The Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (the "New START Treaty" or the "Treaty") consists of the main Treaty text composed of sixteen articles, and a Protocol, which is an integral part of the Treaty and contains ten Parts and three Annexes.
Associated with the New START Treaty are three unilateral statements, which address missile defense and the Trident I SLBM. These statements are not integral parts of the Treaty, and they are not legally binding. The texts of these statements are included herein only for the information of the Senate, and they are discussed in this analysis.
The Treaty further reduces the limits on strategic offensive arms from the levels permitted under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991 (the "START Treaty"), which expired on December 5, 2009; and further reduces the limits on warheads from the levels permitted under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions of May 24, 2002 (the "Moscow Treaty"), which this Treaty will supersede upon entry into force.
As in the preceding START Treaty, the term "strategic offensive arms" is not defined in the New START Treaty. "Strategic" indicates that, in general, the forces covered are those of intercontinental range. "Offensive" is in contrast to defensive strategic arms, such as ballistic missile defense systems.
PREAMBLE
The Preamble serves as an introduction to the Treaty and sets forth the general context and goals of the Treaty. The Preamble draws on and develops the Joint Understanding signed in Moscow on July 6, 2009, by President Barack Obama and President Dmitry Medvedev, which conveyed the Presidents’ concept and further guidance for the negotiation of the New START Treaty. Initial Presidential guidance for the Treaty was set forth in the London Joint Statement Regarding Negotiations on Further Reductions in Strategic Offensive Arms of April 1, 2009.
The second, third and fourth paragraphs of the preamble emphasize that new global challenges and threats require a new approach to strategic interaction between the United States and the Russian Federation than that which existed during the Cold War. This new relationship is being forged on the basis of mutual trust, openness, predictability, and cooperation. The Parties acknowledge a mutual desire to reduce further the role and importance of nuclear weapons in their nuclear postures.
In the fifth and sixth preambular paragraphs, the Parties reiterate their commitment to fulfilling their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which provides, in part, that the NPT Parties undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race, and they jointly express strong support for on-going efforts in non-proliferation. The seventh paragraph notes the Parties’ intention to continue their efforts to reduce and limit nuclear arms while maintaining the safety and security of their nuclear arsenals, with a view to expanding this process in the future, to include a multilateral approach. In the U.S. view, follow-on negotiations with Russia should address non-strategic nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear weapon stockpiles.
Paragraphs eight through ten emphasize the shared view of the importance of predictability and strategic stability and the Treaty’s contribution to those goals. The eighth paragraph states that the Parties are guided by the principle of indivisible security and expresses the shared view that the measures set forth in this Treaty will enhance predictability and stability, and thus the security, of both Parties. Paragraph nine recognizes the existence of an interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic defensive arms, that this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms are reduced, and notes that current strategic defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive arms of the Parties. Paragraph ten notes that the Parties are mindful of the impact of conventionally armed ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.
Paragraphs eleven and twelve address the role of verification in the Treaty. The eleventh paragraph notes that verifiable and significant reductions in nuclear arsenals have had a positive effect on the world situation. The twelfth paragraph sets forth the goal of the Parties to create a verification mechanism based on the positive record of the START Treaty that is adapted, simplified, and made less costly to implement, as the U.S. and Russian Presidents instructed in their July 6, 2009, Joint Understanding.
The final preambular paragraphs welcome the implementation of the START Treaty and the Moscow Treaty. The Parties acknowledge the role in the implementation of the START Treaty of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, along with the Russian Federation and the United States. They further express deep appreciation to the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine for their contribution as non-nuclear weapon states to strengthening the NPT regime.
ARTICLE I
Article I sets forth the basic obligations of the Parties to reduce and limit their strategic offensive arms and to carry out the other obligations set forth in the Treaty and its Protocol.
This Article also establishes that definitions of terms used in the Treaty and its Protocol are provided in Part One of the Protocol. The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply all of the terms and definitions in Part One of the Protocol.
