This report is a product of the Defense Science Board (DSB).

The DSB is a Federal Advisory Committee established to provide independent advice to the Secretary of Defense. Statements, opinions, conclusions and recommendations in this report do not necessarily represent the official position of the Department of Defense.

This report is unclassified.
MEMORANDUM FOR UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS


I am pleased to forward the final report of the Defense Science Board task force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within the Department of Defense (DoD). This task force was asked by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to consider the institutional hurdles to effectively constitute and use capabilities for stability operations as called for in the 2004 Defense Science Board Report on Transition to and from Hostilities and the subsequent draft Directive to implement the recommendations of the report.

The task force concludes that there is room for improvement in the Department to embrace stability operations as a core activity. Even though stability operations are as pervasive as combat operations across the Department, high level leadership and management is currently needed to accelerate transformation. An important first step, as recommended in the report, is to sign Draft Directive 3000, with minor modification if needed.

The task force has set forth a number of other recommendations in the areas of advocacy, readiness, communication, private sector support, and civil affairs, that it sees as necessary to accelerate transformation to establish stability operations on par with combat operations as well as to institutionalize stability operations within the Department.

I endorse the task force’s recommendations and encourage you to review the report.

William Schneider, Jr.
Chairman
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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD


Enclosed is the final report of the Defense Science Board task force on Institutionalizing Stability Operations within the Department of Defense (DoD). This task force was asked to consider the institutional hurdles to effectively constitute and use the capabilities for stability operations called for in the 2004 Defense Science Board Report on Transition to and from Hostilities and the subsequent draft Directive to implement the recommendations of the report.

In the last year there has been noticeable progress within the Department toward explicit embrace of stability operations as a core activity of DoD on par with combat operations; although there is still a long way to go. In that light, our recommendations should be viewed as accelerants of the process. Unfortunately, during the last year the progress of other elements of the Government has been less fulsome. Thus, we urge that the Department act with dispatch to accelerate the transformation of its own capabilities, while concurrently continuing to give full support to the evolution of capabilities elsewhere within the Government.

Even though stability operations are as pervasive as combat operations across the Department, high level leadership and management is currently needed to accelerate transformation. The most important agent of change is the Secretary of Defense. Ideally the Secretary, with the Deputy Secretary, should, in effect, act as Executive Agent for change of the magnitude envisioned. If the Secretary and Deputy Secretary seek additional support beyond that to be provided by the OSD Staff and the Joint Staff, appointing an Executive Agent will accelerate change, and the Secretary of the Army is a possible choice in light of the Army’s dominant albeit not exclusive role in stability operations.

We recommend the following actions as means to accelerate transformation toward stability operations:

- Sign the Draft Directive 3000, with minor modification if needed.
- Establish high level and properly resourced advocates for stability operations both within OSD and the Joint Staff.
- Extend and improve our readiness system to realistically encompass stability operations, provide metrics for management, and provide incentive for change.
We also see three structural improvements as being necessary to institutionalize stability operations:

- Establish an organization to effectively exploit our 'fifth force provider'— the private sector.
- Strengthen our ability to communicate DoD's intentions and actions to the public in the foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operations.
- Recruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs.

In summary, we urge that the Secretary be forceful and frequent in getting the message out that stability operations is a core mission for the Department in parallel with combat operations; continue to focus his attention on our readiness for conducting stability operations with the same scrutiny as he does for conducting combat operations; and make a special effort to the support available to him from the high level advocates for stability operations on his staff and on the Joint Staff. The expressed and perceived attitude of the Secretary is a key factor in accelerating transformation in this regard.

Dr. Craig Fields
Task Force Chairman
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INTRODUCTION AND BOTTOM LINE

We were asked to consider the institutional hurdles, to effectively constitute and use the capabilities for stability operations called for in the 2004 Defense Science Board (DSB) Report on Transition to and from Hostilities and the subsequent draft Directive to implement the recommendations of the report. As in that report, we are defining "stability operations" broadly to include security, transition, counterinsurgency, peacemaking and the other operations needed to deal with irregular security challenges.

We saw no need to revise the 2004 report, despite the passage of a year since it was submitted to the Department of Defense (DoD). Further, with one possible minor change detailed below, we believe the draft Directive is correct, timely and should be signed as soon as possible.

We have been parsimonious in making recommendations for organizational change, insofar as reorganization of an institution typically is fractious and disruptive. Further, we believe our recommendations must transcend the incumbents, while being mindful of their capabilities and inclinations. Finally, we have given priority to recommendations that should, taken together, be substantially worrisome to our adversaries, extremist militias.

Further, wherever possible we have sought to maintain unity of our institutional arrangements underpinning combat operations and stability operations. The line between the two is often not clear and constantly shifting, and further we cannot afford to maintain two separate forces, one dedicated to major combat, the other to stability operations.

In the last year there has been noticeable progress within the Department toward explicit embrace of stability operations as a core activity of DoD on par with combat operations; although there is still
a long way to go. In that light, our recommendations should be viewed as accelerants of the process.

Unfortunately, during the last year the progress of other organs of Government has been less fulsome, and we cannot have confidence in the speed with which changes in other departments and agencies outside DoD will take place. Thus we urge that the Department act with dispatch to accelerate the transformation of its own capabilities, while concurrently continuing to give full support to the evolution of capabilities elsewhere within the Government.
This report is, in effect, an addendum to the much more complete and substantial study ‘Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study on Transition To and From Hostilities’ that was presented to the Secretary of Defense on 31 August 2004. The earlier report made recommendations to not only the Department of Defense, but also to the Department of State, the National Security Council, and other organs of the Executive Branch. In the year past the Department of Defense has made modest progress toward implementing the recommendations of the 2004 report, although there is much more to do. The rest of the Executive Branch has made very little progress toward the development of operational capabilities applicable to stability operations; and the Congress has not provided Departments other than Defense with appropriate authorities and resources in order to develop those capabilities. We are particularly concerned that the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) in the Department of State is not getting anywhere near the level of resources and authority needed.

This current report recommends that Defense take an active role and seek resources for critical areas wherein legislated authorities
and responsibilities overlap among Departments, e.g. in communication with the indigenous population of an area, in applying civil skills, and in mobilizing the commercial sector both in the United States and the regions in which we might operate. We believe that DoD should take these steps regardless of the pace of progress in other agencies. However if they are not complemented by growth of capabilities in other agencies, the overall U.S. ability to conduct successful stability operations will be far less than it should be.

While it is not our intention to summarize and recount all the elements of the 2004 Defense Science Board study on Transition to and from Hostilities, it is worth noting the formidable hindrances we face, other than organization, to achieving effective stabilization operations -- although advocacy and incentives can make a significant difference.

Within DoD and the Intelligence Community, to succeed at stability operations: there will be substantial cost of personnel, operations, and training; a requirement for a change in culture in parts of DoD; and in particular with regard to intelligence, we will need a decade to bolster our intelligence capabilities.

Within the U.S. Government, there will need to be a change in the culture of cabinet departments, other than DoD, which are largely focused on policy. Congress will need to overcome reluctance to authorize and appropriate -- with adequate flexibility -- the funds required, reflecting in part a lack of public acceptance of supporting large scale standing contingency capabilities other than in DoD. Incidentally, industry cannot swiftly surge to provide capabilities as a possible substitute for large scale standing contingency capabilities. The nature of the inter-agency process has to change to be more than coordination; to be an orchestration of all the instruments of U.S. power. Where there is separation of statutory authorities from capabilities and resources, we will need to reconcile those differences without undue acrimony.

With regard to foreign governments or the United Nations, there is a question of alignment of their international policy goals with U.S.
foreign policy goals. Those partners will need to face up to the cost of maintaining contingency capabilities, of training with the United States and each other, and of operations. The United States will need to face up to security issues vis-à-vis sharing sensitive plans and other information.

With regard to Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) the challenge is to establish trust and effective working relationships with organizations that are disinclined to work closely with DoD.

