7	9	8	13	15	14	11	4	5	5.16	
05 ph wtd	5	3	5	7	9	16	12	17	15	4	7	5.68	
05 phone	5	4	5	8	8	17	12	16	15	4	7	5.62	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

p76_respond2 How confident are you in the ability of the US Department of Defense, including active, reserve, and National Guard forces, to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	5	3	5	7	8	14	9	16	15	8	11	5.99	
05 web wtd	4	2	4	6	8	14	11	16	15	9	12	6.22	
05 ph wtd	2	2	3	4	6	12	11	18	20	8	15	6.78	
05 phone	2	2	3	4	6	12	11	17	21	8	14	6.73	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

p77_respond3 How confident are you in the ability of your state government to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	10	7	11	11	11	17	12	10	6	3	3	4.36	
05 web wtd	8	5	10	10	13	18	12	11	7	3	3	4.59	
05 ph wtd	5	4	7	10	10	19	13	13	11	2	6	5.18	
05 phone	5	5	7	10	10	20	12	13	10	2	6	5.14	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

p78_respond4 How confident are you in the ability of your city and county government to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
05 web	14	9	12	11	10	16	10	8	5	3	3	3.84	
05 web wtd	12	7	11	14	10	16	10	8	5	3	3	4.06	
05 ph wtd	7	8	9	10	12	19	10	11	7	2	6	4.61	
05 phone	7	8	10	11	11	19	10	11	7	2	5	4.58	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

Now I would like to know about your beliefs concerning a variety of issues.

p79_nature First, on a scale where zero means nature is *robust and not easily damaged* and ten means nature is *fragile and easily damaged*, how do you view nature?

%	Robust and <i>Not Easily Damaged</i>						Fragile and <i>Is Easily Damaged</i>					Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
05 web	3	2	6	8	8	16	9	14	15	5	15	6.13
05 web wtd	3	2	5	10	8	16	9	13	14	5	15	6.11
05 ph wtd	3	3	3	5	5	15	7	12	15	5	27	6.85
05 phone	3	3	3	5	5	15	7	12	15	5	27	6.85
02(E) phone	2	2	3	3	4	13	7	11	17	7	33	7.36

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

[Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p80_env On a scale where zero means the natural environment is *not at all threatened* and ten means the natural environment is on the *brink of disaster*, how do you assess the current state of the natural environment?

%	Not at All Threatened					Brink of Disaster					Mean	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		10
05 web	2	2	5	8	8	20	16	18	12	5	6	5.83
05 web wtd	1	1	5	8	8	20	17	17	13	4	6	5.90
05 ph wtd	2	2	3	8	10	17	15	16	12	4	12	6.03
05 phone	2	2	3	8	8	18	15	16	12	4	11	6.03
02(E) phone	1	1	3	5	6	19	16	18	14	6	11	6.40
01 phone	1	2	3	7	9	18	16	17	14	5	10	6.22
97 phone	1	3	4	8	10	17	14	19	11	4	9	5.95

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0282$]

[Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .1405$]

Please respond to each of the following statements using a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*.

p81_beliefs1 It is vital to enlist the cooperation of other countries in dealing with international security and terrorism.

%	Strongly Disagree					Strongly Agree		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	2	2	2	12	19	22	41	5.76
05 web wtd	2	2	2	14	20	22	38	5.68
05 ph wtd	3	2	3	7	15	15	55	5.95
05 phone	3	2	2	6	15	16	57	6.03

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

[Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p82_beliefs2 Widely shared problems such as energy, disease, and protecting the environment can best be handled by fostering international cooperation.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	4	3	6	17	21	19	30	5.28
05 web wtd	4	3	6	19	22	18	28	5.17
05 ph wtd	4	3	3	7	17	19	47	5.74
05 phone	4	3	3	7	16	18	49	5.79

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p83_beliefs3 The free flow of trade and economic investments between countries is essential.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	3	3	6	19	24	21	24	5.16
05 web wtd	3	3	6	21	24	20	24	5.13
05 ph wtd	3	2	6	9	18	18	44	5.67
05 phone	3	2	5	8	18	19	44	5.72

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$]

p84_beliefs4 The US can never entrust its security to international organizations such as the United Nations.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	7	6	8	18	14	14	33	5.01
05 web wtd	7	7	9	20	15	14	28	4.84
05 ph wtd	14	8	9	12	15	11	31	4.65
05 phone	13	8	9	11	15	10	34	4.71

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p < .0001$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0140$]

p85_beliefs5 Even though allies are important, the US must be willing to act alone to protect American interests.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	6	6	6	13	16	17	36	5.24
05 web wtd	5	6	6	15	18	17	34	5.20
05 ph wtd	8	5	6	8	15	14	44	5.35
05 phone	8	6	6	7	16	14	43	5.31

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: $p = .3264$] [Weighted: web vs. phone: $p = .0359$]

p86_beliefs6 The US must be willing to act preemptively by using military force against those that threaten us before they can attack us.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	12	8	8	19	18	15	20	4.46
05 web wtd	10	9	9	21	18	16	18	4.44
05 ph wtd	18	9	9	12	18	10	25	4.31
05 phone	18	9	9	12	17	10	26	4.32

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0847] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0996]

p87_beliefs7 What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	17	10	10	24	17	10	11	3.92
05 web wtd	14	11	10	25	18	10	13	4.03
05 ph wtd	18	9	9	12	19	10	23	4.27
05 phone	20	10	8	13	18	10	22	4.15

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0034] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0020]

p88_beliefs8 Society works best if power is shared equally.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	6	6	10	22	20	16	19	4.66
05 web wtd	5	9	12	21	20	16	18	4.61
05 ph wtd	10	6	9	12	17	14	34	4.95
05 phone	9	6	9	11	17	14	34	4.98

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

p89_beliefs9 It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	17	9	11	20	17	11	16	4.08
05 web wtd	16	9	10	20	17	11	17	4.16
05 ph wtd	21	9	9	9	15	11	27	4.27
05 phone	22	10	10	10	15	10	25	4.14

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .4706] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .1564]

p90_beliefs10 In the long run, spreading democracy is the best way to create a peaceful world.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
05 web	6	6	11	22	20	15	20	4.71
05 web wtd	6	6	11	25	19	14	18	4.61
05 ph wtd	9	5	10	13	17	12	34	5.00
05 phone	8	5	9	12	17	13	35	5.06

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p < .0001]

p91_beliefs11 If terrorists use a nuclear weapon against the US, we would be justified in using nuclear weapons to fight a war on terrorism.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
05 web	11	6	8	18	15	13	29	4.75	
05 web wtd	11	6	9	20	15	14	26	4.69	
05 ph wtd	16	9	9	8	13	11	35	4.68	
05 phone	16	9	8	8	13	12	35	4.67	

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .2855] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .8638]

p92_faith Now using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important is religious faith in your life?

%	<u>Not At All Important</u>					<u>Extremely Important</u>					Mean	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		10
05 web	8	2	4	3	3	11	6	9	11	7	36	6.91
05 web wtd	8	3	3	3	3	12	7	10	10	6	35	6.87
05 ph wtd	5	4	4	4	2	9	5	12	9	7	40	7.15
05 phone	5	4	5	4	3	8	5	11	9	7	40	7.13

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .0782] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .0188]

Finally, I need some basic background information.

p93_zip What is the zip code at your residence? (verbatim)

p94_reside Including yourself, how many people currently live at your residence?

		Means
Public	05 web	2.62
Public	05 phone	2.69
Public	03 phone	2.60
Public	01 phone	2.76
Public	99 phone	2.77
Public	97 phone	2.70
Public	95 phone	2.80
Public	93 phone	2.79

p95_ovr18 How many are 18 years of age or older?

