I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection establishing procedures for the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members. The Treaty was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. I recommend that the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.
In addition, accompanying this Report is the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement). The Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. Also enclosed are the Notes that were exchanged between the United States and both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding inspections that will be carried out on the territory of those two countries. The Basing Country Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987, and the Notes were exchanged on December 23, 1987, between the United States and the German Democratic Republic and on January 5, 1988, between the United States and Czechoslovakia. Identical notes are also being exchanged between the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries. I recommend that the Basing Country Agreement and the Notes be provided to the Senate for its information.
The Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate, throughout the world, their shorter-range (500 to 1000 kilometers) and intermediate-range (1000 to 5500 kilometers) ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles, along with the launchers for those missiles and unique support equipment and support structures. This marks the first time that the two principal nuclear powers have agreed to the elimination of an entire class of weapon-delivery systems.
The Treaty is the fruit of many years' labor and of this Administration's firm policy regarding the Soviet deployment of SS- 20s threatening our Allies in Europe and Asia. It was negotiated in Geneva and at ministerial meetings in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva. In addition to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all played important roles in its development.
Throughout the negotiating process, we consulted extensively with our NATO and Asian allies, particularly the Western European Basing Countries in which missile systems, support structures, or other equipment subject to the Treaty are located: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. Contemporaneously with the negotiation of the Treaty, the United States negotiated the Basing Country Agreement with these countries, providing for their approval and assistance in the implementation of the Treaty's inspection provisions. We also regularly advised Congress, in Washington and during the Congressional Observer Group's meeting in Geneva, on the progress of the negotiations and on the objectives of the United States in negotiating the Treaty.
The Treaty had its genesis in the Soviet Deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range missiles beginning in 1977. The SS-20 is an accurate, three-warhead, ground-mobile ballistic missile, whose deployment by the Soviet Union increased an already existing imbalance in favor of Soviet theater nuclear forces. These Soviet deployments not only directly threatened our NATO and Asian Allies, they also raised questions about the ability of the United States and its Allies, to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In December 1979, after thorough consultations among the Allies, NATO reached what became known as the "dual-track" decision. On the one hand, NATO would proceed to deploy a limited number of U.S.
Pershing II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to maintain its deterrent capability. On the other hand, the United States would pursue arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing a balance in intermediate- range nuclear missile forces at a lower and equal level.
Under this Administration, the "dual-track" decision was reaffirmed, and on November 18, 1981, the United States proposed the "zero option" to the Soviet Union. Pursuant to this proposal, the United States would have canceled its planned deployments to Europe of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union would have agreed to eliminate all of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
Today, more than six years later, the U.S. "zero option" proposal constitutes the basis of the Treaty. The six years of negotiations, however, did not produce this result easily. For example, while the United States emphasized for years its preference for the "zero option," the Soviets at first insisted on retaining a residual force of intermediate-range missiles and on counting the independent British and French nuclear deterrents as though they were forces of the United States. The United States rejected that position. Moreover, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in November 1983 when the United States began deployments of intermediate-range missiles in Europe. It was not until January 1985 that the Soviets agreed to return to the negotiations. They did not agree to the "zero option" until July 1987.
Soviet shorter-range missiles--the SS-12 and SS-23--can fulfill many of the same military missions as the Soviet intermediate-range missiles. Therefore, from the outset, the United States insisted upon concurrent constraints on shorter-range missiles in order to enhance the effectiveness of limits on intermediate-range missiles. In the Summer of 1987, after the Soviets proposed the elimination of shorter-range systems in Europe, the United States proposed that the shorter-range systems of both sides be eliminated on a global basis. In response to the U.S. proposal, the Soviets accepted the "zero option" for shorter-range missiles as well.
For much of the negotiations, the Soviet Union argued that the Treaty should focus only on missile systems located in Europe and that missiles located outside of Europe should be exempt from the Treaty or subject to less stringent restrictions. The United States, however, insisted on a "global" approach in view of the mobility and transportability of the Soviet missile systems. The Soviets eventually agreed to this approach.
