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Bilateral Destruction Agreement Text
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Introduction
Article I: General Provisions and Areas of Cooperation
Article II: Cooperation Regarding Methods and Technologies of Destruction
Article III: Cessation of the Production of Chemical Weapons
Article IV: Destruction of Chemical Weapons
Article V: Inspection Activities
Article VI: Measures to Facilitate the Multilateral Convention
Article VII: Consultations
Article VIII: Relationship to Other Documents
Article IX: Amendments
Article X: Entry into Force; Duration; Withdrawal
 
Agreed Statement in Connection with the Agreement
 
Annex VI: Memorandum of Understanding
 
General Provisions
Phase I Phase II Timing
Verification Format Entry into Force
 

 

OFFICIAL TEXT
June 1, 1990


AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DESTRUCTION AND NON PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20451 OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS (202) 647-8677

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as "the Parties,"

Determined to make every effort to conclude and to bring into force at the earliest date a convention providing for a global ban on the development, production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and on their destruction, hereinafter referred to as "the multilateral convention,"

Aware of their special responsibility in the area of chemical weapons disarmament,

Desiring to halt the production of chemical weapons and to begin the destruction of the preponderance of their chemical weapons stockpiles, without waiting for the mulitateral convention to enter into force,

Recalling the Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding a Bilateral Verification Experiment and Data Exchange Related to Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, signed at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, hereinafter referred to as "the Memorandum,"

Recalling the bilateral commitment to cooperate with respect to the destruction of chemical weapons, contained in the joint statement on chemical weapons issued at Jackson Hole, Wyoming on September 23, 1989, and mindful of the efforts of each Party aimed at the destrection of chemical weapons and desiring to cooperate in this area,

Have agreed as follows

ARTICLE I

GENERAL PROVISIONS AND AREAS OF COOPERATION

1. In accordance with provisions of this Agreement, the Parties undertake:

  1. to cooperate regarding methods and technologies for the safe and efficient destruction of chemical weapons;

  2. not to produce chemical weapons;

  3. to reduce their chemical weapons stockpiles to equal, low levels;

  4. to cooperate in developing, testing, and carrying out appropriate inspection procedures; and

  5. to adopt practical measures to encourage all chemical weapons-capable states to become parties to the multilateral convention.

2. Each Party, during its destrtzction of chemical weapons, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. Each Party shall destroy its chemical weapons in accordance with stringent national standards for safety and emissions.

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  ARTICLE II

COOPERATION REGARDING METHODS AND TECHNOLOGIES OF DESTRUCTION

1. To implement their undertaking to cooperate regarding the destruction of chemical weapons, the Parties shall negotiate a specific program of cooperation. For this purpose, the Parties may create special groups of experts, as appropriate. The program may include matters related to: methods and specific technologies for the destruction of chemical weapons; measures to ensure safety and protection of people and the environment; construction and operation of destruction facilities; the appropriate equipment for destruction, past, current and planned destruction activities; monitoring of destruction of chemical weapons; or such other topics as the Parties may agree. Activities to implement this program may include: exchanges of visits to relevant facilities; exchanges of documents; meetings and discussions among experts; or such other activities as the Parties may agree.

2. Each Party shall, as appropriate, cooperate with other states that request information or assistance regarding the destruction of chemical weapons. The Parties may respond jointly to such requests.

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ARTICLE III

CESSATION OF THE PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Upon entry into force of this Agreement and thereafter, each Party shall not produce chemical weapons.

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ARTICLE IV

DESTRUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 5000 agent tons. In this Agreement, "tons" means metric tons.

2. Each Party shall begin its destruction of chemical weapons by no later than December 31, 1992.

3. By no later than December 31, 1999, each Party shall have destroyed at least 50 percent of its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons. The aggregate quantity of chemical weapons of a Party shall be the amount of chemical weapons declared in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or declared thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum, as updated in accordance with paragraph 6(b) of this Article.

