Phase Zero Contracting Operations (PZCO)—Strategic and Integrative Planning for Contingency and Expeditionary Operations

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Abstract

Contracting in expeditionary operations is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the scope and magnitude that contracting and contractors play in today’s military operations. Even if global operating tempos decline, many experts believe that reliance on contractor personnel will remain at current levels, or even grow, in relation to the number of uniformed personnel.

Lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strategic level leads to loss of efficiencies, lack of effectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud of the executing participants. The authors propose adopting an Integrated Planner and Executor (IPE) and embrace mandates for Operational Contract Support, including generating a thoroughly vetted Annex W into OPLANs. The authors contend that the best means to accomplish integration into existing war planning systems is by congressionally mandating, authorizing, and funding (via appropriation) the IPE positions at the flag and senior executive service (SES) levels within Service structures, such as at the JCASO. The authors recommend that JCASO have more authority within GCC and Service staffs—particularly to establish, monitor, and manage Annex W for GCC and the Services within the APEX framework. These recommendations will allow for greater efficiency and effectiveness in providing contracted support to all military operations.

Keywords: Contingency Contracting, Expeditionary Contracting, Humanitarian Aid, Disaster Relief, Advanced Planning, Three-tier Model, YTTM, APEX, JOPES, JCASO.
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Long has a very broad experience in operational, systems and contingency contracting at numerous locations within the Department of Defense and overseas. He was responsible for managing critical, multi-million dollar programs during various operational and systems-level assignments, including the Enhanced Guided Bomb Unit (EGBU-15), AGM-65 H/K Maverick Missile, and the Miniature Air Launched Decoy program.

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Long retired as an Air Force contracting officer with over 20 years’ experience and was previously an enlisted member as an avionics guidance and control systems technician on MH-60 Pavehawk helicopters and HC-130 Air Force special operations aircraft. He received his Level III DAWIA Certification in contracting and became a member of the Defense Acquisition Corps in 2004. During his military service, Long received numerous military awards and decorations. His most prestigious military award was the Bronze Star, which he was awarded by the
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Following his last joint deployment, Long led and designed the joint enterprise training architecture to develop the Department of Defense’s first-ever Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook. His leadership was crucial in standardizing contracting principles, techniques, and procedures across an entire DoD enterprise, meeting Congress’ vision of a joint warfare capability. Long received numerous accolades from the Director of Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy, the Gansler Commission, and members of Congress. He later went on to win the Air Force Special Recognition in Contracting Award in 2009 from the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Contracting and Acquisitions, and, in 2010, he was presented with a AT&L Workforce Achievement Award from the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics for his work in shaping the DoD’s contingency contracting workforce.

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I. Introduction

A. Military Stands to Gain From Newest Initiatives in Doctrine

Military organizations throughout the world are increasingly called to perform functions and create outcomes that are reliant on contractor support. In fact, contractors perform myriad functions in modern, often complex, military operations. Additionally, there is increased scrutiny on militaries to become better stewards of scarce resources, to eliminate potential waste, and to reduce abuse of taxpayer money due to poor management, operational redundancy and duplication of effort, and outright corruption. Because of an increased reliance on contractors and recent demands for improved accountability and performance, the authors contend that international military organizations will benefit by incorporating Phase Zero Contracting Operations (PZCO), strategic and integrative planning, for contingency and expeditionary operations. The PZCO concept has gained high-level attention recently, as the concept is embedded in Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2011), published in August 2011, and in Joint Publication 4-10, Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008), published in October 2008, and currently under revision. Additionally, PZCO protocols were proposed and published in 2010, and the concept has gained popularity among military leaders seeking to improve military capability while following sound business practices (Yoder, 2010).

In this paper, the authors present the PZCO concept for strategic leaders and planners. The PZCO concept is presented to include the scope and magnitude of current and future contractor support, the need for integration and coordination amongst stakeholders, key PZCO model constructs, and alignment with key aspects of the Adaptive Planning and Execution System (APEX), which must include contracting. Finally, the authors present conclusions and recommendations for forward-thinking leaders and planners.
B. The Scope and Magnitude of Contractor Support in Expeditionary Operations

Contracting in expeditionary operations is not a new phenomenon. What is new is the scope and magnitude that contracting and contractors play in today’s military operations. For example, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), in March 2011, reported that in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility, the ratio of contractors to uniformed personnel supporting operations was at 1.23 uniformed military per contractor represented (Schwartz & Swain, 2011). Even if global operating tempos decline, many experts believe that reliance on contractor personnel will remain at current levels, or even grow, in relation to the number of uniformed personnel. The New York Times reported in February 2012 that 113,491 contractor personnel were in Afghanistan compared to 90,000 U.S. soldiers (Nordland, 2012).

