New START Treaty (NST)

Treaty Name: Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START Treaty).

Signed by the United States and the Russian Federation: April 8, 2010

Advice and Consent of the Senate: December 22, 2010

Entry Into Force: February 5, 2011

Background: On April 1, 2009, Presidents Obama and Medvedev met in London and issued a joint statement outlining their goals regarding a new treaty that would replace the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Treaty (START Treaty). This new treaty would be a comprehensive, legally-binding agreement that would supersede and further reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals as described in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (also known as the Moscow Treaty).

Formal negotiations began in Rome on April 24, 2009, and continued in Moscow in May 2009. On July 6, 2009, in Moscow, the Presidents signed a Joint Understanding in which they agreed that the Treaty would include two central limits, one for strategic delivery vehicles (to a range of 500–1,100) and the other for their associated warheads (to a range of 1,500–1,675). As the negotiations proceeded, the Parties agreed to pursue a third central limit for the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and for deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.

Treaty negotiations continued in Geneva from September 2009 through March 2010, culminating with the signing of the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010, by President Obama and President Medvedev in Prague. After extensive discussions within the United States Senate and the Russian Federal Assembly, the New START Treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011, with the exchange of instruments of ratification between Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov in Munich.

Treaty Structure: The New START Treaty (NST) consists of the main Treaty text, which is composed of sixteen articles, and a Protocol, which is an integral part of the Treaty and contains ten Parts and three Annexes. The basic rights and obligations are contained within the Treaty articles and the Protocol. The three Annexes to the Protocol provide the technical details for implementation of certain rights and obligations delineated in the Treaty articles and the Protocol. The Annexes address inspection activities, notifications, and telemetric information.

Associated with the NST are three unilateral statements, which address the Russian and U.S. views on the impacts of missile defense on implementation of the Treaty and the U.S. view that Trident I SLBMs are currently not subject to the Treaty. These statements are not integral parts of the Treaty, and they are not legally binding.

Treaty Objectives: The Treaty further reduces the limits on strategic offensive arms (SOA) from the levels permitted under the START Treaty, which expired on December 5, 2009; and further reduces the limits on operationally deployed warheads from the levels established under the Moscow Treaty. These limits serve the principal U.S. objective in bilateral strategic arms control, which is to increase stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship at significantly lower levels of strategic delivery systems and nuclear warheads. The duration of the Treaty is ten years unless superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of SOA or extended by mutual agreement for no more than five years.

The Preamble of the NST notes the treaty is guided by the principle of indivisible security. It also contains a brief statement acknowledging the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability. It takes note of the interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms, as President Obama and President Medvedev acknowledged in their Joint Understanding of July 2009, recognizing that this relationship will become more important as SOA are reduced, and noting that current strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the Parties’ SOA.

Treaty Provisions: The Treaty requires the Parties to reduce their SOA so that, no later than seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, each Party’s SOA do not exceed 800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments. Within that total, each side is limited to no more than 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers equipped to carry nuclear armaments.

Rather than using the START Treaty concept of considering launchers to almost always contain deployed ICBMs or SLBMs, under the NST, ICBM and SLBM launchers are considered deployed only when they actually contain an ICBM or SLBM, respectively. ICBM test launchers, training launchers and launchers located at space launch facilities are not accountable as deployed ICBM launchers. SLBM launchers used for testing or training are also not accountable as deployed SLBM launchers. Soft-site launchers are considered to be neither deployed nor non-deployed launchers and do not count against Treaty limits.

Deployed heavy bombers are those heavy bombers that are equipped for nuclear armaments, other than test heavy bombers or heavy bombers located at a repair facility or production facility, which are considered non-deployed heavy bombers. Heavy bombers equipped exclusively for non-nuclear armaments are not considered to be deployed or non-deployed heavy bombers and do not count against Treaty limits.

The Treaty limits each side to no more than 1,550 deployed warheads. The NST counts the actual number of warheads emplaced on each deployed ICBM and SLBM, rather than relying on an attribution of a certain number of warheads to each deployed missile type as was done under the START Treaty. Additionally, since the sides have long dropped the practice of deploying alert heavy bombers (i.e., heavy bombers armed with nuclear weapons on the tarmac ready to taxi), the sides agreed to attribute one warhead to each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments.

The Protocol to the Treaty contains the procedures for conversion, elimination, and other means for removal from accountability for SOA. There are specified procedures to eliminate ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM and SLBM launchers as well as heavy bombers. In order to provide some flexibility, the Protocol allows the sides to pursue alternate elimination procedures not specified in the Treaty to eliminate ICBM and SLBM launchers. In a departure from the START Treaty, the sides are allowed to convert ICBM and SLBM launchers so that they are no longer accountable. The Protocol also allows the sides to convert heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, thus removing them from accountability.