4. In the event that a Party determines that it cannot achieve an annual rate of destruction of chemical weapons of at least 1000 agent tons during 1995, or that it cannot destroy at least 1000 agent tons during each year after 1995, that Party shall, at the earliest possible time, notify the other Party, in accordance with Paragraph 10 of this Article.

5. Each Party, in its destruction of chemical weapons, shall also destroy the munitions, devices and containers from which the chemicals have been removed. Each Party shall reduce and limit its other empty munitions and devices for chemical weapons purposes so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, the aggregate capacity of such munitions and devices does not exceed the volume of the remaining bulk agent of that Party.

6. Thirty days after the entry into force of this Agreement, each Party shall inform the other Party of the following:

  1. its current general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement and its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force. The detailed plan shall encompass all of the chemical weapons to be destroyed during the calendar year, and shall include their locations, types and quantities, the methods of their destruction, and the locations of the destruction facilities that are to be used; and

  2. any changes, as of the entry into force of this Agreement, in the data contained in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum.

7. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than November 30, of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons during the following calendar year.

8. Beginning in the calendar year following the year in which this Agreement enters into force, each Party shall inform the other Party annually, by no later than April 15, of the following:

  1. any further changes, as of December 31 of the previous year, to the data contained in the data exchange carried out on December 29, 1989, or provided thereafter, pursuant to the Memorandum;

  2. the implementation during the previous calendar year of its detailed plan for the destruction of chemical weapons; and

  3. any update to the general and detailed plans provided pursuant to paragraphs 6(a) or 7 of this Article.

9. Each Party shall limit its chemical weapons storage facilities so that, by no later than December 31, 2002, and thereafter, the number of such facilities does not exceed eight. Each Party plans to have all such facilities located on its national territory. This is without prejudice to its rights and obligations, including those under the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925.

10. If a Party experiences problems that will prevent it from destroying its chemical weapons at a rate sufficient to meet the levels specified in this Article, that Party shall immediately notfly the other Party and provide a ful explanation. The Parties shall promptly consult on measures necessary to resolve the problems. Under no circumstances shall the Party not experiencing problems in its destruction of chemical weapons be required to destroy its chemical weapons at a more rapid rate than the Party that has experienced such problems.

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ARTICLE V

INSPECTION ACTIVITIES

1. Each Party shall provide access to each of its chemical weapons production facilities for systematic on-site inspection to confirm that production of chemical weapons is not occurring at those facilities.

2. Each Party shall identify and provide access to each of its chemical weapons destruction facilities and the chemical weapons holding areas within these destruction facilities for systematic on-site inspection of the destruction of chemical weapons. Such inspection shall be accomplished through the continuous presence of inspectors and continuous monitoring with on-site instruments.

3. When a Party has removed all of its chemical weapons from a particular chemical weapons storage facility, it shall promptly notify the other Party. The Party receiving the notification shall have the right to conduct, promptly after its receipt of the notification, an onsite inspection to confirm that no chemical weapons are present at that facility. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year of the notification and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility for which it has received a notification pursuant to this paragraph, to determine that chemical weapons are not being stored there.

4. When a Party has completed its destruction of chemical weapons pursuant to this Agreement, it shall promptly notify the other Party. In its notification, the Party shall specify the chemical weapons storage facilities where its remaining chemical weapons are located and provide a detailed inventory of the chemical weapons at each of these storage facilities. Each Party, promptly after it has received such a notification, shall have the right to inspect each of the chemical weapons storage facilities specified in the notification, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons at each facility.

5. Each Party shall also have the right to inspect, not more than once each calendar year, subsequent to the year in which destruction begins and until such time as the multilateral convention enters into force, each chemical weapons storage facility of the other Party that is not already subject to annual inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article, to determine the quantities and types of chemical weapons that are being stored there.

6. On the basis of the reports of its inspectors and ocher information available to it, each Party shall determine whether the provisions of this Agreement are being satisfactorily fulfilled and shall communicate its conclusions to the other Party.

7. Detailed provisions for the implementation of the inspection measures provided for in this Article shall be set forth in the document on inspection procedures. The Parties shall work to complete this document by December 31, 1990.

