ATTACHMENT TO THE STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION AT THE CLOSING PLENARY OF THE TWELFTH SESSION, DECEMBER 12, 1995 [1], [2]
I. Unilateral Plenary Statements
The U.S. side appreciates the Russian Federation's timely response to U.S. concerns regarding inspector safety when certain AN-12 inspection airplanes were used that were not equipped to carry passengers to and from Russian inspection sites. The United States recently received assurances through diplomatic channels that measures were being taken to end the use of AN-12 aircraft for the transport of U.S. inspectors. The United States Delegation considers this matter satisfactorily resolved on the basis of these assurances.
The U.S. side was pleased to learn during this session that the Russian Federation confirms that the height dimension of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, which is declared in the MOU, should properly be measured to the extreme point. The U.S. side has concurred with the Russian Federation's proposal for inspectors and in-country escorts to determine on-site the most appropriate methods for measuring to the extreme point of such structures. We will now prepare instructions to our inspectors regarding conducting such measurements at the Kostroma and Bershet' rail garrisons in cooperation with the in-country escort.
The U.S. side is pleased to have received during this session an affirmation from the Russian Federation of the obligation of the in-country escort to demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that an object contained in the front section that is declared not to be a reentry vehicle is not, in fact, a reentry vehicle, pursuant to paragraph 13 of Annex 3 to the Inspection Protocol. The U.S. side notes that specific Treaty procedures are not necessary in order for the inspected party to comply with this obligation.
With regard to B-1B heavy bombers, the United States has met its obligation as called for in the letters exchanged at Treaty signature and has made available for inspection all deployed B-1B heavy bombers. All B-1B heavy bombers will continue to be subject to inspection during future data update inspections in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol. The United States believes this issue is resolved.
With regard to the soft-site launcher at Vandenberg Test Range, the United States has determined that, in addition to national technical means of verification, the soft-site launcher can be inspected. A new site diagram has been provided that includes the soft-site launcher within the inspectable area. As a result, the United States believes this issue can be closed.
The item observed by Russian Federation inspectors at the Washington Naval Yard Museum is a static display of an inert mock-up of a Poseidon SLBM that has been in place since 1980. This static display was inadvertently omitted from the list of static displays in existence at the time of signature of the Treaty, and contained in paragraph 1 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The United States will include this inert mock-up in Annex I to the MOU during the next MOU data update.
The device found at the training facility, King's Bay, has not been used for, and was not designed to be used as, a launcher of SLBMs or as a training launcher. It is incapable of storing an SLBM and incapable of being used as an SLBM launcher or as a treaty-defined "training launcher." The United States regards this statement as having resolved this issue.
For structures within the boundary of the inspected facility that are large enough to contain or to be used for items or support equipment subject to inspection or declared for that facility, and the entrances of which are large enough to permit passage of such items or support equipment, but that are not intended for such items or support equipment, such structures need not be depicted on the site diagram for that facility. Not depicting such structures on a site diagram, however, does not affect the rights of the Parties with regard to the inspection of such structures within the boundaries of the inspected facility.
With regard to the Minuteman I ICBM, the United States acknowledges that it is a missile maintained, stored, and transported in stages, and has the same first stage dimensions as the U.S. existing types of ICBMs, the Minuteman II and III. In accordance with paragraph 18 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, the United States declares the number and location of the limited number of Minuteman I ICBMs every six months. As appropriate during pre-inspection briefings, the United States indicates the number of Minuteman I ICBMs located at the inspected facility. The United States believes that the declarations and notifications for the Minuteman I ICBM should be guided by the Treaty provisions, especially the Thirty-Seventh Agreed Statement, concerning former types. In order to facilitate the inspectors' ability to identify the Minuteman I ICBM, the United States has placed decals on the first stages of the Minuteman I ICBM, similar to the type and location of the decals used to identify the first stages of the Minuteman II and III ICBMs.
II. Coordinated Plenary Statements
The United States notes that the Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs use the same first stage, and hence by their appearance and dimensions are indistinguishable. To facilitate counting the number of Minuteman II and III ICBMs by inspectors, the United States has affixed a permanent decal to the aft end dome of the motor case of the first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs, using roman numerals II or III, thus identifying the missile as a Minuteman II or Minuteman III ICBMs, respectively. The United States further notes that, for the purpose of counting first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs to determine whether the number of first stages of Minuteman II and Minuteman III ICBMs present at an inspected facility corresponds to the number declared by the inspected party, inspectors may use these decals to identify the missile type.
The Parties will record agreements on changes to the boundaries of facilities on site diagrams, provided for in paragraphs 19 and 20 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), as JCIC Joint Statements with a separate number sequence prefaced by S- (Number of Joint Statement).
The United States has no further questions regarding the Bershet' ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, based on the understanding that the rail spurs not depicted on the site diagram of the rail garrison that are located north of the exit/entrance of the facility and are connected to the main rail line, will not be used to base, store or maintain items of inspection or support equipment that are declared for this facility. [3]