Although the Treaty does not define the term "strategic offensive arms," it lists in Article III the specific types of systems to be limited by the Treaty and defines, in Part One of the Protocol, those systems so as to capture any modernized replacements.
ARTICLE II
Article II sets forth the central limits of the Treaty. It explicitly provides that each Party shall have the right to determine for itself the composition and structure (e.g., numbers and types) of its strategic offensive arms within the prescribed limits of the Treaty, consistent with the principle set forth in the Joint Understanding of July 6, 2009. This means that each Party has the freedom to determine for itself how it will meet the central limits of the Treaty by the end of the seven-year reduction period.
Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties shall reduce and limit their intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber nuclear armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter until its expiration, the aggregate numbers of these systems, as counted in accordance with the Treaty, do not exceed:
700, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;
1,550, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and
800, for deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers.
The July 6, 2009, Joint Understanding established that the Treaty would include two central limits, one for strategic delivery vehicles and the other for their associated warheads. The first and second central limits are intended to limit the deployed strategic forces of each Party. As the negotiations proceeded, the Parties agreed to pursue a third central limit for the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and for deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. This third central limit is intended to limit the ability of the Parties to "break out" of the Treaty limits by constraining the number of non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and non-deployed heavy bombers available for deployment. Each Party will have to operate within this aggregate limit as it considers whether to build and store new systems, and whether to eliminate, convert, or retain older systems.
"Deployed" and "non-deployed" are key concepts in the Treaty and are explained in Part One of the Protocol. A deployed ICBM or SLBM is an ICBM or SLBM that is contained in or on a deployed launcher of such missiles. Similarly, a deployed launcher of ICBMs is a launcher that contains an ICBM and is not an ICBM test launcher, an ICBM training launcher, or an ICBM launcher located at a space launch facility. A deployed launcher of SLBMs is an SLBM launcher installed on a submarine that has been launched, that contains an SLBM, and is not intended for testing or training. Soft site launchers, when used for testing, training, or space launch, would not meet the definition of either deployed or non-deployed launchers. A deployed heavy bomber is any heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments, other than a test heavy bomber or a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments located at a repair facility or production facility.
When ICBMs or SLBMs are removed from their launchers for any reason -- for example, for maintenance -- then both the missile and launcher become non-deployed for purposes of the Treaty and a notification of this change in status will be provided within five days of the change in status, leading to a corresponding adjustment in the New START Treaty’s database, pursuant to subparagraph 3(e) of Section II of Part Four of the Protocol. Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, by definition, become non-deployed when they are located at a repair facility or production facility, or if they meet the Treaty’s definition of a test heavy bomber. Each such change in the deployed and non-deployed status of accountable systems will be notified in a timely manner to the other Party and recorded in the Treaty’s database. This will help the Parties maintain an ongoing account of each side’s deployed and non-deployed forces throughout the duration of the Treaty.
ARTICLE III
Article III provides the counting rules for the limits established in Article II of the Treaty. Paragraphs 1-3 establish the counting rules for each of the three central limits. Paragraph 1 establishes that deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers each count as one toward the aggregate limit of 700 deployed systems. Paragraph 2 makes it clear that, with respect to counting toward the warhead limit of 1,550, the number of warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs is the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs. Each such reentry vehicle, including conventionally-armed reentry vehicles, is counted as one warhead. It is important to note that the Treaty uses the defined term "warhead" to mean a unit of account used for counting toward the 1,550 aggregate limit as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers. The term "reentry vehicle" is used to describe the part of the front section that can survive reentry through the dense layers of the Earth’s atmosphere and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery.
Previous practice under START was to use attribution rules to determine the number of warheads counted for each type of ICBM and SLBM. Under this practice, each deployed missile of a given type was counted as if it carried a particular number of warheads, even if the individual missile carried fewer reentry vehicles than its attributed number of warheads. Under the Moscow Treaty, each Party used its own methodology for counting which of its warheads it considered to be "deployed" and thus subject to the Treaty’s limits. Under the New START Treaty, one set of warhead counting rules will be used by both Parties and the warhead count will reflect the number of reentry vehicles actually emplaced on each ICBM and SLBM.