These factors are highlighted because while organization changes within DoD can doubtless facilitate progress within the Department, from a National perspective there is much else besides.
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING
STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DoD

Briefings and Meetings

- Mr. James Thomas, DASD Policy (Resources and Plans)
- Mr. Joe Binkert, Deputy Director, Defense Reconstruction Office, Mr. Mike Dineley, OSD Director Administration and Management
- RDML Frank Pandolfe, JCS J-5 Deputy Director for Strategy and Policy
- J-3 Readiness Division: LtCol Wawrzynski, LtCol Burgin, Major Farrell
- Hon. Thomas O’Connel, ASD (SODIC) and Mr. Robert Andrews, PDASD (SODIC)
- Dr. Jeff Nadaner, DASD Policy (Stability Operations)
- Dr. Paul Mayberry, DUSD (P&R)
- J-7: COL Nathan Slate (Exercise Don Grant (Operational War Plans Division), CAPT Jeff Miller and COL Doug Merrison (Training Division); LtCol Edward McKinnon (Joint Concepts and Experimentation)
- Task Force meeting September 2, 2005
  - Dr. Jeff Nadaner, DASD Policy (Stability Operations)
  - Hon. Ryan Henry, PDUSD (Policy)
- Mr. Richard Milnes, Deputy Director, DSCA
- Amy LaFleur, J-8 War Gaming Division
- LTG James Lovelace, Army G-3; MG Keith Dayton, Army G-35, Director, Strategy, Plans, Policy
- BG Sandy Davidson, Former Commander 350th Civil Affairs Command
- Mr. Donnice Smith, Consultant to SecDef
- NDU: Dr. Hans Binnendijk, Mr. Franklin Kramer, Dr. James Schear
- Amb. Carlos Pascual, Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, DOS
- JFCOM-J-8-J-9: Mr. David Ozolik, J-9 Executive Director Joint Futures Lab, Janet Tucker, J-9 Strategic Communications, Rapelle Hill, J-9 Business Operations, Hannah Francis, J-83 Resources
- Task Force meeting September 9, 2005
  - Hon. Thomas O’Connel, ASD (SODIC)
  - AFSC Teleconference: COL Cartwright, Deputy Commander, Mr. Scott Weiler - Acting Deputy to the Commander, Mr. James Locht - Director of Contracting, Mr. Mike Hutchinson - Deputy Director for Contracting, Mr. Kirk Schubing - Acting Deputy, G4, Mr. Ricksy Peer - Chief Plans & Initiatives, G7, Mr. Bruce Daasch - Support Operations, G3
  - AMC Teleconference: MG Stevenson - Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G3; Mr. Sue Baker - Principal Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, G3; Mr. Greg Key - Director for Future Operations, G3; Mr. Niels Bannen - Director for Current Operations, G3; Mr. Jeff Parsons - Command Contracting
  - LTG Walter Sharp, Director Joint Staff
  - Hon. Tom Hall, ASD (Reserve Affairs), Dr. Craig Duching, PDASD (RA)
  - ADM Edmund Giambastiani, VCJSO
  - Hon. Ken Keog, USD (AT&L)
  - Mr. Ray Dubois, Special Assistant, Secretary of the Army, Secretary
  - Dr. Barbara Sablin, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
  - Col Clarke Lehr, USMC and LtCol Krug Kimmonth, USMCOR, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Capabilities Development Directorate, Fins and Manpower Integration Division
  - PACOM teleconference: Colonel Richard Bliss, J-5, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bridgford, J-71, Lieutenant Colonel John Cardenas, J-72, Commander Jeff Gilbreth, J-54, Lieutenant Colonel Laurence Howl, J-54; Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Jackson, J-712, Major John Martin, J-714; Mr. Larry Dysten, J-711
  - Hon. Eric Edelman, USD (Policy)

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FOREIGN STABILITY OPERATIONS ARE A CORE ACTIVITY FOR DoD

- We have engaged in foreign stability operations for a long time
  - 1846: Major General Winfield Scott’s forces occupied and administered Mexico City
- We frequently engage in stability operations
  - Every two years, on average, since the end of the Cold War
- We engage in stability operations more frequently than combat operations
  - Most combat operations are followed by stability operations
  - Some stability operations are not preceded by combat operations, e.g. responding to the collapse of a failed state
- Stability operations cost more than combat operations
  - Since the end of the Cold War, 80% of our supplemental funds for operations have been for stability operations and 20% have been for combat operations
- We have not yet learned to use technology to reduce the cost of stability operations as we have for combat operations
  - But technology has significantly amplified the capabilities of insurgents to disrupt U.S. operations

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Domestic Stability Operations Are A Core Activity For DoD

- Providing support for domestic civil authorities in the face of natural disaster
  - Hurricanes, floods, earthquakes, fires
  - Industrial accidents
    - Chemical waste
    - Hazardous materials
    - Nuclear power plants & materials
    - Electric power outages
- Providing support for civil authorities in the face of malicious, e.g. terrorist, attacks
  - Biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear

There are parallels between the capabilities required for DoD to succeed at foreign stability operations and domestic stability operations. Both require anticipation of the likely and important possibilities, and identification of DoD objectives should those possibilities arise. Both require careful planning and mission rehearsal, gaming, and exercises. Both require partnership in the aforementioned with many other entities. Both require the availability of trained personnel and equipment that differs from the requirements for combat operations. Both require a foundation of information for both planning and execution, information that must be gathered long in advance and cannot be accessed at the last moment.

There are differences, of course, the most obvious being with regard to insurgency in foreign stability operations, which is oftentimes of greater intensity and duration, and sponsored by foreign powers; in contrast to looting, riots and general crime of more modest magnitude sometimes accompanying domestic disasters.
We have yet to compose a sizing concept regarding our preparation for concurrent domestic stability operations, foreign stability operations and foreign combat operations; all of which will call upon some of the same resource base. Further, there may be a causal link among those kinds of events, e.g. a foreign stability operation triggering a domestic terrorist attack and accompanying domestic stability operation. In composing a sizing concept we need to be careful with our accounting: we must avoid 'double counting' resources that may be concurrently needed by the Secretary of Defense abroad and, e.g. a State Governor in the United States. Considering these questions is beyond the scope of the current study, and they are raised to underscore the central nature of stability operations for DoD.
Accelerating Transformation Toward Stability Operations —Bottom Line (1 of 2)

- Even though stability operations are as pervasive as combat operations across the Department, high level leadership and management is currently needed to accelerate transformation
  - Relevant elements of the Department already have the statutory authority and responsibility – if not resources and skills – for stability operations
  - However, with the need for massive cultural change and resource allocation, high level advocacy is required to accelerate transformation
- The most important agent of change is the Secretary of Defense
  - The perceived attitude of the Secretary vis-à-vis stability operations is the single most important factor
- Draft Directive 3000 should be signed, with minor modification if needed
- We need high level and properly resourced advocates for stability operations both within OSD and the Joint Staff
- We must extend and improve our readiness system to realistically encompass stability operations, provide metrics for management, and provide incentive for change

We urge that the Secretary: be forceful and frequent in getting the message out that stability operations is a core mission for the Department in parallel with combat operations; continue to focus his attention on our readiness for conducting stability operations with the same scrutiny as he does for conducting combat operations; and make a special effort to make use of the support available to him from the high level advocates for stability operations on his OSD staff and on the Joint Staff. The expressed and perceived attitude of the Secretary is the most important factor in accelerating transformation in this regard.

The 2004 Defense Science Board study on Transition to and from Hostilities, with its emphasis on enhancing our capabilities for stability operations, remains valid today, and the draft Directive called for by the Secretary largely directs the implementation of the recommendations thereof. The elements of the Directive have been discussed and coordinated throughout the Department for a year, and general consensus has been reached. With possible minor modification, it should be signed posthaste.
The question of whether the Secretary should appoint an Executive Agent depends largely on whether he, along with the Deputy Secretary, want to enlist additional executive support than would normally be provided by the OSD Staff and the Joint Staff. If the Secretary and Deputy Secretary seek additional support beyond that to be provided by the OSD Staff and the Joint Staff, appointing an Executive Agent will accelerate change, and the Secretary of the Army is a possible choice in light of the Army's dominant albeit not exclusive role in stability operations.

At some time in the future the Department will not need high level advocacy for stability operations in OSD and in the Joint Staff, in much the same way that there is now no need for any high level advocate for combat operations per se. We are not there yet.

If our readiness system was extended to fully encompass stability operations, and was improved so as to realistically demonstrate our actual capabilities to succeed at stability operations: the Secretary would have the management information with which to manage; the Secretary would be able to give supportable advice to the President when asked about the feasibility of future operations; and, most importantly, pervasively across all segments of DoD there would be new and strong incentive to enhance our capability for stability operations - what is measured is taken seriously.
Structural Improvements to Institutionalize Stability Operations—Bottom Line (2 of 2)

- We need an organization to effectively exploit our ‘fifth force provider’— the private sector.
- We need to strengthen our ability to communicate DoD’s intentions and actions to the public in the foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operations.
- We need to recruit more senior professionals into the Reserves that have requisite skills and experience for Civil Affairs.

