Department of Defense (DoD) Joint Federated Assurance Center (JFAC)
Overview

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Malicious Supply Chain Risk

• **Threat:**
  – Nation-state, terrorist, criminal, or rogue developer who gains control of systems through supply chain opportunities, exploits vulnerabilities remotely, and/or degrades system behavior

• **Vulnerabilities:**
  – All systems, networks, and applications
  – Intentionally implanted logic
  – Unintentional vulnerabilities maliciously exploited (e.g., poor quality or fragile code)

• **Consequences:**
  – Loss of critical data and technology
  – System corruption
  – Loss of confidence in critical warfighting capability; mission impact

*Access points are throughout the lifecycle…*

*…and across multiple supply chain entry points*

- Government
- Prime, subcontractors
- Vendors, commercial parts manufacturers
- 3rd party test/certification activities
Sophisticated vulnerability discovery, analysis, and remediation for Sw/Hw has been a maturing strategic imperative for DoD
### Congressional Direction


**Sec. 937 Joint Federated Centers for Trusted Defense Systems for the Department of Defense**

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<td>1. Business Act (15 U.S.C. 632) that are awarded contracts by the Department of Defense to assist such businesses to—</td>
<td>(b) <strong>Discharge of Establishment.</strong> In providing for the establishment of the federation, the Secretary shall consider whether the purpose of the federation can be met by existing centers in the Department. If the Department determines that there are capabilities gaps that cannot be satisfied by existing centers, the Department shall devise a strategy for creating and providing resources for such capabilities to fill such gaps.</td>
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<td>(a) <strong>Federation Required.</strong></td>
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<td>1. IN GENERAL. - The Secretary of Defense shall provide for the establishment of a joint, functional organization of capabilities to support the trusted defense system needs of the Department to ensure security in the software and hardware developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department, pursuant to the trusted defense systems strategy of the Department and supporting policies related to software assurance and supply chain risk management.</td>
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<td>(C) the requirements for the discharge by the federation, in coordination with the Center for Assured Software of the National Security Agency, of a program of research and development to improve automated software code vulnerability analysis and testing tools;</td>
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<td>(d) <strong>Charter.</strong> - Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall issue a charter for the federation. The charter shall—</td>
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<td>(D) the requirements for the federation to procure, manage, and distribute enterprise licenses for automated software vulnerability analysis tools; and</td>
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<td>1. (1) the role of the federation in supporting program offices in implementing the trusted defense systems strategy of the Department;</td>
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<td>2. (A) in coordination with the Defense Information Systems Agency and individual major military commands, establish interagency and interagency-wide federations to support the trusted defense system needs of the Department to ensure security in the software and hardware developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department, pursuant to the trusted defense systems strategy of the Department and supporting policies related to software assurance and supply chain risk management.</td>
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<td>(B) the software and hardware assurance expertise and capabilities of the federation, including policies, standards, requirements, best practices, contracting, training, and testing;</td>
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<td>(2) the requirements for the discharge by the federation, in coordination with the Center for Assured Software of the National Security Agency, of a program of research and development to improve hardware code vulnerability analysis and testing tools.</td>
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NDAA 937 Approach and Status

Congress, through NDAA 2014 Section 937, directed DoD to:

“...provide for the establishment of a joint federation of capabilities to support the trusted defense system needs...to ensure security in the software and hardware developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department.”

Approach:
- Establish a Federation of HwA and SwA capabilities to support programs in program protection planning and execution
- Support program offices across the life cycle by identifying and facilitating access to Department SwA and HwA expertise and capabilities, policies, guidance, requirements, best practices, contracting language, training, and testing support
- Coordinate with DoD R&D for SwA & HwA
- Procure, manage, and distribute enterprise licenses for SW and HW assurance tools

Status:
- Charter under review for DepSecDef signature
- 937 Congressional Report in process and on track
- Working concept of operations, capability map, and capability gap analysis
- Initial capability on track for 2015

Implementing Section 937 through a DoD Joint Federated Assurance Center
Charter Mapping to Section 937 Language

