



Trusted Microelectronic Investment Strategy

Dr. Jeremy Muldavin, DASD(SE)
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


Outline



- **State of advanced microelectronics for DoD applications**
- **Strategy to assure access for the DoD**
 - Need access to state-of-the-art integrated circuits (ICs) while maintaining an acceptable level of risk
 - New Trust and Assurance approaches to expand fabrication access
 - We want to maintain the U.S. technological and competitive edge in microelectronics
- **Partnership opportunities**
- **Questions**



Microelectronics Trends



State-of-the-art Devices

- Deeply-Scaled Silicon ICs (14nm)
- 2.5 & 3D ICs
- Heterogeneous System-on-Chip (SoC) ICs
- Flexible and miniature packaging
- Accelerator and SoC architectures

Increasing Cost and Complexity

- \$5-15B for a modern fabrication facility
- >\$500M for a new commercial smart phone SoC development
- Reliance on third-party Intellectual Property (IP)

Globalization and Commercial Dominance

- State-of-the-art fabrication consolidation
- Commercially-driven (DoD <1% of market)
- Complex global supply chain
- China investing heavily (\$150B)

New Applications

- Internet of Things
- Big Data systems
- Autonomous systems
- Spectral and spatial communication agility



Commercial Computing Trends



Mobile computing



Internet of Things and Software Defined Radio




Powerful test and measurement



Cloud computing and infrastructure

Commercial SoC for mobile applications




SoCs with custom accelerators enable size, weight and power (SWaP)-efficient mobile applications and servers

Global mobile computing and wireless infrastructure brings powerful capabilities to nearly everyone



Future Warfighting Systems





Needs for Innovation in DoD Computing



Challenges

Parallelism and reduced efficiency of CPUs

High cost and acquisition time

Flexibility and sustainment for DoD applications

Security and trust in global environment

Needs


Big Data and small platforms

Contested environment computing


Systems of Systems and autonomy

Cyber Protection and security


Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Graph Processors




High Dynamic Range Flexible Radios and Digital Equalization



Autonomy Open Architecture



Heterogeneous SoCs




Vision and Precision Navigation and Timing (PNT) processing Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs)



Forward Deployed PED and Miniature Sensor Systems



Assurance and Supply Chain Integrity




Cryptographic Key Management





Electronics as a Strategic Issue



[†] Including the broader national security community, banking, critical infrastructure, commercial industry, etc.




Microelectronics Strategy Challenges



- DoD-driven
- Availability concerns
- Yield and complexity challenges
- Specialized IP needed
- \$\$ to maintain

- Commercially-driven
- Moderate volumes required
- Some Trust and assurance challenges
- Third-party IP necessary
- \$ to access



- Follows state-of-the-art (offshore) threatening DoD Subject Matter Expertise
- Investing in assurance and beyond-Silicon components
- Long-term impact on state-of-the-art

- Commercially-driven
- High volumes desired
- Trust and assurance challenges
- Third-party IP necessary
- \$\$\$ to access

Four Distinct Interrelated Domains





DoD Microelectronics Goals



- **DoD can lower barriers to safely access and develop advanced semiconductor-based systems to address new threats**
- **DoD can leverage an assured global supply and partners in U.S. semiconductor industry generate a competitive advantage for new markets through enhanced assurance practices**
- **Legacy and specialized microelectronics for DoD systems leverage increased assurance and expanded supply options through assurance and systems engineering**



Systems Engineering Approach




Innovators and Developers

- System architects
- R&D engineers
- Acquisition experts
- Manufacturing experts





Adopters & Improvers

- System Integrators
- Test and validation Operators and Maintainers





What We are Doing



Policy

- DoD Instruction (DoDI) 5000.02
- Program Protection Plan (PPP)
- International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) update (in work)

Joint Federated Assurance Center

- Software assurance knowledge & tools
- Hardware assurance knowledge & tools
- Advanced verification & validation capabilities

Trusted & Assured Microelectronics


- Access to state-of-the-art foundries
- Trust and assurance methods and demonstration
- Industrial best practices for assurance

COTS and FPGA



- Supply chain risk management
- FPGA Assurance Study
- Radiation hardened microelectronics initiative



Program Protection Planning Policy



- **System Security Engineering is accomplished in the DoD through PPP**
- **DoDI 5000.02 requires program managers to employ system security engineering practices and prepare a PPP to manage the security risks to Critical Program Information, mission-critical functions and information**
- **Program managers will describe in their PPP:**
 - Critical Program Information, mission-critical functions and critical components, and information security threats and vulnerabilities
 - Plans to apply countermeasures to mitigate associated risks:
 - Supply Chain Risk Management
 - Hardware and software assurance
 - Plans for exportability and potential foreign involvement
 - The Cybersecurity Strategy and Anti-Tamper plan are included