There are 60,000 private sector employees taking part in stability operations in Iraq in a fully integrated fashion. In future stability operations, the fraction of the ‘force’ from the private sector may be greater or lesser, but will inevitably be significant. Employing the indigenous private sector can be a powerful tool for enhancing economic wellbeing and bringing about swifter stabilization. Unfortunately, the Combatant Commanders (COCOMs) do not receive the information they need to realistically factor the private sector, either U.S. or indigenous, into their stability operations plans. The COCOMs know what to expect from the four Services and the traditional aerospace companies; they don't know what they can count on from civil companies, universities, federally funded research and development centers, private consultants, NGOs etc. Further, there is no effective mechanism in place to involve the private sector in rehearsal or exercises. Finally, during actual operations, there is no effective and agile institution for bringing the full power of the private sector to bear on stability operations swiftly and efficiently.
Nothing is more important than the attitudes of the public we are trying to help in foreign stability operations. The Department's capability for communicating to those people in foreign lands the truth about our past, current and future actions and intentions is not robust. In this context we are not addressing clandestine or covert activities, communication with insurgents, communication to the U.S. or foreign press corps, long term communication in the years before a stability operation that might make a stability operation unnecessary, propaganda designed to influence attitudes, nor strengthening the capabilities of other parts of our Government for communication - these topics are worthy of consideration, but were deemed outside the scope of our study.

Finally, Civil Affairs plays a crucial role in stability operations. Years ago the primary role of Civil Affairs was reducing foreign civilian interference with U.S. military operations. Nowadays the primary role of Civil Affairs is accelerating stability: helping to restore and maintain public order; safeguarding, mobilizing and using local resources; facilitating the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies and services, and other critical functions involving essential services and governance. We need to better recruit mid-career senior professionals from the private sector who already have the skills and experiences we need.

While it does not rise to the same level of importance as the aforementioned topics, we have urged the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L]) to ensure that there is sufficient advocacy within his organization for the technology and system developments, closely linked to operator needs, required for stability operations.

In addition, several topics arose that have not led to specific recommendations, but are worthy of note. First, we believe that there is nothing more important than improving the effectiveness of our intelligence apparatus to gather the information needed - much unclassified - for success at stability operations: the 2004 DSB Report and subsequent Directive fully cover that topic, and we urge special attention to monitoring implementation. Second, DoD lacks the legal
authorities to perform certain activities required for timely closure of stability operations; other parts of the Government have such authorities but do not always have the capabilities or resources to effectively perform those activities. We understand that there is continuing effort to reconcile the situation, we have no new approach to suggest for doing so, but we want to emphasize that the tremendous drain on the Department's resources might be obviated by solution. Finally, we acknowledge the importance of effective partnership with NGOs in stability operations, but we have been unable to uncover an encouraging approach to further improving that partnership.
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Findings: The Draft Directive

- The items of discussion
  - An Executive Agent for Stability Operations
  - An oversight board for an Executive Agent for Stability Operations
    - Chair and composition of an oversight board
- Options
  - The Army as Executive Agent
  - JFCOM as Executive Agent
  - Some other DoD component as Executive Agent
  - No Executive Agent

The major topic of open discussion with respect to the draft Directive to implement the recommendations of the 2004 Defense Science Board study on pre- and post-hostilities is in regard to the appointment of an executive agent to focus on the implementation of said recommendations. We will not comment on other parts of the draft Directive except to express support.

Traditionally, an ‘executive agent’ is assigned responsibilities, functions and authorities by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary to focus on specific activities involving two or more DoD components in order to accomplish an objective. In this instance of stability operations, the responsibilities envisioned include tasks that are akin to those oftentimes performed by the OSD staff or the Joint Staff – coordination, reporting to the Secretary on implementation,
identifying requirements and recommending priorities, developing processes to facilitate information sharing, monitoring doctrine and concepts development, ensuring technology support; as well as tasks oftentimes undertaken by the Joint Staff and JFCOM – developing operational concepts. However, in addition to these staff function, an executive agent also has delegated line authority that takes precedence over other DoD components.

Stability operations cross the full gamut of DoD functions, much like combat operations. Insofar as there is no executive agent for combat operations, there might be no executive agent for stability operations. On the other hand, evolving our capabilities for stability operations involves such enormous transformative changes in culture and such significant reallocation of resources that, in reality and on a temporary basis, additional focused and assigned senior advocacy and leadership may be necessary to actually accomplish our objectives vis-à-vis stability operations. In any case, an executive agent would need to have experience building capabilities, experience coordinating with outside organizations, and direction connection to the COCOMs.

With respect to the options, the Army has strong experience building capabilities and routinely is connected to the COCOMs, but has lesser experience coordinating in the interagency process and with the United Nations or foreign governments. If history is a guide, the Army provides most of the capabilities employed in stability operations, with critical contributions from the Marine Corps and the other Services.

JFCOM has experience acting as an executive agent for functions like joint warfighting experimentation, and already coordinates with outside agencies, e.g. with State and multi-national organizations; but may lack the resources required to act as executive agent for stability operations.

No other DoD component leaps forth as a potential executive agent for stability operations. A new entity could be created with new skilled staff drawn from the range of DoD components, e.g. the Services, Joint Staff, Policy and so on; and could report to the
Secretary of Defense or elsewhere. Starting a wholly new organization of major size is a daunting prospect.

Finally, among the options, the Department could proceed to strengthen its capabilities for stability operations without an executive agent. To actually succeed, this implies that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary, supported by the OSD Staff and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Joint Staff, would effect transformative change across the full gamut of DoD Components. The functions required are as broadly based within the Department as for combat operations. All relevant components within the Department already have the statutory authority -- with a few exceptions -- and responsibility for performing stability operations; although they may not have the resources, skills and perhaps motivation. There is no executive agent for combat operations. Finally, we posit that there is no bright line between combat operations and stability operations. They often happen simultaneously within the same geographic location (e.g., the three or even four or five block war).

If the Secretary of Defense chooses to appoint an executive agent, e.g. the Secretary of the Army, so as to enlist greater executive management capacity to accelerate transformation, we do not think that there is any need for a the creation of a new oversight board to monitor the actions of the executive agent. The OSD Staff and the Joint Staff both have and exercise oversight responsibilities that would be more than adequate for the purpose.
Recommendations: The Draft Directive

- The Secretary, with the Deputy Secretary, should effect the transformation of DoD for stability operations
  - The transformation is massive and involves most of DoD
  - The effort required will be comparably massive and sustained
    - The OSD staff will require significant strengthening
- If the Secretary wants additional executive capacity, he should direct the Secretary of the Army to act as Executive Agent

All components of DoD already have and oftentimes exercise the authority with responsibility needed to succeed in stability operations -- although in some instances resources or skills for stability operations are deficient. There is already a requirement for so-called Phase 4 planning within the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES). Furthermore, a separate line role in the form of delegated authority to an executive agent for stability operations might establish an unconstructive division between stability operations and combat operations that is antithetical to overall success and furthermore give appearance that stability operations are only a niche capability instead of a mission of comparable importance to major combat operations.

In practice, the transformation required in terms of both culture and resource allocation vis-à-vis stability operations is so significant, sustained senior executive leadership, management and focus will be needed to effect the evolution. Change in large corporations always devolves from the Chief Executive Officer as agent of change; and
within DoD the Secretary, with the Deputy Secretary, must be the agent of change with respect to stability operations.

This is a very substantial and time consuming undertaking, and the Secretary may want to enlist the executive resources of the Secretary of the Army, while himself remaining engaged in his leadership role. Most of the resources and capabilities employed in stability operations are the Army’s, with important contributions from the Marines and other Services.

We could uncover no credible third alternative other than the Secretary's effecting the major transformation of stability operations; or the Secretary's assignment of the management task to the Army while continuing to exercise his leadership. If neither happens, transformation will not be swift and steady.

In either case the Directive should be signed posthaste. If the Secretary does not feel that an executive agent is appropriate for stability operations, a proposed revision deletes the 'line' tasks that had been envisioned for an executive agent, insofar as they would be performed in the course of daily leadership and management by the Secretary; and reallocates the 'staff' tasks that had been envisioned for an executive agent to the OSD Staff, specifically the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and to JFCOM.