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ARTICLE VI

MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION

The Parties shall cooperate in making every effort to conclude the multilateral convention at the earliest date and to implement it effectively. Toward those ends, the Parties agree, in addition to their other obligations in this Agreement, to the following:

1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its chemical weapons so that, by no later than the end of the eighth year after entry into force of the multilateral convention, its aggregate quantity of chemical weapons does not exceed 500 agent tons.

2. Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of states parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, inter alia, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years.

3. The Parties shall intensify their cooperation with each other and with other states to ensure that all chemical weapons-capable states become parties to the multilateral convention.

4. The Parties declare their intention to be among the original parties to the multilateral convention.

5. To gain experience and thereby facilitate the elaboration and implementation of the multilateral convention, the Parties agree to conduct bilateral verification experiments involving trial challenge inspections at facilities not declared under the Memorandum or subsequently. The detailed modalities for such experiments, including the number and location of the facilities to be inspected, as well as the procedures to be used, shall be agreed between the Parties no later than six months after the signing of this Agreement.

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ARTICLE VII

CONSULTATIONS

The Parties, in order to resolve questions related to this Agreement that may arise, shall use normal diplomatic channels, specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as they may agree.

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  ARTICLE VIII

RELATIONSHIP TO OTHER DOCUMENTS

1. After the multilateral convention enters into force, the provisions of the multilateral convention shall take precedence over the provisions of this Agreement in cases of incompatible obligations therein. Otherwise, the provisions of this Agreement shall supplement the provisions of the multilateral convention in its operation between the Parties. After the multilateral convention is signed, the Parties to this Agreement shall consult with each other in order to resolve any questions concerning the relationship of this Agreement to the multilateral convention.

2. The chemical weapons, chemical weapons storage facilities, and chemical weapons production facilities subject to this Agreement are those that are subject to declaration under the Memorandum.

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ARTICLE IX

AMENDMENTS

Each Party may propose amendments to this Agreement. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Agreement

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  ARTICLE X

ENTRY INTO FORCE; DURATION; WITHDRAWAL

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon an exchange of instruments stating acceptance of the Agreement by each Party.

2. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration, unless the Parties agree to terminate it after the entry into force of the multilateral convention.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

DONE at Washington, in duplicate, this 1st day of June, 1990, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

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AGREED STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON DESTRUCTION AND NON-PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS AND ON MEASURES TO FACILITATE THE MULTILATERAL CONVENTION ON BANNING CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Paragraph 2 of Artide VI of the Agreement stipulates that, "Upon signature of this Agreement, the Parties shall enter into consultations with other participants in the multilateral negotiations and shall propose that a special conference of states parties to the multilateral convention be held at the end of the eighth year after its entry into force. This special conference would, inter alia, determine, in accordance with agreed procedures, whether the participation in the multilateral convention is sufficient for proceeding to the total elimination of all remaining chemical weapons stocks over the subsequent two years."

In this connection, the Parties agree that an affirmative decision would require the agreement of a majority of the states parties that attend the special conference, with such majority including those states parties attending the special conference that had taken the following three steps:

  1. presented officially and publicly, before December 31, 1991, before the Conference on Disarmament, a written dedaration that they were at the time of that declaration in possession of chemical weapons;

  2. signed the multilateral convention within thirty days after it was opened for signature; and

  3. became a party to the multilateral convention by no later than one year after its entry into force.

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  ANNEX VI

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA REGARDING A BILATERAL VERIFICATION EXPERIMENT AND DATA EXCHANGE RELATED TO PROHIBITION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS

The Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the United States of America,

Determined to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable, and truly global convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons,

Convinced that increased openness about their chemical weapons capabilities is essential for building the confidence necessary for early completion of the convention,

Desiring also to gain experience in the procedures and measures for verification of the convention,

Have agreed as follows:

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I. General Provisions

1. As set forth below, the two sides shall conduct a bilateral verification experiment and data exchange related to the prohibition of chemical weapons.