It is the scope and variety of contracted functions that is particularly noteworthy. These functions include base operation support (BOS), weapon system support, security services, and a host of others. For example, DynCorp International (DynCorp; 2011), recently advertised the following job opportunities in government and industry publications:

LOGCAP work opportunities includes many support roles such as: Construction Engineers and Superintendents, Project Controls, Project Managers, Quality Assurance Specialists, Site Managers, HSE Managers, Logistics Support, Supply Assignments, Security Jobs, Firefighting Opportunities, Laundry Service, Food Services Support, Water Works, Vector Control Sanitation Jobs, Billeting Positions, Transportation/Logistic Managers, Heavy Truck Drivers, Crane operators, Ware House workers, Aviation, Forklift Operator, Chemical Engineer, Electrical Engineer, Construction Engineer, Mechanical Engineering, Supply Chain Manager, Senior Safety Management, Maintenance Jobs, and Power Generation Support. (DynCorp, 2011)

C. High Reliance on Contracted Support Has Created Challenges

Based on continued public and political pressure to keep organic uniform force structures low, the continued reliance on contract support for military
operations is not likely to wane. But, high reliance has also created challenges for military planners, operators, contracting units, and even for the contractors themselves. Challenges have manifested in command and control, in integration into Geographic Combatant Command (GCC) battle and operational schema, and in the need for advanced planning, phasing, and timing of contracting events to synchronize with and complement operations plan (OPLANs). Additionally, consideration must be made in regards to communications and movement plans, weapons control, compliance with host nation and status of forces agreements (SOFA), contract management and oversight, indemnity and insurance of government-contracted personnel, prevention of human trafficking, third-country national (TCN) labor protections, issuing and maintaining security clearances, and law suits under the Defense Base Act, to name only a few. Many of the challenges stem from a shift in organic uniformed-force capability to a contracted capability—from “doing” to “managing.” So what can military leaders and planners do to effectively and efficiently manage all of these aspects of contracted support? The incorporation of Phase Zero Contracting Operations—PZCO—into the design and construct of military planning will address many of the challenges identified previously.
II. Phase Zero Operations: The Three-Tier Model

A. Credentialed Contract Planners Integrated With Operations Planners

The Three-tier Model (TTM) was published to address the challenges inherent in contracting in complex military operations (Yoder, 2004). The TTM is a credential-based personnel hierarchy for contracting officers and planning staff that optimizes the integrative planning, coordination, and execution required for contingency and expeditionary operations at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of the organization. The model is based on two primary premises: First, mission optimization occurs only with well-credentialed contracting planners and executors. Second, optimized stakeholder integration, including, for example, operational commanders, supporting units, and NGOs and PVOs, can only be accomplished by utilizing well-credentialed participants in the planning and execution phases (Yoder, 2011).

The three-tier model has specific personnel credentials in three primary areas: (1) training and education, (2) certification (such as Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act–Defense Acquisition University contracting levels, security clearance requirements, etc.), and (3) experience. The three tiers are described in the following paragraphs.

Tier One—The ordering officer at Tier One serves at the lowest level. This contracting level has several identifying attributes. Tier One personnel reside within the tactical level of the military hierarchy and are the most prevalent contracting personnel within most formal military and civilian organizations. Tier One personnel are junior civilians and military staff. They operate at the tactical and unit levels and, as such, perform no integrative planning at the operational and strategic levels. Tier One personnel place basic orders and conduct simple transactions. In the broadest terms, there is little stakeholder integration being initiated or managed at this level. However, this lowest level is absolutely essential because it represents where a
majority of “in-the-field” contracting actions are conducted. As this is the tactical level of the enterprise, particular importance at Tier One is placed on standardized training—emphasizing protocols, ethical conduct, management, control, and oversight.