In accordance with the Eighth Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol, the Parties have agreed that non-nuclear objects on the front sections of ICBMs or SLBMs declared to carry at least one nuclear-armed reentry vehicle will not be counted as warheads. This statement is premised on the shared assumption that there is no military utility in carrying nuclear-armed and conventionally-armed reentry vehicles on the same ICBM or SLBM. In practice, this means that objects such as penetration aids and inert ballast objects that may be carried on an ICBM or SLBM will not count toward the Treaty’s warhead limits. Inspectors will have the opportunity to confirm that these objects are not nuclear through the use of radiation detection equipment during the re-entry vehicle portion of Type One inspections. Procedures for the use of radiation detection equipment are provided in the Annex on Inspection Activities.
Paragraph 2 provides that for purposes of counting toward the 1,550 limit, one nuclear warhead is counted for each deployed heavy bomber. Counting nuclear warheads for deployed heavy bombers is thus an attribution rule. This attribution approach was adopted because on a day-to-day basis, neither the United States nor the Russian Federation maintains any nuclear armaments loaded on board its deployed heavy bombers. If the counting approach adopted for deployed ballistic missiles had been applied to deployed heavy bombers, each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments would have been counted with zero nuclear warheads. The New START Treaty approach strikes a balance between the fact that neither side loads nuclear armaments on its bombers on a day-to-day basis and the fact that these bombers nonetheless have the capability to deliver nuclear armaments stored on or near their air bases. The rationale for this "discounted" attribution of one weapon for each heavy bomber is based on the fact that bombers are not fast-flying, first-strike weapons, and are thus considered to be stabilizing systems.
Paragraph 3 establishes rules for counting deployed and non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers toward the aggregate limit of 800.
Paragraph 4 provides the counting rules for ICBMs, SLBMs and launch canisters. The rules reflect the fact that some missiles are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, others as assembled missiles without launch canisters, and others as assembled missiles in launch canisters. The counting rules are as follows:
For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, is considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type is considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type. This rule applies to all U.S. "existing types."
Each launch canister is considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM or SLBM is installed in it, until an ICBM or SLBM has been launched from it, or until an ICBM or SLBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister is not considered to contain an ICBM or SLBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a particular type are to be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type.
Paragraph 5 sets out the rules regarding when newly constructed strategic offensive arms begin to be subject to the Treaty, meaning when they will begin to be subject to numerical restrictions and other relevant Treaty provisions. New ICBMs, SLBMs, and mobile ICBM launchers become subject to the Treaty when they first leave a production facility. A new ICBM silo launcher becomes subject to the Treaty when the silo door is first installed and closed. A new SLBM launcher becomes subject to the Treaty when the submarine in which it is installed is first launched. A new heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments becomes subject to the Treaty when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which it was assembled. Notifications of newly constructed strategic offensive arms are provided in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty, including a notification 48 hours in advance of the exit of a solid-fueled ICBM or solid-fueled SLBM from a production facility. Such notifications help each side assess missile movements through national technical means of verification (e.g., overhead imagery satellites).
Paragraph 6 sets out the rules governing when ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers cease to be subject to the Treaty. Paragraph 6 distinguishes between rules governing when an individual item ceases to be subject to the Treaty (e.g., through conversion or elimination, and notification thereof, in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol to the Treaty), and rules governing when an entire type of ICBM or SLBM is no longer subject to the Treaty (when all launchers of that type of missile have been eliminated or converted in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol).
Paragraph 7 sets forth three important rules:
A missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth is not a ballistic missile to which the provisions of the Treaty apply. Thus, missiles for defense against ballistic missile attack or for air defense are not subject to the Treaty’s limitations on ballistic missiles, provided that they are developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth. This provision parallels paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, with Memorandum of Understanding and Protocols, signed at Washington on June 1, 1987 (the "INF Treaty") and subparagraph 9(a) of Article III of the START Treaty.
Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments is to be distinguishable from a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The term "distinguishable" is defined in Part One of the Protocol. In this context, it means that, within the same type, heavy bombers not equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments must be different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means of verification, or, that are visible during inspection activities.
Heavy bombers of a given type cease to be subject to the limitations of the Treaty when the last heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments of that type is eliminated or converted in accordance with the procedures contained in Part Three of the Protocol. The First Agreed Statement adds specific verification and transparency measures associated with B-1B heavy bombers that apply once all B-1B heavy bombers have been converted to be equipped for non-nuclear armaments. This statement also establishes that these verification and transparency measures would apply in the event there is another type of heavy bomber for which all bombers of that type have been converted to non-nuclear heavy bombers. The United States expects to complete the conversion of all B-1B heavy bombers soon after the Treaty enters into force.
Paragraph 8 lists, for each Party, the existing types of ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers that are subject to the Treaty. The Parties agree that these lists are complete as of the date of Treaty signature. Because some silo launchers of Minuteman II and Peacekeeper ICBMs have not been eliminated, those missile types are considered to be existing types of ICBMs. Once all launchers for any existing type are converted or eliminated in accordance with the procedures specified in Part Three of the Protocol, that type will no longer be considered an existing type. New types of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments, if developed by either Party, would also be subject to the Treaty. The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply the list of existing types in paragraph 8 of Article III.
ARTICLE IV
Article IV sets forth basing and locational restrictions for strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty. The concept of "basing" is used throughout the Treaty to convey the idea of a permanent facility that supports the long-term operations of a particular strategic offensive system on a permanent basis, as distinguishable from the idea of temporary stationing. In order for a deployed ICBM or deployed heavy bomber to be based at a facility, its routine day-to-day operations must be supported there. The term "based" is also used to assign a strategic offensive arm to a specific facility in the New START Treaty database. For example, deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers temporarily visiting locations other than their assigned base will continue to be specified as "based" at their assigned air base, but temporarily "located" at the facilities they are visiting. The Fourth Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol also specifies that the U.S. heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments undergoing conversion or awaiting elimination at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in Arizona will be considered deployed heavy bombers based at a declared air base, but located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, until converted or eliminated.
Paragraph 1 establishes that deployed launchers of ICBMs, whether mobile launchers or silo launchers, shall be based only at ICBM bases. An ICBM base is defined as an area in which one or more basing areas and one associated maintenance facility are located (for mobile ICBM launchers), or an area in which one or more groups of silo launchers of ICBMs and one associated maintenance facility are located (for silo ICBM launchers). Maintenance facilities are an important component of the definition of an ICBM base because the operation of deployed ICBM launchers, including the ICBMs loaded on or in them, requires long-term support that can be provided only at or from a maintenance facility. Paragraph 1 also establishes that deployed heavy bombers, which, by Treaty definition, are equipped for nuclear armaments, shall be based only at air bases. This requirement is premised on the same rationale: that deployed heavy bombers require the long-term operational support provided only at an air base.
There are no restrictions on where deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located. These launchers may leave their basing areas for field deployments, similar to the deployments from their bases of ballistic missile submarines and heavy bombers. Because mobile ICBMs are considered survivable when deployed in the field and therefore stabilizing, their unhampered operation while deployed in the field is permitted.
Paragraph 2 establishes that deployed launchers of SLBMs may be installed only on ballistic missile submarines. This requirement precludes installation of deployed SLBM launchers on surface ships or other platforms.
Paragraph 3 provides locational restrictions for non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, non-deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and prototype ICBMs and SLBMs. There are no locational restrictions for non-deployed launchers of ICBMs within an ICBM base. There are no locational restrictions for non-deployed launchers of SLBMs.