2. The bilateral verification erpenrnent and data exchange shall be conducted in two phases. In Phase I, the two sides shall exchange general data on their chemical weapons capabilities and carry out a series of visits to relevant facilities. In Phase II, the two sides shall exchange detailed data and perform on-site inspection to verify the accuracy of those data.

3. The bilateral verification experiment and data exchange is intended to facilitate the process of negotiation, signature and ratification of a comprehensive, effectively verifiable and truly global convention on the prohobition and destruction of chemical weapons by:

  1. enabling each side to gain confidence in the data on chemical weapons capabilities that will be provided under the provisions of the convention;
  2. enabling each side to gain confidence in the inspection procedures that will be used to verify compliance with the convention; and
  3. facilitating the elaboration of the provisions of the convention.
4. Terms used in this Memorandum shall have the same meaning as in the draft convention text under negotiation by the Conference on Disarmament. The draft convention text that is current as of the date of the exchange of data shall be used.

5. Data shall be current as of the date of the exchange, and shall encompass all sites and facilities specified below, wherever they are located.

6. Each side shall take appropriate steps to protect the confidentialitv of the data it receives. Each side undertakes not to divulge this data without the explicit consent of the side that provided the data.

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II. Phase I

In Phase I, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilities:

    1. the aggegate quantity of its chemical weapons in agent tons;

    2. the specific types of chemicals it possesses that are defined as chemical weapons, indicating the common name of each chemical;

    3. the percentage of each of its declared chemicals that is stored in munitions and devices, and the percentage that is stored in storage containers;

    4. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons storage facilities;

    5. for each of its declared chemical weapons storage facilities:

    -- the common name of each chemical defined as a chemical weapon that is stored there;

    -- the percentage of the precise aggregate quantity of its chemical weapons that is stored there;

    and

    -- the specific types of munitions and devices that are stored there;

    6. the precise location of each of its chemical weapons production facilities, indicating the common name of each chemical that has been or is being produced at each facility; and

    7. the precise location of each of its facilities for destruction of chemical weapons, including those currently existing, under construction, or planned.

    In Phase I, each side shall permit the other side to visit some of its chemical weapons storage and production facilities, the exact number of which will be agreed upon as soon as possible. In addition, each side shall permit the other side to visit two industrial chemical production facilities. Each side will select the facilities to be visited by the other side.

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III. Phase II

In Phase II, each side shall provide the following data pertaining to its chemical weapons capabilies:

    1. the chemical name of each chemical it possesses that is defined as a chemical weapon;

    2. the detailed inventory, including the quantity, of the chemical weapons at each of its

    chemical weapons storage facilities;

    3. its preliminary general plans for destruction of chemical weapons under the convention, including the characteristics of the facilities it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

    4. the capacity of each of its chemical weapons production facilities;

    5. preliminary general plans for closing and destroying each of its chemical weapons production facilities under the convention, including the methods it expects to use and the time schedules it expects to follow;

    6. the precise location and capacity of its planned single small-scale facility allowed under the convention for the production, for non-prohibited purposes under strict safeguards, of a limited quantity of chemicals that pose a high risk, i.e., Schedule 1 chemicals;

    7. the precise location, nature and general scope of activities of any facility, or establishment designed, constructed or used since 1 January 1946 for development of chemical weapons, inter alia, laboratories and test and evaluation sites.

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IV. Timing

1. Except as specified below, Phase I data shall be exchanged not later than 31 December 1989. Visits shall begin not later than 30 June 1990, provided that the sides have agreed, with appropriate lead time, on the number of visits, as well as on the programs and other detailed arrangements for the visits, and assuming that the sides have agreed by 31 December 1989 on the type of facility to be visited by each side in its first visit to the other side.

2. In Phase I each side may withhold temporarily, for reasons of security, data on the locations of storage facilities that together contain a total quantity of chemical weapons that is more than two percent of the precise quantity of its chemicaI weapons. In addition, the other data pertaining to these locations, as specified in Section II, paragraph 5, shall be grouped under the heading "other storage locations" without reference to specific locations. Precise data pertaining to these locations shall be exchanged later in Phase I on a subsequent date to be agreed.