		Means
Public	05 web	2.23
Public	05 phone	2.27
Public	03 phone	2.24
Public	01 phone	2.23
Public	99 phone	2.24
Public	97 phone	2.23
Public	95 phone	2.22

p96_party With which political party do you most identify?

		<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Independent</u>	<u>Other</u>
		1	2	3	4
Public	05 web	32	41	18	9
	05 web weighted	36	37	17	11
	05 phone weighted	46	42	9	4
Public	05 phone	43	45	9	4
Public	03 phone	41	45	10	5
Public	01 phone	44	45	7	4
Public	99 phone	47	41	6	6
Public	97 phone	43	44	10	3
Public	95 phone	37	37	23	3
Public	93 phone	43	39	16	2

p97_iden Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with that political party?

		<u>Slightly</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Completely</u>	
		1	2	3	Mean
Public	05 web	13	64	23	2.11
	05 web weighted	14	63	24	2.10
	05 phone weighted	14	55	31	2.17
Public	05 phone	13	56	32	2.19
Public	03 phone	11	56	33	2.22
Public	01 phone	8	53	39	2.31
Public	99 phone	22	60	19	2.03
Public	97 phone	21	61	18	2.03
Public	95 phone	21	58	21	1.99
Public	93 phone	18	55	26	2.08

p98_ideol On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from *strongly liberal* to *strongly conservative*. Which of the following categories best describes your views?

		<u>Strongly Liberal</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Slightly Liberal</u>	<u>Middle of the road</u>	<u>Slightly Conserv.</u>	<u>Conserv.</u>	<u>Strongly Conserv.</u>	
		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean
	05 web	5	12	11	31	15	21	5	4.23
	05 web wtd	5	12	13	33	13	18	6	4.14
	05 ph wtd	6	13	11	28	18	18	7	4.21
	05 phone	5	13	10	26	18	19	8	4.28
	03 phone	6	12	10	27	18	19	9	4.34
	01 phone	4	12	11	27	18	19	9	4.35
	99 phone	4	13	8	29	17	20	8	4.37
	97 phone	4	10	11	28	17	24	7	4.43
	95 phone	2	10	11	28	21	20	7	4.46
	93 phone	4	12	12	28	17	19	9	4.34

[Unweighted: web vs. phone: p = .4039] [Weighted: web vs. phone: p = .2116]

p99_race Which of the following best describes your race or ethnic background?

%	American Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White, non-Hispanic	Other
Public 05 web	1	2	3	3	89	2
Public 05 ph	2	2	5	4	83	4
Public 03 ph	3	1	5	4	85	1
Public 01 ph	3	3	6	5	81	3
Public 99 ph	2	2	7	5	79	4
Public 97 ph	2	1	6	4	81	5
Public 95 ph	2	2	7	4	79	6
Public 93 ph	2	2	6	4	84	2

p100_inc Please indicate which of the following income categories approximates the total estimated annual income for your *household* for the year 2002.

%	< \$10K	\$10–20K	\$20–30K	\$30–40K	\$40–50K
	1	2	3	4	5
Public 05 web	4	8	15	14	11
Public 05 ph	4	7	11	10	11

%	\$50–60K	\$60–70K	\$70–80K	\$80–90K	\$90–100K
	6	7	8	9	10
Public 05 web	12	9	7	5	3
Public 05 ph	10	10	7	5	5

%	\$100–110K	\$110–1200K	\$120–130K	\$130–140K	\$140–150K
	11	12	13	14	15
Public 05 web	3	2	2	1	1
Public 05 ph	3	4	2	2	1

%	> \$150K	Median
	16	
Public 05 web	4	5
Public 05 ph	7	6

Median Ranges

Pub 05 web	Pub 05 ph	Pub 03 ph	Pub 01 ph	Pub 99 ph	Pub 97 ph	Pub 95 ph	Pub 93 ph
\$40K–50K	\$50K–60K	\$40K–50K	\$50K–60K	\$40K–50K	\$40K–50K	\$30K–40K	\$35K–40K

Appendix 3: Questions, Distributions, and Means: Internet Panel Survey

Q1_edu What is the highest level of education you have completed?

%	Public 05 Web-A All (1,535)	Public 05 Web-A Panel (555)	Public 05 Web-C Panel (555)
< High school graduate	1	1	1
High school graduate	15	15	16
Some college/voca. school	41	40	38
College graduate	24	26	26
Some graduate work	7	6	7
Master's degree	9	8	9
J.D. or higher law degree	NA	NA	NA
Doctorate	2	3	3
Other degree	1	1	1

Q2_age How old are you?

	Means
Public 05: Web-A All (1,535)	49.4
Public 05: Web-A Panel (555)	52.4
Public 05: Web-C Panel (555)	52.7

Q3_gend As part of the survey, I am required to ask: are you male or female?

%	Female	Male
Public 05: Web-A All (1,535)	46.2	53.8
Public 05: Web-A Panel (555)	48.8	51.2
Public 05: Web-C Panel (555)	48.8	51.2

Now I want to ask you some questions about today's security conditions.

Q4_intnow Considering international security as a whole, using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all secure* and ten means *completely secure*, how do you rate international security today?

%	Not at All Secure										Completely Secure		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	5	3	8	13	13	23	13	13	6	1	1	4.64	
web-A 555	6	3	10	14	13	24	12	11	5	1	0	4.42	
web-C 555	6	4	10	17	15	21	11	10	4	0	1	4.24	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0412] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0097]

Q5_Usnow Using the scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all secure* and ten means *completely secure*, how do you rate the security of the United States today?

%	Not at All Secure										Completely Secure		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	4	3	5	10	11	18	15	17	12	3	1	5.21	
web-A 555	5	4	6	11	12	17	16	15	10	3	0	5.00	
web-C 555	5	4	8	8	12	20	14	17	9	3	1	4.95	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0648] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .1263]

Q6_big Which of the following would you say poses the single, biggest threat to security in the United States today? Is it:

Cause	% web-A_1535	% web-A_555	% web-C_555
1. Poverty and economic inequality	10	8	11
2. Threats to the environment	2	2	1
3. Religious and political extremism	24	25	25
4. War between nations	6	5	4
5. Acts of terrorism	36	39	42
6. Crime and corruption	14	11	9
7. Something else	8	9	8

Now I want you to consider the different arguments that people make about the effect of the conflict in Iraq on US security.

Q7_Iraq Using a scale from one to seven, where one means the ongoing conflict in Iraq is *greatly decreasing* US security and seven means it is *greatly increasing* US security, what kind of effect do you think the conflict in Iraq is having on US security?

%	Greatly Decreasing US Security						Greatly Increasing US Security		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	15	9	17	25	18	9	7	3.78	
web-A 555	15	11	18	26	15	7	7	3.65	
web-C 555	15	10	18	26	17	9	6	3.70	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .1269] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0718]

Q10_nucter Now I want you to assess the risk of nuclear terrorism. Again, using the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of terrorists using nuclear weapons against us, including so-called dirty bombs, within the next ten years?

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	1	1	3	5	6	13	15	20	16	6	13	6.60	
web-A 555	0	1	3	5	7	13	16	19	15	7	14	6.66	
web-C 555	0	1	4	8	7	17	15	18	13	6	11	6.29	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .6084] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0033]

Q11_chembio On the same scale from zero to ten, where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk that terrorists will use chemical or biological weapons against us within the next ten years?

