

Operational Contract Support Concept of Operations

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Foreword



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Today's threats to our national security continue to decentralize, and the global flashpoints for employing military power spark quickly and burn incessantly. In response, our Force must hedge against uncertainty and provide effective capabilities to myriad unforeseeable crises. We must be responsive and flexible in our location, capability, knowledge, and endurance. We must also be economically solvent, serving as good stewards of the national treasure and ensuring our resources are adequate to satisfy demands beyond any single engagement.

To achieve these ends, Operational Contract Support (OCS) was adopted as a joint capability area that delivers effects using contracts and contractors to support joint force commanders during contingencies. Contract employees provide an adaptable mix of unique skill sets, local insight, and staying power that a strictly military force could not cultivate or resource for all scenarios. Contracts provide supplies and services while alleviating stress on our military capabilities, reducing military footprint, and increasing military availability. OCS provides options that enable us to respond with precision to worldwide contingencies while maintaining force readiness.

Contracting for contingencies is not new, but current use has escalated to a scale that dictates we manage OCS as a strategic capability. The contractor-to-soldier ratio in Iraq and Afghanistan has exceeded 1:1. The cost of contracts for these contingencies has risen to more than \$85 billion. Clearly, this is not just a contracting or logistics issue. Commanders and non-contract personnel must be informed and engaged to ensure proper utilization and integration across DoD and with our mission partners.

OCS program management is essential to promote unity of effort, deliver benefits across all echelons, and optimize OCS execution with all stakeholders through all operational phases. For example, competition between the military services and among our partners for common in-theater products and services increases prices for us all. Through cooperation and synchronization, we can leverage purchasing power to reduce prices, optimize availability of limited expertise and resources, reduce contractor support requirements, and facilitate commander coordination. Some partnerships must be ad hoc, based on the contingency; however, pre-coordination of OCS across the whole of government and with multinational partners will facilitate planning and responsive execution, and will ease transition between phases of an operation.

Contractors are a critical component of the Total Force and must be integrated into military processes, planning, and functions. OCS is a core capability that must be matured to ensure we are poised to take full advantage of it in an effective and efficient manner. We must institutionalize OCS within DoD and with our partners, generating the capacity to deliver effects when and where they are needed to support missions across the range of military operations. We must also develop common doctrine, establish organizational relationships and procedures, participate in common training, and adopt standard technology solutions. Success will achieve our national and operational objectives, compliant with federal statutes and responsive to commanders' needs.

This concept of operations (CONOPS) serves as the foundation upon which we will build DoD's core capability for OCS. Use of contract support in two simultaneous wars has demonstrated the potential of this capability, but it has also exposed complexities and shortcomings that must be resolved. We must invest in OCS management and fully develop a wide range of capabilities if we expect to leverage contract support as a core competency. We must continually track, monitor, and adjust our investments in this capability area. Properly funded and integrated, OCS not only provides support to forces, it can also achieve mission objectives and battlefield effects for the commander.

As recognized by the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the United States needs a broad portfolio of capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest spectrum of conflict. The QDR also establishes requirements to project power, deter aggression, and come to the aid of allies and partners. OCS, as defined in this CONOPS, supports these goals as well as the QDR's objectives to prevail in today's wars, prevent and deter conflict, prepare to defeat adversaries, and succeed in a wide range of contingencies. OCS supports our broad national goals of promoting stability in key regions, providing assistance to nations in need, and preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through allies, partners, and civilian agencies.

I would like to thank the various organizations—Joint Staff, OSD, military departments, combatant commands, DoD agencies, and partners outside DoD—for their contribution in developing the OCS CONOPS. As a result of this collective effort, the OCS CONOPS is now available at <http://www.acq.osd.mil/log/PS/coi.html>; it serves as a guide that any joint force commander can use to execute OCS.



Mr. Gary J. Motsek, ADUSD(PS)
Chair, Operational Contract Support
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Executive Summary

Military Problem

DoD needs to transform its capability to fully leverage, integrate, and administer robust contracted support during contingencies. Public law¹ mandates the transformation of operational contract support (OCS). Without an integrated strategy, the employment of OCS will not achieve the commander's intent, and will likely negatively impact unity of effort, morale, and management of contracted capabilities. This will decrease effectiveness and increase cost by escalating the number of contractors in the theater, expanding force protection requirements, stressing infrastructure, and generating unproductive competition for limited resources within the theater.

Objective

This concept of operations (CONOPS) provides a unifying strategy for aligning OCS among joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational partners to improve the effective and efficient use of contracts and contractors during contingencies. It responds to federal statutes, leverages best practices, and incorporates lessons learned. It also lays the foundation for identifying OCS requirements, shortfalls, and solutions, promoting institutionalization of OCS in DoD processes and allocating long-term resources toward sustaining OCS capacity.

Scope

The time horizon for this CONOPS is the near (2009) to midterm (2016). The CONOPS spans all echelons, from strategic to tactical; encompasses all phases of worldwide contingencies across the range of military operations; and integrates whole-of-government (WoG), multinational, and other mission partners.

OCS Delivers Value

Effective and efficient OCS delivers value to operations and provides additional flexibility to DoD leadership. Strategically, OCS permits the adoption of an agile force structure that allows for rapid growth during surge operations beyond the constraints of DoD's long-lead capabilities; offers a non-military option to contingencies when it is politically expedient; and "promote[s] peace, security, development, democratic practices, market economies, and the rule of law"² to deter terrorism and political instability. OCS also provides access to commercial assets and services with unique skill sets and knowledge when and where they are needed, reduces military operations tempo, and circumvents our reliance on extended supply chains through local providers.

¹ Codified in Chapter 137 of title 10, United States Code.

² National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-44

Defining OCS

The Secretary of Defense Deputy's Advisory Working Group–approved definition of OCS is the ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area. This includes two Tier 3 joint capability area (JCA) OCS tasks:

1. *Contract support integration*: The ability to synchronize and integrate contract support being executed in a designated operational area in support of the joint force.
2. *Contractor management*: The ability to manage and maintain visibility of associated contractor personnel providing support to the joint force in a designated operational area.

OCS requires integration of requirements definition, program management, and contingency contracting. These functions overlap, but all three are requisite during a contingency. OCS program management is the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the OCS efforts to meet the joint force commander's objectives.

Strategic Context

OCS is espoused in strategic guidance, including the National Defense Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, and *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*. Although OCS is one of seven Tier 2 JCAs under Tier 1, Logistics, it is not limited to logistics. It is a force enabler requiring integration across all functional areas under commanders and leaders at all echelons from strategic to tactical.

Applying OCS

OCS is applicable across command echelons (strategic to tactical) and operational phases (0–V), thus supporting the range of military operations. The institutional mission at the strategic level develops OCS capacity; the effects of employing OCS are realized at all echelons. The scope and scale of OCS differ based on the type and duration of the operation, but they generally increase across the six phases of an operation. In CONUS-based contingencies that require civil support operations, the Department of Homeland Security is the lead agency for coordinating federal response activities, with DoD in a supporting role. In contingencies outside the continental United States, the Department of State is generally the lead agency, particularly during phases 0, I, II, and V. If DoD assumes lead for an operation (typically during phases III and IV), OCS management, oversight, and transition will require extensive coordination in both planning and execution with other government agencies and other mission partners.

Roles and Responsibilities

Effective, responsive, and efficient OCS involves participation and coordination from many stakeholders across the Office of the Secretary of Defense, defense agencies, joint staff, military departments, combatant commands, WoG, multinational organizations, and industry. Theater requirements definition is an operations function, but it may be delegated by the geographic combatant command, or GCC. OCS program management ensures proper administration of acquisitions in the contingency environment, and links requirements definition and contingency contracting. Theater OCS program management may be accomplished by a forward-deployed Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO) team, as a temporary solution, until a

more permanent structure is put into place. JCASO and joint OCS planners are two new players to OCS; they play key roles in ensuring the proper integration and synchronization of contracted support into military operations. Specifically, they work with commanders, their staffs, and theater and military service component planners to ensure pre-contingency planning for OCS. The operational theater contingency contracting options include a military service's component support to its own forces, a lead service component responsibility for theater support contracting, and joint theater contracting command. All require GCC oversight and insight. In a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) operation, the NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency may act as lead contracting activity to optimize and synchronize contracting activities.

Way Ahead

This CONOPS provides a foundation for the continued development, implementation, and integration of concepts, policies, doctrines, and exercises to ensure the required OCS and contract capabilities will be available to meet force demands when and where they are needed. Maturing OCS capacity requires capabilities-based analyses to determine measures, gaps, and solutions, and to ensure long-term resourcing. DoD needs to integrate and synchronize OCS with its mission partners to ensure effective and efficient solutions that are responsive to operational commanders, while complying with federal statutes.

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I. Introduction

The Department of Defense must transform to fully leverage, integrate, and administer robust contracted support during all contingencies. Use of the contractor component of the Total Force has exceeded that of the military force, and it may again. It has also involved a fiscal cost that requires strategic management. Without an integrated strategy, the employment of operational contract support (OCS), may limit a commander's ability to accomplish the mission because of a lack of unity of effort and an increase in the cost of contingency operations.

Uncoordinated use of OCS among DoD, the whole of government (WoG), and coalitions is detrimental to contingency operations. More importantly, it can detract from mission accomplishment by increasing complexity for Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) commanders and draining scarce government and military resources through the proliferation of redundant contractors in the joint operations area (JOA). This in turn, challenges security (force protection, base access) and contracted support (either government-furnished support [GFS] or contingency contract administration services [CCAS]). Pooled requirements and coordinated use of contracted support is a force multiplier for the deployed military force and provides the following benefits:

- Enables partners to leverage purchasing power and economies of scale to lower costs, optimize contractor force size, and lower contracted support burdens, thus reducing GFS, decreasing the number of acquisition personnel and subject matter experts (SMEs), and limiting the requirements for CCAS).
- Eases OCS management by reducing complexity, improving visibility of contractors and contract capabilities, easing security risk, and reducing force protection requirements. It also increases morale and streamlines CJTF coordination requirements.
- Improves civil-military relations by enhancing relations with the indigenous populous, providing a single source for coordination with local markets, and facilitating the transition and close out of operations.

But benefits aside, federal statute (i.e., *National Defense Authorization Act* updates to U.S. Code) mandates the transformation of OCS.

Purpose

The primary purpose of this OCS concept of operations (CONOPS) is to describe, in broad terms, a vision for OCS capabilities circa 2009–2016. It applies to the use of contracted support in all contingency operations across the range of military operations (ROMO), both outside and inside the United States.

This CONOPS is intended to serve as a foundation for the formal follow-on capabilities-based assessment that will identify near-term doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader development and education, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) requirements, overlaps, gaps, and shortfalls and give direction to joint and military service-specific OCS programs and policies. This CONOPS describes both organizational and functional approaches to OCS. OCS functions

may be fulfilled through command and contracting authorities and structures consistent with CCDR OPLANs.

Other key purposes of this document include the definition of a comprehensive OCS strategy to promote convergence and coherence for its use among the DoD, whole of government, and coalitions; broadening of the OCS community of interest (COI); promotion of stakeholder awareness and commitment; compliance with federal statutes; and adoption of important lessons learned during implementation.

Scope

This CONOPS addresses the near (2009) to midterm (2016) future. It applies to all echelons, from strategic institutional capacity to tactical capability. It also spans all operational phases (from Shaping, 0, to Enable Civil Authority, V), addresses worldwide contingencies (foreign and domestic) across the range of military operations, and integrates relationships with interagency and multinational partners and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

This CONOPS complies with federal legislation and extends OCS beyond the logistics and acquisition communities to all functions and across the joint capability areas. It incorporates emerging lessons learned and maximizes benefits of OCS while minimizing the risks associated with its use. This CONOPS applies accepted standards for program management to improve OCS effectiveness and efficiency; synchronizes and integrates OCS across DoD components; and promotes the employment of OCS in coordination with mission partners. Neither the CONOPS nor products of the Capabilities-Based Assessment (CBA) will alter or diffuse the command and acquisition authorities of Title 10 and Title 41 of the U.S. Code.

Assumptions

This CONOPS complies with public law, and is informed by current Department policy and doctrine to facilitate the development of a future baseline that enables improved OCS execution and maturity of that critical capability. The CONOPS and subsequent products of the CBA should be consistent with Joint Doctrine to the maximum extent practicable.

OCS requires significant planning and a comprehensive program management approach. To that end, this CONOPS assumes the following:

- Contractors will continue to be a critical component of the Total Force.
- Commercial support to contingency operations will remain a viable and cost-effective option.
- Effective and efficient management of OCS will continue to be a strategic priority.
- The use of contracting will continue to acquire significant non-logistics support.
- Multiple contracting authorities will support (either directly or indirectly) any given contingency. Contracts (whether theater, external, or system support contracts) and associated stakeholders can be integrated by using sound program management principles.

- Employment of military forces will continue in partnership with interagency, multinational, and ad hoc partners. Often, these partners will require significant joint force–provided contract support.
- Response to demands for OCS will remain flexible. OCS will require a spectrum of capabilities that can be implemented based on the scope of the operation, but will likely increase over the operational phases (0–V). More specifically, phase IV operation may require significant base life support and facilities construction or management requirements, which are far more challenging than tactical logistic support requirements normally conducted during phases II and III.
- Congress will continue to support the Department’s ability to deploy a significant contracted capability.
- Efforts to improve OCS will continue to be supported programmatically and financially by Congress and the Department of Defense.

II. OCS Delivers Value

OCS, as a foundational capability, provides value to DoD by furthering the execution of the U.S. national defense strategy. Transformation of OCS will reduce the burden placed on the Joint Force Commander (JFC) and enable combatant commander's (CCDR's) intent. The *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* (CCJO) endorses "greater adaptability and versatility across the force to cope with the uncertainty, complexity, unforeseeable change, and persistent conflict that will characterize the future operating environment," which OCS delivers. OCS also provides access to local and worldwide resources that can be leveraged to mitigate capability shortfalls or augment military capabilities.

OCS is a powerful force multiplier that can provide services that are not viable for execution by military forces or are performed more effectively or efficiently by contract solutions. OCS further achieves the "significant implications for the way the military services organize, man, train, and equip the units that compose the joint force" in accordance with (IAW) the CCJO:

- *Build a balanced and versatile joint force.* OCS provides customizable forces "to deal with unpredictable, dynamic situations" and addresses "force posture as well as force composition" by providing access to non-DoD capabilities wherever they may be needed.
- *Improve knowledge of and capabilities for waging irregular warfare.* OCS supports irregular warfare by providing knowledge and access in specialized areas that outsiders could not cultivate without extensive lead time.
- *Improve knowledge of and capabilities for security, engagement, and relief and reconstruction activities.* OCS is well suited to these "noncombat, but equally vital, activities." Local contractors have long endurance and can alleviate the operations tempo burden to improve dwell time for military forces or allow their application to other activities.
- *Renew emphasis on and understanding of strategic deterrence, including nuclear deterrence.* OCS provides a "flexible range of options for deterring a wide range of threats." "Deterrence convinces potential adversaries not to take threatening actions by influencing their decision making...It involves general activities, postures, and communications intended to influence any adversary's decision making...such as implementing a proactive deterrence campaign or executing flexible deterrent options in response to specific threats." Employing indigenous civilians via OCS contracts may create a barrier to their corruption by enemy forces and provide a deterrent by "convincing those adversaries that a contemplated action will not achieve the desired result."
- *Create general purpose forces capable of operating independently at increasingly lower echelons.* Contractors with unique skill sets balance the need for general purpose military forces and augment the need for "cultural sensitivity." Contract forces performing general purpose functions allow military forces to focus on operational roles.