If the Secretary chooses to assign the role of executive agent to the Secretary of the Army, the current draft of the Directive is ready for signature, with very slight modification.
Findings: High Level And Properly Resourced Advocates For Stability Operations Both Within OSD And The Joint Staff

- We do not have high level and properly resourced advocates for stability operations either within OSD or within the Joint Staff.
- Within OSD there is a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations who reports to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.
  - The individual’s small office has been assigned myriad tasks that are not central to stability operations, albeit vaguely related to stability operations.
- Certain functions need to be performed within OSD to support the transformation of stability operations:
  - Advocacy, preparation of stability operations elements of SPG and other key guidance documents.
  - Ensure that the Secretary has the information he needs to accelerate the transformation of stability operations.
  - Represent the Secretary in the interagency process; take lead for DoD in helping make interagency partners more capable.
  - Represent the Secretary with the UN, foreign governments, and NGOs.
- Within the Joint Staff there is no correspondent to the aforementioned DASD for Stability Operations.
  - Tasks are apportioned among J-1, J-3, J-4, J-5, J-7, and J-8; and probably elsewhere as well.
  - There is no formal lead, although J-5 has assumed de facto lead.
- Certain functions need to be performed within the Joint Staff to support the transformation of stability operations:
  - Advocacy.
  - Ensure that planning, concept development, doctrine, exercises, training, professional military education encompasses stability operations.
  - Ensure that readiness reporting encompasses stability operations.
  - Work with OSD, the State Department and other organs of government, as needed.
- Certain functions need to be performed in concert between the OSD staff and the Joint Staff:
  - Our readiness to conduct stability operations should be presented to the Secretary, e.g., jointly by the Deputy Secretary and the Vice Chairman, supported by their respective staffs.

Staff responsibilities for both combat operations and stability operations are pervasive across DoD. Those responsibilities have been distributed across the Joint Staff, unified with staff responsibilities for combat operations. Those responsibilities have also been largely distributed across the OSD staff, and cannot and should not be fully centralized under any single individual; although within the OSD staff there is a central staff focus and advocate for stability operations in the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (DASD) for Stability Operations, while there is no such corresponding individual on the Joint Staff.

For pervasive activities like combat operations and stability operations, should there be any central staff focus and advocate?

Several decades ago most large U.S. corporations had corporate staff offices devoted to quality, to international sales, and to environmental correctness. Those are in principle pervasive corporate functions, but at that time they were not pervasively practiced within corporations, and so forward looking CEOs and Boards accelerated transformation toward enhanced quality, global operation and
environmental sensitivity with corporate advocacy and focus on the corporate staff. By now most such offices have been abolished as no longer needed; or should be.

In much the same way, a transitional, temporary focus and advocacy by the Secretary's and Chairman's 'corporate' staffs can serve an important need essential function in accelerating transformation, as well as serving traditional staff roles in supporting their principals. To be effective such staff roles must be of sufficiently high rank to signal the seriousness of the principal and importance of the topic - especially insofar as the Government and the Military are most conscious of rank, both informally and formally - and more importantly must be properly resourced to actually get work done.

Having a staff focus for stability operations of sufficient rank and resource on both the OSD staff and the Joint Staff is important irrespective of the issue of having or not having an executive agent supporting the Secretary. If there isn't an executive agent, the Secretary will need even more powerful staff support to effect the transformation himself, but even if there is an executive agent with responsibility delegated from the Secretary, there remains a need for central oversight.
We recommend the establishment of a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Stability Operations)
- With functional responsibilities as described above
- With personnel resources increased above the current staffing of 21 individuals; the increase in the range of 20 to 35 more people – either as government employees, IPAs, FFRDC employees, or contractor employees

We recommend that stability operations be made an explicit mission and priority for the J-5 Deputy Director for International Negotiations and Multilateral Affairs (INMA)
- With personnel resources increased by 3 individuals
- With functional responsibilities as described above

We believe that a Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense is simply of too low rank to effectively operate in the inter-agency process within the U.S. government, with the United Nations, and with foreign governments. In an ideal, world rank would not matter, only capability and the visible support of the Secretary of Defense, but in our actual circumstances rank does matter.

In making this recommendation, we considered alternatives to establishing a Deputy Under Secretary for Policy (Stability Operations) position. A Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Stability Operations) could report directly to the Principal Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, which would not solve the problem. An Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy (Stability Operations) might approach suitable rank for effectively working on behalf of the Secretary of Defense with rank-conscious individuals, but establishing that position would either entail the delay and negotiation of Congressional legislation, or would require disestablishing one of the current Assistant Secretary assignments. Four Assistant Secretaries of Defense are mandated in legislation - Homeland Defense, SO/LIC, Reserve Affairs and Legislative Affairs;
five ASDs are currently assigned, namely ISA, ISP, NII, PA and Health Affairs. We considered the possibility of a Special Assistant to the Secretary for Stability Operations, but that positioning did not carry with it the gravitas of the role we recommend.

Establishing a Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Stability Operations) will underscore our determination to succeed at stability operations in foreign lands, and to the degree that comparable capabilities apply, at home.

With regard to resources for the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (Stability Operations) which we recommend, the current office of the DASD for Stability Operations includes 21 individuals, perhaps half of whom are focused on stability operations per se. The office of the DASD (Stability Operations) informally suggested increasing that staffing by 24 more individuals to a total of 45 individuals to encompass the expanded role and performance contemplated in this study. In a recent study, the National Defense University suggested increasing the staffing by 20 to 30 individuals. The ASD (SO/LIC) suggested increasing the staffing by 30 to 35 individuals. These estimates made independently and of comparable magnitude, bound the additional staffing needed. If there is anxiety about OSD bloat, some of those individuals could be Intergovernmental Personnel Act (IPAs) or from an FFRDC or from a support contractor. As always the quantity of people matters less than the quality of people; and in addition the additional resources must be devoted to stability operations and not to 'other duties as assigned' which, meritorious or not as those duties may be, consumes about half of the resources of the current office.

Note that we are not recommending that Policy be fully reorganized to center all activities related to stability operations under the proposed Deputy Under Secretary. That would be in opposition to our intention to proceed toward full symmetry and integration between combat operations and stability operations. We have tried to strike a balance between centralization and distribution of staff function.

With regard to a corresponding activity within the Joint Staff, we considered alternatives to the recommendation. We could continue
with the current arrangement wherein stability operations responsibilities cross most segments of the Joint Staff without an explicit advocate and focus, e.g. J-5 has two individuals with stability operations as collateral duties. We did not believe that would lead to the accelerated transformation we all seek. We considered the establishment of an entire new Directorate (J-?) but we felt that was a bridge too far, again without intention of long term unity. As with the OSD Staff recommendation, within the Joint Staff we have tried to balance centralization and distribution.
At this time the Secretary is not adequately informed regarding our readiness for success in stability operations. For different events, e.g. regime change or stabilization of a failed state, and with different objectives, e.g. reduce the level of violence to levels typical of crime vice transform a 15th century society into a 21st century society, he does not have an adequate indication of our likelihood of success. He is not fully informed about whether any component of DoD is better or worse prepared to succeed at stability operations, e.g. any particular Service, any particular intelligence agency, any of the regional COCOMs. He is not fully informed about whether we are better or worse prepared to succeed at any of the essential elements of stability operations within a region, e.g. peacekeeping, or restoration of critical services like health care, power, potable water.

Without that knowledge, that management information, he can lead but he cannot fully manage. He cannot with full confidence advise the President and the Congress regarding our potency for stability operations that may be required by various courses of action under consideration. Further, if that information were visible to the Secretary there would be powerful motivation across all elements of
DoD to get better at stability operations: to quote a lawyerly phrase 'sunlight is the best disinfectant'. This motivation would accelerate transformation toward stability operations as does the Secretary of Defense’s perceived attitude toward stability operations.

Understandably, our current readiness system is largely geared toward indicators of combat readiness. The natural question is 'readiness for what?' and the current answer is the successful execution of the regional COCOMs' portfolio of operational contingency plans. These plans shape and bound the list of indicators - both objective, like amount and state of equipment, and subjective, like level of morale - that in union comprise our readiness reporting. The Military Essential Task Lists cover availability of personnel and supplies, condition of equipment, and currency of training. The indicators contribute to the Joint Quarterly Readiness Review. A few of the Military Essential Tasks are related to stability operations, but much more needs to be assessed. The progress planned for improving the readiness reporting system – the new Defense Readiness Reporting System – provides an expanded framework for reporting that could, in principle, be better for monitoring readiness indicators for both combat operations and stability operations - if fully and properly employed. The aforementioned system focuses on military capabilities. Insofar as stability operations involve many civilians, both from the private sector and public servants, we need indicators of their readiness as well.

These indicators, however, are 'input' indicators and not 'output' indicators insofar as they express individual necessary but not sufficient contributors to overall capability, but not overall capability per se. It's as if one assessed a player's tennis ability by reporting on the quality of their racquet and sneakers, the number of hours of practice each week, their self-assessment of their confidence as a player, and so on; and not on their actual ability to play.