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	0	1	2	3	4	12	12	20	20	11	16	7.12	
web-A 555	0	1	2	3	4	10	12	22	20	10	16	7.15	
web-C 555	0	0	1	4	4	12	16	19	20	9	14	7.04	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .7314] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .4769]

Q44_winwot Using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all confident* and ten means *extremely confident*, how confident are you that we will eventually win the war on terrorism?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	15	5	10	9	7	11	9	13	10	5	7	4.71	
web-A 555	16	6	11	8	7	12	8	14	8	4	6	4.51	
web-C 555	14	6	10	12	8	15	8	8	8	4	6	4.36	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .1898] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .1306]

The terrorist attacks in New York and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001 have raised questions about what can be done to stop terrorism in the US. Using a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*, please respond to the following statements:

Q45_stopter1 There is nothing the government can do to stop determined terrorists.

%	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	18	15	10	12	17	14	13	3.91	
web-A 555	20	14	10	10	19	14	13	3.88	
web-C 555	15	11	15	14	20	14	10	3.97	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .7299] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .4447]

Q46_stopter2 The government could stop terrorists, but only with unacceptable intrusions on people's rights and privacy.

%	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	17	12	12	19	15	12	13	3.90	
web-A 555	17	12	13	20	14	12	13	3.88	
web-C 555	12	11	17	16	18	15	11	4.07	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .8709] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0166]

Q47_stopter3 The government must try to stop terrorists, even if it intrudes on some people's rights and privacy.

%	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	15	9	8	15	16	14	24	4.43	
web-A 555	16	8	7	16	15	15	23	4.43	
web-C 555	12	7	8	16	19	18	20	4.55	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .9776] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .1370]

Using a scale where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how would you feel about the following measures for preventing terrorism in the US?

Q48_intrude1 Requiring national identification cards for all US citizens.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	15	6	6	13	13	14	34	4.80
web-A 555	15	6	5	11	13	15	34	4.83
web-C 555	13	7	7	14	11	17	32	4.82

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .7832] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .8363]

Q49_intrude2 Restricting immigration into the US to prevent terrorism.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	6	4	6	12	13	16	43	5.43
web-A 555	7	4	4	12	12	18	42	5.42
web-C 555	6	5	5	11	12	18	43	5.43

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .8559] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .3180]

Q50_intrude3 Permitting government officials to hold and interrogate suspected terrorists within the US for a period of one year without charging the suspect with a crime.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	21	10	9	15	12	11	22	4.06
web-A 555	23	10	10	16	11	10	20	3.96
web-C 555	18	12	10	13	14	12	21	4.12

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .3708] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0053]

Responding to terrorist attacks against the US poses difficult choices involving a range of options. If our government determines to a high degree of certainty that another country actively supported acts of terrorism in the US by providing personnel or training for terrorists, and it resulted in <randomly insert one of three following options> deaths, please tell me if you would support the following responses by the US. Use a scale from one to seven, where one means you *strongly oppose* such actions and seven means you *strongly support* them.

- a. 10
- b. 1,000
- c. 10,000

Q50a Distributions of randomly assigned assumed deaths

%	10 Deaths	1,000 Deaths	10,000 Deaths
Web-A 1535	36	28	36
Web-A 555	35	28	36
Web-C 555	37	31	32

Q51_dip First, how do you feel about applying strong diplomatic and political pressures against that country?

	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	10	2	2	1	8	11	18	59	6.12
web-A 555	10	4	2	0	6	13	18	58	6.09
web-C 555	10	1	0	1	10	14	17	57	6.12
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .7956] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 72): p = .6700]									
web-A 1535	1,000	1	0	1	7	12	14	65	6.31
web-A 555	1,000	0	0	1	8	10	18	63	6.33
web-C 555	1,000	1	3	1	3	14	16	61	6.16
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .8336] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 48): p = .5282]									
web-A 1535	10,000	2	0	3	9	12	13	62	6.15
web-A 555	10,000	1	1	1	7	12	10	68	6.31
web-C 555	10,000	1	1	1	8	16	14	59	6.16
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .1287] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 61): p = .6211]									

Q52_econ How do you feel about applying strong economic and trade sanctions against that country?

	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	10	2	1	2	8	12	17	58	6.12
web-A 555	10	2	2	1	9	13	18	55	6.05
web-C 555	10	1	0	2	10	17	18	52	6.04
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .5199] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 72): p = .7819]									
web-A 1535	1,000	1	1	0	6	11	15	66	6.35
web-A 555	1,000	1	1	0	5	9	17	67	6.42
web-C 555	1,000	1	2	4	4	12	17	61	6.19
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .4995] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 48): p = .2220]									
web-A 1535	10,000	2	1	1	7	11	18	60	6.21
web-A 555	10,000	2	1	1	6	8	16	66	6.30
web-C 555	10,000	1	2	2	5	15	12	64	6.25
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .3727] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 61): p = .2259]									

Q53_bomb How do you feel about conducting air strikes against that country using conventionally armed weapons, such as bombs and cruise missiles?

	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	10	13	6	10	18	17	9	28	4.58
web-A 555	10	16	9	10	18	13	13	22	4.29
web-C 555	10	11	6	14	22	14	10	23	4.42
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0890] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 72): p = .4242]									
web-A 1535	1,000	10	6	8	16	22	10	28	4.74
web-A 555	1,000	10	4	8	15	22	15	26	4.81
web-C 555	1,000	12	5	9	21	13	12	28	4.67
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .6788] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 48): p = .1241]									
web-A 1535	10,000	10	5	10	20	15	13	28	4.77
web-A 555	10,000	10	5	12	21	13	13	26	4.64
web-C 555	10,000	11	5	7	25	20	9	23	4.58
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .4001] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 61): p = .8118]									

Q54_inva How do you feel about using US military forces to invade that country?

	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	10	20	10	13	18	15	8	17	3.88
web-A 555	10	27	12	11	15	12	11	11	3.50
web-C 555	10	18	11	15	21	14	9	12	3.78
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0280] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 72): p = .3000]									
web-A 1535	1,000	16	10	10	21	18	7	18	4.10
web-A 555	1,000	17	7	10	20	18	9	19	4.15
web-C 555	1,000	18	9	12	23	12	9	16	3.94
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .7582] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 48): p = .6430]									
web-A 1535	10,000	14	8	13	18	16	12	18	4.25
web-A 555	10,000	15	10	15	21	16	9	14	3.99
web-C 555	1,0000	17	7	16	19	16	10	14	3.97
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .1076] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 61): p = .4840]									

Q55_nuke How do you feel about attacking that country using US *nuclear* weapons?

	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>			Mean
	Deaths	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	10	42	16	10	13	8	4	8	2.69
web-A 555	10	52	12	11	10	6	3	6	2.40
web-C 555	10	52	14	10	9	6	2	8	2.40
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0656] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 72): p = .6103]									
web-A 1535	1,000	38	16	10	16	10	3	7	2.82
web-A 555	1,000	36	18	10	13	14	3	7	2.87
web-C 555	1,000	44	18	13	8	6	2	9	2.56
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .7531] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 48): p = .0103]									
web-A 1535	10,000	39	16	11	15	8	4	8	2.79
web-A 555	10,000	43	16	11	13	6	3	7	2.63
web-C 555	1,0000	48	14	14	10	5	2	7	2.45
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .3260] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555 (n = 61): p = .3034]									

Q56_WOT Now, on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all effective* and ten means *extremely effective*, how effective, overall, do you believe US efforts in the war on terrorism have been thus far?

	<u>Not At All Effective</u>					<u>Extremely Effective</u>					Mean	
	%	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8		9
web-A 1535	9	5	9	12	8	15	13	14	9	3	4	4.73
web-A 555	9	6	9	13	8	13	14	14	7	3	3	4.58
web-C 555	9	6	10	12	8	15	13	17	7	2	1	4.53
[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .2614] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .3266]												

Q57_borders1 How effective have efforts been to improve security at US borders?