During the last months of the negotiations, the Soviet Union insisted that U.S. warheads associated with the Pershing IA missiles belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany be included in the Treaty. The United States had insisted from the beginning of the negotiations that systems belonging to third countries would not be part of, or be affected by, the Treaty. On August 26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter- range missiles pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the Parties to the Treaty.
Following the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period specified by the Treaty. At that period, the conditions established by the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and returned to U.S. territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents will not affect existing programs of cooperation.
THE TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
The Treaty obligates the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range ground- launched, weapon-delivery, ballistic and cruise missiles, their launchers, and specified support structures and support equipment.
The Treaty requires periodic data exchanges and gives each Party the right to carry out verification measures, including on-site inspections.
The Treaty consists of four documents, which set forth the basic obligations and the means of implementing those obligations.
These are: The Treaty Articles, which obligate the Parties to eliminate all of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three years and 18 months, respectively; not to possess such missile systems after elimination; not to produce or flight-test such missiles in the future; and to carry out provisions to facilitate effective verification of the terms of the Treaty;
The Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, which contains the data, including site diagrams and photographs that are integral parts of the MOU, exchanged between the Parties prior to the signing of the Treaty regarding the locations, numbers, and characteristics of each Party's intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems as of November 1, 1987;
The Protocol on Elimination, which sets forth the detailed procedures for eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment subject to the Treaty; and
The Protocol on Inspection, which sets forth the detailed procedures for conducting on-site inspections, including "short notice" inspections, "baseline" inspections, "close- out" inspections, "elimination" inspections, and continuous portal monitoring.
The Treaty provides that each Party must eliminate all of its intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. Intermediate-range missiles have a range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers; shorter-range missiles have a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers.
The existing types of intermediate-range shorter-range missiles are listed in Article III of the Treaty. For the United States, these are the Pershing II intermediate-range ballistic missile, the BGM-109G intermediate-range cruise missile, and the Pershing IA shorter-range ballistic missile. For the Soviet Union, the existing types of missiles are the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-12 shorter- range ballistic missile, and SS-23 shorter-range ballistic missile. All intermediate-range missile systems must be eliminated within three years after entry into force of the Treaty. All shorter- range missile systems must be eliminated within 18 months. For ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles not listed in Article III as "existing types," range capability is determined in accordance with criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty.
Upon entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may produce or flight-test any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or produce any stages of such missiles or launchers of such missiles. The Parties are prohibited from conducting any launches of shorter- range missiles. During the first six months following entry into force of the Treaty, however, each Party may launch up to 100 intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of destroying them. Once all intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems have been eliminated, neither Party may thereafter possess any intermediate-range or shorter-range missile systems.
Also, the Treaty takes account of the fact that the first stage of the Soviet SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is not subject to the Treaty, is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missile, which is subject to the Treaty. The Parties are permitted to produce a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), having a range such that it is not subject to the Treaty, that uses one stage, and only one stage, outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of an existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile that is subject to the Treaty. However, to strengthen the ban on missile production, the Parties are prohibited from producing any other stage that is similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of any existing type of intermediate- range ground-launched ballistic missile. In order to help verify compliance with this provision, the United States has the right to establish a portal monitoring system, including resident inspectors, to monitor continuously the portal of each facility at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled. Currently there is one such facility at Votkinsk. For its part, the Soviet Union has the right to establish a continuous portal monitoring system at a former U.S. intermediate-range GLBM production facility at Magna, Utah.
The scope and intrusiveness of verification called for in this Treaty are unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union. Verification obligations fall under five basic categories:
- locational restrictions
- elimination requirements
- national technical means of verification
- data exchanges
- on-site inspections
In order to facilitate verification, the Treaty imposes a number of restrictions on activities relating to intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems during the elimination periods.
For example, pending elimination:
All intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be located in deployment areas or at support facilities, such as storage or repair facilities, or be in notified transit between them. All such areas and facilities must be named and their locations described. An intermediate- range missile or launcher located elsewhere (and not in a notified transit) would thus be in violation of the Treaty.
Within 90 days after the Treaty enters into force, all deployed shorter-range missiles, as well as deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles, must be moved to elimination facilities. The remaining non-deployed shorter-range missiles must be moved to elimination facilities within one year. Until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range missiles and their launchers must be located at missile operating bases, be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit.
