PGI 207—Acquisition Planning

(Revised October 31, 2019)

PGI 207.1—ACQUISITION PLANS

PGI 207.103 Agency-head responsibilities.

(h) Submit acquisition plans for procurement of conventional ammunition to—

Program Executive Officer, Ammunition
ATTN: SFAE-AMO
Building 171
Picatinny Arsenal, NJ 07806-5000

Telephone: Commercial (973) 724-7101; DSN 880-7101.

PGI 207.105 Contents of written acquisition plans.
For acquisitions covered by DFARS 207.103(d)(i)(A) and (B), correlate the plan to the DoD Future Years Defense Program, applicable budget submissions, and the decision coordinating paper/program memorandum, as appropriate. It is incumbent upon the planner to coordinate the plan with all those who have a responsibility for the development, management, or administration of the acquisition. The acquisition plan should be provided to the contract administration organization to facilitate resource allocation and planning for the evaluation, identification, and management of contractor performance risk.

(a) Acquisition background and objectives.

(1) Statement of need. Include—

(A) Applicability of an acquisition decision document, a milestone decision review, or a service review, as appropriate.

(B) The date approval for operational use has been or will be obtained. If waivers are requested, describe the need for the waivers.

(C) A milestone chart depicting the acquisition objectives.

(D) Milestones for updating the acquisition plan. Indicate when the plan will be updated. Program managers should schedule updates to coincide with DAB reviews and the transition from one phase to another (e.g., system development and demonstration to production and deployment).

(E) Supplies and services. To determine if acquisitions for supplies or services are covered by DFARS 208.7, acquisition officials shall use the AbilityOne
Program Procurement List published by the Committee for Purchase From People Who Are Blind or Severely Disabled at http://www.abilityone.gov/procurement_list/index.html (see FAR Part 8.7).

(3)(i) Life-cycle cost. When acquiring tents or other temporary structures, consider total life-cycle costs in accordance with DFARS 215.101.


(b) Plan of action.

(2) Competition. For information on various approaches that may be used to competitively fulfill DoD requirements, see the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining a Competitive Environment for Supplies and Services in the Department of Defense.

(4) Acquisition considerations. When supplies or services will be acquired by placing an order under a non-DoD contract (e.g., a Federal Supply Schedule contract), regardless of whether the order is placed by DoD or by another agency on behalf of DoD, address the method of ensuring that the order will be consistent with DoD statutory and regulatory requirements applicable to the acquisition and the requirements for use of DoD appropriated funds.

(5) Budgeting and funding. Include specific references to budget line items and program elements, where applicable, estimated production unit cost, and the total cost for remaining production.

(6) Product or service descriptions. For development acquisitions, describe the market research undertaken to identify commercial items, commercial items with modifications, or nondevelopmental items (see FAR Part 10) that could satisfy the acquisition objectives.

(14) Logistics considerations.

(i) Describe the extent of integrated logistics support planning, including total life cycle system management and performance-based logistics. Reference approved plans. See PGI 245.103-73 for information on reporting requirements for Government inventory held by contractors under sustainment contracts in accordance with DoD Manual 4140.01, Volume 6, DoD Supply Chain Materiel Management Procedures: Materiel Returns, Retention, and Disposition.

(ii)(1) Discuss the mission profile, reliability, and maintainability (R&M) program plan, R&M predictions, redundancy, qualified parts lists, parts and material qualification,
R&M requirements imposed on vendors, failure analysis, corrective action and feedback, and R&M design reviews and trade-off studies. Also discuss corrosion prevention and mitigation plans.


(iii) For all acquisitions, see Subpart 227.71 regarding technical data and associated license rights, and Subpart 227.72 regarding computer software and associated license rights. For acquisitions involving major weapon systems and subsystems of major weapon systems, see the additional requirements at DFARS 207.106(S-70).

(iv) See DoD 4120.24-M, Defense Standardization Program (DSP) Policies and Procedures.


(17) Environmental and energy conservation objectives.

(i) Discuss actions taken to ensure either elimination of or authorization to use class I ozone-depleting chemicals and substances (see DFARS Subpart 223.8).

(ii) Ensure compliance with DoDI 4715.23, Integrated Recycling and Solid Waste Management.

(20) Other considerations.

(A) National Technology and Industrial Base. For major defense acquisition programs, address the following (10 U.S.C. 2506)—

(1) An analysis of the capabilities of the national technology and industrial base to develop, produce, maintain, and support such program, including consideration of the following factors related to foreign dependency (10 U.S.C. 2505)—

(i) The availability of essential raw materials, special alloys, composite materials, components, tooling, and production test equipment for the sustained production of systems fully capable of meeting the performance objectives established for those systems; the uninterrupted maintenance and repair of such systems; and the sustained operation of such systems.
(ii) The identification of items specified in paragraph (b)(19)(A)(1)(i) of this section that are available only from sources outside the national technology and industrial base.