%	Not At All Effective										Extremely Effective	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
web-A 1535	15	10	12	12	9	15	11	8	5	2	1	3.71
web-A 555	14	12	13	12	8	14	12	9	3	1	1	3.56
web-C 555	17	10	14	13	10	15	9	6	3	1	1	3.34

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .2422] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = 0654]

Q58_borders2 How effective have efforts been to improve security at US seaports and harbors?

%	Not At All Effective										Extremely Effective	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
web-A 1535	10	8	11	11	10	17	12	11	7	2	2	4.27
web-A 555	12	8	12	11	10	17	12	10	5	1	2	4.00
web-C 555	13	8	9	10	12	19	13	8	5	2	1	4.01

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0380] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .8470]

Q59_borders3 How effective have efforts been to improve security at US airports?

%	Not At All Effective										Extremely Effective	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
web-A 1535	5	5	6	8	8	13	15	17	13	6	4	5.46
web-A 555	5	5	6	9	6	15	16	15	16	4	3	5.36
web-C 555	5	4	5	6	8	15	15	17	16	6	4	5.63

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .4125] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0164]

On a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all confident* and ten means *completely confident*, how confident are you that the US can achieve each of the following in the next ten years?

Q60_USlarge How confident are you that the US can prevent large-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill thousands of people from occurring in the US in the next ten years?

%	Not At All Confident										Completely Confident	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
web-A 1535	13	4	10	11	9	13	12	14	9	3	3	4.53
web-A 555	15	4	10	12	8	14	11	15	8	2	2	4.33
web-C 555	13	6	10	11	10	14	12	13	7	2	2	4.25

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .1446] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .2290]

Q61_wldlarge How confident are you that the US can prevent large-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill thousands of people from occurring anywhere in the world in the next ten years?

%	Not At All Confident										Completely Confident	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
web-A 1535	26	8	12	14	11	12	8	5	2	1	1	2.90
web-A 555	32	7	12	14	12	11	5	4	2	0	1	2.57
web-C 555	29	10	15	12	11	12	5	4	1	0	1	2.56

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0068] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .9466]

Q62_USsmall How confident are you that the US can prevent small-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill a few people from occurring in the US in the next ten years?

%	Not At All Confident										Completely Confident	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
web-A 1535	18	7	10	10	9	14	8	10	8	3	3	4.04
web-A 555	20	7	9	11	9	12	9	10	7	4	3	3.88
web-C 555	19	9	10	11	10	14	8	8	8	2	2	3.72

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .2561] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .1335]

Q63_wldsmall How confident are you that the US can prevent small-scale terrorist attacks that injure or kill a few people from occurring anywhere in the world in the next ten years?

%	Not At All Confident										Completely Confident	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
web-A 1535	36	10	12	12	7	10	5	5	2	1	1	2.45
web-A 555	40	8	13	11	7	10	5	4	2	0	1	2.22
web-C 555	40	11	12	11	5	13	3	3	1	1	1	2.14

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0570] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .3985]

Q64_water How confident are you that the US can prevent terrorist attacks that destroy critical US infrastructures, like water and power plants in the next ten years?

%	Not At All Confident										Completely Confident	Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
web-A 1535	14	5	10	11	10	15	10	12	8	3	2	4.33
web-A 555	16	6	9	12	9	14	10	12	8	3	2	4.07
web-C 555	14	7	10	12	11	16	9	9	7	3	2	4.03

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0575] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .7952]

Efforts to prevent terrorism are causing debate about whether we should limit privacy and personal liberties in an effort to improve national security.

On a scale from one to seven where one means *strongly oppose* and seven means *strongly support*, how do you feel about the government taking the following measures in an effort to help prevent terrorism?

Q65_bigbro1 Collecting personal information about you, such as your name, address, phone number, income, and social security number.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	24	11	9	17	14	10	14	3.75
web-A 555	23	11	10	19	12	11	14	3.75
web-C 555	21	9	9	20	16	12	13	3.87

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .9836] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0915]

Q66_bigbro2 Collecting information about your behavior, such as where you shop, what you buy, what organizations you belong to, and where you travel?

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	38	14	11	14	11	5	7	2.88
web-A 555	38	14	11	14	12	5	6	2.86
web-C 555	32	14	14	15	10	8	6	3.06

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .8159] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0034]

Q67_bigbro3 conducting pat-down searches of your clothing and inspections of your belongings?

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	23	10	10	18	15	10	14	3.79
web-A 555	22	10	11	18	15	11	13	3.78
web-C 555	20	9	11	19	16	11	13	3.92

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .9583] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .1073]

Q68_bigbro4 Taking photographic images of you without your knowledge?

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	38	14	9	15	11	5	8	2.93
web-A 555	36	15	9	17	9	6	8	2.95
web-C 555	32	12	11	15	14	8	8	3.20

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .8156] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0029]

Q69_bigbro5 Taking harmless electronic scans of your hands and face?

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	21	8	8	16	17	13	18	4.10	
web-A 555	19	8	9	16	17	14	18	4.16	
web-C 555	19	8	6	19	16	14	19	4.22	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .5468] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .3199]

Q70_bigbro6 Taking a sample of your DNA?

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	34	9	8	15	12	9	14	3.45	
web-A 555	33	10	7	16	10	10	13	3.43	
web-C 555	30	9	7	17	11	11	14	3.60	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .8159] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0267]

In this next series of questions, I would like to ask about your views on the government in Washington. I am not asking about Democrats or Republicans in particular, just the government, in general.

Q71_doright First, on a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *none of the time* and ten means *all of the time*, how much of the time do you trust the government in Washington to do what is right for the American people?

%	<u>None of the Time</u>										<u>All of the Time</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	9	10	13	13	10	15	10	11	6	2	1	4.05	
web-A 555	10	9	14	12	11	15	9	11	6	1	1	3.98	
web-C 555	10	8	15	13	9	15	10	11	7	2	0	4.00	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .5589] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .7917]

Q72_USest Now, using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means you have *no confidence* and ten means you have *complete confidence*, how much confidence do you have in our government's ability to accurately assess the threat of terrorism occurring in the US?

%	<u>No Confidence</u>										<u>Complete Confidence</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	9	5	10	12	10	17	12	12	9	3	2	4.49	
web-A 555	11	7	10	13	9	15	13	12	7	3	1	4.31	
web-C 555	11	7	8	12	13	13	12	14	6	3	1	4.33	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .1607] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .8222]

Q74_hilow When US government assessments of threats of terrorism are wrong, do you believe they tend to assess the threats as lower than they really are, or do they tend to assess the threats as higher than they really are?

%	Lower	Higher
web-A 1535	41	59
web-A 555	44	55
web-C 555	48	52

Now I want to know about the level of confidence you have in different agencies to respond to terrorist attacks that cause mass casualties like 9/11. Please use a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all confident* and ten means *extremely confident* when considering each of the following.

Q75_respond1 How confident are you in the ability of the US Department of Homeland Security to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	10	6	8	8	9	14	12	14	10	5	4	4.87	
web-A 555	11	5	10	8	8	14	13	12	11	5	3	4.78	
web-C 555	10	5	8	7	11	14	12	12	12	5	3	4.92	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .4894] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .1665]

Q76_respond2 How confident are you in the ability of the US Department of Defense, including active, reserve, and National Guard forces, to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	5	3	5	7	8	14	9	16	15	8	11	5.99	
web-A 555	5	4	6	7	8	14	10	14	14	8	10	5.81	
web-C 555	4	3	8	6	6	12	13	12	18	9	9	5.99	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .1991] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0789]

Q77_respond3 How confident are you in the ability of your state government to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	10	7	11	11	11	17	12	10	6	3	3	4.36	
web-A 555	11	6	10	10	12	18	13	8	7	3	2	4.33	
web-C 555	10	6	9	11	13	16	10	10	7	5	2	4.41	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .8151] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .4509]

Q78_respond4 How confident are you in the ability of your city and county government to respond to large-scale terrorist attacks in the US?