- *Maintain the capability to project and sustain military power over global distances.* OCS augments military supply chains, provides access to commercial lines of communication, and improves availability via local supplies to promote global reach and sustainment.
- *Improve the ability to operate in urban environments.* OCS provides knowledge and insight to local “social, economic, and religious” intricacies that are opaque to outsiders. Without this local insider knowledge, application of military power may result in unintended consequences and not achieve desired effects.
- *Markedly increase language and cultural capabilities and capacities.* OCS supports “the requirement for greater language and cultural proficiency.” The “more extensive contact and interaction with indigenous agencies and populations” required by non-combat operations is well suited to hiring local contractors. Use of contracted interpreters overcomes the long lead times needed to train military personnel and addresses the volatile nature of worldwide events that may require action in areas where military language capabilities are limited.
- *Institute mechanisms to prepare general purpose forces quickly for new mission sets.* OCS augments “combat formations committed to relief and reconstruction activities...with logistical, engineering, and medical support.”
- *Markedly improve the ability to integrate with other U.S. agencies and other partners.* OCS also requires “frequent coordination and exercises with interagency and international partners and the development of common procedures before an occasion for commitment arises.” Success in synchronizing and integrating OCS with mission partners provides a means for improving relationships on a broader level.
- *Improve organizational solutions for protracted missions that cut across geographical boundaries.* OCS offers an “innovative organizational solution” to “protracted, geographically dispersed challenges.” Leveraging global commercial capabilities and local sources, OCS provides responsive alternatives to geographic challenges along with high-endurance support to alleviate ops tempo concerns associated with deployment of out-of-area personnel.
- *Develop innovative and adaptive leaders down to the lowest levels.* Effective and efficient implementation of OCS requires knowledgeable military leaders capable of integrating it into operations and precluding sub-optimization at lower echelons. OCS programs of instruction target leaders via professional military education and integration with training exercises, which will provide options and grow “leaders at all levels who are able to respond quickly and flexibly to the unexpected.”
- *Develop joint commanders who are masters of operational art.* OCS requires “joint synergy by establishing proper relationships among the components of the joint force, and ... with interagency and international partners.” OCS integration with CCDR and lower level exercises provides the JFC with a vehicle for achieving this synergy.

- *Develop senior leaders who are experts not only in the operational employment of the joint force, but also in the development and execution of national strategy.* OCS generates benefits to both strategic and tactical organizations. It also provides a non-military option that could preclude the use of military force to meet strategic ends. Applying OCS to achieve these strategic ends requires commanders who understand the potential of OCS.
- *Improve service and institutional adaptability to deal with rapid change.* Recognizing “there are limits to how adaptive joint forces can be,” OCS provides agile options to support and augment employment of joint forces. OCS offers responsive options to meet the “pervasive uncertainty and rapid change” of today’s operations.

III. Defining OCS

This section defines the processes of operational contract support, a Tier 2 joint capability area, and its two sub-tiers, contract support integration and contractor management. It integrates program management into OCS in accordance with federal statute and best practices.

Operational contract support, a Tier 2 joint capability area (JCA), is defined as:

The ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area.

This Deputy's Advisory Working Group (DAWG) definition implies a requirement for OCS program management (PgM), which includes an ability to institutionalize and deliver effective and efficient OCS for interagency and multinational partners.

Two Tier 3 JCA capabilities further define OCS:

- *Contract support integration*—the ability to synchronize and integrate contract support being executed in a designated operational area in support of the Joint Force.
- *Contractor management*—the ability to manage and maintain visibility of associated contractor personnel providing support to the Joint Force in a designated operational area.

OCS Evolution

Recent federal statute and lessons learned are driving the application of PgM principles to improve OCS. Improperly managed, OCS could have a negative effect on cost and fail to deliver benefits at any echelon, or it could create disunity of effort among partners with common objectives. Properly managed, OCS can be a force multiplier, achieving more than the individual task or service required by a particular contract. Moreover, synchronized and coordinated OCS can reduce costs and provide strategic options and operational flexibility, while promoting unity of effort and enabling other capabilities.

OCS Program Management

Public Law¹ defines contingency program management as “the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the combined efforts of participating civilian and military personnel and organizations for the management of a specific defense acquisition program or programs during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations.” This definition includes the contract solutions associated with OCS and could include rapid systems development acquisitions. Likewise, OCS must be managed programmatically.

¹ Public Law 109-364, *John Warner FY2007 National Defense Authorization Act*, Section 854, “Joint Policies on Requirements Definition, Contingency Program Management, and Contingency Contracting.”

In accordance with DoD Directive (DoDD) 3020.49, *Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution*, and the definition of OCS as a JCA, this document addresses the OCS component of contingency program management, excluding system development programs covered under the Joint Rapid Action Cell and DoDD/DoDI 5000 series guidance.

DoDD 3020.49 defines program management as it relates to OCS as “the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the OCS efforts to meet the joint force commander’s objectives.” By applying program management principles to OCS, contracted support of deployed military operations becomes more effective, efficient, and compliant with law. PgM, as applied to OCS, is not concerned with the development of large weapon systems, but it does not exclude the need for traditional program managers to develop materiel solutions to facilitate OCS, such as biometric solutions, contracting and contractor management tools, and the Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker (SPOT). PgM of OCS involves improving the way we synchronize, coordinate, and integrate OCS capabilities among diverse communities in a structured fashion to achieve exponentially greater return on our collective investment. It also means ensuring OCS is institutionalized across the Total Force.

Application of Program Management to OCS

OCS is not an end in and of itself, but a means to an end. It exists to accomplish the strategy and objectives of the organization. Strategic guidance from U.S. and DoD leadership recognizes OCS as a critical capability, and one that requires proper management. PgM must not be limited to strategic-level organizations; it should apply across all echelons. Business planning and management, which influence capital planning and investment activities, also support the organizational strategy.

OCS is a capability portfolio management area to ensure appropriate investment and oversight. Programs and projects are initiated, planned, executed, managed, and transitioned to support the development of OCS as a capability for executing operations, which are supported by the Tier 3 business processes. It is important to distinguish between traditional program management as defined in the DOD 5000 series regulations and a programmatic approach to OCS as defined in DODD 3020.49. OCS PgM requires management in three key areas:

- *Benefits:* OCS provides contracts and contractors so objectives can be accomplished. Each contract is a project that must balance constraints of cost, schedule, and performance, as well as scope and quality. OCS projects can only deliver their intended benefits through proper monitoring and control and the generation of metrics for review at higher echelons by portfolio, program, and requiring activity project managers. Contracts must be individually managed and collectively integrated into the overall OCS action plan to ensure their intended benefits are not sub-optimized at the individual contract level and their benefits are realized across all echelons and in concert with our mission partners. PgM further ensures that market research and collective requirements influence decisions and the development of contracts to optimize solutions and address the needs across echelons and in conjunction with mission partners. Finally, PgM ensures OCS provides flexible, responsive solutions to meet

strategic, operational, and tactical requirements and enables a transition to sustain the benefits beyond the contract period.

- *Stakeholders*: PgM calls for extensive coordination and synchronization of OCS across the joint force, among WoG, and with multinational partners to encourage cooperation, capitalize on economies of scale, and promote unity of effort. Management of stakeholders also involves leveraging NGO capabilities to accomplish tasks within their charter, understanding market forces in the JOA, leveraging global and local suppliers to accomplish mission tasks, and consideration of effects on partnerships at higher echelons. Theater and operational-level OCS PgM must also consider system and external support contracts beyond those generated in theater. Leaders and commanders will designate an individual responsible for OCS PgM to ensure leaders and commanders are informed and OCS is integrated and synchronized at each echelon. Effective communication among stakeholders (within and external to DoD) promotes trust, mitigates risk, and overcomes obstacles to the desired benefits. These capabilities require continuous, accurate, and timely sharing of information among stakeholders.
- *Governance*: Program governance provides a structure and process for achieving program success. Emerging strategy (e.g., the Quadrennial Defense Review, or QDR, and this CONOPS), OCS policy (e.g., directives or instructions), and doctrine (e.g., joint publications [JP 4-10]) lay a foundation for communicating, understanding, and managing OCS. Organizationally, the portfolio manager, OCS PgM, and boards (e.g., CLPSB, JARB, JCSB²) all need to ensure contract authority is integrated with command authority and processes and procedures are defined in memoranda of agreement or understanding (MOAs or MOUs) or terms of reference (TORs). OCS measures define criteria to ensure oversight and provide feedback to decision makers on future implementation of OCS at each echelon. This critical feedback ensures OCS matures as a capability to an optimum level in accordance with continuous process improvement. Governance further provides a means for raising issues, reporting status, supporting oversight of compliance, and offering a mechanism for managing risk.

Implementation of OCS PgM during contingencies involves five phases: pre-program standup, program standup, establishment of program management, delivery of incremental benefits, and program close.³ These activities, discussed briefly below, occur across all echelons and involve both the OCS institutional mission to build capacity—the ability of individuals, institutions, and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner—and the operational mission to execute capabilities:

- *Pre-program standup* establishes the foundation for successful OCS during contingencies, which by their nature may not allow sufficient time for planning and coordination once they occur. To the extent practical, OCS should be coordinated before any contingency. Longstanding relationships with partners, internal and external to DoD, provide a sound basis for subsequent crisis planning. This phase defines the value of OCS to the organization and how it supports and aligns with the operational mission; identifies key decision makers and partners and defines their roles and

² CLPSB = CCDR Logistics Procurement Support Board; JARB = Joint Acquisition Review Board; and JCSB = Joint Contracting Support Board.

³ The five phases of OCS PgM were derived from program management best practices.

responsibilities; establishes program guidance and governance; and defines the scope and constraints of the program. This information is captured in MOAs or MOUs and in OCS program charters or TORs to facilitate interaction and governance. At the strategic level, the OCS COI is organized during this phase, and it continues to evolve its membership. Having an OCS community in place facilitates changes in OCS guidance in Joint Strategic Planning System documents and the integration of those changes across policy, doctrine, organizations, plans, training, and resourcing. At the theater level, joint operational contract support planners (JOCSPs) assist the CCDR—in conjunction with military service-component OCS planners—in establishing contract and contractor plans for contingencies in the command’s operational and contingency plans (OPLANs and CONPLANs) (via Annex W). Service-component plans provide the backbone of plan details. During steady state activities, these JOCSPs assist in integrating OCS into theater planning and activities. They may also be deployed to provide continuity when a contingency occurs. Training for OCS and non-OCS personnel across all levels is included in the pre-program standup phase. The participation of partners in exercises that integrate OCS facilitates the development of convergent and coherent doctrine, organizations, and materiel solutions to improve OCS execution and unity of effort during a contingency.

- *Program standup* builds upon the pre-program standup process and includes the approval to execute OCS. For the institutional mission, the COI is involved in program standup and the development of strategic guidance, such as this CONOPS, and analysis, coordination, and approval of standards, gaps, and solutions. At the theater and operational echelons, this phase entails the establishment of ad hoc partnerships, mobilization of OCS personnel, assignment of OCS-specific organizational solutions (such as the standup of a joint theater contracting command or center [JTCC] or deployment of a Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office [JCASO] forward team), assignment of an OCS head of program management (HPM) who reports to the JFC, and refinement of TORs to align OCS with mission-specific contingency details. It is critical to assign responsibilities in this phase and identify resources to accomplish tasks, institute mechanisms for accountability, and establish value priorities as a basis for evaluating future trades and decisions.
- *Establishment of program management* integrates partners and further refines guidance, policy, processes, measures, templates, and systems to ensure appropriate coordination and communication. Institutionally, ad hoc agreements or additional policy and guidance may be required. At the theater level, it involves the establishment or refinement of OCS bodies; coordination among partners; and standup of physical organizations in theater, including assignment of facilities and establishment of electronic means for communications (such as web portals, e-mails, or address books) to facilitate delivery, monitoring, and control and the transition of benefits, as required.
- *Delivery of incremental benefits* focuses on the delivery of contract solutions to meet operational needs. For the institutional echelon, this phase involves initiation and development of capacity development projects and programs, including the development of solutions across DOTMLPF⁴ and the application of OCS capability to achieve

⁴ Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities

awareness and increase maturity. At the operational level, synchronization of requirements, solutions, and resources delivers effective and efficient benefits. Contracts and contractors that achieve operational effects will likely produce benefits in accomplishing the strategic vision. Improved PgM of OCS solutions in requirements development, sourcing, execution, and oversight of contract solutions strengthen benefits for all partners. Accountability and visibility of contract solutions are provided at the tactical level and generate metrics that provide valuable feedback for higher level echelon decisions concerning OCS. The reporting of benefits allows the tracking of program success and accommodates benchmarking of best practices. It also provides a catalyst for strategic communications to embolden partners, deter opponents, and obtain political support.

- *Program close* involves transitioning ongoing OCS activities to operations or other partners, administrative closeout activities, and closing the contingency program management structure (JTCC, JCASO, and the supporting infrastructure). During this phase, transition of requirements development, PgM, and contingency contracting to the incoming organization is accomplished. DoD and partner OCS organizations and personnel redeploy, temporary theater OCS organizations are disbanded, and infrastructure elements (facilities and Web portals) are returned to a pre-contingency state. After-action reports, lessons learned, and contract closeout documents are generated, reviewed, and integrated into future institutional mission and OCS planning activities.

Contract Support Integration

Contract support integration (CSI) is the process of synchronizing joint operational planning, requirements development, and contract support actions for deployed military forces and other designated organizations in the area of responsibility (AOR) to support the range of military operations. CSI actions require the development of acquisition-ready requirements for theater support and external support contracts, and they must be closely coordinated with external and system support contracting authorities. Properly planned and executed CSI actions

- increase command visibility and control of common contracting functions within the JOA;
- minimize competition for scarce commercial resources within the JOA;
- reduce or eliminate redundant contracts and achieve economies of scale;
- enable enforcement of priorities of support and direction of contract actions to promote the civil-military aspects of the campaign plan (e.g., the “Iraqi First” program where the JFC directed maximum use of local national contracts and contractor personnel);
- ensure OCS is utilized effectively, efficiently, and properly;
- mitigate risk of contract fraud, waste, and abuse; and
- increase integration of contracted support into the overall effort, especially in logistics and distribution domains.

CSI requires coordinating theater support, external support, and common systems support contracts within the JOA. It also includes planning and execution support to multinational and other

government agency (OGA) partners and special interest and capacity development programs, such as the current Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP).

CSI has five distinct phases: planning, requirements identification, contract instrument development, contract execution, and contract closeout. These phases are briefly described below:

- *Planning* includes all activities necessary to provide at each echelon the requisite capabilities before, during, and after an operation. At the theater level, a contract support integration plan (CSIP) is developed. The CSIP includes information the JFC units need to plan and execute theater, external, and systems support contracts in the operational area to support the joint force and multinational and OGA partners. Pre-contingency planning defines OCS organizational responsibilities and contracting and coordination authorities; it may identify initial joint, multinational, and OGA operational needs and the availability of organic or other non-contracted means of support, such as host nation support. It may also involve market research to determine availability, quantity, and quality of contractor sources in the potential area of operations. Pre-contingency planning defines initial contracted support requirements; determines military service and partner contracting organizations, command and control, contracting authority, and coordinating authorities; and ensures coordination of contracting organizations deployment and in-theater support requirements.
- *Requirements identification* defines phase-specific operational requirements and adjusts planning in response to contingency-specific developments. At the strategic national level, revision to exercises, plans, and DOTMLPF solutions may be required in response to joint urgent operational needs and lessons learned to ensure continuous process improvement. At the theater and operational levels, adjustments to the following information may be required:
 - Designated contracting organization, along with the associated command and control
 - Membership and roles of related boards and cells
 - Funding mechanisms and process guidance
 - Common contracting procedures, such as theater business clearance (TBC)
 - Guidance for use of local nationals (LNs).

During this phase, requiring activities identify their requirements for subsequent validation, prioritization, and sourcing at the JARB. The JARB is not a contracting board; it is a forum the head of requirements definition (HRD) should use to coordinate and control requirements generation and prioritization of contract supplies and services needed to support the mission. The HRD (via the JARB) validates, prioritizes, and determines the appropriate source of support for supplies and services across the JOA, integrating partner requirements whenever possible. A key role of the HRD is to ensure standardization in the approach to and process of requirements definition for theater requirements in a JOA. This includes the use of common templates for performance work statements (PWSs) and independent government estimates (IGEs). Such documents facilitate the creation of acquisition-ready requirements documents and successful contract vehicles.

- *Contract instrument development* delivers contract vehicles that are synchronized and coordinated across DoD and among all partners to leverage existing solutions and achieve economies of scale. This process requires access to a contracting management system that provides visibility of commercial sources of support within the JOA, including DoD and partner contracts. The OCS contracting management tool needs to be able to obtain, maintain, and update information on the availability, quantity, and quality of commercial sources. During this phase, market research and analysis identify what commercial sources of supplies and services are available. Contract instruments are also reviewed for suitability before seeking new sources. The appropriate contract instrument is then selected after considering several key factors, including price competition, cost analysis and uncertainty, and urgency of requirements (see Federal Acquisition Regulation [FAR 16.104]). Appropriate consideration of these factors ensures the appropriate division of cost, schedule, and performance risk between the contractor and the government, and provides an optimal basis for the contractor to be able to meet the government's requirements.