(iii) The availability of alternatives for obtaining such items from within the national technology and industrial base if such items become unavailable from sources outside the national technology and industrial base; and an analysis of any military vulnerability that could result from the lack of reasonable alternatives.

(iv) The effects on the national technology and industrial base that result from foreign acquisition of firms in the United States.

(2) Consideration of requirements for efficient manufacture during the design and production of the systems to be procured under the program.

(3) The use of advanced manufacturing technology, processes, and systems during the research and development phase and the production phase of the program.

(4) To the maximum extent practicable, the use of contract solicitations that encourage competing offerors to acquire, for use in the performance of the contract, modern technology, production equipment, and production systems (including hardware and software) that increase the productivity of the offerors and reduce the life-cycle costs.

(5) Methods to encourage investment by U.S. domestic sources in advanced manufacturing technology production equipment and processes through—

(i) Recognition of the contractor’s investment in advanced manufacturing technology production equipment, processes, and organization of work systems that build on workers’ skill and experience, and work force skill development in the development of the contract objective; and

(ii) Increased emphasis in source selection on the efficiency of production.

(6) Expanded use of commercial manufacturing processes rather than processes specified by DoD.

(7) Elimination of barriers to, and facilitation of, the integrated manufacture of commercial items and items being produced under DoD contracts.

(8) Expanded use of commercial items, commercial items with modifications, or to the extent commercial items are not available, nondevelopmental items (see FAR Part 10).
(9) Acquisition of major weapon systems as commercial items (see DFARS Subpart 234.70).

(B) Industrial Capability (IC).

(1) Provide the program's IC strategy that assesses the capability of the U.S. industrial base to achieve identified surge and mobilization goals. If no IC strategy has been developed, provide supporting rationale for this position.

(2) If, in the IC strategy, the development of a detailed IC plan was determined to be applicable, include the plan by text or by reference. If the development of the IC plan was determined not to be applicable, summarize the details of the analysis forming the basis of this decision.

(3) If the program involves peacetime and wartime hardware configurations that are supported by logistics support plans, identify their impact on the IC plan.

(C) Special considerations for acquisition planning for crisis situations. Ensure that the requirements of DoD Instruction 1100.22, Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix, are addressed. Also—

(1) Acquisition planning must consider whether a contract is likely to be performed in crisis situations outside the United States and must develop appropriately detailed measures for inclusion in the contract. Combatant commanders establish operational plans identifying essential services that must continue during crisis. DoDI 1100.22 requires Combatant Commanders to develop contingency plans if they have a reasonable doubt that a contractor will continue to provide essential services during a mobilization or crisis. When planning the acquisition, consider these operational plans and the resources available to carry out these plans.

(2) During acquisition planning, identify which services have been declared so essential that they must continue during a crisis situation. A best practice is to create a separate section, paragraph, line, or other designation in the contract for these essential services so they can be tracked to an option or separate contract line item.

(3) The requirements for the contractor written plan for continuity of essential services and the criteria for assessing the sufficiency of the plan will be determined/tailored for each acquisition of essential services by the contracting officer in coordination with the functional manager. The contractor's written plan, including prices/cost, shall be considered and evaluated in conjunction with the technical evaluation of offers.
(4) Operational-specific contractor policies and requirements resulting from combatant commander “integrated planning” will be described in operation plans (OPLAN), operation orders (OPORD) or separate annexes, and must be incorporated into applicable contracts. The plans may include rules for theater entry, country clearance, use of weapons, living on-base, etc. Therefore, the requiring activity is responsible for obtaining pertinent OPLANs, OPORDs, and annexes (or unclassified extracts) from the affected combatant command or military service element or component and for ensuring that the contract is consistent with the theater OPLAN and OPORD.

(5) Ask the requiring activity to confirm that the appropriate personnel department has determined that inherently Governmental functions are not included in the contract requirements. If contract services will become inherently Governmental during a time of crisis, ensure that the contract states that work will be removed from the contract (temporarily or permanently) upon the occurrence of a triggering event (specified in the contract) or upon notice from the contracting officer that informs the contractor when its responsibility to perform affected duties will stop or restart. The contract should require the contractor to have a plan for restarting performance after the crisis ends.

(6) If the combatant commander’s contingency plan requires military members to replace contractor employees during a crisis or contingency, acquisition planning must consider whether the contract should require the contractor to train military members to do that.

(7) For acquisitions that have or may have some portion of delivery of items or performance in a foreign country, address considerations and requirements set forth in DFARS 225.370, Contracts requiring performance or delivery in a foreign country; 225.371, Contractor personnel supporting U.S. Armed Forces deployed outside the United States; 225.372, Antiterrorism/force protection, and 225.373, Contract administration in support of contingency operations.

