Intelligence Integration into Acquisition Programs

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A summary of program engagements and site visits conducted by the Acquisition Intelligence Division and resulting observations and recommendations.

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Executive Summary

Project Overview
At the direction of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (Strategy, Programs, & Resources (SPR)), the Acquisition Intelligence Division (AID) conducted a series of engagements with major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) with a focus on Acquisition Category 1D programs along with site visits.

Intelligence Supportability
Programs did not note any significant intelligence supportability issues aside from availability of intelligence data needed to support capability development. Demand will always exceed supply. Services must be able to tailor and prioritize intelligence support.

Threat Products and Processes
Programs met regulatory requirements for threat products. The Department should continue to evaluate methodologies and tools to deliver tailored and timely intelligence information to programs and portfolio managers in a digital construct and support cross-Service collaboration and discoverability. There is a need to establish intelligence related data driven feedback mechanisms.

Observations and Recommendations
The Acquisition Intelligence Division offers an enterprise focal point, though success can only be through a community effort and enterprise solutions. Top 3 initiatives that require acquisition intelligence workforce attention: digital acquisition intelligence, intelligence integration reviews, and the acquisition intelligence career occupation program. Other recommendations focused on counterintelligence and security, cybersecurity, intelligence participation in the request for proposal, threat support to testing and evaluation, and intelligence support to Modular Open Systems Approach.

― Colin Powell

“The day the soldiers stop bringing you their problems is the day you stopped leading them. They have either lost confidence that you can help them or concluded that you do not care. Either case is a failure of leadership.”

― Colin Powell
Project Overview

At the direction of the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (SPR), the Acquisition Intelligence Division (AID) conducted a series of engagements with major defense acquisition programs (MDAPs) with a focus on Acquisition Category 1D programs.

Intent of the project was to assess the demand signal or intelligence and ensure the Defense Intelligence and Security Enterprise (DISE) is positioned to support capability solutions. Project personnel conducted program engagements, site engagements, and when available, reviewed intelligence integration documents. We focused on infrastructure, intelligence planning for supportability, threat support, intelligence threat application, and the acquisition intelligence career occupation program in order to provide an overall assessment.

The AID team conducted the following program engagements:

- Army (USA): Precision Strike Missile (PrSM), Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD), Future Vertical Lift (FVL).
- Navy (USN): Columbia Class Submarine.

The AID conducted site visits to Redstone Arsenal, AL; Aberdeen Proving Grounds, MD; Fort Sill, OK; Naval Information Warfare Center – Pacific, CA; Naval Station Norfolk, VA; Farragut, MD; Patuxent River, MD; Navy Yard, DC; Wright Patterson Air Force Base, OH; Hill Air Force Base (AFB), UT; and Eglin AFB, FL.

Project personnel sought answers to the following questions:

- How do we improve DISE support to Acquisition?
- How do we deliver a stronger intelligence voice to the acquisition table?
- Where can automation assist?

When engaging with acquisition intelligence specialists, project personnel sought answers to the following:

- Do you have a means to communicate resource needs?
- Where are your pain points in executing intelligence functions?
- Are DISE products and service sufficient for today and the future?

“[It] is important that these capabilities are designed in a way that they are flexible in addressing the variety of mission needs, and can evolve with emerging threats and new technology opportunities.”

Honorable Ellen Lord
• Can you execute effectively when and where needed?
• What skill sets are needed for the future workforce?
• How can we help?
Intelligence Supportability

Overall observations

- Integration of intelligence has improved significantly over the past decade and senior leaders routinely talk to the importance of intelligence in driving capability development.
- Each Service is different in how it provides acquisition intelligence support.
- Engagements can be difficult to arrange. Programs are often leery of Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) interest in their program. Continued engagements and showing value added can build trust throughout the Services.
- Intelligence supportability falls under the requirements process and program offices frequently do not view it as an acquisition responsibility.
- Determination of intelligence supportability requirements is a training shortfall.
- Not all services have a process to provide intelligence integration feedback. Where there is policy and process, it’s not always followed.
- Need more efficient process for integration of intelligence products produced outside of the intelligence production centers. Programs expressed a need for more timely, tailored intelligence.