The JCSB is a key mechanism in maximizing the use of existing contract instruments to produce effective and efficient contracted support. Coordination between contracting officers and requiring activities is critical when defining requirements, support, and contract oversight. In accordance with federal statute and DoD policy, contracting officer's representatives (CORs) from the requiring activity must be trained and assigned prior to contract award to ensure adequate surveillance of contracts. In addition, the requiring activity must ensure the CORs have the appropriate technical skills (e.g., electrical, food service, or water purification) to properly monitor the contract. JFCs gain visibility and authority and support all contingency contracts being performed to or delivered in a JOA (including system and external support contracts) through the TBC process. Besides ensuring visibility, TBC ensures solicitations and contracts comply with the commander's intent and contain necessary language to ensure compliance with battlefield orders, local contract oversight, and pre-arrangement of any required GFS for contractor personnel.

Depending on the contract type and dollar amount, this phase may include development of a formal solicitation package and submission for formal advertising of the solicitation to the contractor community and negotiations. Use of appropriate competition procedures such as sealed bidding, competitive proposals and other procedures promote and provide for full and open competition in soliciting and awarding government contracts and ensures the government pays a fair price in the market place. This stage ends when the contract is awarded.

- *Contract execution* begins with contract award and includes both contract administration by the government and contract performance by the contractor. Contract administration involves those activities performed by government officials (i.e., contracting officers, quality assurance representatives, contracting officer's representatives, and property administrators) to determine how well the government and the contractor performed in meeting the requirements of the contract. It encompasses all dealings between the government and the contractor from the time the contract is awarded until the work has been completed and accepted or the contract terminated, payment has been

made, and disputes have been resolved. This includes: tracking of contractor performance, contract modifications, settlement of disputes, contractor payments, maintaining accountability of contractor personnel, equipment, and property. Contract administration constitutes that primary part of the procurement process that assures the government gets what it paid for. In the contingency environment, contract administration services are typically referred to as contingency contracting administration services (CCAS). Conducting CCAS is challenging due to the austere and often dangerous environment. Successful execution of CCAS requires commitment of both requiring activities and contracting activities to perform their respective roles. CCAS personnel monitor contract execution, generate metrics, and report on performance to provide valuable feedback and visibility regarding the contractor's performance.

- *Contract closeout* occurs once the contract has been completed and all outstanding contract administration issues have been resolved. This phase includes initiating final payment to—or collection from—the contractor, de-obligating excess funds, and finalizing records disposal and disposition. Contract closeout ends once the contracting officer has prepared a contract completion statement and placed a signed original in the contract file. Contract closeout requirements are codified in FAR Part 4.804 and include the completion of disposition of classified material, receipt of property clearance, settlement of subcontracts by the prime contractor, and settlement of all interim or disallowed costs. In some cases, responsibility for ongoing contract activities are assumed by other government entities and transition is required. This may involve the transfer of equipment from the contractor to government personnel. In other cases, contract planning will require coordination between outgoing and in-coming government organizations to effectively synchronize periods of performance and sustain contracted services during the transition. Government-furnished equipment (GFE) and contractor acquired government owned (CAGO) is returned and assessed, and a decision is made on its retention, sale, or disposal. At this point, final contract closeout occurs, unless the contract mission is assumed either by the CCDR as an ongoing peacetime mission or by an OGA as a continuing requirement.

Contractor Management

The contractor management (CM) process is composed of five key phases: planning, pre-deployment, deployment and reception, in-theater management, and redeployment. These are executed across command echelons. CM generally involves the control, care, and potentially the feeding of contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF) and deploying into a JOA, but it also includes force protection and security issues of non-CAAF employees and extends to OGA and other partner contractor personnel operating in the JOA. CAAF generally include U.S. citizens and third country nationals (TCNs) that do not normally reside in the JOA and require close proximity to U.S. forces. Non-CAAF contractors, or those not qualifying as CAAF, are generally not granted access to GFS. Proper CM planning and execution facilitates effective support, reduces risk to the joint force, and conserves U.S. resources. The five key CM phases are described below:

- *Planning* includes all activities necessary to provide capabilities before, during, and after an operation at each echelon. Institutionally, policy, regulations, guidance, and measures are defined to aid in the execution of CM. Myriad policies govern the

deployment of contractor personnel. The capstone document, DoDI 3020.41, *Program Management for Acquisition and Operational Contract Support in Contingency Operations* (proposed), provides overarching guidance and serves as a reference for existing regulatory and policy guidance and procedures governing contingency contractor personnel. The SPOT business rules provide additional guidance for ensuring visibility and accountability of contractors in the JOA. At the theater echelon, pre-contingency planning ensures integration of contractor management planning into operational plans. A combatant command contractor management plan (CMP) provides broad general guidance to ensure contractors supporting an operation are qualified to deploy, processed for deployment and redeployment, received in theater, and visible and managed in theater, as required under the terms and conditions of the contract. The CMP applies to U.S., third-country, and LN contractors supporting system, external, and theater support contracts. This evolving CMP template, which is being integrated into the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES), addresses guidance on force protection and security, medical support, personnel recovery, and movement control matters for CAAF and non-CAAF personnel who perform duties in the vicinity of U.S. forces and OGAs in the JOA. The CMP is integrated with the CSIP to enable risk assessments regarding the impact of contractors in support of military operations. The CMP can also shape the determination of in-theater staff required to oversee and enforce CM activities. CSIP-related decisions that affect the quantity, type, and rate of change in the numbers of contractor personnel in the JOA have a direct bearing on the quantity and type of in-theater staff required to oversee, execute, and enforce CM activities. Theater planning requires the identification and promulgation of operation-specific guidance, policy, and procedures, including contractor entry requirements defined in the *Foreign Clearance Guide* and other geographic combatant commander (GCC)-specific theater entrance guidance (e.g., TBC). It also requires the establishment of designated reception sites (DRSs) to in-process them. Planning identifies the GFS that contractor personnel may be authorized to receive in the JOA. Planning occurs in conjunction with OGAs (including the chief of missions) and longstanding partners to ensure coordination of partner requirements. Contractors must be integrated with the time-phased force and deployment data (TPFDD) to ensure the synchronized deployment of the Total Force.

- *Predeployment* includes actions taken by the government and contract companies to ensure contractor personnel meet all requirements established by the supported GCC and subordinate JFCs before entering the AOR or JOA. This process involves coordination among requiring activities, CCDR staff, contracting officers, and company administrators to ensure personnel are deployable and not excluded for deployment based on legal, health, security, or other constraints. Eligibility, as defined in the *Foreign Clearance Guide* and other GCC-specific theater entrance guidance process, may require country and theater clearances, waiver authorities, immunizations, required training or equipment, and the forestalling of any restrictions to ensure proper deployment, visibility, security, accountability, and redeployment of CAAF in the JOA. Deployment-cleared contractors are issued identification cards and letters of authorization (LOAs). As required under Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 225.7401 and applicable TBC policy, contracts must integrate JOA-related CM language, including CM clauses related to force protection and security, base

badging and access procedures, and personnel recovery plans for service contracts that have contract employees who will perform their duties in the vicinity of U.S. forces. During pre-deployment, contractors should receive military training based on specific duty requirements and may be issued organizational clothing and individual equipment (OCIE), including protective clothing and equipment, as required. DRSs use the projected deployment and redeployment travel itineraries to accommodate reception, staging, onward-movement, and integration (RSOI) planning. Pre-deployment activities are captured electronically in SPOT to improve visibility and accountability of personnel throughout their deployment.

- *Deployment* involves managing the flow of contractors into the JOA (via a DRS) and IAW theater policies and procedures. Deployment and subsequent movements are tracked using automated tools, such as the Joint Asset Movement Management System (JAMMs) and SPOT, to promote visibility and accountability of contractors. Obtaining and maintaining personnel accountability enables the JFC to control the entrance and egress of contract personnel into and out of the JOA. It further allows the JFC to automatically track—by name and location—the movement of deployed contractors throughout the contractor’s deployment. Contractors are processed through DRS, where pre-deployment processing is validated and RSOI procedures are executed. Upon arrival at their duty station, contractors report to their requiring activities, at which point oversight and contracted support begins.
- *In-theater management* involves orchestrating and managing the provision of day-to-day support and the enforcement of personnel accountability, force protection, discipline, movement control, and other general CM policies and procedures through the appropriate military service, status of forces agreement, and combat support agency channels. GFS includes provision of base operating support (such as billeting, messing, laundry, mail, morale, welfare and recreation services, and deployable base or post exchange access); medical support (such as emergency and resuscitative care, stabilization, hospitalization at medical treatment facilities, and assistance with patient movement in emergencies involving risk of loss of life, limb, or eyesight); incorporation of all contractors into personnel recovery systems and plans; and provision of mortuary affairs. Contractor discipline is maintained by contract companies. Government disciplinary action includes the ability to revoke LOA privileges and access to military facilities and to investigate, conduct apprehensions, refer for prosecution to the Department of Justice, and charge and prosecute CAAF personnel for major (felony-level) discipline infractions. Implementing force protection and security includes vetting contractors, incorporating biometrics, controlling base access, issuing and controlling the use of weapons, and controlling the use of contingency contractor personnel to provide security services. To achieve this, the JFC requires situational battlespace awareness of the Total Force, which includes contractors. Intra-theater movement control includes directing contractor movement through DoD, OGA, or partner-contracted support convoy along specified routes and times.
- *Re-deployment* involves orchestrating and conducting the redeployment of contractor personnel out of the JOA upon completion of their period of performance or, if extenuating circumstances dictate, early redeployment (such as for administrative actions or changes in deployment eligibility). Re-deployment also requires contractors to

out-process through their requiring activity, redeploy through a contractor replacement center, ensure the return of OCIE, complete medical screenings, and close deployments in SPOT. If contractor personnel terminate employment, company contract administrators must release them so potential new employers can register them in SPOT. Lessons learned and information on contractor performance must be recorded to improve CM.

Supporting Ideas and Key Considerations

Contracting Authority vs. Command Authority

Contracting authority and command authority are not one in the same. Contracting authority is the authority to enter into binding contracts and obligate the U.S. government; command authority includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.

Contracting authority resides with the head of contracting activity (HCA), the official who has the responsibility to ensure the integrity of and legal compliance of contracts issued under his authority. The authority to acquire supplies and services for the government comes from three sources: the U.S. Constitution; statutory authority; and regulatory authority from the FAR, DFARS, and military department (MilDep) supplements. In the operational area, contract authority flows from Congress to the President, then to the Secretary of Defense (SecDef), through the military service or agency head, to the senior procurement executive, the HCA, the senior contracting official (SCO), and finally to the contracting officer. This contracting authority is explicitly documented in the contracting officer's warrant; however, synchronization and integration of these multiple HCA authorities and contract solutions in joint, WoG, and coalition operations is complicated.

Command authority includes the authority to perform functions involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks and designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of an operation. It does not include the authority to make binding contracts or obligate funds on behalf of the U.S. government. Commanders at all levels must avoid improper command influence, or its appearance, on the contracting process. The contracting officer must be able to independently exercise sound, unbiased business judgment and contract oversight in the accomplishment of the contracting mission. Title 10 U.S. Code (USC), Section 164, grants command authorities and identifies the powers and duties for combatant commanders. In all contingency operations, contracts should incorporate appropriate terms and conditions that permit area and base commanders to exercise local directive authority over CAAF personnel and any non-CAAF employees operating in the vicinity of U.S. forces in matters of force protection, security, and safety of the force. Command responsibilities associated with contingency contracting may include the following:

- Determining requirements, appointing CORs and SMEs to oversee and assist in oversight of contract performance, and acting as the adjudication authority for contractor requests for GFS, in coordination with contracting officials.
- Defining the rules for the use of force—According to applicable U.S., host nation (HN), or international law; relevant status-of-force agreements (SOFAs); international

agreements; or other arrangements with local authorities and on a case-by-case basis when military force protection and legitimate civil authority are deemed unavailable or insufficient, the CCDR (or a designee no lower than the general/flag officer level) may authorize contingency contractor personnel to be armed for individual self-defense. In such cases, the contracting officer or designee will validate completion of weapons familiarization, qualifications, and briefings regarding rules for the use of force to the contingency contractor personnel in accordance with CCDR policies. Provision of weapons to contractor personnel must be permitted by the defense contractor and the contract and voluntary on the part of the individual. The contract will require the contract company ensure such personnel are not prohibited to possess firearms under U.S. law. When armed for personal protection, contingency contractor personnel are only authorized to use force for individual self-defense. Unless immune from local laws or HN jurisdiction by virtue of an international agreement or international law, the contract will include language advising contingency contractor personnel that the inappropriate use of force could subject them to U.S., local, HN prosecution and civil liability.

- Execution of military justice—CAAF remain subject to U.S. laws and regulations. CAAF are subject to prosecution under federal law, including the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Subject to any host nation law, status of forces agreements, and the jurisdiction of the Department of State (e.g., consulate or chief of mission) over civilians in another country, commanders retain authority to respond to an incident, restore safety and order, investigate an incident, apprehend suspected offenders, and otherwise address the immediate needs of the situation. UCMJ authority is contingent upon Department of Justice's notification that it will not pursue prosecution. Contingency contractor personnel are also subject to the domestic criminal laws of the local nation absent a SOFA or international agreement to the contrary. When confronted with disciplinary problems involving contingency contractor personnel, commanders will seek the assistance of their legal staff, the contracting officer responsible for the contract, and the contractor's management team.

Key Players in OCS

Effective and efficient execution of OCS requires coordination among contingency contracting, OCS program management, and requirements definition functions. Common policies and a preplanned organizational approach among military service, defense agency, OGA, and coalition partners is required to achieve unity of effort and deliver OCS that is responsive to commander needs.

In accordance with changes to Chapter 137 of Title 10, USC, each MilDep designates a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service to administer and synchronize OCS policy. Further, each military department must maintain the capacity to conduct contingency contracting and OCS PgM and requirements definition during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving interagency organizations. This includes maintaining sufficient personnel with the requisite functional-area training and participation of personnel in exercises. Integration with interagency and coalition partners in exercises and subsequently in contingency operations improves coordination and integration and may offset manning requirements.

During combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, the GCC for the AOR in which the operations occur will assign a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to act as head of contingency contracting (HCC). The HCC oversees execution of contingency contracting to deliver contract solutions that are responsive to subordinate unified joint task force (JTF) commanders' requirements. The HCC also synchronizes and integrates contract methods within and external to the theater and in conjunction with WoG and coalition capabilities. To ensure jointness and cross-service, cross-agency, and national coordination, the HCC may establish a joint contracting support board that maximizes the contracting capabilities of the JOA while minimizing competition for limited vendor capabilities. The HCC coordinates the efforts of SCOs assigned to subordinate JFCs. The HCC also act in coordination with the HPM and HRD. If designated by the CCDR, the HCC role can be a functional responsibility of the senior contracting official supporting the operation.

The theater combatant commander designates an OCS head of program management during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple U.S. agencies and international organizations. The HPM is a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service, with appropriate experience and qualifications. The HPM oversees all efforts related to planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading OCS in the CCDR's AOR. The HPM manages benefits and advises the CCDR on pertinent issues (including risk, opportunity, resources, communication, transition, and improvement) by maintaining awareness, establishing measures and thresholds, monitoring reporting, and conducting reviews of OCS activity in theater. The HPM provides governance for OCS activities in theater, establishing policy and procedures, such as the theater business clearance process, to integrate system, external, and theater support contracts. The HPM cultivates collaboration among diverse stakeholders (e.g., the military services, defense agencies, OGAs, and coalition partners) and may establish a CCDR CLPSB or draft a TOR or other charter agreement to facilitate jointness and cross-service, cross-agency, and national coordination; assign responsibilities; and promote unity of effort. The HPM role is designated by the CCDR and may be a senior command officer or SES in his staff or subordinate organization.

Definition of requirements is an operational function. Sub-unified JFCs will serve as the lead for these activities. If the GCC delegates this function to someone other than the JTF commander, it will be assigned to a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service, with appropriate experience and qualifications related to the definition of requirements to be satisfied through acquisition contracts. The head of requirements definition and coordination during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, leads a requirements review board (the joint acquisition review board, or JARB), involving all concerned joint, interagency, and partner organizations. Operational requirements that meet criteria established by policy are sent through the JARB to ensure a proper level of review and synchronization before acquisition action. The HRD ensures requirements are defined in a way that effectively implements WoG objectives, policies, and decisions regarding the allocation of resources, coordination of interagency efforts in the theater of operations, and alignment of requirements with the proper use of funds. The HRD also oversees all requirements management functions down to the tactical echelon, ensuring CORs/SMEs are available, assigned, trained, and performing to standard. In collaboration with the HPM and HCC, the HRD integrates and coordinates requirements management with OCS program management and contingency contract activities from conception of

requirements through delivery of contract effects and close out of contract activities. HRD is a functional responsibility of the CCDR and delegable. (The definitions in the back of the CONOPS further detail.)