Paragraph 4 provides that non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, as well as non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs, may be in transit between declared facilities listed in the database established in accordance with Article VIII of the Treaty using the categories of data in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty. Paragraph 4 requires each Party to limit the duration of each such transit between facilities to no more than 30 days.
Paragraph 5 requires test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs to be located only at test ranges.
Paragraph 6 requires that training launchers be located only at ICBM bases, training facilities, and test ranges. Paragraph 6 also provides that the number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs may not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.
Paragraph 7 requires each Party to limit the number of its test heavy bombers to no more than ten. This limit is established because test heavy bombers are not subject to inspection.
Paragraph 8 provides that test heavy bombers, which are defined as non-deployed, may be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and that non-deployed heavy bombers other than test heavy bombers may be located only at repair or production facilities for heavy bombers.
Paragraph 9 provides that each Party may not carry out at an air base joint basing of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties. Such an agreement, which allows for the joint basing of heavy bombers of the same type (e.g., B-1B, B-52H) where there is a mixture of those equipped for nuclear armaments and those converted to employ only non-nuclear armaments, is provided in the Third Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol. During the negotiations, the United States made clear to the Russian Federation that it planned to jointly base B-52H heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments and B-52H heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at a selected air base during the life of the Treaty pursuant to this Agreed Statement.
Paragraph 10 provides that strategic offensive arms may not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers at such facilities. In accordance with the First Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol, this provision will have no effect on the basing of B-1B heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota, and Dyess Air Force Base, Texas, following the elimination of these bases as declared facilities once all B-1B heavy bombers have been converted or eliminated in accordance with the Treaty. Procedures for inspection of converted B-1B heavy bombers at an eliminated facility are established in the First Agreed Statement in Part Nine of the Protocol and in Part Five of the Protocol.
Paragraph 11 establishes that strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty may not be based outside the national territory of each Party. This paragraph notes that the obligations provided for in this paragraph do not affect the Parties’ rights in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States. This paragraph also provides that heavy bombers subject to the Treaty may be temporarily located outside the national territory. In such a case, a Party is required to provide notification in accordance with Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty.
ARTICLE V
Article V of the Treaty sets forth the Parties’ understandings with respect to the modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms.
Paragraph 1 provides that, except as prohibited by the provisions of the Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out. This repeats the language of the July 6, 2009, Joint Understanding and is a further reflection in the Treaty of the flexibility concept first expressed in Article II that each Party has the right to determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms within the Treaty’s aggregate limits. Thus, within the overall limits of the Treaty, the Parties are permitted to deploy "new types" of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
Paragraph 2 addresses "new kinds" of strategic offensive arms. Whereas "new types" refers to new types of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments that meet the definitions of the Treaty, "new kinds" refers to new offensive arms of strategic range that do not meet the Treaty’s definitions of these existing strategic offensive arms. This paragraph provides that when a Party believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that Party has the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration within the framework of the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC). The provisions regarding the BCC are contained in Article XII and Part Six of the Protocol and establish that either Party may place issues on the BCC agenda for consideration. This paragraph is thus included only for emphasis that either Party may place a concern about a new kind of strategic offensive arm on the BCC agenda for consideration.
The Parties understand that they may use the BCC to discuss whether new kinds of arms are subject to the Treaty. The United States stated during the negotiations its view that not all new kinds of weapon systems of strategic range would be "new kinds of strategic offensive arms" subject to the New START Treaty. Specifically, the United States stated that it would not consider future, strategic range non-nuclear systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of this Treaty to be "new kinds of strategic offensive arms" for purposes of the Treaty. The Parties understand that, if one Party deploys a new kind of strategic range arm for delivering non-nuclear weapons that it asserts is not a "new kind of strategic offensive arm" subject to the Treaty, and the other Party challenges that assertion, the deploying Party would be obligated to attempt to resolve the issue within the framework of the BCC. There is no requirement in the Treaty for the deploying Party to delay deployment of the new system pending such resolution.
The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply paragraph 2 of Article V.