Tier Two—In the middle of the hierarchy is Tier Two—the leveraging contracting officer (LCO) who serves at the operational level. Tier Two personnel require enhanced credentials. These personnel conduct complex contracting transactions and leverage local economy assets. They may perform all functions of Tier One personnel, but with increased credentials, scope, and responsibilities. The TTM calls for Tier Two personnel to be mid-level civilians, mid-grade officers, or credentialed senior enlisted. They can be integrated into planning and local operations—performing some integrative planning at the tactical and operational levels—and they can perform some liaison functions with broader stakeholders. Their main mission is to optimize local operations in harmony with strategic guidance. Since Tier Two personnel serve at the operational level of the organization, expertise in the protocols, ethical conduct, management, control and oversight, conduct of complex negotiations, broad business acumen in complex military contracting, and phase I Joint Professional Military Education (JPME I) are required. Currently, the Naval Postgraduate School and the Defense Acquisition University offer Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) CON 234 Contingency Contracting and CON 334 Advanced Contingency Contracting courses to standardize education in the contingency contracting business field.

Tier Three—The highest and most crucial tier in the TTM is Tier Three—the integrated planner and executor (IPE). This tier is at the strategic level of military and civilian organizations. The IPE is a flag officer or senior civilian position. It calls for the highest credentials to include, but not be limited to, Joint Professional Military Education (JPME I & II), Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Contracting Level III certification and warrant (or international equivalent), a graduate degree or higher, a Top Secret security clearance, and experience in
operations and contracting gained through experiential tours or assignments (Yoder, 2010). Figure 1 highlights the key aspects of the IPE position (Yoder, 2011).

**Integrated Planner & Executor**

Tier Three - Integrated Planner and Executor: highest credentials

- Highest level of planning and integration
- Strategic Level (Joint Staff, GCC-COCOM, etc.)
- Works with Joint and Combined Logistics, Planning and Ops
- Links operation strategy to contract integration in OPLANS
- High-level civilians and senior-grade officers
- Liaison functions with broader stakeholders - NGO & PVO
- Designs and exercises contracting support plans
- Comprehensive analysis to create contract schema
- Develops Annex W (CSIP)
- Standardized training and education essential:
  - protocols
  - ethics
  - control and oversight
  - most experienced
  - highest education
  - joint and multidisciplinary experience

**Figure 1. TTM—Tier Three—Integrated Planner & Executor**

(Yoder, 2010)

The IPE must be strategically positioned within the organization to achieve the highest levels of integrative planning. The IPE’s primary mission is creating and validating a comprehensive contracting plan, Annex W, to complement all elements of the OPLAN. Ideally, the IPE position should be placed within the Joint Staff, at GCC-COCOM, and at the highest operational and planning staffs within each Service branch.

The IPE will create and validate the Operational Contract Support (OCS) Plan, Annex W, in all key geographic combatant command (GCC) CONPLANs and OPLANs. (Specific content elements of Annex W are presented later in this paper.) Because of the complexity and magnitude of the tasks involved in creating and validating comprehensive plans, the IPE requires a supporting staff and subordinate
expertise in key strategic and analytical areas, such as OPLAN analysis, logistics assessments, contracting, and similar professional disciplines.

Of note, most organizations do not have a dedicated contracting IPE (by any moniker) within their organizational structure. Traditionally, the joint logistics (J-4) organizations have embedded contracting officers. However, the contracting positions within J-4, or within traditional logistics organizations, have been utilized as adjunct positions to the broader logistics functional planning. Additionally, the relatively low military rank and lack of seniority of the contracting personnel on J-4 staffs often lack both the credential and the clout to effectively execute the requirements proposed for the IPE.

Despite the DoD Service components lacking an IPE at the strategic level, the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (NDAA, 2008) has made significant impact at addressing credentialed personnel shortfalls at the strategic level. The NDAA 2008 authorized and established the Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office, JCASO, directed by a military one-star. JCASO has a staff of 49 personnel expressly to provide IPE strategic-level assistance in providing contract support to GCCs. According to Admiral Ron J. MacLaren (2012), Director, JCASO, each GCC is allocated two specialists from JCASO to assist in the development and exercise of key OPLAN Annex W’s. These JCASO specialists work with GCC planning staffs to incorporate essential contracting plans at the GCC.