%	Not At All Confident										Extremely Confident		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	14	9	12	11	10	16	10	8	5	3	3	3.84	
web-A 555	14	9	11	13	10	17	10	8	3	2	2	3.80	
web-C 555	13	10	8	14	10	16	11	10	4	3	2	4.06	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .7518] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0131]

Now I would like to know about your beliefs concerning a variety of issues.

Q79_nature First, on a scale where zero means nature is *robust and not easily damaged* and ten means nature is *fragile and easily damaged*, how do you view nature?

%	Robust and Not Easily Damaged										Fragile and Is Easily Damaged		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	3	2	6	8	8	16	9	14	15	5	15	6.13	
web-A 555	3	1	5	8	7	16	9	13	16	6	16	6.29	
web-C 555	3	2	5	8	7	14	11	15	12	6	16	6.22	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .2100] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .4459]

Q80_env On a scale where zero means the natural environment is *not at all threatened* and ten means the natural environment is on the *brink of disaster*, how do you assess the current state of the natural environment?

%	Not at All Threatened										Brink of Disaster		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	2	2	5	8	8	20	16	18	12	5	6	5.83	
web-A 555	2	2	4	7	8	19	17	17	12	6	7	5.93	
web-C 555	1	1	4	8	7	22	17	17	11	6	5	5.92	

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .3644] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .9194]

Please respond to each of the following statements using a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*.

Q81_beliefs1 It is vital to enlist the cooperation of other countries in dealing with international security and terrorism.

%	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	2	2	2	12	19	22	41	5.76
web-A 555	2	1	2	11	18	21	45	5.84
web-C 555	1	1	2	9	15	22	50	6.00

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .2613] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0040]

Q82_beliefs2 Widely shared problems such as energy, disease, and protecting the environment can best be handled by fostering international cooperation.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	4	3	6	17	21	19	30	5.28
web-A 555	4	2	4	16	18	21	35	5.46
web-C 555	2	3	5	14	19	20	38	5.58

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0237] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0740]

Q83_beliefs3 the free flow of trade and economic investments between countries is essential.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	3	3	6	19	24	21	24	5.16
web-A 555	4	2	5	20	24	22	24	5.19
web-C 555	3	3	4	21	23	22	25	5.24

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .6817] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .3689]

Q84_beliefs4 The US can never entrust its security to international organizations such as the United Nations.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	7	6	8	18	14	14	33	5.01
web-A 555	8	6	9	17	13	15	32	4.95
web-C 555	6	6	7	15	16	13	37	5.16

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .5387] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0022]

Q85_beliefs5 Even though allies are important, the US must be willing to act alone to protect American interests.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	6	6	6	13	16	17	36	5.24
web-A 555	6	5	5	14	16	16	37	5.25
web-C 555	7	5	5	12	13	18	40	5.33

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .9694] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .2459]

Q86_beliefs6 The US must be willing to act preemptively by using military force against those that threaten us before they can attack us.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	12	8	8	19	18	15	20	4.46
web-A 555	14	8	10	19	16	15	18	4.28
web-C 555	13	8	9	18	19	13	21	4.45

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .0691] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .0127]

Q87_beliefs7 What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	17	10	10	24	17	10	11	3.92
web-A 555	15	11	11	24	17	9	13	3.97
web-C 555	14	9	13	26	17	9	13	4.03

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .5926] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .4506]

Q88_beliefs8 Society works best if power is shared equally.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	6	6	10	22	20	16	19	4.66
web-A 555	6	6	9	22	20	16	22	4.78
web-C 555	6	4	11	22	19	17	20	4.79

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .1578] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .7916]

Q89_beliefs9 It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	17	9	11	20	17	11	16	4.08
web-A 555	15	7	12	22	16	9	19	4.19
web-C 555	16	7	11	22	16	12	16	4.16

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .2734] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .5707]

Q90_beliefs10 In the long run, spreading democracy is the best way to create a peaceful world.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	6	6	11	22	20	15	20	4.71
web-A 555	6	5	11	22	20	17	19	4.70
web-C 555	6	6	10	23	19	15	21	4.72

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .9461] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .8461]

Q91_beliefs11 If terrorists use a nuclear weapon against the US, we would be justified in using nuclear weapons to fight a war on terrorism.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>				<u>Strongly Agree</u>			Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	11	6	8	18	15	13	29	4.75
web-A 555	12	7	9	17	15	11	29	4.65
web-C 555	15	7	9	16	11	10	32	4.57

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .2833] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .3730]

Q92_faith Now using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important is religious faith in your life?

%	Not At All Important										Extremely Important	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
web-A 1535	8	2	4	3	3	11	6	9	11	7	36	6.91
web-A 555	10	2	3	3	2	10	7	7	12	7	36	6.89
web-C 555	9	4	3	3	3	8	6	10	13	9	33	6.88

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .8668] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .9449]

Finally, I need some basic background information.

Q93_zip What is the zip code at your residence? (verbatim)

Q94_reside Including yourself, how many people currently live at your residence?

	Means
web-A 1535	2.62
web-A 555	2.43
web-C 555	2.45

Q95_ovr18 How many are 18 years of age or older?

	Means
web-A 1535	2.23
web-A 555	2.27
web-C 555	2.19

Q96_party With which political party do you most identify?

%	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Independent</u>	<u>Other</u>
	1	2	3	4
web-A 1535	32	41	18	9
web-A 555	33	41	17	8
web-C 555	33	40	18	9

Q97_iden Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with that political party?

%	<u>Slightly</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Completely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	
web-A 1535	13	64	23	2.11
web-A 555	13	65	22	2.09
web-C 555	14	65	21	2.07

Q98_ideol On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from *strongly liberal* to *strongly conservative*. Which of the following categories best describes your views?

	<u>Strongly Liberal</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Slightly Liberal</u>	<u>Middle of the road</u>	<u>Slightly Conserv.</u>	<u>Conserv.</u>	<u>Strongly Conserv.</u>	
%	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean
web-A 1535	5	12	11	31	15	21	5	4.23
web-A 555	5	13	12	31	16	19	5	4.15
web-C 555	4	13	12	31	16	18	5	4.17

[Unpaired t-test: web-A_1535 vs. web-A_555: p = .3375] [Paired t-test: web-A_555 vs. web-C_555: p = .6973]

Q99_race Which of the following best describes your race or ethnic background?

	<u>American Indian</u>	<u>Asian</u>	<u>Black</u>	<u>Hispanic</u>	<u>White, non-Hispanic</u>	<u>Other</u>
%						
web-A 1535	1	2	3	3	89	2
web-A 555	1	3	3	2	90	2
web-C 555	1	2	3	2	90	2

Q100_inc Please indicate which of the following income categories approximates the total estimated annual income for your *household* for the year 2002.