(8) Contract administration planning considerations for contracts in support of contingency operations.

   (i) When delegation of contract administration services to a contracting officer located in a different geographic area to support a contract for the delivery of items or performance in a joint operations area will or may occur, address the resourcing of contract administration and oversight personnel, including administrative contracting officers, quality assurance specialists, contract administrators, property administrators, and contracting officers’ representatives.

   (ii) If contract delivery of items or performance in support of contingency operations will or may occur in an austere, uncertain, or hostile environment, address the need for logistics support of contract administration and oversight personnel.
When some portion of contract delivery of items or performance may take place in a contingency area, address pertinent combatant commander or joint force commander requirements and considerations for contract administration. Such requirements will be maintained on the particular combatant commander operational contract support website, http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/pacc/cc/areas_of_responsibility.html.

When contracts are awarded for performance in a contingency area, the head of the contracting activity is responsible for planning to ensure that contingency contracts will be closed in a timely manner considering personnel turnover and preaward, contract administration, and other contracting workload. A plan for reachback support of contract closeouts should be included, if required.

(9) For contracts that will incorporate the clause at DFARS 252.225-7040, Contractor Personnel Supporting U.S. Armed Forces Deployed Outside the United States, in accordance with DFARS 225.371-5(a), or otherwise require accountability for contractor personnel, consider the requirements and resources necessary for both the Government and contractor to keep the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT) current in accordance with the SPOT business rules available at the website provided at http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/ctr_mgt_accountability.html.

(10) For contracts that will incorporate the clause at FAR 52.222-50, Combating Trafficking in Persons, consider the requirements and resources necessary for both the Government and contractor to implement and maintain compliance with Federal and DoD trafficking in persons requirements, including PGI 222.1703.

(D) Software and software maintenance. When acquiring software or software maintenance, see DFARS 212.212.

(E) Procurement Support for Theater Security Cooperation Efforts. When planning procurement support for theater security cooperation efforts (e.g., military exercises/training, base operations, weapons procurement, aviation fuels, construction, or the President's Emergency Plan for Aids Relief projects), planners should be aware that Department of State (DoS) missions (embassies and consulates) do not provide such contracting support; however, these missions can provide support for routine, non-complex services and supplies used by U.S. Government personnel, even if funded with foreign-military-sales case money (see DFARS PGI 225.78). Planners shall take the following steps:

(1) Become familiar with DoS Cable 11 STATE 030953, “Procurement Roles and Responsibilities – General Services Officer and DoD Personnel” (see also DFARS PGI 225.78).

(2) Request general guidance from the combatant-command coordinator on past practices in the particular location for which procurement support is to be requested;
(3) Contact the Defense Attaché Office and/or General Services Officer (normally the embassy/consulate contracting officer) at the DoS mission at least 60 days prior to the requirement, or as soon as practicable, to obtain information on—

(i) Availability of, and procedures associated with, requesting DoS mission procurement support;

(ii) Local sources of supplies and services; and

(iii) Business payment practices to support DoD procurement of specific theater security cooperation procurement requirements.

(4) Ascertain whether payment support is available from the DoS mission.

(5) When DoS contracting support is determined to be unavailable or not allowed, ensure the party of DoD military and/or civilians deploying to support the particular Theater Security Cooperation effort either pre-arranges DoD contracting support through reach-back, if possible, or if necessary, includes a warranted contracting officer, field-ordering officer, or credit-card holder, and, if necessary, a paying agent.

PGI 207.171 Component breakout.

PGI 207.171-4 Procedures.

(1) Responsibility.

(i) Agencies are responsible for ensuring that—

(A) Breakout reviews are performed on components meeting the criteria in DFARS 207.171-3(a) and (b);

(B) Components susceptible to breakout are earmarked for consideration in future acquisitions;

(C) Components earmarked for breakout are considered during requirements determination and appropriate decisions are made; and

(D) Components are broken out when required.

(ii) The program manager or other official responsible for the material program concerned is responsible for breakout selection, review, and decision.
(iii) The contracting officer or buyer and other specialists (e.g., small business specialist, engineering, production, logistics, and maintenance) support the program manager in implementing the breakout program.

(2) **Breakout review and decision.**

(i) A breakout review and decision includes—

(A) An assessment of the potential risks to the end item from possibilities such as delayed delivery and reduced reliability of the component;

(B) A calculation of estimated net cost savings (i.e., estimated acquisition savings less any offsetting costs); and

(C) An analysis of the technical, operational, logistics, and administrative factors involved.

(ii) The decision must be supported by adequate explanatory information, including an assessment by the end item contractor when feasible.

(iii) The following questions should be used in the decision process:

(A) Is the end item contractor likely to do further design or engineering effort on the component?