Intelligence Manpower Support

Addressed if capability solution requires intelligence personnel for development, testing, training, and/or operations.

- Programs were assessed to have met manpower requirements except for the Army’s Future Vertical Lift which does not have dedicated acquisition intelligence support.
- Pertaining to acquisition intelligence support, additional analysis is needed by the Services to determine the optimal manning mix vice what’s good enough.
  - USAF is developing an Acquisition and Sustainment Unit (ASU) Manpower Model Assessment tool that would better identify optimal manpower requirements based on identified support to a program. This could be useful across the Services.
  - USA/USN are exploring various methodologies.
- The Electronic Warfare (EW) portfolio lead highlighted concerns about the shortfall of Electronic Warfare Officers and shortfalls in the intelligence community in general. This needs further analysis.
- The depth of the scientific and technical intelligence bench to address future threats and technology is of concern and warrants additional analysis.

“What counts is not necessarily the size of the dog in the fight -- it's the size of the fight in the dog.”

-- Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower
Intelligence Supportability

- AID coordinated production of the acquisition intelligence manpower assessment that is available upon request and has been provided to the Services.

Intelligence Funding Support
Addressed if capability solution or supporting efforts will require, or depend upon, intelligence funding. Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) is considered separately below.

- Programs were assessed to have met intelligence funding requirements.
- Additional analysis is needed to identify intelligence costs associated with testing and evaluation (T&E) earlier in the materiel development process and integrating those costs into the budgeting process.

Intelligence Planning and Operations Support
Identifies support requirements derived from the interrelated categories of intelligence operations.

- All programs were assessed to have met intelligence planning and operational support requirements.
- The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency has established a detailed requirements determination process. Continued collaboration and messaging are encouraged.
- Evaluation of an integrated, digitized machine-to-machine processing, exploitation, and dissemination process was not included in this project and warrants additional analysis.

Intelligence Interoperability
The ability to receive, produce, store, and/or share intelligence data, products, services, and/or processes with similarly compatible systems.

- All programs were assessed to have met intelligence planning and operational support requirements.
- Evaluation of the various programs and their support to an integrated, digitized machine-to-machine information exchange with the intelligence community was not included in this project and warrants additional analysis.
- The Missile and Space Intelligence Center has resurrected the Reprogrammer’s Forum that will focus on Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Reprogramming Electronic Warfare Systems. The forum is looking at the Joint Emitter
Priority Requirements List which has fallen by the wayside and potential to integrate into the Annual Framework.

**Targeting Support**
The intelligence support needed to develop targets, prioritize targets, and selecting responses.

- No program had intelligence targeting requirements.
- Intelligence support to long-range targeting and multi-sensor queuing were noted as a concern in execution of long-range fires.

**Intelligence Mission Data (IMD) Support**
IMD needed to program platform mission systems including, but not limited to signatures, electronic warfare integrated reprogramming, order of battle, characteristics and performance, and geospatial intelligence.

- Programs are generally good about submitting requirements via a LMDP and/or the Annual Framework. In some cases, they are relying on requirements to support legacy programs (PrSM and FVL).
- Recommend changing this to “Intelligence Data” in order to capture the totality of intelligence data required to support a capability development.
- All programs that had identified IMD requirements had gaps. Additional work is needed to ensure incorporation of sufficiency in the risk management framework.
- IAMD has a waiver though is likely dependent on GEOINT, EWIR, signatures, and characteristics and performance. Programs related to IAMD had submitted IMD requirements (Lower Tier Air and Missile Defense).
- Need to construct a library of blue, grey, and white platforms. USAF 57th Intelligence Squadron is working to manage this in support of a variety of platforms.
- The USN is developing a Department of the Navy IMD Requirements Tool (DIRT) to provide customers an ability to derive, document, and submit IMD and M&S requirements. Need to facilitate integration of DIRT with the broader ecosystem.
Intelligence Supportability

Space Intelligence Support
Requirements for space-based capability solutions reliance on space-based capabilities, or perform space control or space support.