	<u>< \$10K</u>	<u>\$10–20K</u>	<u>\$20–30K</u>	<u>\$30–40K</u>	<u>\$40–50K</u>
%	1	2	3	4	5
web-A 1535	4	8	15	14	11
web-A 555	4	8	15	16	10
web-C 555	3	9	15	14	10

	<u>\$50–60K</u>	<u>\$60–70K</u>	<u>\$70–80K</u>	<u>\$80–90K</u>	<u>\$90–100K</u>
%	6	7	8	9	10
web-A 1535	12	9	7	5	3
web-A 555	10	10	7	5	4
web-C 555	12	10	5	6	3

	<u>\$100–110K</u>	<u>\$110–1200K</u>	<u>\$120–130K</u>	<u>\$130–140K</u>	<u>\$140–150K</u>
%	11	12	13	14	15
web-A 1535	3	2	2	1	1
web-A 555	3	2	1	1	1
web-C 555	3	2	2	1	1

	<u>> \$150K</u>	<u>Median</u>
%	16	
web-A 1535	4	5
web-A 555	3	5
web-C 555	3	5

Appendix 4: Questions, Distributions, and Means: New Questions on Suicide Bombings

C1_educ What is the highest level of education you have completed?

%	Public 05 Web-A All (1,535)	Public 05 Web-A Panel (555)	Public 05 Web-C Panel (555)	Public 05 Web-C All (950)
< High school graduate	1	1	1	1
High school graduate	15	15	16	15
Some college/voca. school	38	40	38	38
College graduate	26	26	26	26
Some graduate work	7	6	7	7
Master's degree	10	8	9	10
J.D. or higher law degree	NA	NA	NA	NA
Doctorate	2	3	3	2
Other degree	1	1	1	1

C2_age How old are you? **Means**

Public 05: Web-A All (1,535)	49.4
Public 05: Web-A Panel (555)	52.4
Public 05: Web-C Panel (555)	52.7
Public 05: Web-C All (950)	52.3

C3_gender As part of the survey, I am required to ask: are you male or female?

%	Female	Male
Public 05: Web-A All (1,535)	46.2	53.8
Public 05: Web-A Panel (555)	48.8	51.2
Public 05: Web-C Panel (555)	48.8	51.2
Public 05: Web-C All (950)	47.7	52.3

C101_newter1 We would like to know how closely you have been following news about the terrorist attacks against subways and a bus in London on July 7, 2005. Considering television, newspapers, and magazines, how many reports on those bombings do you estimate that you have seen, read, or heard from all types of media?

%	None	1-5	6-10	11-15	16-20	21-25	> 25	Median
C-950	1	16	23	18	12	6	24	11-15
C-950 wtd	1	14	23	18	11	8	26	11-15

C102_newter2 Using a scale from one to seven, where one means *not at all likely* and seven means *extremely likely*, what is your assessment of the likelihood of terrorist suicide bombings occurring in the US in the next five years?

%	<u>Not At All Likely</u>			<u>Extremely Likely</u>				Mean
%	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Mean
C-950	0	1	3	14	27	21	34	5.63
C-950 wtd	0	2	3	13	26	20	36	5.66

Lead-in: Using a scale from zero to ten where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, how do you rate the risk of one or more terrorist suicide bombings occurring in each of the following countries in the next five years? (randomized order)

C103_newter3_1 Britain

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	1	0	1	1	2	7	8	16	19	17	28	7.90
C-950 wtd	1	0	1	1	2	7	8	16	19	15	30	7.98

C104_newter3_2 France

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	3	3	5	7	7	15	9	16	14	8	13	6.16
C-950 wtd	3	5	5	6	7	14	10	16	14	7	14	6.13

C105_newter3_3 Germany

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	3	3	4	8	7	18	13	16	12	6	10	5.97
C-950 wtd	2	5	4	7	8	19	11	16	12	6	11	5.90

C106_newter3_4 Russia

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	3	3	4	7	6	17	9	13	12	11	14	6.25
C-950 wtd	2	4	4	7	7	16	10	13	14	9	15	6.28

C107_newter3_5 Japan

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	3	3	8	8	8	17	11	14	11	7	10	5.77
C-950 wtd	3	3	7	8	10	17	10	16	10	5	11	5.77

C108_newter3_6 Canada

%	No Risk										Extreme Risk	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	5	5	9	9	9	18	10	11	10	5	10	5.32
C-950 wtd	6	5	9	9	9	18	9	10	8	5	12	5.28

C109_newter3_7 United States

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	1	1	2	3	3	9	8	12	16	15	29	7.66
C-950 wtd	1	1	1	3	3	10	8	13	16	15	30	7.68

C110_newter3_8 Pakistan

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	2	2	2	3	3	9	6	11	16	15	30	7.52
C-950 wtd	2	2	2	3	4	10	6	10	18	15	29	7.53

Lead-in: Using the same scale from zero to ten where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*, please rate the risk each of the following poses as a source of suicide attacks within the United States. (randomized order)

C111_newter4_1 Foreign terrorists who live outside the US.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	0	1	1	3	4	9	9	13	17	14	28	7.64
C-950 wtd	1	1	1	3	3	9	9	12	18	14	30	7.74

C112_newter4_2 Foreign terrorists who live in the US.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	0	0	1	1	1	5	4	12	17	17	42	8.47
C-950 wtd	0	0	1	1	2	4	4	11	16	17	44	8.56

C113_newter4_3 American citizens who are dissatisfied with their lives or with the government but are not members of a terrorist group.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	4	8	14	10	8	16	10	11	8	5	6	4.84
C-950 wtd	4	8	15	9	7	15	10	11	9	5	6	4.88

C114_newter4_4 American citizens who are members of terrorist cells within the US.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	0	0	2	2	4	8	8	15	16	14	30	7.77
C-950 wtd	0	0	2	2	4	7	8	15	16	13	33	7.88

C115_newter4_5 Illegal immigrants who feel they are being unfairly treated.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	3	5	6	9	10	14	10	13	12	6	12	5.77
C-950 wtd	3	5	6	10	10	13	10	13	11	5	15	5.81

Lead-in: Please rate the likelihood of terrorist suicide attacks occurring in each of the following settings in the US using a scale from one to seven where one means *not at all likely* and seven means *extremely likely*. (random order)

C116_newter5_1 Airlines

%	<u>Not at All Likely</u>						<u>Extremely Likely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	4	9	16	20	24	25	5.23
C-950 wtd	1	4	8	15	19	27	27	5.34

C117_newter5_2 Trains

%	<u>Not at All Likely</u>						<u>Extremely Likely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	0	3	6	14	23	28	27	5.45
C-950 wtd	0	3	5	15	23	28	27	5.45

C118_newter5_3 Subways

%	<u>Not at All Likely</u>						<u>Extremely Likely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	1	3	11	23	30	32	5.70
C-950 wtd	1	1	2	13	21	32	30	5.70

C119_newter5_4 Buses

%	<u>Not at All Likely</u>						<u>Extremely Likely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	5	7	20	23	22	23	5.13
C-950 wtd	2	5	9	19	23	20	22	5.06

C120_newter5_5 Malls

%	<u>Not at All Likely</u>						<u>Extremely Likely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	3	7	21	23	21	23	5.20
C-950 wtd	1	3	8	22	23	21	23	5.15

C121_newter5_6 Office buildings

%	Not at All <u>Likely</u>						Extremely <u>Likely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	2	5	17	26	26	24	5.38
C-950 wtd	1	2	5	16	26	26	25	5.41

C122_newter5_7 Sporting events

%	Not at All <u>Likely</u>						Extremely <u>Likely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	2	6	16	23	24	27	5.39
C-950 wtd	1	3	6	18	22	22	28	5.38

C123_newter5_8 School buildings

%	Not at All <u>Likely</u>						Extremely <u>Likely</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	2	8	13	22	24	16	16	4.68
C-950 wtd	1	9	12	24	22	16	16	4.68

Lead-in: Please respond to the following statements using a scale from one to seven where one means you *strongly disagree* and seven means you *strongly agree*. (random order)