Will the DoD and the military Service components embrace the TTM and particularly the IPE function established by the NDAA 2008 as the JCASO? Currently, JCASO has not been empowered to compel GCC or the Service components to utilize their operational contract support development functions. Rather, it is an advisory group that must “sell” its capabilities to improve mission support through integrative planning (MacLaren, 2012). Only time and sound metric analysis will prove whether or not the JCASO is effective at creating the needed Annex W, Operational Contract Support Plans, mandated and needed for key GCC OPLANs.
What specifically will the IPE position accomplish—what, exactly, will the IPE achieve? If the warfighters are to embrace operational contract support, they must understand what essential functions the IPE achieves, and how those functions will yield benefits.
III. Phase Zero—Planning, Exercise, and Rehearsal

Phase Zero, generally known in GCC planning arenas as the shaping phase, is adopted by the operational contract support contracting community as the planning and exercising phase. Traditional military jargon defines Phase Zero as “shaping.” The authors contend that Phase Zero contracting in the integrative strategic planning arena is the advance planning, exercising, and rehearsal of robust contracting support plans designed to complement the GCC’s deliberate and contingency planning process. Realistically, the contracting community and the warfighter have the same vision for Phase Zero—get the plans in place then rehearse, validate, and update them to reflect current realities. In essence, Phase Zero contract planning, and the creation of OPLAN Annex W, became mandatory under the 2008 Defense Authorization Act (Government Accountability Office [GAO], 2011). The authorization and supporting guidance under Joint Publication 4-10—Operational Contract Support (CJCS, 2008)—requires all GCCs to create Annex W for OPLANS, representing the embodiment of Phase Zero integrative planning. However, despite the mandate, what is particularly disconcerting is that the GAO recently determined that only four out of 39 OPLANS requiring comprehensive Annex W integration plans actually had them (GAO, 2011). Admiral MacLaren (2012), Director, JCASO, indicates that there is significant work ahead to get all the GCC OPLAN Annex W support plans in place and exercised. The authors contend that current operational tempos, along with constrained budgets, may preclude achieving fully integrated exercises and rehearsals for all OPLANs, as these rehearsals can carry a huge price tag. However, failure to exercise and rehearse, based on recent and well-documented problems in Iraq and Afghanistan, results in costs that far outweigh the up-front costs to fully vet Annex W plans. Deliberate planning and contingency planning are different—the first is not necessarily time sensitive, but the second is very time sensitive and often constrained. While JCASO has assigned two specialists at each GCC to assist in creating and exercising Annex Ws, ultimately, the service component contract warrant holders will
be responsible for providing actual contract support and must be included in the planning, exercise, rehearsal, and execution of the OPLAN. Sound strategy requires the exercise and rehearsal of Annex Ws in the most critical OPLANs with the personnel that will ultimately be called into action.

Ideally, each OPLAN and CONPLAN will have an Annex W, fully drafted, exercised, rehearsed, analyzed and revised. The doctrinal framework published in Joint Publication 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, along with Joint Publication 4-10, *Operational Contract Support* (OCS), is key for the design and integration of contracting into OPLANs. The objective is to embed and synchronize the OCS plan with all elements of the OPLAN to meet the commander's intent. Properly constructed Annex W plans must include elements such as, but not limited to, personnel/organizational structures and authorities; business protocols, including special statutory and regulatory provisions under declared contingencies; scheme of operations; synchronization with the battle plan; oversight; management and auditing; personnel regulations and provisions; spend analysis integration; synchronization with broader strategic objectives; and metrics for assessment of the efficiencies and effectiveness of embedded plans and actions (Yoder, 2011).

To ensure the efficacy of the integrated Annex W plan, the IPE must act as a strategic liaison with key stakeholders. Analytical assessments of the Annex W plan may utilize strength, weakness, opportunity, threat (SWOT) and capability gap analysis techniques. The SWOT method allows the IPE to evaluate the strengths, weaknesses/limitations, opportunities, and threats, and, ultimately, the potential efficacy of the OPLAN's integrated contracting plan. The capability gap analysis determines the support and provisioning gaps in the OPLAN that may be addressed through contracted support.
IV. Contracting Phases—Complementing Warfighter Strategy

Contracting plans in Annex W, must be established, orchestrated and synchronized with the broader OPLAN strategy. Since the NDAA of 2008, contracting has utilized five phases. Phase Zero is the planning, exercise, and rehearsal phase. Phase One is deployment. Phase Two is build-up. Phase Three is sustainment. Phase Four is termination and redeployment (Yoder, 2010; Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy [DPAP], 2010).