Paragraph 3 states that each Party may not convert and may not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. In addition, neither Party may convert or use launchers of missile defense interceptors for placement of ICBMs and SLBMs therein. The paragraph further states that the provision does not apply to former ICBM launchers that were converted prior to signature of this Treaty for placement of missile defense interceptors therein. This statement has the effect of ensuring that this prohibition does not apply to the five former ICBM launchers at Vandenberg Air Force Base, California that have been converted for missile defense purposes. These former ICBM launchers are not subject to the limits or obligations of the Treaty, except for the exhibitions required by the Seventh Agreed Statement of Part Nine of the Protocol. The Seventh Agreed Statement provides for an exhibition to confirm the conversion of all of these former ICBM silo launchers and a second exhibition to confirm they have not been reconverted.
ARTICLE VI
Article VI sets forth the requirement that conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities must be carried out in accordance with Part Three of the Protocol. The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply paragraph 1 of Article VI so that any conversion or elimination carried out between Treaty signature and entry into force will be done in accordance with the Treaty’s procedures for conversion or elimination. There is no requirement in the provisional application period to convert or eliminate strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty. This merely establishes the requirement that, should a Party decide for itself to carry out conversion or elimination, it will do so in accordance with the agreed conversion or elimination procedures.
This Article also provides that notifications related to conversion, elimination, or other means of removal from accountability of strategic offensive arms and facilities must be provided in accordance with Parts Three and Four of the Protocol.
Finally, this Article establishes that verification of the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms and elimination of facilities, in accordance with the procedures set forth in Part Three of the Protocol, will be carried out by national technical means of verification in accordance with Article X of the Treaty, as well as through inspection activities, as provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.
ARTICLE VII
Paragraph 1 provides that a database pertaining to the obligations under the Treaty will be created in accordance with Parts Two and Four of the Protocol. It also stipulates that the categories of data that must be provided are those set forth in Part Two of the Protocol. Part Two of the Protocol provides that an initial exchange of site diagrams will occur within 45 days after signature of the Treaty, an initial exchange of data according to the categories of data will occur within 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, and photographs will be provided within 45 days after entry into force for types of strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty for which no photographs were previously provided under the START Treaty.
The Parties must provide notifications provided for in Article VII in accordance with the provisions of Part Four of the Protocol and the Annex on Notifications. The data provided in the notification providing the initial exchange of data must be current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty.
Paragraph 2 establishes the obligation that each Party must notify the other Party about changes in data and provide other notifications in a manner provided for in Part Four of the Protocol to the Treaty.
Paragraph 3 requires the Parties to use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers (NRRCs) in order to provide and receive notifications, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty. Examples of notifications that may be provided through diplomatic channels rather than the NRRC include: notice to the other Party that a facility is temporarily exempt from inspection activities in exceptional cases; information a Party voluntarily provides to enhance confidence in the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty; and some communications pertaining to the BCC.
Paragraph 4 permits the Parties to provide additional notifications on a voluntary basis beyond those specified in Paragraph 2 of this Article if a Party deems this necessary to ensure confidence in the fulfillment of obligations assumed under the Treaty.
Paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 establish rules governing the public release of data.
Paragraph 5 provides that the Parties will hold consultations within the framework of the BCC on releasing to the public data and information obtained during the implementation of the Treaty. Paragraph 5 further makes it clear that the Parties have the right to release to the public such data and information only following agreement thereon within the framework of the BCC. Finally, this paragraph provides that each Party may, of course, release to the public data related to its own strategic offensive arms.
Paragraph 6 also makes it clear that geographic coordinates relating to data provided in Part Two of the Protocol to the Treaty, unique identifiers on ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, site diagrams of facilities provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty, as well as coastlines and waters diagrams provided by the Parties pursuant to the Treaty may not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed by the Parties within the framework of the BCC.