The Treaty includes several prohibitions to address concerns regarding missile defense, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments as well as the basing of SOA. The Parties may not convert or use ICBM or SLBM launchers for deployment of missile defense interceptors -- the five converted silo launchers of ICBMs located at Vandenberg AFB, California, that contain missile defense interceptors are grandfathered from this prohibition. Conversely, a side may not convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for deployment of ICBMs or SLBMs. The Parties also may not base heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments together with heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments. However, the Third Agreed Statement allows heavy bombers of a type undergoing conversion to heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments to be based with the same type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments until the last heavy bomber of that type has been converted.

The Treaty also sets forth basing and locational restrictions for SOA subject to the Treaty. The concept of "basing" is used throughout the Treaty to convey the idea of a permanent facility that supports the long-term operations of a particular strategic offensive system on a permanent basis, as distinguishable from the idea of temporary stationing. The Treaty also prohibits the basing of each Party’s SOA outside their respective national territories. This prohibition does not affect the United States’ practice of temporarily locating heavy bombers overseas.

The Treaty includes a number of Agreed Statements that address specific issues raised during the negotiations: Converted B-1B heavy bombers; U.S. submarines equipped with launchers of cruise missiles converted from ballistic missile submarines; Joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments; Deployed heavy bombers located at Davis-Monthan AFB; Rapid reload of ICBM and SLBM launchers; Use of telemetric information; Converted silo launchers of ICBMs at Vandenberg AFB; Non-nuclear objects located on the front section of an ICBM or SLBM; Conversion of individual launchers of SLBMs; and Customs duties and taxes.

Under the START Treaty there was an extensive telemetry exchange regime designed to aid verification of compliance with several provisions of that Treaty. The NST does not contain any provisions, restrictions or constraints that require confirmation through the exchange of telemetric information on launches of ICBM and SLBMs. However, the sides agreed to exchange telemetric information on an equal number of ICBM and SLBM launches each year, not to exceed five launches, as an additional transparency measure. At the beginning of each year the sides will meet to decide on the number of launches from the previous year for which telemetric information will be exchanged and to address issues associated with this exchange. The specific launches for which telemetric data will be provided are determined by the Party conducting the launches.

Verification: The Treaty establishes a verification regime that includes national technical means, inspection activities, and notifications. Details regarding the implementation of inspection and notification activities are provided in the Protocol and in the Annex on Inspection Activities and the Annex on Notifications.

Inspection Activities refers to both inspections and exhibitions. There are three types of inspection activities under the Treaty: Type One inspections, Type Two inspections, and exhibitions.

Ten Type One inspections may be conducted each year at a Party’s ICBM bases, submarine bases, and heavy bomber bases to confirm the accuracy on the declared number of deployed nuclear warheads, deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. This includes confirming the actual number of reentry vehicles emplaced on a deployed ICBM or SLBM designated for inspection.

Eight Type Two inspections may be conducted each year at a wide range of a Party’s declared facilities associated with SOA and formerly declared facilities. The purpose of such inspections is to confirm the accuracy of declared data on SOA, including confirming the absence of undeclared items, to confirm conversions and eliminations, and to confirm that formerly declared facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.

Each Party must conduct exhibitions to demonstrate and confirm distinguishing features and technical characteristics of new types, versions, or variants of SOA as well as to demonstrate the results of conversion of the first item of a given type of SOA. Exhibitions are conducted separately from Type One and Type Two inspections.

The NST requires extensive notifications and exchanges of data regarding accountable items. The Protocol establishes a database for exchange that includes data on the types of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and their related facilities. The database also lists the categories for technical characteristics for ballistic missile systems as well as categories for distinguishing features for heavy bombers. The complete database must be updated and provided to the other Party every six months.

The NST requires notifications of certain activities involving SOA subject to the Treaty and their related facilities including movement of SOA; conversion or elimination of SOA; exhibitions; launches of ICBMs and SLBMs; the introduction of prototypes, new types, and new kinds of SOA; and the intention to conduct inspections. The Parties transmit these notifications and data exchanges through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs).

Compliance: The Treaty establishes the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to resolve questions related to compliance with the Treaty. The BCC may be convened at the request of either Party but no fewer than two times per year, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. The Parties may agree on additional measures to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, discuss unique features of missiles and their launchers, and resolve questions regarding new kinds of SOA.