- This is a relatively new area and has not been integrated into most of the program’s capability development documents.
- AID conducted outreach to the Space community to identify space-related IMD requirements that were integrated into the Annual Framework.
- The Space portfolio has significant growth potential for intelligence support as we continue to identify what may be unique requirements for intelligence data.

Counterintelligence Support
Intelligence information, infrastructure, or resources used to assist acquisition community in planning for protection of designated technology information.

- All programs post-Milestone A had a program protection plan with a multi-disciplined counterintelligence threat assessment.
- Technology targeting risk assessments (TTRA) required by DoDI 5000.02 are not being routinely done. Intelligence production centers cite a lack of resources.
- Supply chain and anti-tamper are two significant areas that need additional analysis.
- The USAF has piloted the Vendor Susceptibility Target Assessment which is a supply chain risk management process that utilizes publicly available information to identify supply chain risks. It contains analytical assessments on fifteen risk indicators. This approach warrants additional consideration across the Services.
- Need to relook the Acquisition Security Database (ASDB) that was sponsored by OSD(AT&L) and run by Defense Technical Information Center. ASDB served as a repository for program security and seems to have gone dormant.

Intelligence Training Support
Requirements for intelligence personnel to provide specialized training to support part or all of a given capability solution’s lifecycle.

- All programs were assessed to have met intelligence training requirements.

“I believe we must balance authorities with the speed to deliver capability and the critical nature of the threat.”
Honorable Ellen Lord
Intelligence Supportability

- Acquisition intelligence personnel were very supportive of the Defense Acquisition University’s ACQ110, Acquisition Intelligence. Those that had participated in the pilot believe it will be a great start.
- There will be a need for Service-specific acquisition intelligence training. USAF conducts a quarterly Intelligence Formal Training Unit (IFTU). USA conducts an annual Intelligence Support to Acquisition and Requirements Training (iSTART) event.
- AID is coordinating for additional analysis on Level II and Level III requirements for acquisition intelligence training and qualification.
Threat Products

General

Acquisition intelligence support is very document based. There is no way to know if the provided intelligence is read, how the intelligence is applied, nor if the intelligence is effective. The Department should continue to evaluate methodologies and tools to deliver tailored and timely intelligence information to programs and portfolio managers. Acquisition Intelligence personnel at Hanscom AFB focus on providing tailored intelligence support that informs programmatic decisions and is a great exemplar. There is a need to establish intelligence related data driven feedback mechanisms.

Validated Online Lifecycle Threat (VOLT) Report

All programs had a validated VOLT.

Current regulatory guidance directs production of a VOLT at the Materiel Development Decision, Milestone A, Development Request for Proposal, Milestone C, and Full Rate Production. There is no requirement for an updated VOLT during the Operations and Support phase. The VOLT should be in place a year prior to any given touchpoint in order to inform those efforts.

The VOLT process has significantly reduced production time and has ensured consistency of threat data. Programs and supporting acquisition intelligence specialists expressed support for continued efforts of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to make the VOLT truly dynamic and tailorable.

Many programs consider the VOLT as the only intelligence support that they need to meet regulatory requirements. The VOLT should be considered as the beginning of a conversation and a tool to identify needed intelligence support to support a program throughout its lifecycle.

MDA uses a portfolio approach by producing a Ballistic Missile Defense System VOLT that covers multiple systems with similar capability and components. This approach warrants additional consideration and could better inform strategic portfolio analysis.

Critical Intelligence Parameters (CIPs)

All programs had CIPs and were assessed to be ahead of breach though F-35 had had two CIPs that had been breached in the past.
CIPs are the area of intelligence support that has the most potential to inform intelligence collection and provide data driven feedback to program offices. There is currently no process in place to monitor and provide real time, dynamic feedback to program offices. The National Ground Intelligence Center is exploring integration of a “barometer” approach to monitoring CIPs.