(B) Is a suitable data package available with rights to use it for Government acquisition? (Note that breakout may be warranted even though competitive acquisition is not possible.)

(C) Can any quality control and reliability problems of the component be resolved without requiring effort by the end item contractor?

(D) Will the component require further technical support (e.g., development of specifications, testing requirements, or quality assurance requirements)? If so, does the Government have the resources (manpower, technical competence, facilities, etc.) to provide such support? Or, can the support be obtained from the end item contractor (even though the component is broken out) or other source?

(E) Will breakout impair logistics support (e.g., by jeopardizing standardization of components)?

(F) Will breakout unduly fragment administration, management, or performance of the end item contract (e.g., by complicating production scheduling or preventing identification of responsibility for end item failure caused by a defective component)?
(G) Can breakout be accomplished without jeopardizing delivery requirements of the end item?

(H) If a decision is made to break out a component, can advance acquisition funds be made available to provide the new source any necessary additional lead time?

(I) Is there a source other than the present manufacturer capable of supplying the component?

(J) Has the component been (or is it going to be) acquired directly by the Government as a support item in the supply system or as Government-furnished equipment in other end items?

(K) Will the financial risks and other responsibilities assumed by the Government after breakout be acceptable?

(L) Will breakout result in substantial net cost savings? Develop estimates of probable savings in cost considering all offsetting costs such as increases in the cost of requirements determination and control, contracting, contract administration, data package purchase, material inspection, qualification or preproduction testing, ground support and test equipment, transportation, security, storage, distribution, and technical support.

(iv) If answers to the questions reveal conditions unfavorable to breakout, the program manager should explore whether the unfavorable conditions can be eliminated. For example, where adequate technical support is not available from Government resources, consider contracting for the necessary services from the end item contractor or other qualified source.

(3) Records.

(i) The contracting activity shall maintain records on components reviewed for breakout. Records should evidence whether the components—

(A) Have no potential for breakout;

(B) Have been earmarked as potential breakout candidates; or

(C) Have been, or will be, broken out.

(ii) The program manager or other designated official must sign the records.

(iii) Records must reflect the facts and conditions of the case, including any assessment by the contractor, and the basis for the decision. The records must contain the
assessments, calculations, and analyses discussed in paragraph 2 of this section, including the trade-off analysis between savings and increased risk to the Government because of responsibility for Government-furnished equipment.
PGI 216—Types of Contracts

PGI 216.4—INCENTIVE CONTRACTS

PGI 216.401 General.

(c) Incentive contracts. DoD has established the Award and Incentive Fees Community of Practice (CoP) under the leadership of the Defense Acquisition University (DAU). The CoP serves as the repository for all related materials including policy information, related training courses, examples of good award fee arrangements, and other supporting resources. The CoP is available on the DAU Acquisition Community Connection at https://acc.dau.mil/awardandincentivefees. Additional information can be found on the MAX website maintained by the Office of Management and Budget at: https://max.omb.gov.

(e) Award-fee contracts.

(i) It is DoD policy to utilize objective criteria, whenever possible, to measure contract performance. In cases where an award-fee contract must be used due to lack of objective criteria, the contracting officer shall consult with the program manager and the fee determining official when developing the award-fee plan. Award-fee criteria shall be linked directly to contract cost, schedule, and performance outcomes objectives.

(ii) Award fees must be tied to identifiable interim outcomes, discrete events or milestones, as much as possible. Examples of such interim milestones include timely completion of preliminary design review, critical design review, and successful system demonstration. In situations where there may be no identifiable milestone for a year or more, consideration should be given to apportioning some of the award fee pool for a predetermined interim period of time based on assessing progress toward milestones. In any case, award fee provisions must clearly explain how a contractor’s performance will be evaluated.

(iii) FAR 16.401(d) requires a determination and findings (D&F) to be completed for all incentive- and award-fee contracts, justifying that the use of this type of contract is in the best interest of the Government. The D&F for award-fee contracts shall be signed by the head of the contracting activity or designee no lower than one level below the head of the contracting activity. The D&F for all other incentive contracts may be signed at one level above the contracting officer. This authority may not be further delegated.

(iv) The head of the contracting activity for each defense agency shall retain the D&F for (a) all acquisition category (ACAT) I or II) programs, and (b) all non-ACAT I or II contracts with an estimated value of $50 million or more. The head of the contracting activity shall forward the D&Fs for ACAT I programs to Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy/Contract Policy and International Policy directorate (DPAP/CPIC) within 1 month of the end of the quarter. Copies of D&Fs on all contracts shall also be included in the contract file.

PGI 216.402 Application of predetermined, formula-type incentives.
PGI 216.402-2 Technical performance incentives.