'Output' indicators devolve, after the fact, from actual experience in the field and, beforehand, from performance in games and exercises - not models and simulations wherein computer programs purport to imitate people - reflecting the aforementioned COCOMs' operational plans. To be sure, games and exercises are not fully realistic, are expensive to conduct, and are always open to
interpretation. Nevertheless the combination of the traditional readiness measures with the results of games and exercises provides a reasonable sense of our capabilities.

At this time the regional COCOMs' portfolio of plans remains more focused on combat operations than on stability operations, but that situation is shifting and will continue to shift in part in consequence of the Directive that is a subject of this study. That shift should be accompanied by an expansion of the reported readiness indicators to encompass those relevant for stability operations, e.g. language capabilities, cultural training, information operations training, number of MPs, civil affairs experts and civil engineering experts. That shift should also be accompanied by a shift in our exercise agenda to include more exercises on stability operations; now most exercises are focused on combat operations.

A shift toward performing more exercises and games devoted to stability operations will have an additional benefit of great significance. It’s all well and good to instruct the COCOMs to broaden their planning to encompass not only combat operations but also stability operations; it is another thing entirely to actually do it and do it well. With regard to combat operations we can draw upon a couple of millennia of recorded history of warfare, a couple of centuries of national experience with warfare, extensive personal experience of many of the incumbents, and extensive training and education. Many - most - U.S. combat operations have been a success, and many individuals have written or contributed to plans for combat operations that have been conducted with success. The recent experience of many of our Army and Marine Corps officers with stability operations provides a foundation - not available several years ago – to begin building equivalent competence for these types of operations. With a skimpy experiential base, 'trial and error' is the only way to refine plans to the point of excellence, and it is a lot better to experience 'trial and error' in exercises and games than in actual field operations.

The regional COCOMs' portfolio of contingency plans for stability operations can provide, in effect, management objectives. A good scheme for readiness measurement can provide, in effect, management incentives. This is a powerful combination, indeed.
Recommendations: Extend and Improve Our Readiness System to Realistically Encompass Stability Operations

- Although the number of stability operations related exercises is increasing, and the list of readiness indicators related to stability operations is enlarging, we recommend that:
  - The Secretary instruct the Joint Staff and the Regional COCOMs to markedly accelerate the extension of our readiness reporting system to encompass indicators for stability operations; and
  - The Secretary instruct the Joint Staff, the Regional COCOMs and JFCOM to markedly accelerate the shift in our exercise and game agenda to more stability operations related games and exercises.
- Ensuring utility and realism, and developing useful readiness measures is much tougher, a major reason being the immaturity of general understanding of these types of operations.
- Rather than merely assigning someone or some organization to make these happen, we believe this area needs an "intellectual jumpstart"
- Learning about stability operations has been on-the-job in Iraq and, to some extent, Afghanistan. The people most qualified to provide the "intellectual jumpstart" are those who have been practicing stability operations with distinction and those who have been on-scene as lesson learned observers.
  - E.g. from JFCOM's Joint Center for Operation Analyses, the Center for the Army Lessons Learned, the Peace Keeping and Stability Operations Institute at the Army War College, the USMC Center for Lessons Learned
- The Secretary should establish a task force with handpicked members from these two groups (perhaps trainers as well). The task force should be led by either an Army or Marine Corps general officer with recent experience in Iraq and should:
  - Develop readiness measures for units from JTF headquarters to Brigade
  - Establish criteria for realistic exercises including roles of OPFORs, populace, instrumentation, AARs, standards
  - Work with COCOMs in order to connect to the stability operations plans being developed
  - Recommend the specific actions needed to incorporate their results into the extant readiness measurement system of METLs, JQRR, etc. and into the full spectrum of games and exercises conducted under the auspices of the Chairman, JFCOM, COCOMs, and the Services
  - Report to the SecDef within 90 days.

Without the type of intellectual jumpstart we advocate provided by a select group of experienced and inventive officers, we fear that: efforts on mission essential tasks for stability operations will produce lists of great extent but little value; or that we will conduct more games and exercises related to stability operations, but not realistic, relevant and indicative games and exercises.
Findings: A New Institution To Effectively Exploit Our ‘Fifth Force Provider,’ The Private Sector

- The private sector provides enormous and essential services for stability operations
- 60,000 private contractor personnel in Iraq; future stability operations, but will inevitable employ a significant fraction of private sector personnel
- Essential skills lacking within DoD, e.g. reconstruction and operation of urban infrastructure
- ‘Private sector’ includes companies, non-profits, FFRDCs, university departments, individual expert consultants
- Employing the indigenous private sector in stability operations provides doubled benefit: the service itself, and local economic wellbeing that promotes stability
- COCOMs’ portfolio of contingency plans for stability operations should take into account the private sector
- What is available? What quality? What timescale? What cost?
- COCOMs know what to expect from the Services, and reasonably know what to expect from aerospace industry, but not from the segments of the private sector unfamiliar to DoD and necessary for stability operations.
- In field operations conducting the aforementioned plans, private sector contracting and management must be efficient, effective and aligned with the planning, tempered by the need for flexibility and agility as conditions change.

In effect, the private sector has become a fifth force provider for stability operations along with the four Services.

In reality that has always been true, i.e. for combat operations, wherein defense aerospace industry, universities, non-profits, FFRDCs, and private consultants have always been integral to national security, in large measure making contributions under the umbrella of the Services’ mandate to ‘organize, train and equip’. What is more or less new for stability operations is the very large number of private sector personnel in the field, the number of participating personnel from parts of the private sector unfamiliar to the military but integral to stability operations, and contracting for products and services through new means and channels other than traditional Service procurement.

Effective planning has always required intimate knowledge of the resources relied upon in the plan. That knowledge is readily available to COCOMs with respect to the Services’ integral capabilities, the defense industrial base, and the other traditional dual-use providers of good and services for the military. That knowledge and au courant
intimacy is not available to the COCOMs with respect to the unfamiliar providers of critical elements of stability operations, particularly including indigenous private sector capabilities in the countries, areas and regions in which we might conduct stability operations. What is available, from whom? Who is reliable and provides quality and value? What are the de facto industry segment standards for performance and profit? What are the de facto industry segment standards for contracting terms and conditions? What delay must be expected between contracting and provision? What are the liability and indemnification issues? How ’ready’ are the private sector sources? Is it possible to practice, game, exercise, and rehearse with the private sector in preparation for operations, and what are the security implications of doing so? As long as these kinds of gaps in knowledge persist, gaps in planning will persist which undermine our ability to perform successful stability operations.

In addition to effective planning we need effective execution during stability operations to bring to bear the full power of the U.S. industrial base and overall private sector, with agility and flexibility; and to support the indigenous private sector in foreign lands wherein we are operating to promote economic health. It is within the power of the Congress and of the Executive Branch to effect such efficiency, to provide agility and capability for dealing with parts of the private sector unequipped to work within DoD’s traditional and perhaps cumbersome acquisition structure.
Providing private sector capabilities in support of Iraq reconstruction and the training and equipping of Iraqi security forces has been accomplished through a number of existing and ad hoc organizations. The following discussion describes these organizations and the origins for those newly established to support U.S. operations in Iraq (portions of the organizational descriptions are taken from their official web sites).

The Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) was created by a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) 36, signed May 11, 2004. IRMO was intended as a temporary organization established under the U.S. Department of State with offices in the U.S. Mission in Baghdad and was created in the final days of the CPA to help facilitate the transition in Iraq.

NSPD 36 also directed the creation of another temporary organization, the Iraq Project and Contracting Office (PCO) within the Department of Defense. The 22 June memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed that the PCO be organizationally established and placed within the Department of the Army to provide acquisition and project management support with
respect to activities in Iraq, to the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) until 30 June 2004. After 30 June 2004, the PCO was directed to support the close-out of the CPA, and to provide to provide acquisition and project management support to the Chief of Mission in Iraq, as requested by the Secretary of State, and for other activities in Iraq, as requested by the heads of other Departments and Agencies. The initial staffing for the PCO came from the Program Management Office (PMO) previously established under the Coalition Provisional Authority, with one important difference. Whereas the PMO had contracting authority, the PCO did not. The PCO manages the $18.4 billion appropriated by the U.S. Congress to support the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure. This office is responsible for all activities associated with program, project, asset, construction and financial management of that portion of the reconstruction effort undertaken by the U.S, and manages both construction and non-construction activities across six sectors: Electrical, Public Works and Water, Communications and Transportation, Buildings, Education and Health Care, Security and Justice, and Oil. The PCO management structure has a "nucleus" of U.S. government employees, along with some representation from Iraq and other nations, represent the "owner's" interest in the enterprise. Contractors are hired to provide the program management, both on an overall scale, as well as in each of the six construction sectors.

