UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENTS TO U.S. OPENING PLENARY STATEMENT FOR JCIC-XXVI (PART 1), MARCH 24, 2004
Coordinated Plenary Statement of the United States Regarding the Distinguishing Features of the B-1 Heavy Bomber Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other Than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs
To resolve the issue of replacement of long-rang-nuclear ALCM pylon attachment joint covers on B-1 heavy bombers, the Parties to the Treaty agree to the following:
Not later then 30 days after this statement is delivers, the United States will forward to the other parties a schedule for inspecting all B-1 heavy bombers present at each air base for B-1 heavy bombers. Such inspections would begin within 60 days of the date such schedule is received and would finish not later then 90 days after the date on which inspections begin. Such inspections will not count against the quotas provided for by the Treaty.
Before the beginning of each such inspection at each of the air bases, the United States will conduct a briefing for inspectors, during which it will explain the sequence of the actions it performed to replace the covers of the pylon attachment joints for long-rang ALCMs on the B-1 heavy bombers. The United States will identify to the inspectors the B-1 heavy bombers attributed to each air base but absent from it at the time of such inspection, as well as provide an explanation for their absence. Thereafter, the inspectors will be given the opportunity to inspect each B-1 heavy bomber present at the air base. The inspections of absent heavy bombers may be conducted during the course of future update inspections.
The United States notes that the Brooks/Nazarkin letters concerning B-1 heavy bombers reflect an agreement between the Parties on the distinguishability of B-1 heavy bombers. The Parties agreed that, with the distinguishing features listed in the letters and Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, B-1 heavy bombers would be considered heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range ALCMs.
The distinguishing features specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the B-1 heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other then long-range nuclear ALCMs are:
- There is no large vertical blade antenna on top of the fuselage near the mid-wing.
Under the wing/fuselage, there are either five or seven external pylon attachment joints on ach side of fuselage (near the weapons bays) which are covered by a process equivalent to welding. There is one additional attachment joint on each side of the fuselage, which also serves as an aircraft jacking point and which will not be covered by a process equivalent to welding.
- The weapons bay bulkhead between the forward and intermediate bays on the B-1 heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other then long-range nuclear ALCMs has not been moved and remains as it was produced. The weapons bay doors are all of equal length, 4.56 meters. The weapons bay size is insufficient to load a long-range nuclear ALCM.
Recognizing that the Treaty does not define the term "process equivalent to welding," the United States provides the following clarifications regarding the process used to install the covers that preclude access to all pylon attachment joints except the two that serve as jacking points for the B-1 heavy bomber:
- The covers are removed from the airplane.
- On the oblong covers, the fasteners are removed. Metal epoxy is applied to the covers and to the place where they are to be attached to the airplane. The covers are then attached to the airplane. As a result, a very strong and enduring bond is formed between the covers and the airplane. Rivets are then used to further attach the covers to the airplane.
- For the circular covers, the same bonding process is used with metal epoxy and then bolts are used to further attach the covers to the airplane.
Taken together, these actions are understood to be a "process equivalent to welding" for the purpose of meeting Treaty requirements.
The covers are then painted.
With regard to the phrase "covered by a process equivalent to welding" as it is used in subparagraph (ii)(3) of Section (a) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, the United States provides the following clarification in order to allow the inspecting Party to confirm the presence of this distinguishing feature of B-1 heavy bombers: the observed features that inspectors will see are oblong and circular covers, installed using the process described above.
If modifications are to be made to the B-1 heavy bomber pylon attachment joint covers in the future, the United States will provide information regarding such modifications in advance, in the form of a diplomatic note to the Parties, except when safety of flight concerns preclude providing such information in advance. In that case, the United States will provide the relevant information to the other Parties as soon as possible after the modification has been completed. The United States will also provide the relevant information regarding the reasons for the modification.
Unilateral Plenary Statement by the United States Concerning B-1 Heavy Bomber Distinguishability
With regard to the letters of agreement exchanges between Ambassadors Brooks and Nazarkin on the distinguishability of the B-1 heavy bomber, the United States provides the following clarifications and assurances.
The configuration of the B-1 today continues to meet the conditions of the letters of agreement on distinguishability. The United States notes that during the April 1999 Holum/Mamedov talks, and subsequently during JCIC-XX, the United States provided detailed information regarding the non-nuclear status of the B-1 and the efforst it would take to restore nuclear capability to the B-1 fleet. The United States reaffirms that the restoration of the ALCM pylon attachment joints, as part of a process to provide long-range nuclear ALCM capability to the B-1, would be done at a major heavy bomber repair facility, should such activity be undertaken.
However, the United States reaffirms the operational status of the B-1 as a non-nuclear heavy bomber and assures the other Parties that there are no plans to return the B-1 to a nuclear role.