Paragraph 7 establishes an important exception to the rules in Paragraph 5 governing release of information. Notwithstanding Paragraph 5, the aggregate number of deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; the aggregate number of warheads on deployed ICBMs, warheads on deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers; and the aggregate number of deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, deployed and non-deployed SLBM launchers, and deployed and non-deployed heavy bombers, may be released to the public by the Parties.
The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply paragraphs 1-6 of Article VII. However, paragraph 2 is provisionally applied only to the extent required to provide the notifications that the Parties agreed to provisionally apply.
ARTICLE VIII
Article VIII provides that, in those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to an ambiguous situation, that Party is to take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty and to enhance confidence, openness, and predictability concerning the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such measures may include, among other things, providing information in advance on activities of that Party associated with deployment or increased readiness of strategic offensive arms to preclude the possibility of misinterpretation of its actions by the other Party. This information is to be provided through diplomatic or other channels.
The formulation "in those cases in which one of the Parties determines that its actions may lead to ambiguous situations" makes it clear that the obligation to "take measures to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty" is triggered only when that Party has determined that its own actions may lead to ambiguous situations. If the other Party has concerns regarding implementation of the Treaty, it has the independent right to raise such concerns in the BCC.
The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply Article VIII.
ARTICLE IX
Article IX provides that, by mutual agreement of the Parties, telemetric information on launches of ICBMs and SLBMs will be exchanged on a parity basis. Details of this exchange are provided in Part Seven of the Protocol and in the Annex on Telemetric Information. The phrase "parity basis" reflects the Parties’ agreement, in Part Seven of the Protocol, that the Parties will annually exchange telemetric information on an equal number of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, up to a total of five launches per year. The number of launches for which telemetric information will be exchanged and issues associated with this exchange will be discussed on an annual basis within the framework of the BCC pursuant to Part Seven of the Protocol and the Annex on Telemetric Information.
ARTICLE X
Article X establishes obligations relating to the use of national technical means of verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty. "National technical means" is a term used in a variety of arms control treaties; it refers to those systems, such as reconnaissance satellites, used to collect information useful in verifying compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Paragraph 1 establishes that the Parties agree:
(1) to use national technical means of verification at their disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law;
(2) not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with this Article (e.g., a Party may not destroy, blind, jam, or otherwise interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party that are used in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law); and
(3) not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Paragraph 2 clarifies that the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to conceal ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers at test ranges. However, the obligation not to use concealment measures does not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms, since such prohibitions would disrupt normal operations.
The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply Article X.
ARTICLE XI
Article XI of the Treaty addresses inspection activities. This Article establishes the purposes and framework of inspections, the general inspection rights of the Parties, and the purposes and framework of exhibitions. Additional details regarding the implementation of inspection activities are provided in Part Five and Part Nine of the Protocol and in the Annex on Inspection Activities.
Paragraph 1 establishes the right of the Parties to conduct inspection activities in accordance with the Treaty and the Protocol to the Treaty. The term "inspection activities" is defined in Part One of the Protocol and refers to both inspections and exhibitions. There are three types of inspection activities under the Treaty: Type One inspections, Type Two inspections, and exhibitions. The purpose of such inspection activities is to confirm the accuracy of declared data provided in accordance with the Treaty as part of the regime to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.
Paragraph 2 defines Type One inspections. Such inspections may be conducted at bases for ICBMs (both for silo-based and mobile launchers), for ballistic missile submarines, and for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to confirm the accuracy of declared data. Confirming the accuracy of declared data at the inspection site includes confirming the number and types of deployed and non-deployed strategic offensive arms subject to the Treaty, the number of reentry vehicles located on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, and the number of nuclear armaments located on deployed heavy bombers, if any, as well as confirming the absence of undeclared items at the inspection site. This inspection activity will contribute to the verification of compliance with the Treaty’s aggregate limits and related obligations. The Type One inspection of deployed and non-deployed strategic systems encompasses both the reentry vehicle inspection and aspects of the data update inspection, which were conducted at such bases under the START Treaty.