JFAC



- **JFAC is a federation of DoD SwA and HwA capabilities and capacities**
 - To support programs in addressing current and emerging threats and vulnerabilities
 - To facilitate collaboration across the Department and throughout the lifecycle of acquisition programs
 - To maximize use of available resources
 - To assess and recommend capability and capacity gaps to resource
- **Innovation of software and hardware inspection, detection, analysis, risk assessment, and remediation tools and techniques to mitigate risk of malicious insertion**
 - R&D is key component of JFAC operations
 - Focus on improving tools, techniques, and procedures for SwA and HwA to support programs
- **Federated Organizations**
 - Army, Navy, AF, NSA, DMEA DISA, NRO, and MDA laboratories and engineering support organizations; Intelligence Community and Department of Energy

The mission of JFAC is to support programs with SwA and HwA needs



Trusted Foundry Long-Term Strategy



Program goals:

- Protect microelectronic designs and IP from espionage and manipulation
- Advance DoD hardware analysis capability and commercial design standards, e.g., physical, functional, and design verification and validation
- Mature and transition new microelectronics trust model that leverages commercial state-of-the-art capabilities and ensures future access

Technical challenges:

- Develop alternate trusted photomask capability to preserve long-term trusted access and protection of IP
- Scale/enhance the government's ability to detect security flaws in ICs
- Leverage academic and industry research for assuring trust from any supplier

Program partners:

- DoD science & technology (S&T), acquisition communities, academia, and industry

Provides technical solutions that can be leveraged by government and industry to enable microelectronics assurance



Long-Term Strategy Time Line



DoD Trusted Foundry Program Consolidation - Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA)




Trusted and Assured Microelectronics Program:

Alternate Source for Trusted Photomasks



Verification and Validation (V&V) Capabilities and Standards for Trust



Advanced Technology and Alternative Techniques for Microelectronics Hardware Trust



2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2020 2023 2024



Trusted Foundry Program at DMEA



- **DMEA is responsible for assuring the access to microelectronics for critical DoD systems**
- **DoD Instruction 5200.44 requires that;**
 - *“In applicable systems, integrated circuit-related products and services shall be procured from a trusted supplier accredited by the Defense Microelectronics Activity (DMEA) when they are custom-designed, custom-manufactured, or tailored for a specific DoD military end use (generally referred to as application-specific integrated circuits (ASICs)).”*
- **Holds Trusted Foundry licensing agreements (transferred from NSA) with ~70 foundries and suppliers**
- **Pursuing new Trust and Assurance accreditation instruments to broaden access and encourage industry best practices**



Alternate Source for Trusted Photomasks



- **Develop second leading-edge Trusted photomask shop**
 - Trusted flow in data preparation and manufacturing designs needed to manage risk of IP theft and malicious alteration
 - GlobalFoundries currently only source of Trusted leading-edge masks
 - A second leading-edge source will ensure tape-in/mask release, mask manufacturing, and authentication process
 - Goal is to have secure, SECRET-level capabilities with a photomask supplier who has business relationships with leading-edge foundries






Microelectronics Trust Verification Technologies



- **Verification needed when Trusted Foundry not available**
 - DoD formed JFAC to provide this service
 - Long-term challenge to analyze leading-edge ICs and scale up capacity


Design Verification

- Verification/assurance of designs, IP, netlists, bit-streams, firmware, etc.




Physical Verification

- Destructive analysis of ICs and Printed Circuit Boards



Functional Verification

- Non-destructive screening and verification of select ICs



DoD, Intelligence Community, and DoE enhancing capability to meet future demand



Microelectronics Assurance Industrial Best Practices




- **Need industry-wide standards for assurance and security throughout the microelectronics supply chain**
 - Leverage efforts by the electronic design automation (EDA), manufacturer, integrator, and other vendor communities to develop security in an open architecture
 - Use government, industry, and academic threat and vulnerability resources to ensure security being developed is adequate for the threat
 - Who else should care about this?
 - Bio-tech community
 - Autonomy and AI community
 - Internet of Things and cloud computing providers
 - What are the benefits?
 - DoD leverages rapid innovation, ability to upgrade, and adapt to threats
 - Assurance for consumers through tracking, authentication, observability, etc., for next generation systems

Assurance as a competitive advantage in new markets



Advanced Technology and Alternative Techniques for Trust & Assurance



Design for trust

- Designing techniques to limit full use/functionality to trusted operation

IP protection

- Preventing exploitation, including control of use, concealment, reconfiguring, partitioning, or employment