Because the PCO did not have contracting authority, the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology) (ASA(ALT)) was designated by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to provide the necessary administrative and contracting support to the Chief of Mission, Project and Contracting Office, and Multi-National Force and support the humanitarian relief, reconstruction, and security of Iraq. This was accomplished through two new organizations: the Joint Contracting Command – Iraq (JCC-I); and the Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement) – (ADASA (P&P).

JCC-I was stood up in January 2005 as a 2-star command under the ADCON (Title 10 authority) of ASA (ALT) in direct support of the Chief of Mission (COM) and the Multinational Force – Iraq (MNF-I). It has approximately 200 personnel in theater and its
mission is to provide operational contracting support to COM and MNF-I to acquire vital supplies, services and construction in support of the Coalition Forces and the relief and reconstruction of Iraq. Specific responsibilities include: award and administer contracts; provide contract expertise to PCO, IRMO, GRD, Multi-National Forces and Chief of Mission; advise Iraqi Ministries on contracting and acquisition issues; assist in generating contract requirements packages; and maintain a central list of contracts.

The DASA (P&P) is headed by an SES, and is directly in the ASA (ALT) chain of command. Focusing on Iraq/Afghanistan is the Contract Support Office, where the Assistant DASA (P&P) and a 15-person office in Washington DC provides the oversight of contract procedures and policies affecting support of the PCO, Congress, and Army Headquarters; This office recruits and deploys contracting personnel to Iraq; assists requiring activities in utilization of CONUS based acquisition organizations - Reach Back; track and validate contract actions; assists in defining requirements packages; and, provides coordination and assistance on reconstruction and equipping actions with OSD, HQDA and Interagency partners.

The Defense Reconstruction Support Office (DRSO) was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DSD) in May 2005, by merging the Defense Support Office – Iraq (established in September 2004 by DSD) and the Afghan Reachback Office (established in August 2003 by the Secretary of Defense). DRSO reports directly to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and has approximately 26 personnel. Its mission is to be the single DoD focus for the coordination of the Department’s operational support of stabilization and reconstruction activities in Iraq and Afghanistan. Responsibilities include: serving as the OSD “watchdog” for reconstruction; providing the primary interface between DoD and other reconstruction activities; the OSD focal point to other agencies for reconstruction issues; and, the OSD advocate for economic development and private sector involvement in reconstruction.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is responsible for approximately $5 billion of the $18 billion appropriated for Iraq reconstruction and support. USAID programs are implemented in coordination with the United Nations, World
Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), Coalition country partners, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private sector partners. The USAID Mission in Iraq has offices located throughout Iraq and a division headquarters office in Baghdad. They carry out programs in education, health care, food security, infrastructure reconstruction, airport and seaport management, economic growth, community development, local governance, and transition initiatives.

The Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) has over 12,500 personnel to perform worldwide acquisition life cycle contract management for Department of Defense weapon system programs, spares, supplies and services for over 325,000 contracts valued at over $852 billion with over 25,000 domestic and foreign contractors. DCMA has liaison officers at all of the COCOMs to provide contingency contract liaison. For years DCMA has used deployable teams to augment the contract management office (CMO) staffs in order to conduct missions in a theater of operations. Contingency Contract Administrative Services (CCAS) teams have supported nearly every major contingency operation, as well as the present operations in Iraq, the Philippines and Afghanistan. The DCMA mission in Iraq includes contract administration, quality assurance and property accountability for billions of dollars in products and services. Additionally, DCMA Iraq oversees dozens of “life support” contracts that provide meals, laundry service, utilities, housing and security to thousands of American and coalition forces and support personnel.

The Department of Defense designated the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) as Executive Agent for implementing plans to extinguish oil well fires and to assess the damage to oil facilities during Operation Iraqi Freedom. For the initial phase of this work, extinguishing nine oil well fires in southern Iraq ignited in the opening days of the operation, the Corps' prime contractor was Kellogg, Brown & Root, of Houston, which prepared the contingency plans for the government under the Army Field Support Command's Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). USACE continues to contract for services to repair and maintain the Iraqi oil infrastructure.
The Gulf Region Division (GRD), an element of the USACE, was activated January 25, 2004. It operates with three district offices located throughout Iraq and a division headquarters office in Baghdad. It has been delegated contract administration authority from the JCC-I, and is planned to take over for the PCO in the future.

The Army Field Support Brigades (AFSB) are a field element of the 2-star Army Field Support Command (AFSC). The AFSBs are regionally focused and are structured to integrate field support with acquisition, logistics, and technology. They have organic liaison with DCMA, USACE, the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), and the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP). The primary mission of the AFSB – Iraq is the support of U.S. military forces in Iraq. Much of this support is accomplished through the LOGCAP program, that delivers private sector contractors and services in place of military force structure to perform military support missions such as construction, subsistence, maintenance, and supply and distribution. Although not their primary mission, AFSB-Iraq has also been called upon to deliver some private sector services for reconstruction efforts.

The Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) is an Army program that plans for the use of a private-sector contractor to support worldwide contingency operations. The Army Materiel Command is the Executive Agent for LOGCAP. Examples of the types of support available include laundry and bath, food service, sanitation, billeting, maintenance, and power generation. LOGCAP has been used extensively to support U.S. forces in recent operations in southwest Asia, with more than $15 billion in estimated work as of January 2005. LOGCAP services are available to all the COCOMs.
DSB TASK FORCE ON INSTITUTIONALIZING
STABILITY OPERATIONS WITHIN DOD

Recommendations: A New Institution To Effectively Exploit Our ‘Fifth Force Provider,’ The Private Sector

- We recommend that USD (AT&L) and Director, Administration and Management jointly conduct a study to design an organizational arrangement for a new institution to effectively use the private sector in service of stability operations
  - Both U.S. private sector and indigenous private sector
  - Both factual and cultural knowledge
  - Integration with the regional COCOMS' plans for stability operations
    - Private sector rehearsal and readiness assessment as practical
    - Efficient, flexible and agile contracting during operations
    - Employing, as contributory
      - Elements of current standing organizations
      - Elements of current transitional or ad hoc organizations, e.g. for Iraq
  - Report due in 60 days

Within the time constraints of this study we have not been able to formulate a design for an institution that would efficiently and effectively involve the private sector both within the United States and within foreign countries wherein we may conduct stability operations. The number of extant organizations, both permanent and temporary, e.g. for Iraq, is large; their operation, capabilities, limitations, and relationships are complex and sometimes murky.

It's fairly clear that the weakest element in the current mix is not efficient and agile contracting during operations -- although there is vast room for improvement in that respect -- but the 'peacetime' gathering of both factual and cultural information on the private sector and the inclusion of that information into the portfolio of operational contingency plans maintained by the regional COCOMs.

We recommend that two elements of DoD collaborate over the next 60 days to formulate an institutional design, and report their findings to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Defense. Without knowing the details of the findings of said study it is impossible to predict how swiftly an institution as we envision
could be constituted. However, we urge speed insofar as there are current pressing needs with regard to the stability operations in which we are engaged; and if history is a guide there is a possibility nee probability that further stability operations will be undertaken.
Findings: Improving Communication

- Communicate DoD’s actions and intentions regarding stability operations to foreign indigenous populace
  - Our soldiers and marines on the ground have a major role to play; they are in most frequent contact with the populace
- Ideally, this critical activity would be characterized by
  - Full integration, far in advance, into the COCOMs plans
  - Engaging contents in support of clear policy
  - Complementary activities at tactical, operational and strategic echelons
  - No less effective and professional than private sector media
  - Employing technology that actually reaches people
- There are at least two parts of DoD positioned for communication
  - PSYOPS at SOCOM and Public Affairs in OSD
  - Both perspectives are needed
- There is also a growing cadre of officers with experience in crafting communication operations

If we do not enlist the local populace in support of the objectives of our stability operations we will not succeed, particularly if our extremist adversaries are able to enlist support for disrupting our activities. A necessary, albeit insufficient, condition for enlisting that local support is clear, timely and honest communication of our intentions and actions.

There is room for improvement in our communication. By and large we do not maintain a portfolio of contingency plans for communication in parallel with and in support of the COCOMs’ portfolios of operational contingency plans for places ripe and important. Our communication activities are sometimes successful and sometimes less successful, but are of a more ad hoc nature.