Whole-of-Government and Multinational Partners

OCS policymakers and program managers plan for DoD's OCS to assist forces from coalition nations and other U.S. government agencies in the AOR. For example, the expansion of WoG processes within the national security sector should encourage GCCs to plan for OCS that supports State Department (DoS) personnel⁵ as combat operations wind down, when the military turns its focus to stabilizing local governance and restoring security. GCCs should also plan for the possibility that DoS contracted support will accommodate the military force's needs during this transition, as operations move into stabilization and reconstruction missions and into returning services to the local civil authorities. Likewise, GCCs should plan OCS to support the requirements of coalition forces and consider the possibility that another nation's contracted support may meet the operational needs of the U.S. force (e.g., trucking or warehousing).

Non-Governmental Organizations

NGOs are private, self-governing, not-for-profit organizations (local, national, or transnational) dedicated to alleviating human suffering; promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society, among others. NGOs can provide immediate relief in high-risk areas where humanitarian assistance is needed, and they may be equipped with the resources and expertise to participate in complex, interagency, inter-governmental organization environments. A sustained, long-term NGO presence is not uncommon and may remain engaged after the military has accomplished its assigned tasks and departed the AOR.

NGOs are not partners. They are fellow actors in the area and may cooperate in limited ways, but they seldom, if at all, operate as integrated partners. They are not a part of the coalition unless they are a United Nations (UN) agency; and even then, their authority to cooperate may be limited. In the most benign humanitarian assistance efforts, NGOs may cooperate with DoS or USAID; and then only in a contractual relationship such as building a school in another country. Coordination with the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance and other USAID offices may provide DoD visibility and awareness of NGO activities and a means for leveraging civilian community capabilities without compromising NGO charters or affecting their independent status. In Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) operations, U.S. NGOs, such as the American Red Cross, may be more cooperative and support recovery operations from natural disasters. In general, these organizations will resist any association with the military to preserve their neutrality and preclude violating their charter. However, the presence of NGOs must be accommodated in planning and should be leveraged to the extent possible.

Transition plans for specific tasks may include NGOs. Although NGOs rarely participate in parallel planning with military, DoD must consider what support NGOs will provide to the local

⁵ Specifically, personnel from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS).

populace. NGOs may assume civil support activities, relieving U.S. forces until local commerce or government can prevail. Umbrella NGO groups may consult during a contingency. Local contingency contracting also should not price the NGOs out of business. When feasible, NGO representatives may be included in requirements and contract coordination boards to ensure unity of effort and prevent competition for limited local resources and services. To expedite the transition of operations and redeployment of U.S. forces, it may be mutually beneficial to aid NGOs by providing information (e.g., weather forecasts and unclassified security information). In addition, the JFC must consider the location and security of the entire civilian populace—including NGOs in the JOA—particularly if the local government cannot provide protection.

IV. Strategic Context

This section provides the strategic context for OCS. It aligns OCS with established strategy, describes the relationships and interdependencies with the family of joint operating concepts, joint integrating concepts, and joint capability areas and outlines the integrating process for maturing OCS.

Integration

DoD is currently embarked on a deliberate and orderly program to transform its capabilities. These changes have been incorporated into the joint operations concepts (JOpsC) that derive from the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, which identifies the characteristics of the future joint force. Both are part of the joint capabilities integration and development system (JCIDS) process, where a joint operating concept (JOC), joint integrating concept (JIC), or a sponsor-developed CONOPS initiates the review of capabilities and shortcomings. These concepts describe how joint forces are expected to operate over a wide range of possible situations. This CONOPS establishes OCS as a capability that is both supported by and supporting of the other foundational concepts.

OCS is a recognized capability that provides value to the warfighter. It is also an enabler to other capabilities. Accordingly, OCS must be integrated across DoD and with our mission partners to realize the full value of its capability and mitigate the risks associated with its use. Logistics is not the sole provider or integrator for OCS. Responsibility for integration of OCS should be accepted across functional staff directorates to ensure it is integrated with joint and military service processes and procedures. As an integral component of the Total Force, contractors should be integrated into military planning and support processes.

Joint Operations Concepts Family

This CONOPS takes into account the full family of concepts headed by the *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* and includes JOCs, JICs, and JCAs. Together, these joint concepts describe how forces are expected to operate across the ROMO in the 2010 to 2025 timeframe. OCS relationships with the joint operating and integrating concepts are briefly described in the following subsections. These interdependencies illustrate the vast potential of OCS and the need to address OCS strategically to enable the greater joint force.

Joint Operating Concepts

OCS supports the JOCs and enables their successful execution. OCS not only provides contract services, personnel, and supplies, it also provides strategic options and operational flexibility and facilitates integration with interagency and multinational partners in various military operations:

- Major combat operations (MCOs). OCS supports four of the eight operational-level objectives for MCOs: isolate the adversary, gain and maintain operational access, deny enemy battlespace awareness (BA), and deny enemy freedom of action. OCS capabilities also reduce military force requirements while maintaining necessary operations tempo through improved visibility, commonality, reliability, maintainability, sustainability, and survivability.
- *Homeland defense (HLD) and civil support*. OCS promotes the unified action necessary for HLD operations. This JOC recognizes civil authority missions require DoD support, including contractor personnel. This JOC also recognizes an evolving trend within DoD to rely heavily on integration, coordination, and synchronization with interagency and multinational partners. OCS supports the Federal Response Framework for non-military contingencies by coordinating with the lead federal agency and numerous federal, state, and local governmental organizations; the National Guard, and NGOs.
- *Military support to stabilization, security transition, and reconstruction (SSTR)*. OCS complements SSTR across all six operational phases. OCS solutions rapidly provide essential civilian assistance, humanitarian aid, and reconstruction materiel and services in permissive and non-permissive environments, including support to restore critical infrastructure services while minimizing the impact of military forces on the civil-military aspect of the operation. SSTR recognizes OCS as an enabling capability that can enable U.S. commanders to rapidly bring to bear reliable, expert foreign and domestic contractor support for a wide variety of SSTR undertakings.
- *Irregular warfare (IW)*. OCS offers an economic solution (e.g., a non-traditional method) to achieve, by indirect means, a strategic effect on the population. Local contractors mitigate the persistent and protracted nature of IW operations. Protracted irregular warfare depends on building global capability and capacity; building capacity can be achieved with OCS that focuses more on the pertinent populations than on the enemy.
- *Deterrence operations*. OCS aids deterrence by enhancing the credibility of U.S. forces to impose costs or deny benefits. OCS expands U.S. military capabilities and employs contractors to relieve military forces so they may be applied to other missions, thus protecting military readiness. Moreover, integration of OCS in WoG planning and response can support engagement actions at home and abroad.
- *Military contribution to cooperative security*. OCS strengthens U.S. security posture and develops partner nation capacity and capabilities to alleviate the conditions, motivators, and enablers of violent extremism and destabilizing militancy. We can cite two examples of how OCS was used in Africa to build civil capacity (which strengthened the representative government) and military capacity by improving training.

Joint Integrating Concepts

Seven of the nine JICs have OCS application. Sea basing may have future OCS-related support, and Global Strike is generally not related to OCS.

- *Forcible entry.* OCS capabilities support the force across the ROMO, although at a more limited level for forcible entry operations.
- *Combating weapons of mass destruction (WMD).* OCS provides specialized contractor support during the elimination of WMD or redirection of dual-use industries and during consequence management, if required.
- *Joint urban operations.* OCS contributes to the resolution of complex operational environments, the control and protection of urban sectors, and denial of adversary access to segments of the population and other key resources in the urban system. Specifically, this JIC identifies a DOTMLPF requirement for significant use of contractor expertise. More broadly, OCS facilitates all the supporting elements of this JIC by providing SMEs with tacit knowledge that cannot be captured otherwise, aiding in the detection of hostile elements, differentiating those element from other elements of the population, gaining the allegiance of the population, and protecting the improvements to and support of the urban system by influencing indigenous perceptions and attitudes, injecting local economic support, and restoring degraded urban subsystems.
- *Joint logistics (distribution).* OCS augments the joint deployment and distribution enterprise system with ready, scalable, and agile distribution capabilities; access to private lines of communications and stocks of supply; and alternatives to military supply chains. Emerging OCS capabilities need to provide greater visibility and integration with joint force capabilities to inform sourcing decisions.
- *Command and control.* Emerging OCS command and control (C2) capabilities need to integrate contractors with the rest of the Total Force C2 capabilities. OCS collaboration among interagency, multinational, and ad hoc partners promotes unity of effort in support of C2.
- *Net-centric operational environment.* OCS, which is supported by net-centric operations, depends on an ability to share knowledge with diverse communities to ensure effective and efficient use of contracted support for contingencies.
- *Persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.* OCS offers local sources of information, provides interpreters and translators, delivers logistics service to intelligence organizations, and supports intelligence platforms.


Joint Capability Areas

OCS is one of seven Tier 2 JCAs under the Tier 1 Logistics JCA (see Figure IV-1). Moreover, OCS is critically important in supporting the other six joint logistics JCAs: deployment and distribution, supply, maintain, logistics services, engineering, and installation support.

Theater support contracts provide military supplies with reduced distribution times. Contractors often provide specialized technical maintenance to major weapon systems that are deployed in theater, and would otherwise be too expensive or impractical to create or maintain. Logistics services like food

and base support functions are also frequently provided by contractors. In some major operations, general engineering forces are significantly supplemented with contracted support. But OCS is not limited to logistics augmentation and can deliver contracted support to other functions and directorates (security, intelligence, C4, linguists, administrative support, etc.). As such, OCS supports and is supported by other Tier 1 JCAs: force application, C2, battlespace awareness, net-centric, protection, building partnerships, force support, and corporate management and support.

Figure IV-1. OCS Integration Across the Joint Capability Areas




Tier 2 capabilities must support future joint forces that are fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable, capable of decision superiority, and increasingly lethal. One of the logistics capability areas is OCS, which focuses on the ability to integrate and synchronize the provision of contracted support and effectively manage contractor personnel providing support to the joint force. Such capability requires a comprehensive program management approach to put the necessary capabilities in place (policies, processes, and procedures) that will enable timely, effective, and efficient contracted support during contingencies.

As prescribed in the high-level JIC and JOC documents, future OCS actions in a JOA must be technology-enabled. For example, logistics contracts need to be executed using an end-to-end automated system to assess, manage, and control the associated funding and supply and fulfillment chains, thus enabling joint logistics and distribution enterprise-wide visibility. This CONOPS for OCS should be utilized as a roadmap to near-term DOTMLPF gap analysis actions and to give direction to joint and military service OCS programs and policies.

Maturing OCS

Maturing OCS as a capability requires integration from JCAs down to Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), as shown by the closed loop system in Figure IV-2.

Figure IV-2. Maturing OCS as a Capability



This structured process ensures alignment from strategy down to individual tasks. While integrating lessons learned back up the process, it establishes a closed-loop system that facilitates continual process improvement of capabilities and strategies. Lessons learned from exercises and recent operations, such as Operations Iraqi and Enduring Freedom (OIF and OEF), show a clear need to integrate OCS into DoD policy and the military services' education, training, and exercise programs. The lessons from past operations highlight a need to focus on the non-acquisition workforce, warfighters, and planners, and to span all functional areas, commanders, staff officers, requiring officers, and contracting officer representatives. Non-acquisition personnel need to be familiar with OCS and their responsibilities related to managing contracts and contractors. The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) issued several lessons-learned reports. Each reported that the United States failed to integrate contracting and PgM systems. Varying regulations, chains of authority, contracting officer shortages, poor quality assurance, and interagency competition combined to sub-optimize the actual outcomes.

JCASO and JOCSPs are key contributors to the integration of OCS into exercises and plans and the identification of lessons learned. The integration and connectivity of JCAs, UJTLs, exercises, training and education, and comprehensive lessons learned will help mature OCS as an integral component of how DoD plans for and executes operations.

Echelon Definitions

OCS applies across all four command echelons (i.e., SN, ST, OP, TA) depicted in Figure IV-2. Those echelons are drawn from the levels of war (LOW) defined in the CJCS manual (CJCSM) 3500.04E, *Universal Joint Task Manual*, which defines three levels of war—strategic, operational, and tactical—with the strategic level subdivided into strategic national and strategic theater.

- *Strategic*. At this level, a nation, often as a member of a group of nations, determines national or multinational (alliance or coalition) strategic objectives and guidance, and develops and uses national resources to achieve those objectives. The President establishes policy, which the SecDef translates into national strategic objectives that facilitate theater strategic planning. Military strategy, derived from national strategy and policy and shaped by doctrine, provides a framework for conducting operations. The strategic LOW also describes activities that implement national and multinational military objectives and apply across DoD. It is divided into strategic national (DoD, military service, and interagency) and strategic theater (combatant command, interagency, and intergovernmental) to clarify and focus task development and execution.
- *Operational*. This level links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives. It focuses on the design and conduct of operations, using operational art—the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience—to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and to organize and employ military forces. This is the (coalition) JTF level.
- *Tactical*. In this LOW, battles and engagements are planned and executed to accomplish military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces. Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. The forces at this level employ a variety of tactics to achieve their military objectives.

Strategic Guidance

Multiple sources guided the development of this CONOPS. The list below is not exhaustive, but it includes a breadth of sources that were used to inform this concept:

- Public law, including national defense authorization acts (NDAAs) and U.S. Code
- Strategic guidance, including National Security Strategy (NSS), National Defense Strategy (NDS), National Military Strategy (NMS), *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations*, Guidance to Develop the Force (GDF), Guidance to Employ the Force (GEF), and Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP)
- Policy, including DoD directives (DoDD 3020.49) and instructions (DoDI 3020.41)
- Doctrine, including JP 4-10 and handbooks (*Joint Contingency Contracting Handbook*)
- Reports, including reports from the 2007 Gansler Commission and the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
- Lessons learned, including lessons from current operations and exercises

- Tools, including SPOT and JOPES.

In addition, more interested parties and products continue to emerge, including the following:

- New oversight bodies, such as the Commission on Wartime Contracting
- Active reports in work
- The Quadrennial Defense Review.

The 2008 National Defense Strategy dictates the following:

- “The Department should also develop the military capability and capacity to hedge against uncertainty, and the institutional agility and flexibility to plan early and respond effectively alongside interdepartmental, non-governmental, and international partners.”

NOTE: OCS satisfies this requirement and provides the requisite agility and flexibility.

- “The Department of Defense has taken on many of these burdens. Our forces have stepped up to the task of long-term reconstruction, development, and governance. The U.S. armed forces will need to institutionalize and retain these capabilities, but this is no replacement for civilian involvement and expertise. The United States must improve its ability to deploy civilian expertise rapidly, and continue to increase effectiveness by joining with organizations and people outside of government—untapped resources with enormous potential. . . . Greater civilian participation is necessary both to make military operations successful and to relieve stress on the men and women of the armed forces. Having permanent civilian capabilities available and using them early could also make it less likely that military forces will need to be deployed in the first place.”

NOTE: Leveraging the “untapped resources with enormous potential” of OCS can assist “in reconstruction and long-term improvements to economic vitality and relieves stress on the . . . armed forces.”

- “We will continue to work with other U.S. departments and agencies, state and local governments, partners and allies, and international and multilateral organizations to achieve our objectives. A whole-of-government approach is only possible when every government department and agency understands the core competencies, roles, missions, and capabilities of its partners and works together to achieve common goals. Examples such as expanding U.S. Southern Command’s interagency composition and the establishment of U.S. Africa Command will point the way. In addition, we will support efforts to coordinate national security planning more effectively, both within DoD and across other U.S. departments and agencies.”

NOTE: OCS accommodates integration with ‘whole of government’ and other partners.

- “The Total Force distributes and balances skills across each of its constituent elements: the active component, the reserve component, the civilian workforce, and the private sector and contractor base. Each element relies on the other to accomplish the mission; none can act independently of the other to accomplish the mission.”

NOTE: OCS provides the “contractor base” of the Total Force.

- “We also must continue to improve our acquisition and contracting regulations, procedures, and oversight to ensure agile and timely procurement of critical equipment and materials for our forces.”

NOTE: OCS achieves this goal for contingency scenarios.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review provides the following guidance:

- “The Department’s Total Force—its active and reserve military components, its civil servants, and its contractors—constitutes its warfighting capability and capacity.”

NOTE: OCS provides the contractor component of DoD’s ‘warfighting capability and capacity.’