Low-volume/high-mix production

- Innovative methods to permit cost-effective, Trusted and assured low volume manufacturing of state-of-the-art ICs

Electronic component markers

- Tagging/marketing ICs and subassemblies to authenticate and track supply chain movements


Imaging technologies and forensics

- Advanced capabilities to efficiently evaluate dense, state-of-the-art commercial components

Implement and demonstrate assurance capability with transition partners



Partner Efforts in Trust and Assurance



DARPA Efforts **Commercial Efforts** **Other Government**



DARPA and IARPA are critical partners in development and transition




Assurance Strategy for FPGAs



- **FY 2016 goals for this effort:**

- Produce a coherent, focused strategy/plan for FPGA assurance

- Leverage existing USG and industry efforts to the maximum extent possible
- Promote community awareness of related USG efforts via a series of workshops and conference calls sponsored by OASD(R&E), in coordination with the JFAC, National Security Agency (NSA), and Sandia National Laboratories (SNL)
- As a community, identify the portfolio of related efforts on which we should focus with the goal of synchronizing and eliminating stove-pipes and separate, single-point solutions when possible
- Identify gaps and/or activities requiring investment and elevate relevant needs to the JFAC Steering Committee (SC) for prioritization and direction regarding resourcing
 - In particular, align with, and inform, the execution plan for the Trusted Foundry Long-Term Strategy





Teaming and Partnerships are Key to Success



Many stakeholders are involved in the success of the long-term strategy:

- Leadership from OSD, Services, and agencies
- Performers including NSWC Crane, DMEA, DARPA, and other DoD S&T organizations and laboratories
- Integration and support of functions of:
 - DoD Trusted Foundry Program
 - DMEA Trusted Supplier Accreditation Program
 - JFAC
 - Microelectronics trust S&T and transition activities
- Coordination with other U.S. Government agency partners
- Building and leveraging partnerships with Defense and commercial industry and academia

Bottom line – structuring activities to meet acquisition program needs for trust and access to state-of-the-art microelectronics



The Way Ahead



- **Program engagement**
 - Foster early planning for HwA and SwA, design with security in mind
 - Implement expectations in plans and on contract
 - Support vulnerability analysis and mitigation needs
- **Community collaboration**
 - Achieve a networked capability to support DoD needs: shared practices, knowledgeable experts, and facilities to address malicious supply chain risk
- **Industry engagement**
 - Communicate strategy to tool developers
 - Develop standards for common articulation of vulnerabilities and weaknesses, capabilities and countermeasures
- **Advocate for R&D**
 - HwA and SwA tools and practices
 - Strategy for trusted microelectronics that evolves with the commercial sector
- **People!**
 - Improve awareness, expertise to design and deliver trusted systems



Opportunities to Contribute



- **Engage with industry to help identify and implement Industry best practices and standards for security and assurance**
 - Requests for Information and Broad Agency Announcements to follow)
- **Identify ASIC needs and program transition opportunities for U.S. Government applications**
- **Leverage and contribute to JFAC to discover and inform the wider community about threats and mitigation tools**
- **Look for upcoming workshops on FPGA Assurance**



Trusted Foundry Long-Term Strategy Management Model



JFAC Steering Committee
S&T Advisory Board

ASD(R&E) Program Oversight
NSWC Crane Lead Execution Activity

- Define Goals and Metrics**
- Provide Oversight
- Establish Schedule and Budget
- Identify Deliverables
- Identify Potential Transition Partners

- Statement of Work (SOW)
- Execution Plan
- Status Reports

Technology Execution Leads*

- Design/IP Protection and Trust – AF
- Commercial Solution Evaluations – Army
- Functional Verification – Navy
- Strategic Rad Hard – Navy
- Physical Verification – NSA
- FPGA Verification – NSA
- Current and Accurate Intel Info – NSA
- Transition to Practice (based on technology) - All

Technology Execution Leads*

- Technical Assessment
- Technology Development
- SME Support
- Contracts & CRADAS
- Education & Outreach
- Performer Reviews and Site Visits

Performers

- Goals and Metrics
- Oversight
- SOW
- Execution Plan
- Status Reports
- Deliverables

- Deliverables**
- Products
 - Services
 - Tools
 - IP
 - Techniques
 - Best Practices
 - Etc.

**Based on JFAC Hardware Assurance Gap Analysis and Program Needs



Systems Engineering: Critical to Defense Acquisition



Defense Innovation Marketplace
<http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil>

DASD, Systems Engineering
<http://www.acq.osd.mil/se>

Twitter: @DoDIInnovation