C124_newter6_1 It is not possible to prevent all suicide bombings by terrorists.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	3	4	4	8	12	19	50	5.79
C-950 wtd	3	4	4	7	11	19	53	5.88

C125_newter6_2 If suicide bombings occur in the United States, I would support new restrictions on immigration.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	4	4	4	10	12	15	51	5.68
C-950 wtd	5	5	3	10	11	16	51	5.71

C126_newter6_3 Since the vast majority of suicide bombings by terrorists are conducted by young Arab men, I support increasing surveillance of that segment of the US population.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	6	7	6	14	18	14	34	5.09
C-950 wtd	7	6	5	14	16	14	37	5.17

C127_newter6_4 If suicide bombings occur in the United States, I would support increased military action against foreign terrorist groups.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	4	4	4	12	15	19	42	5.54
C-950 wtd	7	6	9	19	16	14	29	5.58

Lead-in: Religious extremism represents a small fraction of people who practice any of the world's major religions. Sometimes religious extremists use churches, mosques, temples, religious schools or other religious facilities to incite violence. In countries where religious freedoms are protected, preventing religious extremists from promoting terrorism can conflict with individual rights, posing difficult trade-offs among legal protections, moral beliefs, and requirements to provide security for citizens.

Please respond to each of the following statements on a scale from one to seven where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*. (random order)

C128_newter7_1 If someone *advocates* terrorism, but they do not actively participate in terrorist acts, they should be arrested and tried in a court of law, even if they are a religious leader or teacher.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	7	6	10	18	17	15	27	4.82
C-950 wtd	7	6	9	19	16	14	29	4.88

C129_newter7_2 If someone *actively supports* terrorism, they should be arrested and tried in a court of law, even if they are a religious leader or teacher.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	3	2	4	9	11	21	50	5.85
C-950 wtd	4	2	4	9	11	20	51	5.85

C130_newter7_3 Government law enforcement agencies should never infiltrate or spy on religious groups, even if they are suspected of advocating or supporting terrorism.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	42	20	13	13	5	3	5	2.48
C-950 wtd	44	19	13	13	5	3	4	2.41

C131_newter7_4 If a particular religious sect or group is determined to be advocating or promoting terrorism, that organization should be shut down by the government.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	5	4	6	12	15	16	42	5.44
C-950 wtd	4	5	6	11	16	15	44	5.48

Lead-in: Foreign terrorists could try to gain entry to the US by air, land, or sea. Please rate the risk of each of the following as a means for terrorists to enter the US on a scale from zero to ten where zero means *no risk* and ten means *extreme risk*. (random order)

C132_newter8_1 Crossing the border from Canada by land.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	1	1	1	2	3	8	8	10	15	16	35	7.95
C-950 wtd	1	1	2	1	3	8	9	10	14	17	34	7.93

C133_newter8_2 Crossing the border from Mexico by land.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	1	1	1	1	2	7	5	9	13	16	44	8.31
C-950 wtd	1	1	2	1	2	5	7	9	13	15	45	8.33

C134_newter8_3 Flying in commercial airliners.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	1	0	3	4	5	11	7	16	14	12	26	7.35
C-950 wtd	1	0	3	4	5	11	7	15	18	11	26	7.37

C135_newter8_4 Flying in small planes.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	1	2	4	5	5	12	11	12	15	11	23	6.95
C-950 wtd	1	3	4	4	4	12	11	12	17	9	23	6.98

C136_newter8_5 Entering through harbors or seaports.

%	<u>No Risk</u>										<u>Extreme Risk</u>	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Mean
C-950	1	0	1	1	3	9	8	11	19	16	32	7.97
C-950 wtd	1	0	1	1	3	8	9	11	19	17	31	7.97

Lead-in: Illegal immigration into the United States poses difficult issues, many of which have little if anything to do with terrorism. But some people are increasingly concerned that terrorists may illegally enter the US employing means and methods that other illegal immigrants use to seek economic opportunities. Please respond to the following statements about illegal immigration using a scale from one to seven where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*. (random order)

C137_newter9_1 Illegal immigration poses a significant threat of terrorism to the US.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
C-950	3	4	8	13	17	18	37	5.38	
C-950 wtd	3	4	7	13	17	20	36	5.39	

C138_newter9_2 Because the issue of illegal immigration is so complicated, there is little we can do to prevent terrorists from illegally entering the US.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>					<u>Strongly Agree</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	24	15	13	14	14	10	9	3.48
C-950 wtd	26	13	13	13	15	11	10	3.49

C139_newter9_3 The US must do more to stop illegal immigrants, regardless of their objectives.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>					<u>Strongly Agree</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	3	3	6	10	11	19	48	5.70
C-950 wtd	3	3	6	10	11	19	48	5.72

C140_newter9_4 The United States is dependent on immigration, and even when people enter the country illegally, they do more good than harm.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>					<u>Strongly Agree</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	28	17	14	19	10	5	6	3.05
C-950 wtd	29	16	13	21	11	5	5	3.07

Lead-in: In recent years, the US has taken a number of measures to increase the security of airline travel, to include more stringent screening and searches of passengers, carry-on items, and checked luggage. Less comprehensive measures have been taken to increase security of other modes of public transportation such as passenger trains and subways.

Please rate each of the following options for improving the security of US *passenger trains* and *subways* on a scale from one to seven where one means you *strongly oppose* the measure and seven means you *strongly support* it.

C141_newter10_1 Require all persons to pass through metal detectors before entering terminals.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	2	2	7	10	17	60	6.14
C-950 wtd	1	1	2	7	10	18	60	6.20

C142_newter10_2 Require all passengers to show identification before entering boarding areas.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>						<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
C-950	2	3	3	8	10	16	59	6.06	
C-950 wtd	1	3	5	7	9	17	59	6.05	

C143_newter10_3 Require all hand-carried items to be x-rayed.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	1	3	8	10	15	61	6.12
C-950 wtd	1	1	3	8	10	15	63	6.19

C144_newter10_4 Install video cameras that take images of all persons entering and leaving terminals.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	2	1	1	7	10	17	62	6.22
C-950 wtd	2	0	1	7	11	17	63	6.22

C145_newter10_5 Require all checked luggage to be x-rayed.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	1	1	1	7	10	16	65	6.33
C-950 wtd	1	1	1	6	10	16	66	6.35

C146_newter10_6 Use biometric measures such as facial features to help identify suspected terrorists.

%	<u>Strongly Oppose</u>					<u>Strongly Support</u>		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
C-950	4	3	4	11	13	16	50	5.75
C-950 wtd	6	2	3	10	12	14	52	5.73

Now I would like to know about your beliefs concerning a variety of issues.

Q79_nature First, on a scale where zero means nature is *robust and not easily damaged* and ten means nature is *fragile and easily damaged*, how do you view nature?

%	<u>Robust and Not Easily Damaged</u>								<u>Fragile and Is Easily Damaged</u>		Mean	
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9		10
web-A 1535	3	2	6	8	8	16	9	14	15	5	15	6.13
web-A 555	3	1	5	8	7	16	9	13	16	6	16	6.29
web-C 555	3	2	5	8	7	14	11	15	12	6	16	6.22
web-C 950	3	2	5	8	7	15	10	14	13	7	15	6.20

Q80_env On a scale where zero means the natural environment is *not at all threatened* and ten means the natural environment is on the *brink of disaster*, how do you assess the current state of the natural environment?