- “The future force must be more finely tailored, more accessible to the joint commander and better configured to operate with other agencies and international partners in complex operations. It must have far greater endurance. It must be trained, ready to operate and able to make decisions in traditionally nonmilitary areas, such as disaster response and stabilization. Increasing the adaptability of the Total Force while also reducing stress on military personnel and their families is a top priority for the Department.”

NOTE: OCS satisfies all these requirements.

- “This operational Total Force must remain prepared for complex operations at home or abroad, including working with other U.S. agencies, allies, partners, and non-governmental organizations. Routine integration with foreign and domestic counterparts requires new forms of advanced joint training and education.”

NOTE: OCS, as a component of the Total Force, is applied ‘at home and abroad,’ with other agencies and partners, and in ‘training and education.’

- “Similarly, implementing the new Department of Defense Instruction Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany U.S. Armed Forces is another step toward integrating contractors into the Total Force. The Department’s policy now directs that performance of commercial activities by contractors, including contingency contractors and any proposed contractor logistics support arrangements, will be included in operational plans and orders. By factoring contractors into their planning, Combatant Commanders can better determine their mission needs.”

NOTE: OCS integrates contractors into operational plans through Annex Ws.

The 2009 *Capstone Concept for Joint Operations* envisions the following:

- “Moreover, in a globalized world, most such operations will tend to affect multiple international stakeholders, creating the political if not the operational need to act in concert with international partners....As a result, whether prompted by cooperation, competition, or conflict, future joint operations will require far greater cultural awareness than U.S. forces have demonstrated before and greater tolerance of both inefficiencies and limits on operational choice as the price of closer interagency and multinational collaboration.”

NOTE: Program management involves stakeholder management and OCS leverages local “cultural awareness.”

- “Since engagement imposes both direct budget costs and opportunity costs with respect to the joint forces that conduct them, that inability to measure their impact risks undermining the legislative and political support without which no engagement is feasible. Even more than other joint activities, therefore, engagement depends crucially on the persuasiveness of the strategic narrative underwriting it, and on the active sponsorship of political, diplomatic and military leaders. In the end, however difficult its results may be to quantify, joint engagement may be the most cost-effective of the nation’s military investments.”

NOTE: Program management of OCS provides the means to manage cost among and between contingencies and enables the option of conserving military forces for other contingencies.

- “Absent effective local law enforcement, relief and reconstruction activities may require concurrent security activities, and often must be integrated with nonmilitary efforts, both governmental and nongovernmental. Preparation for this mission must therefore consider two cases: one in which significant civilian relief assets are present, the other in which they are not. Joint relief and reconstruction activities may involve significant contractor support; such support will have to be integrated with the other actions of the joint force.”

NOTE: OCS supports “relief and reconstruction activities” and must be “integrated with the other actions of the joint force.”

- These precepts will underlie future joint operations:
 - “Achieve and maintain unity of effort (to include OCS) within the joint force and between the joint force and U.S. government, international, and other partners.”
NOTE: OCS can also promote unity of effort.
 - “Plan for and manage operational transitions (to include transition of OCS management and oversight) over time and space.”

- “Focus on operational objectives whose achievement suggests the broadest and most enduring results.”

NOTE: Use of OCS can achieve the greatest effect such as deterring terrorism by employing civilians in productive labor insulating them from corruption by terrorists.

- “...Ensure operational freedom of action.”

NOTE: OCS provides freedom of action through intelligence, funded movement and transportation and non-uniformed options.

- “Maintain operational and organizational flexibility.”

NOTE: OCS provides this flexibility.

- “Inform domestic audiences and influence the perceptions and attitudes of key foreign audiences as an explicit and continuous operational requirement.”

NOTE: Visibility and awareness of OCS helps inform domestic audiences, and endurance, non-uniform force of contractors, and employment of local civilians can be a powerful influence to foreign audiences.

- “Ensuring a balanced and versatile force will include addressing the proper ratio between Active and Reserve forces. It will also require assessing the proper role and management of contractors and other civilians within the force.”

NOTE: OCS ensures management of contractors through visibility and awareness.


V. Applying OCS

This section lays the foundation for OCS. It illustrates the OCS vision outlining a governance structure across command echelons, identifies major OCS actors, and describes OCS activities by phases.

OCS operates at varying degrees across all echelons of DoD—from strategic to tactical—and in one or more of the six planning phases. The impact of OCS by echelon and phase is directly dependent on the U.S. government’s strategic, operational, and tactical engagement objectives. The obvious dynamics require that DoD’s OCS concept fully embrace a WoG, responsive, and flexible approach to its role in the national and military strategy.

Major Actors—Who

Figure V-1. Operational Contract Support OV-1: Governance and Reporting




OCS is a team effort that requires the participation of many players—OGAs, Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), MilDepts, functional combatant commands (FCCs), JCASO, GCCs, CJTFs, service components, combat support agencies (CSAs), JTCC, Joint Staff, and partners. Each actor identified in Figure V-1 has provider and customer roles at four echelons. Governance (e.g., guidance, policy, process, measures) begins with building OCS capacity as an institutional mission at the highest level and ends at the tactical level with government personnel overseeing contractors during an operation, with benefits being realized across all echelons. At each echelon below national, commanders provide reporting (e.g., issues, requirements, lessons learned, metrics) to improve visibility and awareness to upper echelons, thus enabling continual process improvement.

At the *strategic national level*, the participants are OSD, its counterparts at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DoS, the Joint Staff, MilDepts, CSAs, and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM). Senior policymakers in three executive-branch departments (DHS, DoD, and DoS) determine how the national security sector will use OCS, and they define the interagency and interdepartmental processes to ensure a whole-of-government approach. OSD aligns strategy, policy, and investment for OCS within DoD and with mission partners by way of the OCS COI and its governing body, the OCS Functional Capabilities Integration Board (FCIB). The principal for OCS portfolio investment and policy is the Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Program Support (ADUSD[PS]), advised and assisted by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; however, multiple other OSD offices also participate, including the Defense Acquisition University, which provides formal training and certification on contingency contracting and contingency program management. Each MilDep (Air Force, Army, and Navy) participates in this process by giving a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service the responsibility for administering OCS policy.

MilDepts and ODAs ensure sufficient capabilities to enable OCS in support of contingency operations through DOTMLPF programs and by maintaining contracts (such as logistics civil augmentation program (LOGCAP), Navy husbanding contracts, Defense Logistics Agency (DLA Prime) Vendor, etc) to support current and future requirements. The MilDepts and ODAs ensure uniformed and civil service personnel are collectively and individually trained and equipped to use contracted support in contingencies.


Figure V-2. JCASO Relationships and Roles



The Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office (JCASO, see Figure V-2) applies program management principles to OCS to ensure it is institutionalized within DoD and synchronized and coordinated with mission partners (JCASO is discussed in more detail later in this section.). JFCOM ensures joint, interagency, and multinational exercises and experiments stress OCS policies and practices and capture best practices and insights. If JCASO is required to support a CCDR, JCASO will be under the operational control of the CCDR.

CCDRs at the *strategic theater level* are required to orchestrate, integrate, and synchronize the preparation and execution of acquisitions during contingency operations within their AOR. Their staffs (including the embedded JOCSPs from JCASO) are key to integrating and synchronizing OCS in formal plans (e.g., OPLANS, CONPLANS), addressing interagency and multinational OCS considerations, and arranging for exercise participation.

Figure V-3. Spectrum of OCS Organizational Solutions



A GCC may staff a contingency contracting entity in several ways (see Figure V-3). If the GCC determines requirements exceed the ability of in-theater Service Components (Army contracting support brigades, or CSBs; Air Force expeditionary contracting squadrons;

or Navy expeditionary logistics support group), he may request the standup of a JTCC, or he may designate a lead nation or agency. Partner involvement and the phase or type of operation will influence the decision to establish the lead outside the DoD.

The HPM, in coordination with the HCC, establishes policy (e.g., theater business clearance) to integrate system and external support contracts into JOAs. External and system support contracts (e.g., LOGCAP, Navy Husbanding contracts, DLA Prime Vendor) may involve U.S. or third-country businesses and vendors. These contracts are usually prearranged, but they may be awarded or modified during the mission based on the commanders' needs. Examples include the Army LOGCAP, the Air Force civil augmentation program (AFCAP), the Navy global contingency construction contract (GCCC) and global contingency services contract (GCSC), the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE), the Naval Facilities Engineering Command (NAVFAC), the Air Force Center for Engineering and the Environment, and CSA contracts, as well as partner contracts from other nations or the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA). The CCDR may request a JCASO forward team deploy for a limited time to lead program management. Generally, this option would be used in conjunction with a lead service, or it would facilitate the establishment of a JTCC as the HCC.

At the *operational level*, a CJTF commander must establish a requirements definition and coordination process during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations to ensure requirements are defined in a way that effectively implements WoG and DoD objectives, policies, and decisions regarding the allocation of resources, coordination of interagency efforts in the theater of operations, and alignment of requirements with the proper use

of funds. The CJTF commander⁶ serves as head of requirements definition and coordination during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations. As the HRD, the CJTF commander oversees the requirements management functions across staff functions and down through the tactical level. The HRD establishes and leads a requirements review board (e.g., JARB) that involves all organizations concerned to assist in this responsibility.

In support of operational requirements, the head of contingency contracting generates and executes contract solutions. The HCC (who is designated by the GCC, as defined above) may manifest in different forms. If the HCC is a JTCC that supports multiple CJTFs, it may oversee multiple SCOs (with augmentation) to support each CJTF. In the absence of a JTCC, a military service component, such as the Army's CSB (reinforced), may serve in this role. To facilitate coordination with joint, interagency, and partner contracting organizations, the HCC may establish a JCSB.

OCS at the *tactical level* requires accountability from initiation through close out of contracts. To achieve this, requiring activities must identify qualified, trained CORs to act as the “eyes and ears” of the contracting officer in monitoring and reporting on the execution of the contract. Commanders perform requirements management to determine whether contract solutions deliver operational effects. They generate requirements, support (in coordination with contracting officers) performance of contingency contract administration (e.g., CCAS), and oversee deployed operational forces (e.g., CORs). CORs perform contractor oversight IAW duties assigned by the contracting officer to ensure contractor services comply with the contract. CORs monitor contractor performance and ensure reporting to provide awareness and visibility to higher echelon staff and contracting officers.

The contracting officer performs contract management in support of the HCC (not the HRD) and retains authority to direct or approve changes to the contract deliverable terms, terminate the contract, or impose administrative actions against the company. The HCC may establish regional contracting centers (RCCs) to provide contract management for designated portions of a combined or joint operations area (CJOA) or CCDR theater.

Within the DoD, CCAS is the responsibility of the military services in accordance with their “train, organize, and equip” mission; however, if requested by the CCDR, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) may support CCAS requirements. If the requiring activity is external to the DoD, that organization provides the COR, in conjunction with established TORs and MOUs between the partners. In some cases, subject matter experts, such as certified electricians, food ordering officers (FOOs), and others with unique skills, qualifications, or certifications, may not be available within the requiring activity. The HCC should not award contracts without these technically qualified individuals in place.

Echelon Activities—What

Governance establishes a control structure—with processes and procedures—to execute activities, monitor and address issues, and maintain accountability. It is refined at each echelon, becoming more granular as it flows down. OCS governance provides guidance, establishes policy, defines

⁶ Unless the GCC assigns an alternate senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service with appropriate experience and qualifications related to the definition of requirements to act as the HRD.

thresholds for reporting and measures for monitoring performance, documents processes and procedures to enable coordinated action, adjudicates issues, and facilitates OCS process improvement.

Reporting provides the feedback mechanism for communication up the echelons to mitigate risk, leverage opportunity, enable oversight, inform capacity development, and enforce accountability. In response to governance, OCS reporting identifies issues, captures lessons learned, documents performance, tracks metrics, provides awareness and visibility, and enables capacity development and future improvement of OCS.

Table V-1 describes the activities and capabilities of OCS engagement across the four echelons and six phases of military operations. The characteristics and timing associated with OCS at each echelon differ. Consequently, orderly and repeatable action-reaction cycles are the exception, not the norm. Operational phases may be skipped or abbreviated, depending on geographical location and current need.

Table V-1. Activities at Command Echelons Across the Phases of Military Operations

Echelon	Phases of military operations					
	0 - Shape	I - Deter	II - Seize initiative	III - Dominate	IV - Stabilize	V - Enable civil authority
Strategic National	Integrate IA, coalition, IO, NGO with SN strategic plans	Exercise OCS processes & procedures in joint, multi-national, bi-lateral events	Facilitate the use of global OCS capabilities	Exploit OCS Global implementation	Institutionalize OCS best practices and build OCS capacity	National support for transfer of OCS oversight to civil authority
Strategic Theater	Integrate IA, coalition, IO, NGO, with Theater engagement plan	Exercise and employ theater OCS capabilities	Oversee Theater OCS capabilities	Execute theater-level OCS implementation	Rationalize the level of theater OCS dependence	Theater support for transfer of OCS oversight to civil authority
Operational	Integrate OCS into operations and concept plans	Capitalize on opportunities for use of OCS in the JOA	Exploit OCS capabilities	Execute operational-level OCS implementation	Refine OCS operational best practices	Operational support for transfer to civil authority
Tactical	Set conditions for OCS use	Use OCS to achieve conditions	Use OCS capabilities	Execute tactical-level OCS implementation	Refine OCS tactical best practices	Execute transfer to civil authority

The following sections provide a general description of OCS at each echelon for a notional operational life cycle. They illustrate the relationships and interdependencies of OCS activities across the phases and at each command echelon. Specific guidance for activities at each echelon is further updated by the NSS, NDS, NMS, GDF, GEF, and JSCP.

Strategic National

At the strategic national level, leaders ensure OCS is institutionalized across the DoD and generating sufficient, enduring OCS capacity to deliver timely, responsive, and optimized OCS capabilities to satisfy contingency demand. With DHS and DoS, DoD sets WoG strategy and guidance

to build OCS capacity. Strategy and guidance establish the foundation for policy, processes, and procedure. Under OSD guidance, and in coordination with the Joint Staff and combatant commanders, JCASO assists and provides inputs to policymakers in DHS and DoS, the MilDeps, and JFCOM. OSD and JCASO practice continuous OCS-related engagement with interagency representatives and multinational partners, which results in formal (e.g., signed MOAs or MOUs) and informal agreements to promote convergence and coherence. OSD establishes measures and ensures capital planning via capability portfolio management. JCASO acts in a program management role and matures OCS by identifying shortfalls, benchmarking best practices, and encouraging continual process improvement efforts. The MilDeps and other defense agencies (ODAs) include OCS when developing their DOTMLPF capabilities and contingency contracting programs (e.g., LOGCAP, Navy husbanding contracts, or DLA Prime Vendor), programming requirements, and DOTMLPF reporting of program performance; while JFCOM integrates OCS and lessons learned into exercises and experiments.

OCS capacity is institutionalized through the formation of a strategic framework and institutional structure that ensures the proper development, integration and synchronization of OCS-related policies, programs, and resourcing, and it provides the foundation for building the DOTMLPF capabilities needed to execute OCS at all levels. As needed and available DOTMLPF solutions are provided to support operations as resources (e.g., personnel or funding) or capabilities (e.g., systems or contracting vehicles). Strategic national actors are advocates for OCS capabilities and requirements in programs and military service budgets. This strategic national governance recognizes OCS capacity as a readiness enhancer. Proper force planning on mix-of-government versus contract personnel and planning for sufficient government personnel to provide contract oversight are required at this level. In addition to DoD capabilities, GSA has been directed to establish a deployable government-wide contingency contracting corps, and DoS maintains a response corps for reconstruction and stabilization.

Policy drives interagency-based accountability for deployable contractor personnel and a DoD-wide ability to synchronize and integrate OCS to meet strategic and operational goals. Leaders at the strategic national level make effective use of strategic communications to propagate OCS policies; they also deliver common processes with clear roles and responsibilities. Strategic national governance provides for DoD's OCS contractual and legal authority and expertise. Effective governance at this echelon is the foundation for the desired OCS outcomes described in law, policy, doctrine, and audits.

Strategic Theater

OCS at the strategic theater level provides a pre-defined plan for implementing OCS and establishes leadership and cooperation among a diverse community of stakeholders and partners—within and external to the AOR—to achieve a convergent and coherent OCS approach. OCS execution at this echelon anticipates the supported geographic combatant commander has a theater engagement plan that complements the global engagement objectives articulated by national political and military strategy. The GCC ensures OCS is included in organizational guidance and plans and orders, and that unity of effort is achieved with all members of the joint force, multinational partners, and other governmental agencies. The GCC also ensures theater plans and objectives consider OCS-related authoritative guidance that will affect the theater, such as doctrine, training, manpower, and strategy at the national level. Theater-level cooperation between DoD,

interagency, and multinational partners is defined by MOU and MOAs or is agreed upon through TORs to facilitate coordination at the operational level. A major element of this institutional mission is incorporation of OCS into both exercises and day-to-day engagement activities.