(2) Contractor performance incentives should relate to specific performance areas of milestones, such as delivery or test schedules, quality controls, maintenance requirements, and achievement of design specification requirements for reliability and maintainability.

PGI 216.403 Fixed-price incentive contracts.

PGI 216.403-1 Fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts.

(1) Use of FPIF contract.

(i) Not mandatory. DFARS 216.403-1(b)(1) directs the contracting officer to give particular consideration to the use of fixed-price incentive (firm target) (FPIF) contracts, especially for acquisitions moving from development to production. DFARS does not mandate the use of FPIF for initial production and each acquisition situation must be evaluated in terms of the degree and nature of the risk presented in order to select the proper contract type.

(ii) Considerations. Volume 4, chapter 1, of the Contract Pricing Reference Guide provides a detailed discussion of the considerations involved in selecting the proper contract type. For example:

(A) It is not in the Government’s best interest to use FPIF when the cost risk is so great that establishing a ceiling price is unrealistic.

(B) It is also not in the Government’s best interest to use firm-fixed-price (FFP) contracts on production programs until costs have become stable. Therefore, FPIF contracts should be considered in production and sole source follow-on programs where actual costs on prior FFP contracts have varied by more than 3-4 percent from the costs considered negotiated. Contracting officers are reminded that actual costs on prior contracts for the same item or essentially the same item, regardless of contract type or data reporting requirements of the prior contract, are cost and pricing data on the pending contract, and must be obtained from the contractor on production programs when certified cost or pricing data are required.

(C) For sole source major systems procurements, contracting officers should utilize FPIF contracts instead of FFP contracts unless the reasons for significant variation are well understood and actions have been taken to ensure that significant variation will not recur. In addition, when options are included as described in PGI 217.202(2), the use of FPIF contracts is both highly recommended and encouraged, because both parties will be assuming more risk in pricing multiple years of requirements.
(2) **Incentive arrangement.** DFARS 216.403-1(b)(2) directs the contracting officer to pay particular attention to share lines and ceiling prices for fixed-price incentive (firm target) contracts, with 120 percent ceiling and a 50/50 share ratio as the point of departure for establishing the incentive arrangement. While DFARS does not mandate the use of these share ratios or ceiling percentage, it is not unreasonable to expect that upon entering into production, risks have been mitigated to the point that the DFARS recommended point of departure for an FPIF incentive arrangement would be normal.

(3) **Analyzing risk.**

(i) **Quantification of risk.**

(A) The first step is establishing a target cost for which the probability of an underrun and overrun are considered equal and therefore, the risks and rewards are shared equally, hence the 50/50 share is the point of departure. Equally important is determining that the contractor has a high probability of being able to accomplish the effort within a ceiling percentage of 120 percent. In accomplishing both these steps, the analysis of risk is essential.

(B) Too often, risk is evaluated only in general terms without attempting to quantify the risk posed by the various elements of cost. Also, a contracting officer may incorrectly fall back on the share ratios and ceiling percentages negotiated on prior contracts or other programs, without examining the specific risks.

(C) Whether being used to select the proper contract type or establishing share lines and ceiling price on an FPIF contract, the analysis of risk as it pertains to the prime contractor is key. From a contractor’s perspective, all risks, including technical and schedule risk, have financial ramifications. Technical and schedule risks, if realized, generally translate into increased effort, which means increased cost. Therefore, all risk can be translated into cost risk and quantified. Risk always has two components that must be considered in the quantification: the magnitude of the impact and the probability that it will occur.

(D) When cost risk is quantified, it is much easier to establish a reasonable ceiling percentage. The ceiling percentage is applicable to the target cost on the prime contract. It is important to understand the degree of risk that various cost elements pose in relation to that target cost. A discussion of the major cost elements and the risk implications follows in paragraphs (3)(ii) through (iv) of this section.

(ii) **Subcontracts and material cost and risk.**

(A) In many prime contractors’ contracts, a substantial amount of risk is borne by subcontractors, not the prime contractor, via negotiated firm-fixed-price (FFP)
subcontracts. In the case of FFP subcontracts, the subcontractor is obligated to deliver at the negotiated price. The risk to the prime contractor is the supplier’s failure to perform or perform on time. Generally, that risk is considered to be low by both the prime and the subcontractor as evidenced by the FFP contract type. In addition, the prime contractor will normally have priced effort for material management or subcontract administration to ensure timely performance on the part of the suppliers. This effort may be bid directly or indirectly (e.g., as part of an overhead expense) depending on the contractor’s accounting practices.