Program offices were supportive of DIA efforts to put in place a process to better manage CIPs and provide threat barometers by which to gauge threat technology advancements. DIA is conducting a CIP pilot that looks to streamline CIP development and better integrate into the Defense Intelligence Threat Library to facilitate monitoring. Future improvements should include active, dynamic CIP monitoring in a digital construct.

Services need to develop a process to integrate the status of CIPs into program reviews. USAF has used a CIP status chart that provides the progression and anticipated timeframe for breach that informs program improvements, requirements changes, and risk mitigation efforts.

The AID is facilitating a CIP monitoring approach in collaboration with the F-35 program office. Intent is to look at a barometer approach to inform program improvements.

MDA does not create CIPs. Instead the program documents and tracks “stressors”. This approach warrants additional consideration and could support a more holistic look at the threat and program impact.

Portfolio CIPs warrant additional analysis. Portfolio CIPs are more challenging in the cyber and software domain than in the traditional air, ground, and maritime domains.

**Lifecycle Mission Data Plan (LMDP)**

Most programs had a LMDP or had submitted requirements in the Annual Framework. Some programs that were pre-Milestone A were relying on the requirements submitted by legacy programs.

Many major platforms are a system of systems. Frequently, subsystem LMDPs have not been completed. Program managers do not see this as their problem, but rather, the problem of the subsystem program manager. Services should track and facilitate subsystem identification of requirements.
DIA (TLA-4) assists with development of the LMDP and produces a Visualization of Intelligence Supportability Report that identifies IMD production shortfalls and can be used to inform a program’s risk mitigation framework.

**Program Protection Plan**

All programs past Milestone A had a program protection plan in place.

Multi-disciplined counterintelligence threat assessments (MDCITAs) are routinely requested and produced though some programs argue their utility. Technology threat risk assessments (TTRAs) are required by DoDI 5000.02 but are not routinely produced due to resource constraints.

Additional analysis is needed to identify what programs truly need from the counterintelligence community to protect their program and what resources are needed.

**Cybersecurity Strategy**

All programs past Milestone A had a cybersecurity strategy.

Additional analysis is needed to identify what programs need in relation to cybersecurity.

The AID is leading an effort to evaluate the cybersecurity requirements needed to support program offices, best practices, and need for a cyber community of interest that can deliver recommendations and tools for improved cyber threat intelligence.

Continue engagement with the Defense Cyberspace Intelligence Committee (DCIC). DCIC is a DIA working group that advises the Functional Manager for All-Source Analysis on issues related to defense cyberspace intelligence.

J-28 is looking at the potential to establish cyber-related intelligence data that can be integrated into the Annual Framework.

The USAF has established the Adversary Cyber Threat Assessment (ACTA) process. The ACTA identifies key program components and sub components, works with the intelligence community to provide a cyber risk assessment for each component, and overlays program documentation with critical cyber threat information. This is an exemplar of a best practice that other Services should evaluate for implementation.
Observations and Recommendations

1. Policy
   1.1 DoD needs to specify acquisition intelligence roles and responsibilities. DoDI 5000.UD is in staffing and can meet this need.
   1.2 DoD needs to mandate integration across acquisition, intelligence, and requirements communities. DoDD 5250.01 is in staffing and can meet this need.
   1.3 DoD needs to share best practices and operational concepts for how to conduct acquisition intelligence. Defense Acquisition Guidebook, Chapter 7 (Acquisition Intelligence) was revised to focus on acquisition and capture best practices. Services must commit to keep capturing best practices.
   1.4 Additional work is needed to assess counterintelligence and security synchronization and how the DISE can best support.

2. Process
   2.1 Where dedicated, experience acquisition intelligence specialists are in place, intelligence support is very effective.
   2.2 Program access can be difficult and often personality/relationship driven.
   2.3 Automation can help though users must commit to drive development.
   2.4 DISE processes can be synchronized to better support acquisition intelligence needs.
   2.5 There is a strong demand signal for tools that support cross-Service collaboration and discoverability of intelligence products.

3. Threat steering group (TSG) and threat working group (TWG)
   3.1 Observations. Services are conducting TSGs/TWGs to coordinate intelligence support requirements.
   3.2 Recommendations. Continued development of the TSG/TWG operating procedures. Need to emphasize participation of system and test engineers. Need to incorporate consideration of data management in order to integrate into digital engineering efforts.