Transit of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles between permitted locations must be completed within 25 days and, following the completion of transit, information regarding the transit must be provided within 48 hours.
Article X of the Treaty sets forth the basic requirements regarding the elimination of specific items and facilities and obligates the Parties to carry out the required elimination activities in accordance with the specific procedures set forth in the Treaty and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection. The locations at which elimination takes place are specified in the MOU or in subsequent updated data. The Protocol on Elimination sets forth detailed procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, launch canisters, shelters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch stands, propellant tanks, and training items, as appropriate, for each Party. Techniques such as burning, demolition, crushing, and flattening are specified for eliminating transportable items at designated elimination facilities. Techniques for eliminating fixed structures in situ are specified, including dismantlement, excavation, and demolition. Provisions governing elimination of missiles through launch, static display, and loss or accidental destruction are also included.
NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
The Treaty recognizes the utility of national technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance satellites, and each Party agrees not to interfere with such means of verification. With a view to enhancing the utility of national technical means, concealment measures are strictly limited. Furthermore, the Soviet Union is required, up to six times a year during the period of elimination, to open on short notice the roofs of SS-25 garages in order to help U.S. national technical means ensure that SS-20s are not deployed at SS-25 strategic missile bases that are not subject to on-site inspections.
The Treaty requires detailed exchanges of data and notifications. Each Party is required to notify the other each time a missile or launcher is moved and of any changes in the data base originally set forth in the MOU. Each Party must advise the other of the scheduled date of elimination activities, the movement of items that are to be eliminated from the area specified in the MOU to elimination facilities, and the completion of elimination activities. Such notifications are required to be made through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established pursuant to the Agreement Between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. The notifications are designed to provide a continuously updated data base, which will serve as a baseline against which other observations can be measured.
The Treaty provides for a wide variety of on-site inspections.
The scope of the inspection measures is unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements. The on-site inspections to be carried out include:
"baseline" inspections, between 30 and 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, to help verify the initial update of data contained in the categories set forth in the MOU;
"close-out" inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities;
"elimination" inspections to observe actual elimination of missiles, launchers, and support equipment at elimination facilities;
"elimination" inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination with respect to items lost or accidentally destroyed or placed on static display and with respect to training equipment;
"short-notice" inspections of certain declared and formerly declared facilities, during the three-year elimination period and for a ten-year period thereafter, to aid in verifying that all Treaty-prohibited activity has ceased; and
"continuous portal monitoring" by the United States at the designated portal and perimeter of the facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, to ensure that stages of the SS-20 are not covertly manufactured as stages of the SS-25 ICBM. The Soviet Union may install continuous portal monitoring at the designated portal and perimeter of the Hercules Plant #1 located in Magna, Utah, at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced. If, at any time after the initial two years of the Treaty, assembly of SS-25s ceases at Votkinsk, continuous portal monitoring would continue for another 12 months and then cease along with the monitoring of the plant at Magna, Utah. The United States could reestablish continuous portal monitoring if the Soviets resumed SS-25 missile assembly at Votkinsk or anywhere else.
The specific procedures for the conduct of these inspections, including provisions governing access for on-site inspections and the infrastructure for a continuous portal monitoring system, are set forth in the Protocol on Inspection.
Inspectors and their supporting aircrews will be designated by each Party in advance by means of lists submitted to the other Party. Specific grounds on which a Party may object to a particular individual are set forth. The Annex to the Protocol on Inspection specifies the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members during the inspection process, including immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability of their person.
The Protocol on Inspection designates certain "points of entry" for each country in which missile systems subject to the Treaty are located. A Party intending to carry out an inspection must notify the other Party, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, not less than a specified number of hours before the inspection team will reach the point of entry. Within a specified time after arrival at the point of entry, the Inspecting Party must indicate the specific site to be inspected. An inspection team must depart the point of entry for the inspection site within a specified number of hours from its arrival at the point of entry.
