Active Strategic Treaties
Geneva, Switzerland
February 7, 2012
Bilateral Consultative Commission
Agreement Number 1
On Procedures for Conducting Demonstrations of Recording Media and/or Telemetric Information Playback Equipment
The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Taking into consideration that the Parties have conducted the initial demonstrations, required by the Treaty, of recording media and telemetric information playback equipment,
Have agreed as follows:
The Parties shall conduct subsequent demonstrations, in accordance with the Treaty, of recording media and/or telemetric information playback equipment using the following procedures:
1. During the demonstration the providing Party shall:
(a) describe its telemetric signal conversion processes (from reception to recording) associated with the recording medium and telemetric information playback equipment to be demonstrated, or provide data on telemetry systems that enable the conversion of telemetric information contained on the recording medium to the form (format) that originates on board the missile before broadcast;
(b) demonstrate each type of recording medium to be provided to the receiving Party in accordance with subparagraph 6(a) of Part Two of the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Annex on Telemetric Information. Each such recording medium that is being demonstrated shall contain a recording of the following examples of telemetric information:
(i) actual telemetric information that was broadcast during the launch of an ICBM or SLBM; or
(ii) information with characteristic features of telemetric information that is broadcast during the launch of an ICBM or SLBM.
In this connection, the recording contained on the recording medium that is being demonstrated must be suitable for demonstrating the playback of the telemetric information on the appropriate telemetric information playback equipment;
(c) describe each type of recording medium that is being demonstrated, as well as describe the recording methods and formats that are used for each type of recording medium;
(d) demonstrate all the telemetric information playback equipment in a manner that allows the receiving Party to observe a display or indicator that demonstrates that the telemetric information playback equipment is operating properly. Such telemetric information playback equipment shall be demonstrated in operation using all the types of recording media that are being demonstrated in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph;
(e) answer questions of the receiving Party pertaining to its ability to play back telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated recording media;
(f) for the examples of telemetric information recording on the recording media that are being demonstrated, provide corresponding illustrative examples of summaries of each of the demonstrated recoding media that meet the requirements of paragraph 2 of Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information, and corresponding illustrative examples of interpretative data for the telemetric information that meet the requirements of paragraph 5 of Part Three of the Annex on Telemetric Information.
2. Upon completion of the demonstration, the providing Party shall provide to the receiving Party all the demonstrated recording media with the examples of telemetric information recorded on them, examples of summaries of each of the demonstrated recording media and examples of interpretative data for the telemetric information on the recording media, as well as other information that is additionally provided in order to achieve the objectives of the demonstration.
3. The demonstration must be sufficient for the receiving Party to be able to get an idea of the full set of telemetric information playback equipment, as well as the technical requirements necessary for playing back the examples of telemetric information recorded on the demonstrated recording media.
4. During the demonstration the procedures for playing back telemetric information shall be demonstrated. The providing Party shall provide a description of those types of modulation, methods, modes, and recording formats, as well as methods for encoding telemetric information contained on recording media that allow the receiving Party to convert the telemetric information contained on the recording medium to the form (format) that originates on board the missile before broadcast.
5. Ambiguities and unresolved questions in connection with the demonstration shall be considered within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission.
6. The provisions of paragraphs 2-6 of Part Six of the Annex on Telemetric Information, which are applicable to the trainee team members, shall also apply to representatives of the receiving Party participating in demonstrations.
7. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force for so long as the Treaty remains in force.
Done in Geneva on February 7, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Geneva, Switzerland
February 7, 2012
Bilateral Consultative Commission
Agreement Number 2
On the Amount of Telemetric Information on ICBM and SLBM Launches That Each Party Shall Provide
The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Have agreed as follows:
1. For each launch of an ICBM or SLBM for which telemetric information is provided in accordance with Article IX of the Treaty, Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty, and the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, the Party conducting the launch shall provide telemetric information to the other Party beginning from the time of ignition of the first stage motor of the ICBM or SLBM, until:
(a) the end of issuance of the command for separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM; or
(b) the end of issuance of the command for separation of the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM; or
(c) the expiration of one second after loss of active control of the missile's control system (when the active stage of the missile does not respond to control signals), if such loss occurred prior to separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM, or until the moment of loss of the telemetric signal coincident with such loss of active control, whichever occurred earlier.