(B) The impact of negotiated FFP subcontracts on the prime contractor’s risk can be significant. A prime contract with a 120 percent ceiling price provides overrun protection to the prime contractor equal to 20 percent of the target cost on the contract. However, if FFP subcontracts represent half of the total contract cost, then half of the target cost is subject to little or no cost risk on the part of the prime contractor. Therefore, the overrun protection provided by 20 percent of the target cost is really closer to 40 percent protection of the prime’s cost that is truly at risk to the prime contractor, which likely is significantly overstated. Thus, a ceiling price less than 120 percent in this risk situation would be more appropriate.

(C) For subcontracts that have not yet been negotiated between the prime and subcontractor at the time of negotiation of the prime contract, the degree of risk is essentially limited to the difference between the price proposed by the subcontractor and the subcontract value included in the prime contractor’s proposal.

(D) For subcontracts that are not FFP, the risk to the prime is based on the risk represented by the subcontractors’ contractual relationship with the prime. If the subcontract is FPIF and has a 50/50 share ratio and 120 percent ceiling, the prime’s risk is 50 percent of each dollar of overrun up to the ceiling amount. An analysis of the subcontractor’s risk would be necessary to determine the probability of reaching the ceiling price.

(iii) Direct labor cost and risk.

(A) The risk in direct labor is in the hours needed to perform the effort and the risk in the labor rates paid to employees. There is generally little risk in the direct labor rates. However, there are various levels of risk in the direct labor hours needed by the prime contractor to accomplish the contract requirements. This risk can be driven by a number of factors including technical complexity, schedule constraints, or availability of personnel, parts, or tooling. Risks vary by task and the key is to identify the major tasks and assess the “what if” impact at the total contract cost level.

(B) Schedule is often correctly cited as a risk factor, but it is important to understand and quantify the probability and impact of a potential schedule slip. Generally, any schedule slip can only affect the prime contractor’s in-house cost. Therefore, any
schedule impact should be assessed on the impact it would have on the prime contractor’s performance of its tasks.

(C) However, it is wrong to assume the worst-case scenario that a schedule delay results in an extension of the entire prime contractor workforce for the period of the delay. A responsible contractor will take steps to minimize both the delay and the impact of that delay. For instance, a production schedule assumes an optimal sequencing of tasks which presumes the timely arrival and availability of parts from suppliers or other in-house sources. A delay in receiving parts as planned could require a resequencing of tasks and could adversely affect the efficiency of performing a number of tasks, but it will not cause the entire workforce to be idle during the delay.

(iv) **Indirect (e.g., overhead) cost and risk.** Overhead and other indirect costs (e.g., general and administrative expense) can represent a significant portion of the prime contractor’s in-house cost. Indirect expense (hereafter referred to as overhead) poses potential cost growth risk or the opportunity for cost reduction from the following two perspectives:

(A) **Actual overhead rate.** (1) First, the actual overhead rate could be different than that proposed. Proposed overhead rates, even those covered by a forward pricing rate agreement, are based on forecasts of overhead expenses and the bases to which they are applied. The final overhead rate that is actually applied (charged) to a contract will be based on the actual overhead expenses and the actual base, each of which could be considerably different than estimated. The net effect could be a higher or lower overhead rate than estimated.

(2) In general, the risk in an overhead rate tends to be driven more by fluctuations in the base than in the expenses. This is because overhead expenses are made up of expenses that consist of “fixed” (e.g., depreciation) and variable (e.g., fringe benefits) in nature. When the actual base turns out to be lower than the estimated base, the fixed costs are spread over a smaller base resulting in a higher overhead rate. In general, if the actual base is greater than estimated, a lower overhead rate will result.

(3) In assessing this risk, the contracting officer should consider the contractor’s ability to predict overhead rates based on comparing proposed versus actual rates for prior years. In making this comparison, it is important to do so in a manner consistent with the proposal being reviewed. For instance, if the majority of overhead costs on the proposal being reviewed occur two years in the future, the comparison should look at the contractor’s accuracy in predicting overhead rates two years in advance. For example, in looking at the 2009 actual overhead rate, what did the contractor propose for 2009 in its 2007 forward pricing rate proposal?
(B) *Actual base cost.* If the actual base cost on the contract (e.g., direct labor dollars) is different than that proposed, the contract will be charged overhead costs according to the actual base costs on that contract. If the contractor overruns direct labor, even if the actual labor overhead rate was the same as proposed, that rate would be applied to a higher base resulting in increased overhead dollars on that contract. The opposite would be true if the contractor underruns direct labor on the contract. Since this aspect of risk is tied to the base cost on the contract, the risk is the same as it is for those base costs (e.g., direct labor, material).

**PGI 216.403-2 Fixed-price incentive (successive targets) contracts.**

The formula specified in FAR 16.403-2(a)(1)(iii) does not apply for the life of the contract. It is used to fix the firm target profit for the contract. To provide an incentive consistent with the circumstances, the formula should reflect the relative risk involved in establishing an incentive arrangement where cost and pricing information were not sufficient to permit the negotiation of firm targets at the outset.