We don't have clear policies, spelled out in advance, regarding the identification of the audiences with whom we want to communicate, nor the kinds of information we want to communicate. This places undue responsibility on local commanders in the field.
For communication to be successful it has to be effective, and that means in part capturing the attention of the selected audiences wherein there is a media glut facing consumers almost everywhere: they can listen to us, they can listen to our adversaries, but they may not choose to listen to both. Our communication has to be interesting and credible, and not ‘just’ accurate and complete. It must be tuned to the local cultural norms, and of course in the languages understood by the audiences.

Finally, if we are going to destroy or disrupt the local technical communication infrastructure in the course of combat operations, or if that infrastructure is lacking in the first place, we need the technical means to deliver our communication; means tailored to the particular place in which we are operating, available on short notice, and devoted to the purpose intended.

While there is a lot of good work underway, we fall short on all of these dimensions. We can and should expect other parts of the Government to develop and employ capabilities, as above. However, that has not happened and we do not know precisely when that will happen. Furthermore, in any actual operation there is no bright line between violence and peace, and there will always be a period during which DoD is the dominant presence in country and needs to ensure adequate communication, if only to enable the reduction in violence to a level that is conducive to the activities of other organs of Government.

Interesting, within the Government there is an organization that effectively performs the opposite of what we need. The Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), during its heyday, collected many kinds of media, e.g. TV, radio, newspapers, periodicals; translated media in about 120 languages into English; knew and understood the local cultural norms for media; and employed that knowledge of local media culture to analytically extract the messages in the collected and translated media. Is there any reason why DoD can't have an activity that reverses that conceptual pipeline, beginning with policy-derived messages, composing media attuned to local norms, preparing communications in the languages required, and employing technology tailored for the environment of the audiences we want to reach? The United Kingdom has a capability
along these lines that is government funded, namely the BBC World Service.

Two parts of DoD have some of the capabilities that we need. Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), reporting to SOCOM, has some of the capability required vis-à-vis technology and is experienced in field operations, e.g., in Iraq right now; but it does not prepare media to the standards of the private sector, nor is it oriented toward the long term planning we posit. Public Affairs is professional in its media preparation, but is not a field organization with the technical capabilities or global capabilities, with respect to languages and local media cultural norms, that we require.
Recommendations: Improving Communication

- The Secretary should direct both SOCOM and PA to prepare and submit plans for extending their capabilities for the purposes of communication to the indigenous populace in stability operations
  - Make use of private sector media capabilities worldwide, don’t reproduce them inside government
  - Develop long term contingency plans in concert with and support of regional combatant commanders
  - Acquire or have access to technology for dissemination in the places likely and important for future operations
  - Seeking policy guidance to shape the media or suggesting same as needed
  - Learn about and conform to local media norms and local languages in the places likely and important for future operations
- Handpick a group of officers with relevant experience in conducting information operations in Iraq and give them a major role in the preparation of the above plans
- The plans should include:
  - Schedules, metrics and resources required
  - Plans for transition of communication to other parts of the government during operations, as stabilization gives way to reconstruction
  - Requisite interactions for learning policy intentions, integrating with planning, and integrating with training
- The plans should be submitted within 60 days
- The Secretary can choose to pursue either plan, or an amalgam of both

We don’t think it is necessary or desirable to create an entirely new organization within DoD for purposes of communication.

Both PSYOPS and Public Affairs currently have some of the elements required, and both could be extended to encompass all of the elements required — although in both instances there would be cultural hurdles based on history and tradition. Both are effective organizations for the purposes for which they were intended and constituted, and our recommendation for extension and change should be taken as complements and not criticisms.

We urge the Secretary of Defense to direct both of those organizations to separately prepare and, within 60 days, submit plans for extensions of the kinds discussed above. The reason for separate planning is to foster the greatest range of creative thought: the two entities have very different experiential bases and are likely to evidence very different approaches to the challenges — it would be instructive and valuable to learn the range of possibilities and avoid — or at least delay — the inevitable narrowing oftentimes termed 'groupthink'. This is a topic wherein there is a premium on creativity.
We expect that both plans will be constructive and palatable, and upon review the Secretary of Defense can decide whether to pursue one or the other, or an amalgam of the best elements of both.
Findings: Civil Affairs

- Central role in stability operations
  - Tradition: reduce civilian interference with military operations
  - Reality: stability operations
    - Restore and maintain public order
    - Safeguard, mobilize and use local resources
    - Facilitate the equitable distribution of humanitarian supplies and services
    - Essential services, infrastructure, governance

- Reports to SOCOM
- Reserves - 5641; active - 351
- Should civil affairs (and PSYOPS, in USACAPOC) report to SOCOM?
- How can civil affairs recruit even better personnel

Civil Affairs, an Army activity under SOCOM, plays a central and sustained role in stability operations.

The active duty component, by and large airborne, is positioned for early entry and to support the traditional role of Civil Affairs in reducing civilian interference with military operations. The reserve component can be an important contributor to the success of longer term stability operations -- if they have the right people.

We have considered whether Civil Affairs (and PSYOPS, both in USACAPOC) should be reassigned elsewhere within DoD, e.g. the Army proper; JFCOM; U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), specifically PSYOPS for closer association with the information operations mission of STRATCOM. Our criterion for assessing the possible organizational changes has been whether it would sufficiently enhance field performance in stability operations as to be worrisome to our adversaries.

Keeping Civil Affairs within SOCOM provides a 'home', a funding channel for equipment and training, and visibility; but places
Civil Affairs in an organization centered on special operations. Since Civil Affairs is, in fact, Army it might seem natural to be in the Army, but given the pressures on the Army there might be an inevitable drift toward duties other than Civil Affairs. Placement at a different COM might make strategic sense, but SOCOM is special in its funding stream and ownership of forces.

Perhaps, more important than organizational reporting is proper sizing, recruitment, retention and motivation of the best people to actually perform Civil Affairs. Civil Affairs is largely a reserve activity, and we think that is good insofar as it provides a window on the private sector where the skills required by the stability operations mission can be found in abundance. However, the reserve recruitment process for Civil Affairs is the overall reserve recruitment process and may not tap into the private sector communities with the special skills needed by Civil Affairs.

Further issues regarding Civil Affairs involve how they are fielded, i.e. coupled to maneuver units, and whether that leads to the best use of the special capabilities of Civil Affairs units. We also need to consider the rotation policy for Civil Affairs reservists and the mobilization policy, and tailor same to the special needs for Civil Affairs. Finally, in light of the likely size of future stability operations, we have to consider whether the overall size of that reserve capability is adequate: quantity has a quality all its own.
Recommendaons: Civil Affairs

- We do not recommend moving civil affairs (or PSYOPS) from SOCOM
  - We have not identified a “destination” wherein a change in reporting chain, in an of itself, would result in materially superior field performance.
- We do not recommend rebalancing the active/reserve ratio within civil affairs at the expense of the reservist component
  - In principle, the reservists within civil affairs can be recruited with mid-career skills and experiences critical for stability operations.
    - Skills and experience at, e.g., urban electric power renovation and operation, cannot be taught in any reasonable time in military schools.
- We recommend a different recruitment process for the reservists within civil affairs
  - By employing the mainline reservist recruitment machinery we are largely hiring young people without domain experience.
  - We need older people, e.g., 35 to 45 year old professionals, who have domain expertise that cannot be practically replicated in military classrooms.
    - We may need inducements, e.g., Warrant Officer status.
  - Recruitment should actively target the skills we need, e.g., those called for in the C.O.O.M.‘s plans, reaching out to, e.g., trade associations and conferences.
- We recommend that the Army and Marine Corps conduct a study to tailor recruitment practices, mobilization and rotation policies, and training regimes for the special needs and capabilities of civil affairs.
  - The study should propose creative and implemental ideas for recruiting mid-career professionals.
    - Through professional societies?
    - With Warrant Officer status?
  - Training what is actually needed for effective civil affairs.
  - Tailored deployment, mobilization and rotation policies.
  - Overall size of the reserve component in light of likely future stability operations.
  - This study should be delivered to the Deputy Secretary of Defense within 60 days.

We do not recommend any organizational reassignment for Civil Affairs (or for PSYOPS) -- we could not identify a parent organization, different from SOCOM, wherein a change would in and of itself enable materially superior field performance of those components.