2. Each Party shall provide, in the interpretive data for the telemetric information, names of data elements and their location in the telemetry frame, as well as descriptions necessary to identity the command for separation of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or the first of the other objects installed on the ICBM or SLBM for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space, from the final stage of the ICBM or SLBM.
3. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force for so long as the Treaty remains in force.
Done in Geneva on February 7, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Geneva, Switzerland
September 21, 2012
Bilateral Consultative Commission
Agreement Number 3
On the Acquisition of Telemetric Information Playback Equipment
The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Section I of Part Six of the Protocol to the Treaty,
Have agreed as follows:
1. In accordance with subparagraph 8(c) of Part Two of the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty and paragraphs 1 and 3 of Part Five of the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, the Parties shall, upon request, provide each other with the opportunity to acquire telemetric information playback equipment for which a demonstration was conducted in accordance with subparagraph 8(a) of Part Two of the Annex on Telemetric Information to the Protocol to the Treaty, together with the appropriate software and technical documentation, as well as spare parts for previously purchased telemetric information playback equipment.
2. The lists of such telemetric information playback equipment, software, and technical documentation are contained in the Annexes to this Agreement.
3. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.
Done at Geneva on September 21, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Annex I to Agreement Number 3 of September 21, 2012
Telemetric Information Playback Equipment Demonstrated by the Russian Party, Together With Appropriate Software and Technical Documentation
RS120/E5 playback device (manufacturer - Open Joint-Stock Company Research & Engineering Center of St. Petersburg Electro-Technology University, St. Petersburg), together with software and technical documentation (in the Russian language) for such playback device.
Annex II to Agreement Number 3 of September 21, 2012
Telemetric Information Playback Equipment Demonstrated by the U.S. Party, Together With Appropriate Software and Technical Documentation
1. Wideband DRS8200X playback device (manufacturer - Wideband Systems, Inc., Silver Spring, Maryland), together with software and technical documentation (in the English language) for such playback device; and
2. Keyboard, mouse, and two interface cables for use with the Wideband DRS8200X playback device.
Geneva, Switzerland
September 21, 2012
Bilateral Consultative Commission
Agreement Number 4
On the Use of Tamper Detection Equipment
The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Section I of Part Six of the Protocol to the Treaty,
Have agreed as follows:
1. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use tamper detection equipment that is brought to points of entry on the territory of the inspected Party. The tamper detection equipment shall be used only to apply tamper detection seals to tamper-proof containers referred to in subparagraph 9(c) and in paragraph 11 of Section VI of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty, in which radiation detection equipment is stored, and to determine the condition of a previously applied tamper detection seal. Such tamper detection seals shall not be applied to and such tamper detection equipment shall not be used on the tamper-proof containers in which the calibration source is stored.
2. The Parties shall use makes and types of tamper detection equipment that are commercially available and available for acquisition by both Parties at the time the inspected Party provides consent to bring the equipment into its territory pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Agreement.
3. Prior to the first time the tamper detection equipment is brought into the territory of the inspected Party, the inspecting Party shall provide to the inspected Party a Format Number 43 notification containing a list of such tamper detection equipment, indicating the manufacturer’s name and the model. The inspected Party shall, within 30 days from the date of receipt of the inspecting Party’s notification, provide a Format Number 43 notification containing its consent to bring in such equipment or refusing such consent, with an explanation of the reasons for the refusal.
4. The inspecting Party may substitute tamper detection equipment of a different manufacturer or different model, subject to compliance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of this Agreement.
5. Tamper detection equipment shall be subject to examination by the inspected Party in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 4 of Section I of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty.
6. Tamper detection equipment shall be used only at the point of entry and shall not be brought to the inspection site. A member of the in-country escort shall be present when tamper detection equipment is used. Tamper detection equipment shall be removed from the territory of the inspected Party by the inspection team that brought such equipment.