4. Intelligence sensitivity, supportability, sufficiency assessment (IS3A)
   4.1 Observations. Only the USAF has established policy, processes, and training in place to conduct IS3A. Though they have a process in place, it is not always utilized especially where support is provided by senior acquisition intelligence specialists. The USA/USN are evaluating an IS3A process for implementation.
   4.2 Recommendations. Establish automated process to conduct IS3A and provide data driven feedback on status and effectiveness of intelligence. IS3A can be used to inform a program’s risk mitigation efforts. Move certification from a check the block
Observations and Recommendations

report card to a process that enables program success throughout the lifecycle with data driven feedback. Need to automate and provide data driven feedback. The AID developed a standard template that can be integrated into the Digital Acquisition Intelligence tool.

5. Request for proposal (RFP).

5.1 Observations. Commenting on the RFP, the Honorable Frank Kendall serving as Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics remarked, “I regard this as the most important single decision point in the entire life cycle because the release of the engineering and manufacturing decision RFP sets in motion everything that will follow in the product’s life cycle.” The RFP translates requirements into engineering specifications that go out to industry for materiel development. Supporting acquisition intelligence personnel are not typically included in the development of a RFP leading to the potential that specifications will not match assessed adversarial technology trends. There are no contracting guidelines that support industrial identification of intelligence data needed to support capability development.

5.2 Recommendations. Supporting acquisition intelligence specialists should be incorporated into development of the RFP. The RFP should be incorporated into acquisition intelligence training. DIA (TLA-4) has agreed to take on development of a Contract Data Requirements List and Data Item Description or Military Specification that can be used to support the RFP and contracting process.


6.1 Observations. Threat representations needed to support T&E are not typically identified early in the acquisition lifecycle. Frequently, programs request threat representations within a year of a test events which can result in a lack of availability or lack of validation/accreditation of those threat representations. Modeling and simulation are critical to developing capabilities and making trade space and technology decisions.

6.2 Recommendations. The USA has a threat test support package process that could be useful across the Services. Threat representation requirements should be identified with the initial Test Evaluation Strategy or Test and Evaluation Master Plan and used to inform requirements for foreign materiel acquisition, modeling and simulation, and development of surrogates. This information can be used to inform management of test resources and lead to potential cost savings. Need to evaluate potential T&E infrastructure improvements to support arc heaters, flight test instrumentation and ranges, scramjet testing, and shock tunnels.
7. Digital Construct.

7.1 Observations. The Department is moving to a digital engineering construct. Acquisition intelligence documentation is for the most part housed in documents, spreadsheets, and emails instead of databased. Information does not flow between processes and datasets leading to duplicative data capture. Tools, templates, relevant data, and best practices are not discoverable and searchable. Stakeholders are not able to easily track acquisition program status or acquisition intelligence support to acquisition programs. The Missiles and Space Intelligence Center is moving towards digitizing intelligence delivery and has expressed a desire for analysts to spend less time writing reports and more time delivering data. The NAVSEA digital engineering team is leading efforts to digitize their Product Lifecycle Management that governs technology investments and aligns requirements, design, engineering, logistics, maintenance, and operational data environments.

7.2 Recommendations. Develop a Role-Based Digital Acquisition Intelligence Ecosystem. Provide a digital front end that improves identification of requirements across programs and Services. Continue to refine Digital Intelligence to support transformation of the DISE from a focus on written products to integrating intelligence in a digital construct. The USN is pursuing the Engineering Level Characterization of the Adversary (ELCA) that focuses on engineering level characterization of adversaries. ELCA has potential to be a pilot program for how the intelligence community can provide tailored intelligence data to a program’s digital engineering efforts. Support pilot with the NAVSEA digital engineering team.

8. Data driven feedback.

8.1 Observations. There is no process in place to provide data driven feedback on the application and effectiveness of intelligence into capability development.