**PGI 216.405 Cost-reimbursement incentive contracts.**

**PGI 216.405-1 Cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts.**

Give appropriate weight to basic acquisition objectives in negotiating the range of fee and the fee adjustment formula. For example—

1. In an initial product development contract, it may be appropriate to provide for relatively small adjustments in fee tied to the cost incentive feature, but provide for significant adjustments if the contractor meets or surpasses performance targets; and

2. In subsequent development and test contracts, it may be appropriate to negotiate an incentive formula tied primarily to the contractor's success in controlling costs.

**PGI 216.405-2 Cost-plus-award-fee contracts.**

1. Although weighted guidelines do not apply per DFARS 216.405-2(3)(ii) when definitizing a contract action, the contracting officer shall, nevertheless, separately assess and document the reduced cost risk on the contract for—
   
   (i) The period up to the date of definitization; as well as
   
   (ii) The remaining period of performance (see DFARS 217.7404-6).

2. Normally, award fee is not earned when the fee-determining official has determined that contractor performance has been submarginal or unsatisfactory.
(3) The basis for all award fee determinations shall be documented in the contract file.

(4) The cost-plus-award-fee contract is also suitable for level of effort contracts where mission feasibility is established but measurement of achievement must be by subjective evaluation rather than objective measurement. See Table 16-1, Performance Evaluation Criteria, for sample performance evaluation criteria and Table 16-2, Contractor Performance Evaluation Report, for a sample evaluation report.

(5) The contracting activity may—

   (i) Establish a board to—

       (A) Evaluate the contractor’s performance; and

       (B) Determine the amount of the award or recommend an amount to the contracting officer; and

   (ii) Afford the contractor an opportunity to present information on its own behalf.

PGI 216.470 Other applications of award fees.

The “award amount” portion of the fee may be used in other types of contracts under the following conditions:

(1) The Government wishes to motivate and reward a contractor for—

   (i) Purchase of capital assets (including machine tools) manufactured in the United States, on major defense acquisition programs; or

   (ii) Management performance in areas which cannot be measured objectively and where normal incentive provisions cannot be used. For example, logistics support, quality, timeliness, ingenuity, and cost effectiveness are areas under the control of management which may be susceptible only to subjective measurement and evaluation.

(2) The “base fee” (fixed amount portion) is not used.

(3) The chief of the contracting office approves the use of the “award amount.”

(4) An award review board and procedures are established for conduct of the evaluation.

(5) The administrative costs of evaluation do not exceed the expected benefits.
### TABLE 16-1, PERFORMANCE EVALUATION CRITERIA

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Time of Delivery.</th>
<th>Submarginal</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(A-1)</td>
<td>Adherence to plan schedule.</td>
<td>Consistently late on 20% plans</td>
<td>Late on 10% plans w/o prior agreement</td>
<td>Occasional plan late w/o justification.</td>
<td>Meets plan schedule.</td>
<td>Delivers all plans on schedule &amp; meets prod. Change requirements on schedule</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A-2)</td>
<td>Action on Anticipated delays.</td>
<td>Does not expose changes or resolve them as soon as recognized.</td>
<td>Exposes changes but is dilatory in resolution on plans.</td>
<td>Anticipates changes, advise Shipyard but misses completion of design plans 10%.</td>
<td>Keeps Yard posted on delays, resolves independently on plans.</td>
<td>Anticipates in good time, advises Shipyard, resolves independently and meets production requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(A-3)</td>
<td>Plan Maintenance.</td>
<td>Does not complete interrelated systems studies concurrently.</td>
<td>System studies completed but constr. Plan changes delayed.</td>
<td>Major work plans coordinated in time to meet production schedules.</td>
<td>Design changes from studies and interrelated plant issued in time to meet product schedules.</td>
<td>Design changes, studies resolved and test data issued ahead of production requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B</th>
<th>Quality of Work.</th>
<th>Submarginal</th>
<th>Marginal</th>
<th>Good</th>
<th>Very Good</th>
<th>Excellent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(B-1)</td>
<td>Work Appearance.</td>
<td>25% dwgs. Not compatible with Shipyard repro. processes and use.</td>
<td>20% not compatible with Shipyard repro. processes and use.</td>
<td>10% not compatible with Shipyard repro. processes and use.</td>
<td>0% dwgs prepared by Des. Agent not compatible with Shipyard repro. processes and use.</td>
<td>0% dwgs. Presented incl. Des. Agent, vendors, subcontr. Not compatible with Shipyard repro processes and use.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B-2)</td>
<td>Thoroughness and Accuracy of Work.</td>
<td>Is brief on plans tending to leave questionable situations for Shipyard to resolve.</td>
<td>Has followed guidance, type and standard dwgs.</td>
<td>Has followed guidance, type and standard dwgs. Questioning and resolving doubtful areas.</td>
<td>Work complete with notes and thorough explanations for anticipated questionable areas.</td>
<td>Work of highest caliber incorporating all pertinent data required including related activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(B-3)</td>
<td>Engineering Competence.</td>
<td>Tendency to follow past practice with no variation to meet reqnts. job in hand.</td>
<td>Adequate engrg. To use &amp; adapt existing designs to suit job on hand for routine work.</td>
<td>Engineered to satisfy specs., guidance plans and material provided.</td>
<td>Displays excellent knowledge of constr. Reqtns. considering systems aspect, cost, shop capabilities and future planning in Design.</td>
<td>Exceptional knowledge of Naval shipwork &amp; adaptability to work process incorporating knowledge of future planning in Design.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### PGI 216—Types of Contracts