7. If it is detected that the tamper-proof containers have been tampered with, the inspection team leader shall, prior to the departure of the inspection team from the territory of the inspected Party, provide to a member of the in-country escort the data generated by the tamper detection equipment confirming the fact that the seal has been tampered with. A copy of such data shall be attached to the inspection activity report.
8. Without prejudice to the procedures described in paragraph 11 of Section VI of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty, issues related to the detection of tampering with the tamper-proof containers shall be resolved by the Parties within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission or by other agreed means.
9. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.
Done at Geneva on September 21, 2012, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Geneva, Switzerland
February 28, 2014
Bilateral Consultative Commission
Agreement Number 5
On the Use of an Additional Measuring Device During Inspections of Reentry Vehicles Emplaced on Deployed Trident II SLBMs
The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Pursuant to subparagraph (b) of Section I of Part Six of the Protocol to the Treaty,
Taking into account the results of the demonstration conducted by the United States of America at the Submarine Base, Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, Kings Bay, Georgia, on February 7-9, 2005, hereinafter referred to as the demonstration,
Have agreed as follows:
1. During an inspection of reentry vehicles emplaced on a deployed Trident II SLBM, the United States of America shall use an additional measuring device for the purpose of confirming that the cover used on the front section of a deployed Trident II SLBM during the viewing provided for in paragraph 12 of Section II of Part Six of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the viewing, is installed in the same manner as was observed during the demonstration.
2. This additional measuring device shall be used in accordance with the following procedures:
a) Prior to the start of the viewing, the entire inspection team shall be given the opportunity to examine the additional measuring device in order to ascertain that it is equivalent to the measuring device which was used during the demonstration.
b) The inspected Party shall take two measurements using the additional measuring device to determine the distance from the upper point of the cover to the upper point of the third stage motor of the designated deployed Trident II SLBM. Such measurements shall be taken in the presence of the last subgroup of inspectors, immediately after those inspectors have completed the viewing of the front section of the designated deployed Trident II SLBM. The last subgroup of inspectors shall also observe the process of installing the additional measuring device. The purpose of such observation is to confirm that the device is installed properly.
c) The last subgroup of inspectors shall read the results of the two measurements and calculate their average value. To confirm that the cover has been installed on the front section of the designated deployed Trident II SLBM in the same manner as was observed during the demonstration, the average value obtained must not differ from the benchmark value by more than three centimeters. These benchmark values shall be: 23 centimeters for the Type A cover and 24 centimeters for the Type B cover.
d) The results of the measurements shall be recorded in the inspection activity report.
3. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.
Done at Geneva on February 28, 2014, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Geneva, Switzerland
October 20, 2015
Bilateral Consultative Commission
Agreement Number 6
On Changing the Timing of the Annual Discussion on the Issue of the Exchange of Telemetric Information on Launches of ICBMs and SLBMs
The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
Acting in accordance with the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XV of the Treaty,
Have agreed as follows:
1. The first sentence of paragraph 2 of Part Seven of the Protocol to the Treaty shall be replaced by the following sentence:
"On an annual basis, within 120 days of the beginning of the calendar year, within the framework of the BCC, the Parties shall discuss the issue of the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, focusing on launches conducted in the previous calendar year, on which an exchange of telemetric information will be carried out."
2. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.
Done at Geneva on October 20, 2015, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Geneva, Switzerland
April 11, 2017
Bilateral Consultative Commission
Agreement Number 7
On Revising the List of Radiation Detection Equipment of the United States of America and on Controlling Access to the Radiation Detection Equipment Provided by the Inspecting Party
The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
Acting in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XV of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Taking into account paragraphs 4 and 6 of Section I of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty,
Have agreed as follows:
1. Items (i) and (ii) of subparagraph 5(a) of Section II of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty shall read as follows:
"(i) 2 Neutron detectors, including preamplifiers with signal and power cables, counting time from 5 to 150 seconds;
(ii) 2 Electronic counters with instruction manual;".
2. In addition to the procedures provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty, the procedures set forth in paragraphs 3-6 of this Agreement shall apply with regard to radiation detection equipment provided by the inspecting Party.
