UNCLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT TO THE U.S. CLOSING PLENARY STATEMENT FOR JCIC-XIII, MAY 15, 1996
I. Coordinated Plenary Statements
On Heavy Bomber Attachment Joints
The third attachment joint at the inboard pylon position under each wing of the TU-95MS16 Russian heavy bomber known to the United States as the BearH16, and attachment joints on the 3MS-2 Russian former heavy bomber known to the United States as the Bison-B, are not now, and are not intended to be used in the future for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
Two attachment joints for an additional pylon on selected B-52H heavy bombers, described by the United States to support an electronic instrumentation package, are not now and are not intended to be used in the future for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs. To show that these attachment joints cannot be used to attach long-range nuclear ALCMs or pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States will provide inspectors the opportunity to make linear measurements of the distance between attachment joints for this pylon on the wing if such attachment joints are present and if questions are raised about them during future inspections of these heavy bombers.
Weapon pylons used for carrying non-nuclear weapons may be attached to the attachment joints for pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs on B-52H heavy bombers.
On Procedures for Elimination of Russian Liquid-Propellant SLBMs
The United States understands that Russian liquid-propellant SLBMs shall be considered to have been rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, after carrying out the procedures listed below at START-declared facilities:
- Guidance system elements have been removed;
- Fuel tanks have been depressurized by cutting out the plugs in fuel and drain ports;
- Propellant components have been drained and fuel tanks neutralized;
- Two holes of no less than 10-15 millimeters in diameter have been drilled (pressed) through the main engine nozzle;
- SLBM airframes with drained propellant components have been placed in open areas visible to NTM for no less than 60 days.
On Procedures for the Elimination of First Stages of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs without Nozzles Attached
The Parties note that the Joint Statement on First Stages without Nozzles Attached of U.S. ICBMs and SLBMs does not affect the procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in paragraph 4 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START Treaty.
II. U.S. Unilateral Plenary Statements
On Confirming Types of Partially-Assembled Missiles
Inspectors are likely to encounter first stages in both partially-assembled and separated configurations during data update inspections at U.S. ICBM repair facilities and submarine bases. The United States invites its Treaty Partners to take advantage of opportunities during inspections in the coming months to reconfirm and compare the lengths of first stages in partially-assembled and separated configurations.
Barring unforeseen circumstances, the United States will have available for measurement both partially-assembled missiles and separate first stages for comparison during the next data update inspections at the following facilities: Hill ICBM Repair Facility for Minuteman II and III ICBMs, Silverdale Submarine Base for Trident I SLBMs; and at the Kings Bay Submarine Base for Trident II SLBMs. All three locations routinely have on hand their respective missiles in such configurations, which would allow the necessary measurements and confirmation of first stage attachment points.
On Measuring the First Stages without Nozzles Attached of SS-24 ICBMs
As the U.S. indicated prior to initialing of the Joint Statement on First Stages without Nozzles Attached of SS-24 ICBMs, nothing in this Joint Statement affects the right of the U.S. during inspections of SS-24 ICBMs at conversion or elimination facilities to measure all elements and assemblies of SS-24 ICBMs that constitute the length of the missile without front sections.
On Minutemen I Missile Distinguishability
The U.S. Minuteman I ICBM, a former type of ICBM, has the same first stage dimension as the U.S. existing types of ICBMs, the Minuteman II and Minuteman III. In accordance with paragraph 18 of Section I of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty, the United States declares the number and location of the limited number of Minuteman I ICBMs every six months. There are currently 26 Minuteman I first stages in the United States inventory. This number will either remain static or decline. As appropriate during pre-inspection briefings, the United States indicates the number of Minuteman I ICBMs located at the inspected facility. Additionally, the United States has placed decals on the first stages of the Minuteman I ICBM, identical to the type of decal placed on the first stages of the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs, in order to facilitate the inspectors' ability to identify the Minuteman I ICBM.
The United States is pleased that the Russian Federation has accepted that the Minuteman I is subject to the provisions of the 37th Agreed Statement as a former type of ICBM, including the six month locational notifications. However, having done so, it is not logical for Russia to assert that a Minuteman I is a Minuteman III. There are no practical consequences to this disagreement because neither non-deployed Minuteman I or Minuteman Ill ICBMs are numerically limited under the Treaty. It is the oldest, least capable ICBM in the U.S. inventory and suitable for no other purpose than certain research and development testing.
On Solid Rocket Eliminations at Perm'
The U.S. Delegation was pleased to receive, during discussions at JCIC XIII, assurances from the Russian Federation that the eliminations of ICBMs and SLBMs at the proposed Perm' Conversion or Elimination Facility would be consistent with obligations under the START Treaty, and that the U.S. and Russia will continue to consult with each other as this process proceeds. The U.S. Delegation will report these assurances to the Department of Defense's Cooperative Threat Reduction personnel. We look forward to the successful accomplishment of our mutual objectives in this area. We note that the presence of even a limited number of mobile ICBMs at Perm', without observing the locational restrictions of the Treaty, would be inconsistent with such assurances.
On Procedures for Elimination of Russian Liquid-Propellant ICBMs
The United States appreciates the clarification provided by the Russian Delegation pertaining to the Russian liquid-propellant ICBM elimination process referred to as "rendered inoperable by cutting" in START Notification Format 59 to mean cutting through the missile's fuel tank, and understands that SS-11, SS13, SS-17, and SS-18 ICBMs, rendered inoperable by cutting, will be considered to have been eliminated, thereby precluding their use for their original purpose.
On Modifications to B-1B Pylon Attachment Joint Covers
The United States, in connection with the requirements set forth in the START Treaty letters exchanged on July 31, 1991, declares its intention to modify the pylon attachment joint covers on all operational B-1B heavy bombers. This modification will include an enhancement to the bonding process and removal of the pliable aerofairing sealant. The U.S. is forced to make this modification to resolve safety concerns brought on by engineering design deficiencies recently discovered in the current attachment joint covering process.
For inspection purposes, there is a minor change to the outward appearance of the pylon attachment joint covers. Pliable aerofairing sealant will be removed from around the edge of the replacement covers, and a drain hole in the circular replacement cover will not be filled with bonding material. These alterations will be clearly visible to future inspection teams.
The U.S. is in the process of retrofitting the entire operational B-1B fleet with this modification. This process will take approximately 6 months. This modification would normally take place at the B-1B Repair Facility. However, because of overriding safety concerns, this modification will take place at both the repair facility and the operational B-1B bases, in order to expedite its completion.
This modification will not alter the warhead attribution, nor the START Treaty status of the B-1B as a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.
On Additional Differences Between Training Models of the SS-N-8 and SSN-18 Types of Missiles and SLBMs of the Corresponding Type
The United States recognizes that any training nozzle or nozzle-like component attached to SS-N-8 and SS-N-18 training models of missiles at the place where a nozzle of the first stage rocket motor would normally be located on the corresponding type of SLBM, will have two holes, each no less than ten millimeters in diameter, drilled through such a training nozzle or nozzle-like component.
On Site Diagrams for Bershet' Silo ICBM Base, Engel's Air Base, and Ukrainka Air Base
The United States has no objections with the site diagrams for the Bershet' Silo ICBM Base dated November 1, 1995; the Engel’s Air Base dated January 22, 1996; and the Ukrainka Air Base dated January 22, 1996.