#### B Quality of Work (Cont’d)

| (B-4) | (B-5)   |  |  | procurement problems. |  |
|-------|---------|  |  | Maintains independent contact with all associated activities, keeping them informed to produce compatible design with little assistance for Yard. | Maintains expert contact, keeping Yard informed, obtaining info from equip, supplies w/o prompting of Shipyard. |
| Liaison Effectiveness | Indifferent to requirements of associated activities, related systems, and Shipyard advice. | Satisfactory but dependent on Shipyard of force resolution of problems without constructive recommendations to subcontr. or vendors. | Maintains normal contract with associated activities depending on Shipyard for problems requiring military resolution. |  |  |

#### C Effectiveness in Controlling and/or Reducing Costs

| (C-1) | (C-2) | (C-3) |  |  |
|-------|-------|-------|  |  |
| Utilization of Personnel | Planning of work left to designers on drafting boards. | Expenditures not controlled for services. | Does not meet cost estimate for original work or changes 30% time. |  |  |
|  | Supervision sets & reviews goals for designers. | Expenditures reviewed occasionally by supervision. | Does not meet cost estimate for original work or changes 20% time. | Exceeds original est. on change orders 10% time and meets original design costs. | Exceeds original est. on changing orders 5% time. |  |  |
|  | System planning by supervisory, personnel, studies checked by engineers. | Direct charges set & accounted for on each work package. |  | No cost overruns on original estimates absorbs service demands by Shipyard. |  |  |
|  | Design parameters established by system engineers & held in design plans. | Provides services as part of normal design function w/o extra charges. |  |  | Never exceeds estimates of original package or change orders. |  |  |
### TABLE 16-2, CONTRACTOR PERFORMANCE EVALUATION REPORT

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ratings</th>
<th>Period of ________________________________</th>
<th>Contract Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Excellent</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very Good</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submarginal</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contractor</th>
<th>Date of Report</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PNS Technical Monitor/s</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CATEGORY</th>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>RATING</th>
<th>ITEM FACTOR</th>
<th>EVALUATION RATING</th>
<th>CATEGORY FACTOR</th>
<th>EFFICIENCY RATING</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>TIME OF DELIVERY</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-1 Adherence to Plan</td>
<td>_______ x .40 = _______</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Schedule</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-2 Action on Anticipated</td>
<td>_______ x .30 = _______</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Delays</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>A-3 Plan Maintenance</td>
<td>_______ x .30 = _______</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Item Weighed Rating</td>
<td>_______ x .40 = _______</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>QUALITY OF WORK</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B-1 Work</td>
<td>_______ x .15 = _______</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Appearance</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B-2 Thoroughness and</td>
<td>_______ x .30 = _______</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Accuracy of Work</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B-3 Engineering</td>
<td>_______ x .20 = _______</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Competence</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>B-4 Liaison</td>
<td>_______ x .15 = _______</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
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<td></td>
<td>B-5 Independence and</td>
<td>_______ x .15 = _______</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Initiative</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total Item Weighed Rating</td>
<td>_______ x .40 = _______</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## C - EFFECTIVENESS IN CONTROLLING AND/OR REDUCING COSTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Item</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Weight (0.30)</th>
<th>Result</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>C-1</td>
<td>Utilization of Personnel</td>
<td>______</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-2</td>
<td>Control of all Direct Charges Other than Labor</td>
<td>______</td>
<td>.30</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C-3</td>
<td>Performance to Cost Estimate</td>
<td>______</td>
<td>.40</td>
<td>______</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total Item Weighed Rating**

\[ \text{Total Item Weighed Rating} = \text{Rating} \times 0.30 \]

**Total Weight Rating**

\[ \text{Total Weight Rating} = \text{Total Item Weighed Rating} \times 0.30 \]

**Rated by:** _______________________________________________

**Signature(s):** _____________________________________________

**NOTE:** Provide supporting data and/or justification for below average or outstanding item ratings.