%	Not at All Threatened										Brink of Disaster		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	2	2	5	8	8	20	16	18	12	5	6	5.83	
web-A 555	2	2	4	7	8	19	17	17	12	6	7	5.93	
web-C 555	1	1	4	8	7	22	17	17	11	6	5	5.92	
web-C 950	1	1	5	8	7	21	15	19	12	5	6	5.90	

Please respond to each of the following statements using a scale from one to seven, where one means *strongly disagree* and seven means *strongly agree*.

Q81_beliefs1 It is vital to enlist the cooperation of other countries in dealing with international security and terrorism.

%	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	2	2	2	12	19	22	41	5.76	
web-A 555	2	1	2	11	18	21	45	5.84	
web-C 555	1	1	2	9	15	22	50	6.00	
web-C 950	1	1	2	10	16	22	48	5.98	

Q82_beliefs2 Widely shared problems such as energy, disease, and protecting the environment can best be handled by fostering international cooperation.

%	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	4	3	6	17	21	19	30	5.28	
web-A 555	4	2	4	16	18	21	35	5.46	
web-C 555	2	3	5	14	19	20	38	5.58	
web-C 950	2	3	4	15	20	20	36	5.48	

Q83_beliefs3 the free flow of trade and economic investments between countries is essential.

%	Strongly Disagree						Strongly Agree		Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7		
web-A 1535	3	3	6	19	24	21	24	5.16	
web-A 555	4	2	5	20	24	22	24	5.19	
web-C 555	3	3	4	21	23	22	25	5.24	
web-C 950	2	3	4	19	25	22	25	5.27	

Q84_beliefs4 The US can never entrust its security to international organizations such as the United Nations.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	7	6	8	18	14	14	33	5.01
web-A 555	8	6	9	17	13	15	32	4.95
web-C 555	6	6	7	15	16	13	37	5.16
web-C 950	6	5	7	16	15	12	38	5.18

Q85_beliefs5 Even though allies are important, the US must be willing to act alone to protect American interests.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	6	6	6	13	16	17	36	5.24
web-A 555	6	5	5	14	16	16	37	5.25
web-C 555	7	5	5	12	13	18	40	5.33
web-C 950	6	5	5	11	15	17	41	5.38

Q86_beliefs6 The US must be willing to act preemptively by using military force against those that threaten us before they can attack us.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	12	8	8	19	18	15	20	4.46
web-A 555	14	8	10	19	16	15	18	4.28
web-C 555	13	8	9	18	19	13	21	4.45
web-C 950	11	7	8	19	18	14	23	4.58

Q87_beliefs7 What society needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	17	10	10	24	17	10	11	3.92
web-A 555	15	11	11	24	17	9	13	3.97
web-C 555	14	9	13	26	17	9	13	4.03
web-C 950	15	9	12	27	16	9	12	3.93

Q88_beliefs8 Society works best if power is shared equally.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	6	6	10	22	20	16	19	4.66
web-A 555	6	6	9	22	20	16	22	4.78
web-C 555	6	4	11	22	19	17	20	4.79
web-C 950	6	5	9	24	20	15	20	4.73

Q89_beliefs9 It is our responsibility to reduce differences in income between the rich and the poor.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	17	9	11	20	17	11	16	4.08
web-A 555	15	7	12	22	16	9	19	4.19
web-C 555	16	7	11	22	16	12	16	4.16
web-C 950	16	9	10	22	15	11	16	4.08

Q90_beliefs10 In the long run, spreading democracy is the best way to create a peaceful world.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	6	6	11	22	20	15	20	4.71
web-A 555	6	5	11	22	20	17	19	4.70
web-C 555	6	6	10	23	19	15	21	4.72
web-C 950	6	5	9	22	21	15	21	4.78

Q91_beliefs11 If terrorists use a nuclear weapon against the US, we would be justified in using nuclear weapons to fight a war on terrorism.

%	<u>Strongly Disagree</u>						<u>Strongly Agree</u>	Mean
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	11	6	8	18	15	13	29	4.75
web-A 555	12	7	9	17	15	11	29	4.65
web-C 555	15	7	9	16	11	10	32	4.57
web-C 950	13	7	9	15	12	12	31	4.66

Q92_faith Now using a scale from zero to ten, where zero means *not at all important* and ten means *extremely important*, how important is religious faith in your life?

%	<u>Not At All Important</u>										<u>Extremely Important</u>		Mean
	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10		
web-A 1535	8	2	4	3	3	11	6	9	11	7	36	6.91	
web-A 555	10	2	3	3	2	10	7	7	12	7	36	6.89	
web-C 555	9	4	3	3	3	8	6	10	13	9	33	6.88	
web-C 950	7	3	3	3	3	9	6	11	12	9	34	6.99	

Finally, I need some basic background information.

Q93_zip What is the zip code at your residence? (verbatim)

Q94_reside Including yourself, how many people currently live at your residence?

	Means
web-A 1535	2.62
web-A 555	2.43
web-C 555	2.45
web-C 950	2.48

Q95_ovr18 How many are 18 years of age or older?

	Means
web-A 1535	2.23
web-A 555	2.27
web-C 555	2.19
web-C 950	2.17

Q96_party With which political party do you most identify?

	<u>Democrat</u>	<u>Republican</u>	<u>Independent</u>	<u>Other</u>
%	1	2	3	4
web-A 1535	32	41	18	9
web-A 555	33	41	17	8
web-C 555	33	40	18	9
web-C 950	33	41	16	9

Q97_iden Do you completely, somewhat, or slightly identify with that political party?

	<u>Slightly</u>	<u>Somewhat</u>	<u>Completely</u>	Mean
%	1	2	3	
web-A 1535	13	64	23	2.11
web-A 555	13	65	22	2.09
web-C 555	14	65	21	2.07
web-C 950	15	64	22	2.07

Q98_ideol On a scale of political ideology, individuals can be arranged from *strongly liberal* to *strongly conservative*. Which of the following categories best describes your views?

	<u>Strongly Liberal</u>	<u>Liberal</u>	<u>Slightly Liberal</u>	<u>Middle of the road</u>	<u>Slightly Conserv.</u>	<u>Conserv.</u>	<u>Strongly Conserv.</u>	Mean
%	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	
web-A 1535	5	12	11	31	15	21	5	4.23
web-A 555	5	13	12	31	16	19	5	4.15
web-C 555	4	13	12	31	16	18	5	4.17
web-C 950	4	12	12	32	16	18	5	4.21

Q99_race Which of the following best describes your race or ethnic background?

%	American Indian	Asian	Black	Hispanic	White, non-Hispanic	Other
web-A 1535	1	2	3	3	89	2
web-A 555	1	3	3	2	90	2
web-C 555	1	2	3	2	90	2
web-C 950	1	2	3	2	90	2

Q100_inc Please indicate which of the following income categories approximates the total estimated annual income for your *household* for the year 2002.

%	< \$10K	\$10-20K	\$20-30K	\$30-40K	\$40-50K
	1	2	3	4	5
web-A 1535	4	8	15	14	11
web-A 555	4	8	15	16	10
web-C 555	3	9	15	14	10
web-C 950	3	9	15	14	11

%	\$50-60K	\$60-70K	\$70-80K	\$80-90K	\$90-100K
	6	7	8	9	10
web-A 1535	12	9	7	5	3
web-A 555	10	10	7	5	4
web-C 555	12	10	5	6	3
web-C 950	12	11	5	5	3

%	\$100-110K	\$110-1200K	\$120-130K	\$130-140K	\$140-150K
	11	12	13	14	15
web-A 1535	3	2	2	1	1
web-A 555	3	2	1	1	1
web-C 555	3	2	2	1	1
web-C 950	3	2	2	1	1

%	> \$150K	Median
	16	
web-A 1535	4	5
web-A 555	3	5
web-C 555	3	5
web-C 950	3	5

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