The conduct of the GCC deliberate planning process is visualized in six phases, as expressed in Joint Publication 5-0 (CJCS, 2011). Phase Zero is the shaping phase, inclusive of normal and routine military activities as well as the development of theater campaign plans. These campaign plans include shaping operations: activities intended to promote international legitimacy and cooperation with friends and allies, while dissuading adversaries. GCCs also develop AOR contributions to various global campaign plans. Phase I is deterrence—demonstrating capabilities and resolve of the joint force in response to an adversary’s undesirable actions. Phase II is seize initiative—executing offensive operations. Phase III is the dominate phase—breaking the enemy’s will. Phase IV is the stabilize phase—required when there is no fully functional legitimate civil governing authority, and joint forces must perform limited local governance and other activities to allow for a restoration of stability and a new normalcy. Phase V is the last phase, enable civil authority—providing joint support to legitimate civil governance in theater. Figure 2 shows the notional warfighter phases (CJCS, 2011).

Department of Defense Directive 3020.49, Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution mandates the coordination and synchronization of contracting with broader warfighter OPLANs (Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics [USD(AT&L)], 2009).
Figure 2. Warfighter’s Notional Operational Plan Phases
(CJCS, 2011)

The planning that takes place in Phase Zero, for both warfighters and contracting, must be designed to support all phases of the operation plan. Each phase will have its unique contracting challenges, dependent on the specific elements of the OPLAN and situation in theater.

As Figure 3 represents, the contracting community must plan and execute its mission in five phases, with the overarching Phase Zero occurring on a continuous cycle supporting all of the phases that would occur in a crisis or actual event.
Figure 3. Contracting Phase Zero—Plan, Exercise, Rehearse, and Synchronize
V. Phase Zero and Mandatory Pillars for Strategic Contracting Integration

As defined previously, Phase Zero is the planning, exercising, and rehearsal phase of military operations—properly establishing and vetting the contracting plan prior to an actual event or crisis. In order to function effectively within the established and existing military deliberate and contingency planning framework, the IPE and associated functions must be designed within three main pillars—personnel, platforms, and protocols. Failure to integrate contracting with all of the three primary pillars will result in sub-optimization or outright contract support and/or mission failure (Yoder, 2010).

The first pillar—personnel—should be addressed by implementing the TTM and particularly the IPE. The second pillar—platforms—is addressed by integrating contracting throughout all phases of military operations and into the existing warfighters’ platforms for planning and execution, the Adaptive Planning and Execution System, or APEX (which is in the process of replacing the JOPES system). Additionally, it must be embedded with other APEX-complementary platforms, such as the Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) system. The third pillar—protocols—represents the existing or desirable set of rules and procedures, including sound business, planning, and military doctrine, that govern the planning and execution of the contracting plan within the broader OPLAN. Figure 4 highlights the three pillars and associated elements.
Figure 4. Mandatory Pillars for Integrative Success

Protocols include, but are not limited to, the strategic planning guidance established by the GCC; strategic purchasing guidance and mandates; Joint Publications 4-10 (Operational Contract Support; CJCS, 2008), 5-0 (Joint Operational Planning; CJCS, 2010), 4-0 (Joint Logistics; CJCS, 2008); and other doctrinal publications, along with the mandates for constructing and implementing Annex W for each unique OPLAN. Additionally, acquisition-and-contracting-specific laws, regulations, and guidance must be utilized including, but not limited to, the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR; 2012).
VI. IPE Within Joint Strategic Planning, APEX Products, and Annex W

Joint strategic planning products include, but are not limited to, GCC estimates, base plans, concept plans, operational plans, warning orders, planning orders, alert orders, operation orders, execute orders, fragmentary orders, and deployment orders, along with all annexes including the newly mandated Annex W—the Operational Contract Support Plan. These products are alien to most contracting and acquisition professionals, because, traditionally, contracting and acquisition personnel have not played a key role in the production or management of these critical documents. In fact, as stated previously, the GAO recently conducted an audit of 39 OPLANS that required an integrated Annex W and found only four had been produced (GAO, 2011).