8.2 Recommendations. Continue efforts with the Defense Acquisition Visibility Environment (DAVE) and the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES) to establish feedback on acquisition intelligence.


9.1 Observations. The intent of MOSA is to design systems with highly cohesive, loosely coupled, and severable modules that can be competed separately and acquired from independent vendors. Intelligence can inform MOSA decisions by providing technology trends of potential adversaries. MOSA can inform science and technology (S&T) and scientific and technical intelligence (S&TI) horizon scanning and inform investments.

9.2 Recommendations. GBSD developed a method to identify the dynamic threat environment along with pace of technology change and relate these to potential MOSA efforts. Services should evaluate this as a best practice to use in support of
Observations and Recommendations

other acquisition efforts. Acquisition intelligence training should include MOSA considerations and the role of intelligence. Intelligence support to MOSA can be a method to improve the synchronization of S&T/S&TI efforts.

10. Adaptive Acquisition Pathways.

10.1 Observations. The Department is implementing six acquisition pathways to streamline acquisition and allow for tailored approaches. Programs “opt in” for regulatory requirements based on their capability. Acquisition intelligence specialists are concerned that intelligence will not be integrated into acquisition efforts outside a traditional program of record.

10.2 Recommendations. Continue to monitor execution of the pathways and integration of intelligence. Continue messaging on value of effective intelligence integration and the positive impact on cost, schedule, and performance.

11. Intelligence support to sustainment.

11.1 Observations. There are no intelligence related products required past full-rate production. Many programs do not see intelligence as having a role during the Operations and Support (O&S) phase. Programs that are sensitive to intelligence data will require support throughout the lifecycle to ensure combat capability maintains pace with threat developments.

11.2 Recommendations. Additional analysis is needed to determine intelligence supportability requirements for programs in O&S. Acquisition intelligence could be tailored for a specific program to ensure that the program will continue to receive timely intelligence data.

12. Partners and forums to leverage.

12.1 Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (SPR) manages the Integrated DoD Intelligence Priorities (IDIP) that can be used to better support collection and analysis to support the acquisition community.

12.2 Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment (Acquisition Enablers). Manages DAVE in which acquisition intelligence can be better integrated. DAVE feeds the DAES report. Acquisition intelligence can be better integrated into this data driven feedback system. Manages the DoD Special Access Program (SAP) Central Office. Acquisition intelligence support to SAP initiatives was not assessed and warrants further analysis.

12.3 Undersecretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. Our partner for intelligence support to digital engineering and the link between S&T.

12.4 Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E). Our partner for policy and processes related to intelligence support to T&E.
12.5 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Continued collaboration with the IMD Standing Working Group (SWG) can reflect acquisition priorities for production and support infrastructure improvements. Service intelligence production centers annually produce a program of analysis which can be better informed with production and analysis in support of key intelligence questions related to acquisition.

12.6 DIA Technology and Long-Range Assessment (TLA-3). Our DISE threat baseline focal point and is vital for establishing dynamic assessments and management of the authoritative sources of truth. Conducts the Acquisition Intelligence Support Working Group which can be leveraged for cross-Service coordination of policy and processes for acquisition intelligence support.

12.7 DIA (TLA-4) is our central DISE production focal point and vital for synchronization and common standards.

12.8 J-28. Our requirements partner. Continued collaboration with acquisition intelligence will continue to improve the process. Intelligence Certification Working Group can be leveraged to improve the tracking and analysis of intelligence supportability requirements. Need to meet with J-281 to discuss potential for intelligence supportability trend analysis.

12.9 Protecting Critical Technology Task Force can provide assistance for counterintelligence support.

12.10 DCIC. Participation can inform AID efforts to solve issues related to defense cyberspace intelligence.

12.11 Test Resource Management Center (TRMC). TRMC is focused on T&E planning and execution, building the professional workforce, maintaining state-of-the-art T&E facilities, and providing data-driven support to the DoD Components. Service T&E requirements can be used to inform range oversight, technology development, test capabilities development, and cyber testing requirements. T&E planning for threat representations need to better feed this effort and can be used to justify infrastructure improvements.

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