

6 April 2005

Talking Paper

Subject: BRAC 2005 Red Team Meeting with the IEC (Infrastructure Executive Council),
(Room 3E928, 1630 – 1815, Wednesday, 6 April 2005)

Background: The purpose of the meeting is to summarize the findings of the 2005 BRAC Red Team to date for the IEC. Significant overarching issues are: working group inconsistency of strategies, military value and capacity approaches; process for combining functional and service recommendations into BRAC recommendations; and DoD integrated story and report development.

Talking Points

- BRAC Red Team asked to look at evolving recommendations from a BRAC commission and DoD policy perspective
 - We did not attempt to judge recommendations from military standpoint
 - Inevitably, our “process questions” may have influenced the recommendations
- As you expected this BRAC is more about the “R” Realignments than the “C” Closures
- Joint Cross Service Groups and Military Departments have looked at parts of DoD previously un-reviewed
 - JCSGs have done well but have also taken differing approaches
 - Desperately need to integrate their efforts by installation and style with consistent justifications
- In past four rounds, DOD has:
 - Closed – 97 bases
 - Realigned – 86 bases
 - However, the non-installation infrastructure has been largely untouched
- Size of BRAC 05
 - Much smaller number of base closures
 - Non-installation infrastructure has been looked at very hard – with large results
- Transformation
 - Was very much a part of everyone’s thinking and played a huge role in strategic analysis
 - However in the report to the Commission, DoD must cast all recommendations and justifications in BRAC terms consistent with the law
- Military Value
 - Not consistently used (applied to installations, functions, and weapon platforms)
 - Quantitative
 - Qualitative
 - Military judgment is part of military value calculations in some cases and applied after military value calculations in other cases
 - Military judgment is sometimes used without adequate substantiation to justify overriding the quantitative military value (based on business/economic factors rather than military requirements)
 - Since military value is the preeminent criteria for closure or realignment, any military judgment based decision that is not within the purview of the particular skills and expertise of military professionals should be scrutinized carefully

- Integration
 - JCSG integration goes beyond knitting together. Each group has used different strategy, guiding principles, surge requirements, capacity measures, military value, and military judgment approaches
 - Need to boil down to BRAC language recommendations

BRAC Action	where	by what	to where	and retaining what
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Close • Realign • Inactivate 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • losing installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • moving • relocating • consolidating • privatizing 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • gaining installation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • enclaves • functions • activities

- Metrics
 - Traditional: Plant Replacement Value (PRV) does not properly reflect changes in infrastructure
 - Annual Recurring Savings is better measure
 - NPV savings amounts are inflated over the past due to discount rate reductions
 - Civilian positions eliminated
 - Military billets eliminated or converted to warfighting roles
 - Capture new capacity requirements as result of surge, Army end-strength increases, returning overseas units, homeland security, etc. that reduced excess capacity pool to work with
 - Reduction of annual lease costs is another possible “good news” metric
- Role of BRAC Commission
 - Remove by simple majority vote, those recommendations that “substantially deviate from the force structure plan and/or final selection criteria”
 - Add to list with 7 of 9 votes super majority
 - Initial Commission reaction to presentation is very important
- Potential Weaknesses
 - Strategy – Lack of consistency among DoD, Military Departments, and Joint Cross-Service Group approaches
 - Integration, consistency, strategy linkage, ties to capacity reduction, strong story
 - Surge capacity policy – Should state that policy was for each Service/JCSG to determine surge capacity based on requirements unique to each group’s mission
 - Many candidate recommendations do not need BRAC authority to implement
 - BRAC military construction and environmental restoration costs could be greatly reduced thereby increasing NPV savings if these actions were accomplished outside of BRAC
 - We understand why these actions were included under BRAC
 - All candidate recommendations that have payback periods greater than 20 years could be considered substantially deviating from the final selection criteria in that the COBRA model only evaluates up to 20 years
 - With careful review after “roll up” most (if not all) will have shorter payback periods
 - Have all issues been addressed
 - BRAC law requires all military installations in the U.S. to be considered equally (beware of statements such as “removed from further review due to...)

- Re-look at candidate recommendations removed from list before IEC review
- Possible Political Issues
 - *(Provide Examples)*
- Deal Breakers
 - *(Provide Examples)*
- BRAC 2005 Story
 - Story approach is crucial with respect to commission and public perception
 - Strong DoD overview of transformation and infrastructure objectives
 - Opportunity to take critical review
 - Modernize through transformational thinking
 - Overseas moves included in BRAC deliberations so as to properly determine location and integrate returning units
 - Past BRACs looked primarily at bases – 2005 BRAC looked at supporting infrastructure
 - Strong role for Joint Cross Service Groups
 - Presentation of Results
 - Use various very positive measures of success
 - Anecdotally take credit for facilities, bases and areas freed up for returning units and resources freed up for homeland security and GWOT
 - Recommendations must be tied to installations