We approve of the large reserve contingent within Civil Affairs; unusual for military units, but Civil Affairs has an unusual mission. That mission relies on skills and experience found largely within the private sector and difficult to replicate and sustain within the military proper. The activities that call upon those skills are consistent with 6 to 9 month deployments, with some overlap with successors, which may be within a reasonable range for reserve duty.

The current recruitment process, however, employs the 'normal' recruiting means for the reserves, and in consequence recruits younger individuals without the domain expertise that is actually needed for Civil Affairs -- classroom training is impractical for these real-world skills and trial and error in the field is costly and delays success. We need to recruit engineers familiar with urban
infrastructure, local government officials, professional with financial expertise and experience, and so on.

While we have tried to make recommendations regarding stability operations that maintain consistency with combat operations, and that work within existing organizations wherever possible, in this instance we believe that something special is required. It will be difficult or impossible to distort the current reserve recruiting machinery, which is already stressed, to meet the needs of Civil Affairs.

We recommend that there be a special recruiting effort targeted at mid-career, 35-45 year old professionals, with the skills actually needed for stability operations within Civil Affairs. This effort could make use of professional societies, professional meetings and trade shows, professional journals and myriad other local means of identifying and recruiting professionals needed by Civil Affairs. It may be that an inducement, like warrant officer status, is needed to effect recruitment; in World War II the same kind of problem arose, and professionals were sometimes given General Officer status as an inducement and to facilitate their performance thereafter.

We recommend that the Army and the Marine Corps conduct a study, to be delivered within 60 days, that suggests creative but practical means of recruitment, motivation, retention, training, deployment, mobilization and rotation tailored to the special opportunities and needs of Civil Affairs. A ‘cookie cutter’ ‘one size fits all’ approach simply does not work: we are not sufficiently tapping the capabilities and patriotism of our mid-career professional population. The study must consider the overall size of the Civil Affairs reserve component in light of the likely size of future stability operations. The study should be conducted in coordination with ASD(RA).
**The Bottom Line: Redux**

**Accelerating Transformation Towards Stability Operations:**
- The perceived attitude of the Secretary vis-à-vis stability operations is the single most important factor
- Draft Directive 3000 should be signed
- We need high level and properly resourced advocates for stability operations both within OSD and the Joint Staff
- We must extend and improve our readiness system to realistically encompass stability operations, provide metrics for management and provide incentive for change

**Structural Improvements to Institutionalize Stability Operations:**
- We need an organization to effectively exploit our ‘fifth force provider,’ the private sector
- We need to strengthen our ability to communicate DoD’s actions and intentions to the public in the foreign countries wherein we conduct stability operations
- We need to recruit more senior professionals with requisite skills and experience into the Reserves for Civil Affairs

If the recommendations of this study are implemented, and in effect the recommendations of the 2004 DSB study are implemented, what will our adversaries face?

- Focus of the full range of DoD’s powers in peacetime – from security assistance to special operations – to head off major combat operations or the need for stability operations
- Failing that, DoD performance of stability operations with sufficient personnel properly trained in language and culture and the other requisite skills, guided by fully rehearsed and vetted plans, properly resourced and supported by the full might of the U.S. private sector, in constructive communication with the vast majority of the public who are moderate in their views, engaged with the indigenous private sector to advance economic wellbeing, and with agile intelligence and response capabilities beyond the speed of innovation of extremists.

This should be worrisome to our adversaries.
APPENDIX A. TERMS OF REFERENCE
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MEMORANDUM FOR CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD

SUBJECT: Terms of Reference - Defense Science Board Task Force on Organizational Structures for Stabilization Operations

The Deputy Secretary of Defense has requested you form a Defense Science Board (DSB) Task Force addressing organizational structures necessary to support or conduct stability operations.

Although the Department plays a critical role in efforts to promote peace and stability worldwide, it is not optimally organized for success in those critical missions. Additionally, the Department must ensure that its efforts at transformation in this area are coordinated with those of the remainder of the United States government, for which incipient efforts are underway. Most importantly, the State Department has established a Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) with DoD support.

The Department has conducted significant work to improve its understanding of the requirements for success in stability operations. This understanding is largely a result of the 2004 Defense Science Board Summer Study, “Transition to and from Hostilities,” and lessons-learned from Iraq, Afghanistan and other stability operations.

This work has resulted in a Draft Department of Defense Capabilities for Stability Operations Directive, Number 3000.ccE.

- This Draft Directive establishes policy and assigns responsibilities to DoD components within their expertise and authority to develop an array of stability operations capabilities.

- It requires that the Department prepare for stability operations as it does for combat operations and provides a vision of stability operations that requires civilian and military contributions and seamless integration within the interagency.

- It seeks to improve what the Department can within its own organization. It does not (and cannot by the nature of a Secretary of Defense directive) direct any non-DoD entities.
It requires Department components to produce measures of effectiveness on stability operations capabilities.

To enhance organization for stability operations, the Task Force shall focus on the following issues:

1) **What organizational change is needed within OSD Policy, the Joint Staff and the rest of DoD to manage implementation** — that is, to ensure that the designated capabilities are created and the interagency and joint vision are followed at various DoD levels?

   a. How can OSD and the Joint Staff best organize to gain the most leverage for the SecDef in the interagency process to get other departments and agencies to produce stability operations capabilities and contribute more to USG missions?

   b. Should there be an executive agent for stability operations? (The Secretary of Defense has expressed grave reservations about a service executive agent in the past). If so, what powers and limitations should it have? Who should oversee it?

   c. Is a board with a secretariat a viable alternative? (If so, how would the secretariat be staffed? Where would the billets come from? What expertise would be required?).

   d. Is more fundamental change required, such as an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations (as suggested by the recent Council on Foreign Relations Report “In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities.”)

2) **What organization change is needed within DoD to improve our ability to conduct or support stability operations** — including employing and integrating DoD capabilities with those of other Departments and Agencies, NGOs, international organizations and the private sector.

   a. What organizational changes does DoD need to undergo to more effectively conduct and support stability operations that involve all national tools of power?

   b. How should it relate to the Defense Reconstruction and Support Office (formerly the Afghan and Iraq reach-back offices), Policy, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands?)
3) What should be the timing and sequence of organization change within DoD?

For issues (1) and (2) above, what DoD reorganization:

a. Can be done quickly so the transformation envisioned in this directive can start without delay?

b. Requires further study or pursuit of legislative authorities (e.g., to facilitate State-DoD stability operations jointness, economic reconstruction under combat conditions, or the hiring of personnel to deploy in missions)?

4) What additional staffing is required for any new or reshaped stability operations entities in DoD?

5) Who are the right people to staff key positions?

This study will be sponsored by the Deputy Secretary of Defense. Additional support will be provided by the Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). Dr. Craig Fields will serve as Chairman. LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA, will serve as the Executive Secretary and Defense Science Board Secretariat Representative.

The Task Force will operate in accordance with the provisions of P.L. 92-463, the “Federal Advisory Committee Act,” and DoD Directive 5105.4, the “DoD Federal Advisory Committee Management Program.” It is not anticipated that this Task Force will need to go into any “particular matters” within the meaning of section 208 of Title 18, U.S. Code, nor will it cause any member to be placed in the position of acting as procurement official.

Kenneth J. Katie
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APPENDIX B. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CHAIR

Dr. Craig Fields

TASK FORCE MEMBERS

Dr. Ted Gold
GEN Jack Keane, USA (Ret)

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY AND DSB REPRESENTATIVE

LTC Scott Dolgoff, USA

GOVERNMENT ADVISORS

Mr. Michael Donley Director, Administration and Management, OSD
Mr. Jerry Jones Special Assistant Office of the Secretary of Defense

STAFF

Mr. Bradford Smith Strategic Analysis Inc.
Ms. Julie Evans Strategic Analysis Inc.
### APPENDIX C. ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADASA (P&amp;P)</td>
<td>Assistant Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army (Policy and Procurement)</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSB</td>
<td>Army Field Support Brigades</td>
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<tr>
<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Army Field Support Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASA (ALT)</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ASD</td>
<td>Assistant Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AT&amp;L</td>
<td>Acquisition, Technology and Logistics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>CMO</td>
<td>Contract Management Office</td>
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<td>CPA</td>
<td>Coalition Provisional Authority</td>
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<td>COCOM</td>
<td>Combatant Commander</td>
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<td>COM</td>
<td>Chief of Mission</td>
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<td>Defense Contract Management Agency</td>
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<td>DLA</td>
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<td>Defense Science Board</td>
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<td>DSD</td>
<td>Deputy Secretary of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>FFRDC</td>
<td>Federally Funded Research Development Center</td>
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<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>Iraq Reconstruction Management Office</td>
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