**Key provisions:**
- “provide for the establishment of a joint federation of capabilities to support the trusted defense system needs…to ensure security in the **software** and **hardware** developed, acquired, maintained, and used by the Department”
- “consider whether capabilities can be met by existing centers”
- “[if gaps] shall devise a strategy [for] resources [to fill such gaps]”
- “[NLT 180 days, SECDEF shall] issue a **charter**…”
- “submit to congressional defense committees…a **report** on funding and management”

**Charter elements:**
- Role of federation in supporting program offices
- SwA and HwA expertise and capabilities of the Federation, including policies, standards, requirements, best practices contracting, training and testing
- R&D program with NSA Center for Assured Software to improve code vulnerability analysis and testing tools
- Requirements to procure manage, and distribute enterprise licenses for analysis tools
- R&D program with DMEA to improve hardware vulnerability, testing, and protection tools

Establishes a Federation of Software and Hardware Assurance Capabilities Across DoD
JFAC Goals and Functions

• **Goals**
  – Operationalize and institutionalize assurance capabilities in support of PMOs and other organizations
  – Organize to better leverage the DoD, interagency, and public/private sector capabilities in hardware and software assurance
  – Collaborate across the DoD to influence R&D investments in hardware and software assurance capability gaps
  – Evaluate, over time, the impact of DoD investments and activities in support of assurance

• **Functions:**
  – Support Program Offices and Systems across the Lifecycle
  – Sustain an inventory of SwA and HwA resources across DoD
  – Coordinate the R&D agenda for assurance (hardware, software, systems, services, mission) across DoD
  – Procure, manage and enable access to enterprise licenses for selected automated software vulnerability analysis and other tools
  – Communicate assurance expectations to the broader community
JFAC Stakeholders

- **Steering Committee**
  - USD AT&L
  - DoD CIO
  - Department of Army
  - Missile Defense Agency
  - Department of Navy
  - Defense Information Systems Agency
  - Department of Air Force
  - National Reconnaissance Office
  - National Security Agency
  - Defense Microelectronics Activity

- **Working Groups**
  - Advisory Working Group assigned by above organizations
  - Software and Hardware Working Groups consisting of key service providers

- **Coordination Activity**

**Joint Federated Assurance Center**

- JFAC Advisory WG
- JFAC Coordination Activity
- HwA Technical Working Group
- SwA Technical Working Group

**Intent is to federate existing DoD capabilities, ensure sharing of best practices, and provide visibility to programs**
JFAC Objectives

• Reduce risk and costs to programs through maturing software assurance tools, techniques and processes

• Assurance issue resolution through collaboration across the community (federated problem solving)

• Leverage commercial products and methods, and spur innovation

• Incorporate SwA and HwA in contracts for enhanced program protection

• Raise the bar on reducing defects and vulnerabilities in developed SW through SwA and HwA Standardization

• Heighten SwA visibility through outreach, mentoring, training and education

• Assess capability gaps over time and recommend plans to close
JFAC Hardware-Focused Customer Interactions

Counterfeit, Re-cycled E-waste, Blacktopped, Potential Malicious, Clones and Substitutions

- Programs /Distributors
- Law Enforcement
- R&D
- Suspect Malicious
- Technical Assessment (Various Labs)
- JFAC
- Sustainment Activities
- Counterfeit
- Legitimate
JFAC Software-Focused Customer Interactions

- Program Offices
- T&E
- Operations & Sustainment
- N-tier contractors

JFAC Customers

JFAC awareness
SwA info request ("one stop shop")
Contract guidance
Technology guidance
Enterprise tools/licenses
Evaluation of OTS results
Evaluation request of OTS
Custom evaluation results (incl. past OTS)

Coordination Activity

Service Provider

JFAC
Summary

• JFAC is a federation of existing capabilities
  – To support cross-cutting needs
  – To maximize use of available resources

• R&D is a key component of JFAC operation

• Innovation of SW and HW inspection, analysis, detection, assessment, and remediation tools is vital

• How can industry help
  – Share assurance metrics and best practices
  – Continue to improve SW and HW assurance capability
  – Develop and maintain SW and HW assurance standards
For Additional Information

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