It is clear, given the defined content of Annex W, that contracting at the strategic IPE level must be included in all phases of planning and in the production of key APEX products. Annex W must include all of the key elements for mission success and address the three mandatory pillars for integrative success—personnel, platforms, and protocols. The integrated Annex W must include, at a minimum, those elements deemed essential for mission accomplishment, while addressing cost and affordability within the overall OPLAN. The contents include, but are not limited to, the following list:

- Mission statement—from the OPLAN or OPORD;
- Primary and secondary customers;
- Anticipated requirements (in relative time-phase);
- Forces deploying in sequence and duration;
- Operational locations;
- Lead service;
Organization structure (HCA, Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB), etc.);

Supported and supporting relationships;

Command and control relationships;

Procedures for appointing, training, and employing FOOs (field ordering officers), CORs (contacting officer representatives), disbursing agents, GPC (Government Purchase Card) holders;

Procedures for defining, validating, processing, and satisfying customer requirements;

Procedures for budgeting receipt of supplies/services and payments to vendors;

Procedures for closing out contracting operations and redeployment;

Supplies and services anticipated locally, local customs, laws, taxes, SOFAs, host nation support, Acquisition Cross Service Agreements (ACSAs), vendor base, etc.;

Infrastructure, office location, security measures, kits, etc.;

Security requirements and procedures for contracting and contractor personnel;

Standards of support—processing times, turn-around-time, PALT, and reporting;

Specific statutory/regulatory constraints or exemptions, special authorities, and programs;

Relief in place/transfer of authority;

Contractor restrictions (movement, basing, etc., time-phase specific);

Guidance on transferring LOGCAP support to theater support contracts by function and/or phase of the operation;

Special authorities and programs (CERP–COIN);

Post-contract award actions (management, closeout, de-obligation, etc.);

Contractor support, civil augmentation programs (CAP);
Mandated solicitation and contract provisions; and

Human trafficking mandates, indemnity, and MEJA provisions. (Yoder, 2010)

Without a comprehensive planning capability, most missions will be negatively affected. It is clear that the IPE, properly positioned within the planning community, can better create and assess the Annex W capabilities within the three main pillars—personnel, platforms, and protocols—in order to allow for future success.
VII. Conclusions

To date, contracting has not been fully integrated into military planning and execution. Some significant strides have been made to better assimilate contracting at the strategic level, including Jacques Gansler’s report (2007), *Urgent Reform Required*, and the recently published doctrine contained in Joint Publication 4-10—*Operational Contract Support* (CJCS, 2008). However, despite the push towards better integration, including the newly formed JCASO, the Department of Defense (DoD) still lacks a manifest comprehensive planning and executing capability, as evidenced most recently in the final report of the Commission on Wartime Contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan (CWCIA; 2011).

The lack of planning and sound contract integration at the strategic level leads to loss of efficiencies, lack of effectiveness, and, in many cases, outright fraud of the executing participants as highlighted in the CWCIA’s report (2011). The functions of the IPE and mandates for *Operational Contract Support*, including generating a thoroughly vetted Annex W, are so massive that the Services have recently contracted out, or outsourced, some of the requirement (Yoder, 2011). However, outsourcing this critical function may only make matters worse, in that key decisions will be left in the purview of non-government personnel—including decisions of further contracting, along with other possible conflicts of interest and potential for corruption.

The authors contend that the best means to accomplish integration into existing war planning systems is by congressionally mandating, authorizing, and funding (via appropriation) the IPE positions at the flag and senior executive service (SES) levels within Service structures, such as at the JCASO. The authors recommend that JCASO have more authority within GCC and Service staffs—particularly to establish, monitor, and manage Annex W for GCC and the Services within the APEX framework. This will require greater engagement authorities than currently exist. Establishing greater presence and authority at the IPE level.
represents the level of bona fide commitment to solve a long-standing problem that, without correction, will continue to fester and plague service chiefs, military commanders, Congress, and taxpayers. Implementing Phase Zero Contract Operations (PZCO) planning through sound public policy, congressional authorization and funding, and the Services’ commitment to fully integrate contracting within the three pillars—personnel, platforms, and protocols—is the proactive move towards success.
List of References


MacLaren, R. (2012, March). PowerPoint presentation slides delivered to the MN3318 Contingency Contracting class at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA.


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