Paragraph 3 defines Type Two inspections. Such inspections may be conducted at a wide range of declared and formerly declared facilities. The purpose of a Type Two inspection at a declared facility is to confirm the accuracy of declared data regarding non-deployed strategic offensive arms located at such facilities, including confirming the absence of undeclared items, or to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms.
Paragraph 3 also establishes the right to conduct Type Two inspections at formerly declared facilities in order to confirm that such facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty. A "formerly declared facility" is a facility that has been eliminated in accordance with Section VII of Part Three of the Protocol, including the removal from the facility of all strategic offensive arms specified for the facility and specified associated items.
Paragraph 4 addresses exhibitions, which are used to demonstrate features of new types of strategic offensive arms that distinguish them from existing types and to confirm the technical characteristics of such new types. Exhibitions are also used to demonstrate the results of the conversion of the first item of a given type of strategic offensive arm subject to the Treaty, including the distinguishing features for the converted system, which are intended to provide the basis for subsequent inspections to confirm the completion of conversion of such systems and that they have not been reconverted. Additional types of exhibitions are addressed in the Agreed Statements in Part Nine of the Protocol.
ARTICLE XII
Article XII establishes the BCC to promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. The authority of and procedures for the BCC are set forth in Part Six of the Protocol.
The Parties agreed in Part Eight of the Protocol to provisionally apply Article XII.
ARTICLE XIII
Article XIII provides that each Party may not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with the Treaty’s provisions. The phrase "obligations or undertakings" covers both formal written agreements and informal arrangements between governments.
Article XIII further provides that the Parties undertake not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to this Treaty to third parties. The Parties are to hold consultations within the framework of the BCC in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. Article XIII makes it clear that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms existing at the time of signature of the Treaty between a Party and a third State.
For the United States, the only pattern of cooperation existing at the time of Treaty signature is the longstanding and continuing pattern of cooperation between the United States and the United Kingdom, which the Russian side acknowledged during the New START Treaty negotiations. The Russian side understands this pattern to be as it was described during the START Treaty negotiations, as discussed below.
With respect to the relationship between the United States and the United Kingdom, the phrase "pattern of cooperation," while not defined, is broader than any specific, currently existing sales or cooperation agreement between the United States and the United Kingdom. On July 29, 1991, in the final plenary meeting of the START negotiations, the United States made a formal statement with regard to the scope of its longstanding pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom. The United States stated that it attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace, and that the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. The United States further stated that this is what it referred to as "the existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom, which then included agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapon system. The United States has consistently maintained that, in this case, "pattern of cooperation" refers to maintaining an independent United Kingdom deterrent and not to any specific weapon system or any specific category of strategic offensive arms.
ARTICLE XIV
Article XIV provides the rules governing entry into force, duration, and withdrawal from the Treaty.
This Article establishes that the Treaty, including its Protocol, which is an integral part thereof, is subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty will enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
The Article further provides that the Treaty will remain in force for 10 years unless superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. If either Party raises the issue of extension of the Treaty, the Parties will jointly consider the matter. If the Parties decide to extend the Treaty, it will be extended for a period of no more than five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. Such agreement to extend the Treaty would not be subject to the advice and consent of the Senate.
On the subject of withdrawal, the Article provides that each Party has the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. A Party must give notice of such decision to the other Party. The notice must contain a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests. The Treaty will terminate three months from the date of receipt by the other Party of the aforementioned notice, unless the notice specifies a later date.
Finally, the Article provides that, upon entry into force, the Treaty supersedes the Moscow Treaty.
ARTICLE XV
Article XV provides that each Party may propose amendments to the Treaty, which, if agreed, would enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of the Treaty.
This Article also permits the Parties to make changes in the Protocol to the Treaty that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty and to use the BCC to reach agreement on such changes. In such cases, the Parties need not resort to the procedure for making amendments in Paragraph 1.
ARTICLE XVI
Article XVI restates the obligation in the Charter of the United Nations to register the Treaty with the United Nations.