3. Phase II data shall be exchanged on an agreed date not less than four months prior to the initialing of the text of the convention. At that time, both sides shall formaIIy and jointly acknowledge the possibility of initialing the convention within four months.

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V. Verification

1. Each side shall use its own national means to evaluate Phase I data and Phase II data.

2. During Phase I, the sides shall hold consultations to discuss the information that has been presented and visits that have been exchanged. The sides will cooperate in clarifying ambiguous situations.

3. During Phase Il, each side shall have the opportunity to verify Phase I and Phase II data by means of on-site inspections. The purpose of these inspections shall be to verify the accuracy of the data that has been exchanged and to gain confidence that the signature and ratification of the convention will take place on the basis of up-to-date and verified data on the chemical weapons capabilities of the sides.

4. Prior to the initialing of the conven tion, each side shall have the opportunity to select and inspect at its discretion up to five facilities from the list of chemical weapons storage facilities and chemical weapons production facilities declared by the other side. During Phase I, the sides will consider whether each side may inspect not less than half of the declared facilities of the other side of their number is more than 10. Should either side as of the date of the Phase II exchange possess a single small-scale facility for production of Schedule 1 chemicals, it shall be subject to an additional inspection.

Each side shall also have the opportunity to carry out up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. All inspections shall be carried out within the agreed four months from the date of the declaration pertaining to Phase II, referred in Section IV.

5. While the signed convention is being considered by their respective legislative bodies, each side shall have the opponunity to request from the other side, and to obtain from it, updated data. Each side shall have the opportunity to conduct up to five challenge inspections, as specified below. During this process, the two sides will consult with their respective legislative bodies, as appropriate, in accordance with their constitutional requirements.

For each side, these inspections shall be carried out within a four-month period, beginning with the date that it conducts its first inspection. The sides shall consult and agree on the dates when the first inspection will be conducted by each side. The dates shall be chosen to ensure that the inspections shall be conducted by both sides at approximately the same time. Once the inspections begin, the sides may, by mutual consent, extend the four-month periods for an additional specified period.

6. Inspections of declared facilities, as well as challenge inspections, shall be conducted in accordance with the corresponding provisions of the draft convention, taking into account that these inspections are being carried out on a bilateral basis and do not involve the bodies that will be established under the convention. If necessary, the two sides shall supplement the provisions of the draft convention by mutually-agreed procedures.

7. Challenge inspections may be made at any location or facility of the other side, as provided for in the draft convention text, except that, for the purposes of this Memorandum and without creating a precedent, challenge inspections at facilities not on the territory of the sides may be made only at military facilities of a side in a limited number of countries; the sides will agree later on these specific countries.

8. Challenge inspections conducted pursuant to this Memorandum shall be conducted in a manner consistent with the domestic law of the side being inspected and shall be based on a recognition by both sides of the need to resolve concerns and build confidence.

9. To clarify. questions related to the data provided during Phase I and Phase II, the two

sides shall employ normal diplomatic channels specifically-designated representatives, or such other means as may be agreed upon.

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VI. Format

1. Unless otherwise provided in this Memorandum, the agreed data shall be provided, according to the specifications contained in the draft convention text for the declarations that are to be made not later than 30 days after the convention enters into force.

2. Precise locations shall be specified by means of site diagrams of facilities. Each diagram shall clearly indicate the boundaries of the facility, all structures of the facility, and significant geographical relief features in the vicinitv of the facility. If the facility is located within a larger complex, the diagram shall clearly specify the exact location within the complex. On each diagram, the geographic coordinates of the center of the facility shall be specified to the nearest second.

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VII. Entry into Force

This Memorandum of Understanding shall enter into force upon signature.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Memorandum of Understanding.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF THE
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:
Eduard Shevardnadze

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
James A. Baker III

Source: Chemical Weapons Convention Bulletin, Issue No. 6. November 1989.

 

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