The Inspected Party must provide transport for the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site. In the case of "baseline," "close-out," and "short-notice" inspections, the Inspected Party must ensure that the inspection team arrives at the site within nine hours of its specification of the inspection site.
In general, one hour after notification of a specific inspection site has been provided, the Inspected Party may not remove any Treaty-limited item from that site prior to inspection. Except for continuous portal monitoring and "elimination" inspections, the period of time an inspection team may remain at an inspection site for a given inspection is 24 hours, with one eight hour extension if agreed to by the Inspected Party. There is a limit on the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously. Inspection procedures vary depending upon the specific type of inspection involved.
The Treaty will enter into force when the constitutional procedures for ratification of the United States and the Soviet Union have been satisfied and the instruments of ratification have been exchanged. The MOU, the Protocol on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the Treaty and upon exchange of the instruments of ratification will enter into force as part of the Treaty. The U.S.-GDR and U.S.-Czechoslovak Notes, which are included herewith for the information of the Senate, will also enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty. The Basing Country Agreement will do so as well, following completion of the constitutional procedures of each of the Parties to it and notification thereof to all other Parties.
Amendments to the Treaty are subject to the same ratification procedures as the Treaty itself. However, some of the provisions and procedures contained in the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are highly detailed and technical. It is recognized that it may be necessary to adjust some of them to take into account unforeseen situations. Accordingly, the Protocols provide that the Parties may, in the Special Verification Commission established by the Treaty, agree upon measures necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Protocols. The Protocols provide that such measures, which would be technical in nature and would not affect the Parties' basic obligations, would not be considered to be amendments and thus would not require ratification.
The Parties commit themselves not to assume any international obligation or undertaking that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This provision will not in any way affect existing or future patterns of defense cooperation with U.S. Allies in other areas, including strategic forces, short-range nuclear forces (with a range capability below 500 kilometers), or conventional forces.
DURATION AND WITHDRAWAL
The Treaty is of unlimited duration. As an exercise of its national sovereignty, a Party may withdraw following six months' notice to the other Party if it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
THE BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT
The Basing Country Agreement is a necessary complement to the Treaty. The Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection provide for on- site inspection to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty not only in U.S. and Soviet territory, but also in the countries in which U.S. and Soviet missile systems are located.
Many of the items that the United States must eliminate are within the territory of our Western European Allies. By means of the Basing Country Agreement, the five Allied Basing Countries, on whose territory U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are located, consent to inspections at facilities subject to the Treaty within their territory by Soviet inspectors conducted in accordance with the Treaty and its Protocols. This formal consent on the part of the Allied Basing Countries provides the legal basis for the United States to make its commitment to the Soviet Union that Soviet inspections can be carried out on the territory of the Allied Basing Countries.
EXCHANGES OF NOTES
Each Basing Country is exchanging diplomatic Notes with the Party that will conduct inspections within its territory. The Notes record the acknowledgement of each Basing Country and the Inspecting Party that the Basing Country has agreed to inspections within its territory conducted in accordance with the terms of the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, and that the Inspecting Party has obligated itself to comply with the terms of the Treaty and to respect the laws and regulations of the Basing Country during the inspections. The Notes state that they do not in any way affect the reciprocal obligations between the United States and the Soviet Union under the Treaty. The countries that base U.S. systems subject to the Treaty are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and the United Kingdom; the Basing Countries for Soviet systems are the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.
INSPECTIONS OF SS-4 SILOS
In addition to the Treaty documents discussed above, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to an exchange of letters between Ambassadors Glitman and Obukhov, dated December 7, 1987, relating to the U.S. inspections of silo launchers for Soviet SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles. This agreement gives the United States the right to conduct a total of up to six on-site inspections of former silo launchers of SS-4 missiles. Organizational matters relating to such inspections will be arranged through the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the Treaty.
Accompanying this Report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty, including the MOU and the two Protocols. Also, attached is an article-by-article analysis of the Basing Country Agreement.
I believe this Treaty will significantly enhance the security of the United States and our Allies. It will eliminate an entire class of weapon-delivery systems in which the Soviet Union has established a clear advantage. I therefore strongly recommend that the Treaty be submitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.
GEORGE P. SHULTZ.