3. An item of radiation detection equipment provided by the inspecting Party that, based upon the results of an examination conducted in accordance with paragraph 9 of Section VI of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty or an operability check conducted in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section VI of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol of the Treaty or in the course of its use in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section VI of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty or in accordance with the fourth subparagraph of paragraph 4 of this Agreement, is determined to have the capability to measure types of radiation other than neutron radiation shall be declared inoperable and shall be removed from the territory of the inspected Party.
4. Each of the Parties shall have the right to place its unique tamper-proof seals, hereinafter referred to as seals, on each of the carrying cases containing the radiation detection equipment provided by the inspecting Party, hereinafter referred to as cases, throughout the period in which the radiation detection equipment is located on the territory of the inspected Party, except when access to the equipment is required to implement the procedures provided for in the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty.
In instances when such access is required, as well as prior to removing the radiation detection equipment from the territory of the inspected Party, seals shall be removed from the cases under the observation of one or more representatives of each of the Parties.
In instances when, during the transportation of radiation detection equipment from the point of entry to the inspection site and back or during the stay of an inspection team at the inspection site, a seal on a case is damaged or lost, the question of the further use of the radiation detection equipment contained within such a case shall be resolved by the inspection team leader and the escort team leader, taking into account the circumstances in which such damage or loss occurred.
In such a case, at the request of one of the Parties, an additional operability check of the radiation detection equipment provided by the inspecting Party may be conducted in accordance with the procedures set forth in paragraph 12 of Section VI of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol to the Treaty. The location for conducting such an additional check shall be selected by the inspected Party.
5. If the radiation detection equipment provided by the inspecting Party is not removed from the territory of the inspected Party for the purposes of performing technical maintenance, the technical maintenance of such radiation detection equipment shall be performed by the inspecting Party only at points of entry under the observation of one or more representatives of the inspected Party. Technical maintenance shall be performed in accordance with the procedures described in the radiation detection equipment instruction manuals provided by the inspected Party. No other technical maintenance of radiation detection equipment provided by the inspecting Party shall be conducted on the territory of the inspected Party.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, battery replacement or recharging as described in the radiation detection equipment instruction manuals may be conducted at points of entry or prior to conducting an operability check upon arrival at the inspection site.
For the repair of radiation detection equipment to be provided by the inspecting Party, such equipment shall be subject to mandatory removal from the territory of the inspected Party.
6. Equipment that is not part of the set of radiation detection equipment provided by the inspecting Party, pursuant to paragraph 5 of Section II of Part Five of the Annex on Inspection Activities to the Protocol of the Treaty, must remain at the point of entry and not be taken to the inspection site.
This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force.
Done at Geneva on April 11, 2017, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Geneva, Switzerland
October 24, 2017
Bilateral Consultative Commission
Agreement Number 8
On Revising the Dates in 2018 for Providing Notifications Concerning Updated Data for Each Category of Data Contained in Part Two of the Protocol to the New START Treaty of April 8, 2010
The Delegation of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission and the Delegation of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission,
Acting in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XV of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of April 8, 2010, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,
Have agreed as follows:
1. In satisfaction of the notification requirement provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty for the six-month period beginning on September 1, 2017 and ending on February 28, 2018, each Party shall provide a notification concerning updated data for each category of data contained in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty for the period beginning on September 1, 2017 and ending on February 5, 2018. Each Party shall provide the aforementioned notification no later than 30 days after February 5, 2018.
2. In satisfaction of the notification requirement provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty for the six-month period beginning on March 1, 2018 and ending on August 31, 2018, each Party shall provide a notification concerning updated data for each category of data contained in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty for the period beginning on February 6, 2018 and ending on August 31, 2018. Each Party shall provide the aforementioned notification no later than 30 days after August 31, 2018.
3. This Agreement shall enter into force as of the date of signature and shall terminate as of the date of receipt of the last notification specified in paragraph 2 of this Agreement.
Done at Geneva on October 24, 2017, in two originals, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.
Commissioner of the United States of America to the Bilateral Consultative Commission
Commissioner of the Russian Federation to the Bilateral Consultative Commission