Planning at the CCDR or subordinate JTF level is performed for the regions or countries within the AOR that could require GCC-specific or DoD-provided OCS capabilities during any phase of military operation. When specific OPLAN or CONPLAN requirements are identified, refined, and codified, OCS is integrated into these plans and Annex Ws capture contracted support planning. CSIPs and contractor management plans should be included as appendices to consider contract and contractor support, respectively. Contractor management plans require extensive coordination between requiring activities, planners and providers from operational, program management, and contracting communities. A contractor management integration working group may be established to coordinate these issues, which include contractor support (GFS), oversight, and entrance and exit processing and procedures. JOCSPs, as JCASO representatives embedded in theater staffs, play a critical role in these activities. Requirement planning at the theater level focuses on general capabilities rather than detailed user-level definitions. However, OCS planning includes sufficient detail to ensure OCS efforts (such as integration of contractors into the theater) achieve the commander's intent. OPLANS and CONPLANS, including service component level plans, are synchronized, coordinated, and resourced along the full spectrum of operational phases (including Phase V) in conjunction with interagency implementation plans to enable appropriate transition among partners and to integrate elements of national power. CCDR planning requires close and continuous coordination with interagency activities operating within the AOR and with all entities within the AOR that are critical to engagement.

During contingency operations, the GCC assigns heads of program management, requirements definition, and contingency contracting. JCASO Forward may serve as a temporary OCS staff augmentation to the CCDR at the appropriate level to perform HPM functions. The HPM may establish a CLPSB to facilitate resolution of issues between actors. Representatives of the JCASO Forward may also deploy to the JTF level to facilitate communication and effective and efficient OCS actions.

The CCDR develops regulations, instructions, and directives needed to synchronize OCS. This level further determines topics such as theater entry requirements, threshold levels, and theater-level priorities. Contractors entering the theater, in-process through a designated reception center that facilitates RSOI and maintains visibility of contractors by ensuring they are entered in SPOT. Proper assignment and integration of these functions ensures the transition from peace to contingency is seamless, as is the transition between phases of operations.

Operational

At the operational level, OCS ensures synchronized contract solutions are responsive to requirements and provide benefits across echelons. In a GCC, every CJTF commander oversees requirements management activities as the head of requirements definition. They issue orders related to OCS, coordinate requirements management within DoD, across WoG, and with multinational partners. To facilitate synchronization of requirements, the HRD establishes a requirements review board (i.e., the JARB).

In response to these requirements, the HCC develops contracts and conducts contract management functions. The HCC oversees contingency contracting activities in the JOA to include advertising and releasing requests for proposal, conducting source selection and award of contracts as well as post award actions such as contract modification, administration, and auditing. This contracting office, potentially a JTCC, is the focal point for contracting activities. It coordinates contract support integration with internal and external stakeholders to ensure external support contracts are integrated with operational activities. JCSBs may be established by the HCC to focus on “how” contracting will procure support within an AOR or JOA; and they are useful for facilitating coordination among multiple OCS partners. Proper close out of contracts is ensured by HCC and includes the evaluation of the contractors’ performance, payment, and maintenance of records.

Tactical

At the tactical level, OCS delivers managed contract support, from generating requirements, through contract execution and contractor surveillance, to contract close out. The requirements management activities are overseen by the HRD and directed by the tactical commander. Critical to supporting this level of an operation is identifying, developing, and justifying OCS requirements for contingency operations. While these requirements should be identified in the planning process, the ultimate customer is the warfighter, and mission dynamics will likely dictate changes. Requiring activities are responsible for developing acquisition-ready requirements packages that clearly describe the requirements, potential sources, approvals or required waivers, and current, qualified points of contact. Acquisition-ready requirements include funding documents, a performance work statement or item description, independent government estimates, government-furnished property and support, nomination and qualification certification of the COR or designation of receiving official. Standard templates and samples facilitate timely, complete preparation of requirements packages. Automation of this process via a single joint integrated system further facilitates the required coordination among the requiring activity, contracting office, and theater staff. Requirements must be unambiguously understood, well defined and scoped in contract documents, and operationally and administratively supportable to ensure the government receives the services and products it needs, in a manner that achieves the intended effects.

During contingencies, contractors provide personnel with specific skills that are needed to augment DoD capabilities, such as linguists and interpreters, report writers, and information technology technicians. Because contracted support at the tactical level has expanded, it now involves numerous complex tasks beyond planned military service-level missions, capabilities, and training. Conducting combat and humanitarian missions in remote locations often requires massive amounts of food, water, supplies, and building materials. Meals must be served, water must be purified, fuel must be tested and distributed, soldiers and civilians must be sheltered, and refuse and hazardous material must be disposed of properly. It has become common practice to use civilian contractors to provide base support services during these operations. During contingencies (which include response to natural disasters, terrorist activities, collapse of law and order, political instability, or military operations), OCS helps ensure the safety and comfort of DoD personnel performing jobs under some of the most difficult conditions imaginable.

In addition, the Department of Defense has only a limited deployable capability to plan and execute facilities construction and management in contingency operations, and reconstruction support (agriculture, finance, energy, transportation, law enforcement, etc.) and the civil struc-

ture to govern these communities in a contingency environment are not core capabilities of the department. Adopting and implementing a whole-of-government approach applies the most effective skills to address these activities in the most efficient manner.


During the performance of contracts, contracting officers, in conjunction with requiring activity CORs, perform contract surveillance and manage and continuously review contractor performance. Service CCAS personnel, potentially augmented by DCMA and contract administration services (CAS) personnel from other federal agencies supporting WoG operations, provide critical contract management oversight and support. They generate reports and metrics to inform higher echelons about the execution of contracts and the performance of contractors. Their input, in conjunction with vendor reporting, provides visibility and awareness of contracts and contractors. Automated tools, like SPOT and JAMMs, facilitate reporting (e.g., incident and performance), contribute to visibility and awareness (location tracking and GFS usage), and preclude the use of timely, manual census collection and reporting.

Proper contract completion and closing is just as important as contract execution. But contract closure requires coordination with contracting officers to ensure pre-planning for return or disposition of CAGO, GFE and OCIE and to provide an historic basis for future planning. Collection of after-action reports (AARs) and lessons learned provides leadership insight into issues and opportunities, and facilitates continuous process improvement to make OCS more effective and efficient.

Phases—When

The phases of an operation fall across a spectrum of activities without distinct boundaries. Although transition from one operational phase to another can occur over time, with some factors and capabilities occurring sooner than others, the phases provide a sound basis for planning and allow the JFC to transition as events dictate. As Figure V-4 shows, some elements of OCS may be present at every phase of military operations.

Figure V-4. Notional OCS Use Across Phases



The operational phases apply each of the DoD joint operational concepts, which range from major combat operations, through stability operations and irregular warfare, to homeland defense, and finally to strategic deterrence.

Shape (Phase 0)

During Phase 0, the DoS chief of mission (COM) has the lead in AORs other than those under the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). In defense support to civil authorities, NORTHCOM supports DHS as lead IAW Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5 and the National Response Framework.

During Phase 0, GCCs and their staffs engage in interagency OCS planning. With interagency involvement, they establish contracts as an influencing, theater-shaping element and as a basis for multiagency use if a military contingency or other crisis arises. GCCs, their staffs, and their components manage all steady-state OCS programs and prepare OCS programs to adapt to all phases of an operation. Within JOPEs, the GCC staffs (including the JOCSPs) formally develop and refine contractor management and contract support integration plans when drafting Annex Ws for CONPLANs and OPLANs.

GCCs coordinate OCS around theater campaign plans, theater security cooperation plans, and ambassadors' mission performance plans, while their staffs develop interagency agreements for use of OCS during crisis response. Tight coordination of operational contracts occurs with the DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) and COM and other U.S. agencies during plan development. OCS planning (documented in Annex Ws) discuss contract transition from DoD to DoS as the on-the-ground situation phases into stabilization and reconstruction. Phase 0 plans typically address the possibility that USAID or DoS reconstruction or peacetime contracts could transition to DoD oversight if needed during military operations.

At the tactical echelon, Phase 0 activities may include setting expectations and requirements in the host environment and putting OCS-enabling processes or entities in place. The GCC may expand or employ theater OCS toward a deterrence activity to achieve a desired condition.

Phase 0 may not have a JTF activated, and the Services may provide their own contingency contracting.

Deter (Phase I)

Outside the United States, Phase I may describe a situation in none or in one or more nations in a GCC's AOR. NORTHCOM typically uses a different phasing reference for defense support to civil authorities in which "anticipate" would roughly equate to Phase I.

In other nations within the GCC's AOR, the GCC continues theater shaping with other government agencies. As a WoG deterrence response, DoS may send an advance civilian team to work with the military. This could trigger the employment of OCS to support any of the interagency elements' activities.

Phase I may reach a level of intensity that requires OPLAN or CONPLAN activation. Standup of a CJTF triggers the GCC to designate an HPM, HCC, and HRD. For example, a lead service may

be assigned to perform as the HCC, the JCASO Forward may be requested to deploy as the HPM, and the CJTF commander may be assigned as the HRD. In many cases, the COM, such as an ambassador, retains the lead in the affected nation, and may retain lead agency responsibility for OCS functions. However, the GCC's OCS capability could be used in support of the DoS mission. Phase I deterrence may involve using OCS to achieve the conditions for subsequent operations. When OCS is employed, GCCs need to be aware of and act on the integration and accountability of contractor personnel requirements.

Seize Initiative (Phase II)

This phase involves oversight of actual OCS use. During Phase II, commanders build upon or initiate country-to-country agreements or MOUs. They also fully integrate OCS with inter-agency, international, coalition, or bi-lateral partners, as needed. This may involve completion of TORs and establishment or revision of boards (e.g., CLPSB, JARB, or JCSB). If transition of OCS from the lead agency (e.g., DoS or DHS) to DoD is envisioned, transition planning should occur during this phase. In which case, standup of a JTCC will be necessary.

The HPM assists the GCC in planning the joint manning document (JMD). When contemplating the use of contracted support during contingency operations, commanders and their staffs should have a basic understanding of contingency contracting, including the legal aspects; funding issues; duties and responsibilities of procurement personnel; the interrelationships of support staff and advisors; and any preparations for deployment. The ability to deal with contractors from different cultures, backgrounds, and perspectives, and with different business practices will also influence operations positively. The value of establishing contingency contracting offices for emergencies in areas where local citizens are unfamiliar with federal procurement procedures or where the local economy has little direct business with federal agencies should not be overlooked. Contacting local leaders or embassies will go a long way toward establishing a viable OCS capability, and it can also aid in the transition of authority between civil and military control.

In Phase II, OCS capabilities are exploited to maximize the effectiveness of ongoing operations, but they must be managed at all echelons to ensure unity of effort, anticipate future requirements, and respond to unexpected challenges.

For Defense Support of Civil Authority (DSCA) operations, phases II and III (under a Deployment phase) involve the actual use of OCS to support mission objectives.

Dominate (Phase III)

The use of OCS expands during this phase to support increased theater-level activities and achieve maximum effect of contract solutions to support the commander's intent. This phase reflects the culmination of the previous phases. In Phase III, OCS is exploited through the directed, precise, and effective use of contract solutions.

Effective OCS program management is particularly important during this phase, because any gaps in planning or execution will directly affect outcomes. The HPM monitors and controls the use of OCS, ensuring battlespace situational awareness and unity of effort among partners. The HCC executes contingency contracting to accomplish the commander's objectives. Synchronization and coordination between the HRD (CJTF commander), the HCC, (potentially a JTCC), and

the HPM (potentially the JCASO Forward) are critical to address requirements in a timely and consistent manner. The planning process should have identified all risks associated with the use of OCS capabilities. If those risks are not identified, valuable time, effort, and resources could be required to achieve operational objectives. The HPM continues to advise the GCC on OCS risk.

Application of OCS continues through the Dominate and Stabilize phases, when capabilities are applied, refined, and rationalized to most effectively support tactical and operational goals and prepare for the final phase.

Stabilize (Phase IV)

The Stabilize phase will likely involve the greatest OCS effort. Many contracts in effect during the Dominate phase continue and may expand during the Phase IV operations, and additional contracts may be required. Contract support may be required to ensure the availability of essential supplies and services continue. Follow-on contracting requirements identified and in place during the planning process allow military components to focus on the operational aspects of the mission. The continuous management of contractor personnel is executed and reported in SPOT, from pre-deployment through redeployment and close out. Aligning and adequately resourcing contractor management staff against the fluctuating number of contractor personnel increases efficiency and effectiveness of contract execution. Integration of DoD, WoG, and coalition contract requirements reduces the size and complexity of contract forces. It also realizes economies of scale, thus reducing cost and optimizing quality control by leveraging low-density, high-demand SMEs to oversee contracts and ensure they achieve commander's objectives.

Event-driven feedback and incident reporting are accomplished in accordance with policy. Standard AARs and lessons learned are captured as personnel redeploy and contracts are closed. Both are accomplished electronically to facilitate rapid dissemination, benchmarking best practices, and continuous process improvement among multiple stakeholders. Discipline in collecting first-hand experiences (using common templates and common databases) from personnel before they depart their positions is essential to mature OCS. This feedback provides a basis for continual improvement in the integration, synchronization, and management of contracted support in future military operations.

To enable transition back to a civil authority, the JTCC's focus shifts to increased regional support, and military service contracting elements begin to revert back to pre-JTCC C2. This requires extensive coordination through the JARB and JCSB, as appropriate.

The following additional actions are required before transition:

- Refine civil augmentation program (CAP) transition plans that begin limited transition of task orders to theater support contracts, if practicable.
- Ensure all joint military service contracts that require base access or include CAAF personnel meet local security and related policies.

Enable Civil Authority (Phase V)

During this phase, local civil authority returns to the foreign government, with assistance from COM, and military theater shaping recommences. Within NORTHCOM, Phase V is a transition to local authority and pre-emergency conditions.

At tactical levels, commanders may continue to rely on OCS during this phase, especially for communications, logistics, and security. When the military effort ends, GCC components assist in transition to DoS, the lead federal agency. GCC personnel interact with representatives from DoS, USAID, and other U.S. government agencies, and they may continue to leverage the GCC's OCS or initiate their own contracts.

During the Phase V, on-the-ground activities prepare for and execute the shift of OCS management to successor organizations. Recent history indicates this final phase is not a simple task. It affects established relationships and requires new processes and procedures. This transition of OCS should be described in Annex Ws if the operation involved a formal plan. Contracts executed under military authority but with anticipation of a transfer to civil authority will aid in the transition.

Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (DUSD), Deputy Chief Management Officer (DCMO)

- Mission: Advise the SecDef and Deputy Secretary of Defense (DepSecDef) on matters relating to their management and improvement of DoD business operations.
- Role: Recommend methods and measurement criteria to better synchronize, integrate, and coordinate DoD's business operations to ensure optimal alignment in support of its warfighting mission. Provide advice and assistance on all matters related to the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives.
- Responsibilities: Integrate warfighting and business mission area business practices to improve operational and institutional efficiencies for all matters associated with OCS. Direct the activities of the Defense Business Transformation Agency to ensure DoD business systems support the accountability and visibility of contracts and contractors supporting contingencies.

Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD[P])

- Mission: Provide responsive, forward-thinking, and insightful policy advice and support to the SecDef and DoD in alignment with national security objectives.
- Role: Provide advice and assistance on all matters associated with the formulation of national security and defense policy and the integration and oversight of DoD policy and plans to achieve national security objectives. Integrate WoG priorities and regional and country-specific assessments into DoD planning. IAW NDAA FY2008, Section 952, be the lead policy official for improving and reforming the interagency coordination process on national security issues for the Department of Defense.
- Responsibilities: Serve as DoD lead for WoG planning and policy guidance and oversee the Defense Security Cooperation Agency. Serve as DoD lead for developing the GEF, GDF, and the Analytic Agenda, including defense planning scenarios and multiservice force deployment. IAW NDAA FY2008, Section 952, assist in integrating interagency policy, planning, or reforms for OCS; advocate for greater interagency coordination on OCS; recommend to the SecDef changes to existing DoD regulations or laws to improve the interagency process for OCS; assist in coordinating OCS-related planning and training designed to improve the interagency process or the capabilities of other agencies to work with the DoD; and assist in integrating OCS into deployable joint interagency task forces.

Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD[AT&L])

- Mission: Establish and publish policies and procedures governing the operations of DoD's acquisition system and the administrative oversight of defense contractors.
- Role: Advisor to SecDef and DepSecDef on all matters relating to acquisition, technology, and logistics. Two subordinate offices focus on OCS topics. ASD (Acquisition) supports the operational commander with policy, guidance, and oversight through acquisition strategies, program execution, contract incentives, contin-

agency contracting, and acquisition policy. DUSD(L&MR) advises on logistics and materiel readiness (L&MR) throughout DoD and is responsible for policy framework and program support governing joint field logistical and support operations (includes combat, humanitarian, and disaster relief); CAAF planning and management; forward distribution and maintenance operations; contracted support to include military service civil augmentation program oversight; management of frustrated cargo; disposal or redistribution of excess materiel and scrap; and retrograde operations.

- Responsibilities: Lead DoD OCS management and integration activities and initiatives, develop contingency acquisition policies and procedures, and serve as DoD lead for OCS management and integration.

Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD[P&R])

- Mission: Develop policies, plans, and programs to ensure the readiness of the Total Force as well as the efficient and effective support of peacetime operations and contingency planning and preparedness. Promote coordination, cooperation, and mutual understanding within DoD, and between DoD and other federal agencies, state and local governments, and the civilian community.
- Role: Advisor to SecDef on policies, plans, and programs to ensure the readiness of the Total Force and the efficient and effective support of peacetime operations and contingency planning and preparedness.
- Responsibilities: Account for all personnel (military, civilian, and contract) supporting DoD operations worldwide; serve as the DoD lead for personnel security, medical readiness, personnel and unit training, and organizational readiness; and oversee the Defense Manpower Data Center.

Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer (USD[C]/CFO)

- Mission: Govern financial management by establishing and enforcing the requirements, principles, standards, systems, procedures, and practices necessary to comply with financial management statutory and regulatory requirements applicable to the Department of Defense.
- Role: Principal advisor to SecDef on all budgetary and fiscal matters, including the development and execution of its annual budget. Oversee DoD's financial policies, management systems, and modernization efforts.
- Responsibilities: Develop DoD financial policies and integrate financial matters into DoD business processes. Oversee the activities of the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) and Defense Finance and Accounting Service in the support of contingencies.

Other OSD Principal Staff Assistants (PSAs)


- Mission: Varied, based on specific PSA.
- Role: Principal advisor to SecDef on respective areas of responsibility.
- Responsibilities: Coordinate level of OCS use in accordance with DoD guidance. PSAs with CSA responsibilities exercise authority, direction, and control over desig-

nated defense agencies and DoD field activities, as designated; and are accountable for the mission performance of such agencies and activities, including their preparation for, and execution of, combat support missions in support of operational forces.

Combat Support Agencies and Other Defense Agencies

The CSAs (highlighted in gold and annotated with a star) and ODAs (highlighted in blue) shown in Figure VI-2 have significant roles in DoD’s OCS operations. Two CSAs have direct OCS responsibilities: DLA and DCMA. They provide combat support or combat service support functions for joint operating forces across the range of military operations and in support of combatant commanders executing those operations. ODAs, in contrast, perform a supply or service activity common to more than one military department.

Figure VI-2. OCS Roles in Defense Agencies



Combat Support Agencies

The two CSAs closely aligned with OCS matters are both under the cognizance of the USD(AT&L). DLA is focused primarily on logistics and sustainment, but it also has an assigned activity, the JCASO, that plays a key role in institutionalizing a program management approach to OCS within the Department of Defense. DCMA performs administrative contract management, as requested, after contract award.

Defense Logistics Agency—USD(AT&L)


- Mission: Provide effective and efficient worldwide logistics support to the military departments and CCDRs under conditions of peace and war, as well as to other DoD components and federal agencies, when authorized by law, state and local governments, foreign governments, and international organizations.

- Role: Manage assigned resources; procure assigned items; and administer, supervise, and control all programs, services, and items assigned to DLA.
- Responsibility: Lead all aspects of common user sustainment sourcing, distribution, and contracting; design and manage DLA programs and activities to improve standards of performance, economy, and efficiency; and demonstrate DLA's attention to customer requirements, both internal and external to DoD. Provide Class I, II, III (Bulk/Energy), Class IV, and Class VIII supply chain logistics support to OCS institutional and operational activities for DoD and WoG.

Joint Contingency Acquisition Support Office

JCASO, a subordinate element of DLA, helps establish capacity for OCS, provides CCDRs with the capability to manage OCS, and satisfies congressional intent for OCS program management. It monitors and matures DoD capability in the five cornerstones of effective acquisition: human capital management, knowledge and information systems execution, policy and process implementation, organizational leadership and alignment, and financial accountability. The JCASO organization is illustrated in Figure VI-3. Use of JCASO Forward depends on the operational need.

Figure VI-3. JCASO Organization



- Mission: Provide strategic-level OCS program management for OSD, including WoG matters. When requested, provide CCDRs with strategic theater-level OCS capability to effectively and efficiently synchronize OCS programs and activities.
- Role: Integrate and synchronize on a continuing basis all aspects of strategic national OCS program management. Provide the necessary OCS program management capacity and capability required by JFCs in complex operations involving multiple compo-

nents, coalition forces, and governmental agencies. When requested by the CCDR, provide an expeditionary, joint OCS program management capability to CCDRs or JFCs that synchronizes OCS to support contingency acquisition and strategic planning; assist in maintaining visibility and accountability of contractors accompanying the force. Manage OCS benefits, stakeholders, and governance. Mature OCS as a capability. Support capital investment planning.

- **Responsibility:** Perform, at the strategic national level, all aspects of OCS program management. Maintain two deployable and scalable teams with reach-back capability. On request, deploy an enabling joint staff organization to augment a CCDR's staff to ensure effective and efficient OCS support. Synchronize and coordinate all DoD institutional DOTMLPF matters associated with OCS and WoG integration. Monitor capacity development efforts to ensure sustained capabilities. Ensure integration of lessons learned to mature OCS capabilities. Identify best practices and issues for resolution. Synchronize and integrate OCS between theaters.

Defense Contract Management Agency—USD(AT&L)

- **Mission:** Perform contract administration services for DoD, other federal agencies, foreign governments, international organizations, and others, as authorized. Provide CAS to the DoD acquisition enterprise and its partners to ensure the delivery of high-quality products and services to the warfighter, on time and within budget.
- **Role:** Provide CAS to authorized users worldwide, as requested. Provide personnel (in conjunction with the military services) to support contract administration by a SCO for CCAS assigned within the JTCC.
- **Responsibility:** Provide contingency contract administration and oversight in support of GCC requirements. Oversee contractor performance by performing quality assurance checks of products and services; evaluate contractor financial, engineering, software, property management, and safety systems, and ensure the timely delivery of high-quality products and services at the agreed-upon price.

Other Defense Agencies

DoD has five ODAs involved with various aspects of OCS. Two report to the USD(C)/CFO, and the others report to the USD(P), DCMO, and USD(P&R), respectively. While the ODAs are not directly involved with contingencies, their responsibilities enable successful mission accomplishment by CCDRs and CSAs.

Defense Contract Audit Agency—USD(C)/CFO

- **Mission:** Perform all necessary contract audits for DoD and provide accounting and financial advisory services regarding contracts and subcontracts to all DoD components responsible for procurement and contract administration; provide these services in connection with the negotiation, administration, and settlement of contracts and subcontracts. Provide contract audit services to other government agencies, as appropriate.
- **Role:** Provide DoD officials responsible for procurement and contract administration with financial information and advice on proposed or existing contracts and contractors.

- Responsibility: Audit, examine, and review contractor and subcontractor accounts, records, other documents, systems of internal control, accounting, costing, and general business practices and procedures to ensure proper performance of assigned duties.

Defense Finance and Accounting Service—USD(C)/CFO

- Mission: Direct, approve, and perform finance and accounting activities for DoD.
- Role: Coordinate and collaborate with all civilian defense agencies, military departments and CCDRs that provide DoD's warfighting capabilities.
- Responsibility: Direct the consolidation, standardization, and integration of finance and accounting requirements, functions, procedures, operations, and systems within DoD and ensure their proper relationship with other DoD functional areas (e.g., budget, personnel, logistics, acquisition, and civil engineering); account for OCS expenditures.

Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA)—USD(P)

- Mission: Lead, direct, and manage security cooperation programs and resources to support national security objectives that build relationships and promote U.S. interests, build allied and partner capacities for self-defense and coalition operations globally, and promote peacetime and contingency access for U.S. forces.
- Role: Guide and delegate, in whole or part, to the military departments and CCDRs the development of security cooperation programs.
- Responsibility: Integrate OCS requirements into security cooperation programs designed by DSCA or military departments.

Defense Business Transformation Agency—DCMO

- Mission: Transform business operations to achieve improved warfighter support while enabling financial accountability across DoD.
- Role: Develop integrated business processes to capitalize on OCS.
- Responsibility: Develop and integrate business applications and policies that effectively and efficiently support OCS in the warfighter and business mission areas. Provide information systems that effectively support the accountability and visibility of contracts and contractors supporting contingencies.

Defense Manpower Data Center—USD(P&R)

- Mission: Provide enterprise human resource information in support of DoD's mission. Collect and maintain an archive of automated manpower, personnel, training, and other databases for DoD. Support the information requirements of OUSD(P&R) and other members of the DoD manpower, personnel, and training communities with accurate, timely, and consistent data. Operate DoD-wide personnel programs and conduct research and analysis, as directed by the OUSD(P&R).
- Role: Provide personnel lifecycle support to DoD for active and retired military, DoD civilians, dependents, and contractors.
- Responsibility: Provide service-oriented architecture for all military, civilian, and contractor personnel in support of DoD contracts worldwide.


Defense Acquisition University—USD(AT&L)

- Mission: Provide practitioner training, career management, and services that allow the AT&L community to make smart business decisions and deliver timely and affordable capabilities to the warfighter.
- Role: Provide training to program management and contingency contracting personnel to facilitate the execution of OCS and integration of these skills and personnel to meet contingency requirements.
- Responsibility: Provide training in the use of laws, regulations, policies, and directives related to program management in combat or contingency environments and contingency contracting operations; the integration of cost, schedule, and performance objectives; DoD procedures related to funding mechanisms and contingency contract management; appropriate use of rapid acquisition methods and authority unique to contingency contracting; and the transition from rapid acquisition authority to other methods.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Many of the Office of the JCS directorates (highlighted in purple) have OCS responsibilities, as Figure VI-4 illustrates. The J4 (Logistics) as the Joint Staff lead for OCS matters, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (both highlighted in gold with a star) have significant OCS responsibilities.

Figure VI-4. OCS Roles of the Joint Staff



Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

- **Mission:** As the senior ranking member of the Armed Forces, serve as the principal military adviser to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), and the Secretary of Defense.
- **Roles:** Provide for strategic planning; provide advice on requirements, programs, and budgets; provide for joint exercises, joint training, and joint education; prepare and review contingency plans; recommend the assignment of logistics and mobility responsibilities to the armed forces; advise the SecDef on critical deficiencies and strengths in force capabilities, including manpower, logistic, and mobility support; and establish and maintain a uniform system for evaluating the preparedness of each combatant command to carry out its missions.
- **Responsibility:** Advise and assist the ADUSD(PS) in joint policy development to implement OCS. Provide for the preparation and review of OCS integration and contractor management in support of operational and concept plans. Ensure joint doctrine and training is developed to guide a JFC's actions in order to integrate contracted capability and the management and oversight of contractors during contingency operations. Ensure GCCs issue guidance and procedures to integrate contracted support within their AOR.

J1, Manpower and Personnel

- **Mission:** Provide the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) with manpower and personnel advice support to ensure maximum readiness and sustainability of the Total Force—including contractors.
- **Roles:** Develop and coordinate initiatives to ensure and enhance individual, theater, and Total Force (to include contractor) personnel readiness and accountability.
- **Responsibility:** Determine Total Force personnel reporting requirements during peace and contingencies, including reporting for contractor personnel that support DoD during contingencies and operations. Oversee CCDR personnel status. Incorporate OCS into force readiness, deployment, quality-of-life, and sustainment plans. Develop procedures to ensure visibility of operational support contractors on the battlefield. Establish policy for the accountability of contractors on the joint personnel status report.

J2, Directorate for Intelligence

- **Mission:** Serve as DoD's focal point for crisis intelligence support to military operations, indications, and warning intelligence.
- **Role:** Serve as the focus for crisis intelligence support to the national defense leadership and military commanders. Assesses the extent to which local or third-country nationals may be available to support OCS efforts.
- **Responsibility:** Maintain worldwide status and assessment of the capabilities of current and future states and other entities that may impact DoD's ability to accomplish national strategy. Incorporate OCS to expand intelligence capabilities to support allied and coalition warfare. Develop vetting standards for locally employed persons

contracted to support U.S. and coalition efforts with regard to intelligence, counter intelligence, and force protection.

J3, Operations

- **Mission:** Translate the Joint Staff's planning, policies, intelligence, manpower, communications, and logistics functions into action. Move military forces, provide detailed operational briefings, and serve as the operational link between the warfighting commanders and the national leadership.
- **Role:** Develop and provide guidance to CCDRs and relay communications between the national command authority and the unified commanders.
- **Responsibility:** Synchronize and monitor worldwide military operations and activities in support of a national military strategy. Provide functional expertise on joint readiness and key warfighting capabilities and the areas of special operations, reconnaissance operations, space operations, information operations, counternarcotics, and nuclear operations. Ensure contracted support and associated contractor integration requirements are addressed in the JOPES policy and execution. In coordination with (ICW) the CCDR J3, address and provide guidance for the use of private security companies or contractors (i.e., establishment of an armed contractor oversight division and contractor operations center) and arming policies as it relates to civilians and contractors. ICW the CCDR, provide CJCS with recommended rules for the use of force by private security contractors and contractor personnel armed for personal protection in support of joint operations. Integrate contractors into JOPES policy and execution.

J4, Logistics

- **Mission:** Enhance joint force readiness by providing vision and shaping an adaptive Joint Logistics Environment to maximize the Joint Force Commander's freedom of action.
- **Role:** Integrate OCS into all aspects of DoD peacetime and military engagement.
- **Responsibility:** Support the Chairman in execution of Title 10 functions as applicable to OCS. Deliver integrated OCS, logistic services, supply, maintenance, deployment and distribution, engineering, and installation support capabilities to optimize support to the deployed forces. Integrate OCS with other Joint Staff directorate responsibilities and capabilities. Identify capability functional area shortfalls where OCS may be required. Develop and deliver OCS joint doctrine. Provide OCS inputs to instructions, manuals and guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans (OPLANS/CONPLANS). Facilitate communication to CCDRs involving OCS matters and coordinate with the OCS community of interest. Ensure GCCs issue guidance and procedures to integrate contracted support within their AOR. Interpret OSD operational contract support integration and contractor management policies and facilitate execution in doctrine, instructions, and guidance. ICW CCDRs, military departments, and CSAs, provide oversight and ensure OCS equities are integrated in joint exercises, joint training, and joint education initiatives¹. When appropriate, request JCASO assistance in the performance of duties noted above. IAW policy, the OCS FCIB charter, and in support of the Chairman's func-

¹ United States Code Title 10, Section 153

tions noted above, advise and assist the ADUSD(PS) in joint policy development to implement OCS.

J5, Strategic Plans and Policy

- Mission: Shape the international environment, respond to crises, and prepare for an uncertain future.
- Role: Develop the National Military Strategy and the JSCP. Develop advice for planning and programming guidance and recommend inputs to SecDef in preparation of contingency planning guidance. Participate in the interagency process, maintain close links with military service and CCDR counterparts, conduct extensive regional travel, and develop military-to-military contacts with foreign forces to aid in identifying shortfalls where OCS may be applicable.
- Responsibility: Provide current and future military strategy, planning guidance, and policy; politico-military advice and policies; and military positions on projected and ongoing international negotiations. Perform interagency coordination in these areas to establish and maintain a government-wide approach to capacity building objectives. Integrate OCS into strategic planning. Ensure OCS policies and procedures are included in overarching policy documents to facilitate military operations. Ensure CAAF are included in the planning policies for deployment and redeployment (e.g., included into the TPFDD).

