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ACQUISITION,
TECHNOLOGY
AND LOGISTICS

AUG 30 2004

MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference – Defense Science Board Task Force on Red Lessons Learned

You are requested to form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force on Red Lessons Learned.

Each U.S. Military engagement provides ample opportunity for an adversary to observe U.S. capabilities and respond to them. The opportunity is enhanced, today, by the documentation provided by embedded and otherwise intrusive news media.

Adversaries can learn about long-lead-time U.S. material capabilities, some kept secret and unveiled for the first time. They can study the evolution of our doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures and when successive conflicts are closely spaced in time—most recently, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) AND OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF)—they can witness our ability to adapt quickly. Insofar as we publicize our lessons learned, they may be able to intuit our next evolution. Adversaries can exploit this wealth of information to guide their own strategies and make future U.S. efforts more difficult.

Moreover, U.S. practice is to rush technology to the area of operations to solve specific problems. This use of the battlefield as a laboratory poses a quandary. Rapid insertion of technology offers great payoff but risks divulging capabilities before adequate security precautions are implemented. An adversary response to such a rapid insertion can stymie a promising technology not yet sufficiently developed thereby wasting valuable resources and time. More generally, such rapid insertions may provide undesirable insights into U.S. industrial and scientific capabilities in aid of our future battlefield prowess.

The problem we introduce when we demonstrate our skills may be particularly acute given today's adversaries. Historically, capable nations—would-be peer competitors—maintained extensive espionage and analysis efforts to obtain and exploit such information. Today's asymmetric adversaries generally would not have this clandestine advantage so they are even more reliant on our exhibited capability. Moreover, their transnational character means they may have first-hand observations on which to base their adaptations.

The Task Force should assess:

1. What useful information can our adversaries—both sophisticated and unsophisticated—learn from U.S. military engagements and, particularly, what might they have learned from OIF and OEF?

2. Identify the channels through which adversaries learn about U.S. capabilities. Are there any methods that can be used to disrupt, manipulate, or control these channels?

3. Is there any evidence an adversary is adjusting to U.S. capabilities? If so, what are they doing, how fast can they adapt, and what might the U.S. do to counter this?

4. What are the indicators or observables that the Intelligence Community can focus on to determine if an adversary is engaging in this type of practice? Do the indicators change in peacetime or wartime?

5. Do different technology insertion models exist? For example, the U.S. tends to insert technology into the armed forces as it is developed. Would it make more sense to insert technology into the forces when they engage in a new campaign? This model would allow greater surprise and possibly better effectiveness but risks improper use of the technology due to ill prepared or untrained troops.

6. Is there any evidence potential adversaries are targeting the seams in the U.S. command and control alignment and planning process (i.e. the seam between U.S. Central Command and U.S. European Command)?

7. The preceding areas of concern focus primarily on the military operations phase. Are potential adversaries observing, analyzing and adapting during the preparation and stabilization phase?

The Study will be sponsored by me as the Acting Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology & Logistics), Under Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), and the Director, Defense Research and Engineering. Mr. Rich Haver will serve as Chairman of the Task Force. Mr. Jerrold Goldblatt, OUSD(I), will serve as Executive Secretary, and CDR Dave Waugh, USN will serve as the DSB Secretariat representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the "Federal Advisory Committee Act," and DoD Directive 5105.4, the "DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program." It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any "particular matters" within the meaning of Section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as a procurement official.

Michael W. Wynne
Acting