J6, Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems

- Mission: Provide CJCS with advice and recommendations on C4 matters and lead the C4 community.
- Role: Function in an oversight capacity to ensure joint C4 training programs comply with joint doctrine and directives. Integrate contract capabilities into DoD operational architecture.
- Responsibility: Oversee support for the national military command system and identify and resolve military-related information-based issues of national importance. Link contractor C2 to overall C2 system.

J7, Operational Plans and Joint Force Development

- Mission: Assist CJCS by enhancing joint force development through war plans, doctrine, education, training, exercises, and assessments through observation of CCDRs and CJCS exercises and real-world operations.
- Role: Execute the joint exercise and CJCS assessment programs. Review conventional war plans, assisting the CCDRs, Joint Staff, military services, and OSD in exercising and improving the capability of DoD forces and combat support agencies to achieve strategic goals.
- Responsibility: Direct the planning process to produce and maintain OPLANs and CONPLANs to provide an integrated foundation for execution. Coordinate interagency contingency planning efforts for the Joint Staff (in conjunction with OSD) to ensure CCDR plans are properly integrated with other instruments of national power. In

conjunction with OSD, create interagency planning concepts for approval by USD(P) and subsequent forwarding to the NSC for interagency planning and staffing. Ensure the integration of the national security strategy, national military strategy, contingency planning guidance (as directed through the joint strategic capabilities plan) and other applicable national policy matters in the development and maintenance of war plans. Determine OCS application for each publication and recommend changes, additions, or deletions. Provide overall management of the planning process. Oversee and conduct the plan development and review process. Serve as the primary agent for developing and monitoring the implementation plans for joint experimentation and concept development. Integrate OCS collective training requirements for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of staff exercises and joint professional military education programs.


J8, Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment

- **Mission:** Support CJCS in developing force structure requirements; conducting studies, analyses, and assessments; and evaluating military forces, plans, programs, and strategies.
- **Roles:** Perform functions related to force structure development, program and budget analysis, and acquisition and technology management. Identify, assess, and prioritize programmed, projected, and potential force application warfighting capability needs.
- **Responsibility:** Advise CJCS on all matters involving force planning, force development, and force structure assessment. Evaluate force planning, force development and force structure assessment for OCS implications. Conduct current and future force structure analyses, conventional and nuclear wargame simulations, arms control analyses, interagency politico-military simulations, and comprehensive net assessments. Develop and implement new analytical methodologies into studies for CJCS.

Military Departments

The military departments identified in Figure VI-5 train, equip, and provide forces in support of joint force and service component commanders. MilDeps provide administration and support of the forces assigned or attached to CCDRs, augmenting military support capabilities with contracted support when appropriate through their respective service component commands. MilDeps execute executive agent responsibilities as assigned by the Joint Staff in support of operational missions.

Figure VI-5. The Military Departments of the Department of Defense




- Mission: Organize, train, and equip ready forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression, and executing the national military strategy.
- Role: Plan, execute, and oversee all aspects of contracted support to their own forces unless directed otherwise by a combatant commander. Conduct contingency contracting and contractor management during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving interagency organizations if required.
- Responsibility: Organize, train, and equip units and individuals to perform all aspects of the OCS mission in response to guidance to develop the force and guidance to employ the force, including pre-award, contract award, contract administration and oversight, and contract closeout. Designate a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service to administer OCS and related and supporting policy and doctrine. Establish the capacity to provide senior commissioned officers with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to act as HCC during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, as required. Establish the capacity to provide senior commissioned officers or civilian members of the senior executive service with appropriate program management experience and qualifications to act as HPM during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple U.S. government agencies and international organizations.

Combatant Commands

DoD has two categories of CCDRs. The unified command plan assigns geographic combatant command responsibility in designated areas of responsibility to six combatant commanders as shown in Figure VI-6. It also identifies four FCCs with worldwide functional responsibilities that are not limited by geography. The mission, role, and responsibility of one functional combatant command, JFCOM, are specifically described because its mission is to provide institutional OCS mission support.

Figure VI-6. Geographic and Functional Combatant Commands



Geographic Combatant Commands

- Mission: Plan, integrate, and execute OCS in their respective AORs.
- Role: Determine and synchronize contracted support requirements, contract planning, and execution of OCS. Ensure coordination and integration of requirements definition, OCS program management, and contingency contracting. Coordinate and integrate OCS with multinational partners and other governmental agencies to enable unity of effort.
- Responsibility: Work closely with the Joint Staff, FCCs, service components, CSAs, and interagency and multinational partners to establish OCS theater governance and to determine OCS requirements, policies, and procedures. Establish TBC processes, security, and badging; coordinate GFS; and establish and execute DRS to conduct RSOI for personnel arriving and departing from theater. Designate heads of requirements definition, OCS program management, and contingency contracting and request forces as required.

Functional Combatant Commands

Four CCDRs are assigned worldwide functional responsibilities that are not bounded by geography: JFCOM, Special Operations Command (SOCOM), Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).

Functional Combat Commands (less SOCOM operating as supported command)

- Mission: Provide OCS within functional capabilities as a supporting combatant command.
- Role: Provide forces and OCS to support GCC or SOCOM requirements.
- Responsibility: Provide the mechanisms and framework to satisfy OCS-related mission requirements of CCDR or SOCOM, as required.

Joint Forces Command (Functional Command)

- Mission: Provide mission-ready, joint-capable forces and support the development and integration of joint, interagency, and multinational capabilities to meet the present and future operational needs of the joint force.
- Role: Harmonize a force of soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines, and civilians who excel at joint warfighting. Perform experiments and develop doctrine, training, and education programs to fully integrate OCS capabilities into the force.
- Responsibility: Engage and collaborate at all levels and on all fronts to create a trust and understanding among joint and coalition forces, interagency partners, and non-governmental organizations. Develop, along with the military departments, institutional doctrine, training, education, and lessons learned to effectively and efficiently capitalize on OCS during peace and contingencies.

OCS Organizational Enablers

Joint Theater Contracting Command/Center (JTCC)

A JTCC is a temporary organization that is stood up by a CCDR to provide contingency contracting during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations. The JTCC is led by a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications to act as head of contingency contracting for OCS in theater. The JTCC can execute contingency contracting for a single CJOA, multiple CJOAs, or an AOR designated by the CCDR. The JTCC is not an enduring organization. It is normally organized around a designated service component's existing contract C2 construct for contingencies and operations. When a GCC designates the formation of a JTCC, the lead service component is augmented by other partners (another military service, CSA, interagency, or multinational partner) to ensure synchronized, integrated action and unity of effort.

- **Mission:** In coordination with the HRD and HPM, provide strategic theater-level or operational contingency contract management as the HCC to effectively and efficiently synchronize OCS programs and activities.
- **Role:** Integrate and synchronize all aspects of theater- and operational-level OCS management and execution. Serve as HCC for JFC. Coordinate with HRD and HPM.
- **Responsibility:** When directed, serve as the CCDR lead office for all contingency contracting activities in support of the CCDR or JFC mission. Synchronize and coordinate activities of each subordinate SCOs and other contracting entities operating within the AOR, including multiple JOAs and interagency and international partners.

Lead Service

The CCDR may delegate a service component to be the lead for contingency contracting or OCS program management in the theater.

- **Mission:** When directed by the CCDR, provide theater-level OCS program management and contingency contracting to effectively and efficiently synchronize OCS programs and activities within the AOR.
- **Role:** Integrate and synchronize all aspects of theater- and operational-level operational contract support management and execution. Provide HPM and HCC.
- **Responsibility:** When requested or directed, serve as the CCDR's lead service for all OCS program management and operational activities, including serving as the HPM and HCC. Synchronize and coordinate activities with the HRD.

Lead Nation

A lead or role-specialist nation may be designated in a combined operation to capitalize on its capabilities in one or more areas of support. The designation of a lead nation is intended to reduce competition for scarce resources, particularly materiel and manpower.

- **Mission:** Procure and provide a broad spectrum of support for all or part of a multinational force and headquarters.

- Role: Provide support to a multinational force and headquarters subject to agreements among all parties for compensation and reimbursement.
- Responsibility: Coordinate common-user support of other nations within functional and regional area of responsibility. Maintain records of goods and services required for audit, compensation, and reimbursement. Develop common standards of support.

OCS Contingency Roles

During combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, GCCs designate leads for program management, contingency contracting, and requirements development. These functions should synchronize and coordinate their activities to improve effectiveness and efficiency of OCS in theater. Coordination and integration of OCS activities within the DoD, across WoG, and among coalitions will improve unity of effort and help achieve the commander's intent.

Head of Program Management

The OCS head of program management is a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service with appropriate program management experience and qualifications and is designated by the GCC during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving WoG and international organizations.

- Mission: Ensure OCS meets the joint force commanders' intent by facilitating the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the OCS efforts. Provide theater OCS synchronization and integration of OCS capabilities across the CCDR staff, between JTFs in theater, and with WoG and coalition partners. Oversee all aspects of OCS within theater.
- Role: Integrate and synchronize all aspects of theater OCS management and execution to realize commander's intent. Advise the CCDR on OCS program management issues. Ensure interagency, coalition, and other partner collaboration and integration. Promote coordination and synchronization of contract activities in conjunction with requirements definition activities.
- Responsibility: Serve as advisor to the CCDR on all OCS program management activities. Establish and manage theater business clearance process in conjunction with the HCC. Establish and conduct boards and cells (e.g., CLPSB) as required in support of the CCDR mission to facilitate collaboration with partner stakeholders and provide a forum for resolving OCS issues. Coordinate MOUs, MOAs, and TORs with partners outside DoD. Establish theater OCS policy, processes, procedures, and reporting requirements. Synchronize theater OCS to ensure unity of effort and efficiency in one or more CJOAs and, as directed by the CCDR, in other AORs to facilitate the GCC's theater engagement plan.

Head of Requirements Definition

The OCS head of requirements definition is a senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service with appropriate experience and qualifications related to the definition of requirements to be satisfied through acquisition contracts (such as for delivery of products

or services, performance of work, or accomplishment of a project) and is designated by the GCC (if other than the CJTF commander) during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations.

- **Mission:** Ensure that requirements are defined in a way that effectively implements WoG and DoD objectives, policies, and decisions regarding the allocation of resources, coordination of interagency efforts in the theater, and alignment of requirements with the proper use of funds.
- **Role:** Oversee requirements management process, from definition through close out, across all echelons to ensure operational needs are satisfied. Ensure OCS contractor management and support delivery of contract support integration.
- **Responsibility:** Lead a requirements review board (e.g., JARB) to integrate and coordinate requirements, priorities, and funding. Ensure sufficiency, training, and expertise of CORs to support operational requirements. Nominate and oversee CORs in generation of requirements and statements of work, in coordinating with contracting officers on performance of contingency contractors, and in coordinating with contracting officers and theater personnel to inform authorization of GFS. Oversee the generation of OCS reports and metrics, identify lessons learned, and implement process improvement. Monitor delivery of contract benefits.

Head of Contingency Contracting

The OCS head of contingency contracting is a senior commissioned officer with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications and is designated by the GCC during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations.

- **Mission:** Perform contingency contracting that effectively and efficiently synchronizes and integrates theater contracted support with external and system support contracts and coordinates and integrates WoG and coalition contracting at the joint operational level.
- **Role:** Integrate and coordinate all aspects of contract management. Determine appropriate contract venue (e.g., theater support, service CAP). Deliver contingency contracting solutions in support of CJTF requirements.
- **Responsibility:** Develop, execute, and close contracts to satisfy operational requirements and achieve strategic ends. Establish JOA policy, processes, procedures, and reporting requirements. Oversee theater contracting officers in approving requiring activities' CORs (who monitor contractor performance), conducting market research, coordinating with theater and requiring activity to inform authorization of GFS in contracts, and facilitating proper close out of contracts, including the coordination and disposition of CAGO and GFE upon completion or transfer of contract activities and OCIE upon redeployment of personnel. Establish and conduct a JCSB, as required. Serve as an advisor to the JARB in support of the JTF mission to integrate contract support within DoD and with interagency and multinational partners.


Whole of Government

Law, policy, doctrine, and audit findings underpin a WoG approach to national security, including OCS. OCS supports all elements of national power, including diplomatic, information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, and law enforcement (DIMEFIL). As such, a WoG approach may require DoD to synchronize, coordinate, and integrate OCS with external federal partners, such as the Departments of Justice, Energy, and Treasury.

To facilitate WoG coordination, NDAA FY2009, Section 870, directs the Administrator of the General Services Administration, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, to establish a government-wide contingency contracting corps to be available for deployment in response to an emergency, major disaster, or contingency operation, both within or outside the continental United States. It further grants the Director of the Office of Management and Budget the authority, upon request by an executive agency, to determine when members of the CCC will deploy. However, these organizations do not normally assume a lead agency status.

Broadly speaking, DoD has lead responsibility for homeland defense and in foreign combat operations, while the DHS is lead for emergency response within the United States and DoS has security responsibility for non-combat areas outside the United States. Given this structure, DoD needs to closely coordinate with other government agencies, particularly DHS (domestic) and DoS (foreign), when planning and executing OCS. Smoothing and formalizing these inter-agency relationships at strategic levels is an important part of DoD's institutional OCS mission. Figure VI-7 identifies domestic and foreign WoG lead and support responsibilities.

Figure VI-7. Domestic and Foreign Lead and Support Agencies



Department of Defense

DoD has an institutional mission to provide an enduring capability to deliver optimal OCS. At DoD's strategic national level, program management and communications plans incorporate the WoG approach to OCS through formal agreements with other federal departments and with multinational partners. National strategy ensures the military departments and JFCOM include WoG factors in OCS training curricula and standards, and in joint, interagency, and multinational exercises that incorporate OCS. At strategic theater levels, OCS planners and practitioners continuously engage with interagency and mission partners in the region and include OCS in formal plans and in theater shaping and country teams' mission performance plans.

DoD structures its OCS to accommodate the requirements of other federal agencies during all operational phases. IAW NDAA FY2009, Section 1031, the SecDef may establish a center for complex operations (CfCO) to provide effective coordination in preparation; foster unity of effort among WoG, foreign governments and militaries, and international and nongovernmental organizations; collect, analyze, and distribute lessons learned; and compile best practices in matters relating to complex operations. The CfCO identifies gaps in the education and training of contractors and facilitates continuous process improvement efforts to fill such gaps.

In its support to civil authorities, NORTHCOM works, trains, and plans regularly within a WoG framework fixed by DHS.

Department of Homeland Security


The Secretary of Homeland Security is the principal federal official for domestic incident management, including prevention, protection, response, and recovery. DoD and other federal departments have key responsibilities to support national response activities and carry out those responsibilities within the coordinating mechanisms of the national response framework. DHS coordinates with other agencies to surge federal support at the headquarters, regional, and field levels. A domestic emergency response may employ contracted support. DHS, as lead under the National Incident Management System (NIMS), provides a wide cast of supporting departments and agencies, including DoD activities, to harness any agency's contracted support and coordinates any DoD-provided OCS with other agencies. DHS ensures the NIMS framework incorporates the possibility of OCS during emergency responses and offers DoD, through NORTHCOM, the opportunity for regular response plan reviews and revisions in the use of OCS in support to civil authorities.

Establishment of mutual aid agreements and assistance agreements provide a mechanism to quickly obtain emergency assistance in the form of personnel, equipment, materials, and other associated services to facilitate rapid, short-term deployment of emergency support prior to, during, and after an incident.

If a crisis requires a federal response, DHS may stand up a temporary joint field office (see Figure VI-8), similar to a JTF. Requirements definition activities (e.g., HRD) reside with the incident commander, who is responsible for setting priorities, approving resource requests, and ensuring after-action reports are completed. The Finance/Administration section chief performs HPM functions (e.g., meets with assisting and cooperating agency representatives, briefs agency administrative personnel on all incident-related financial issues needing attention or follow-

up, and provides input to planning) and HCC functions (e.g., manages all financial aspects of an incident, provides financial and cost analysis information, fills supply and support needs, maintains daily contact with agency headquarters on finance matters, ensures all obligation documents initiated at the incident are properly prepared and completed).

Figure VI-8. Joint Field Office Organization



Within the Finance/Administration section, a procurement unit administers all financial matters pertaining to vendor contracts, coordinates with local jurisdictions to identify sources for equipment, prepares and signs equipment rental agreements, and processes all administrative requirements associated with equipment rental and supply contracts. In some cases, the Logistics section is responsible for certain procurement activities. The procurement unit also works closely with local cost authorities. The Finance/Administration section chief determines, given current and anticipated future requirements, the need for establishing specific subordinate units. In some circumstances, an emergency support function (ESF) may be activated to coordinate response support from across the federal government and with certain NGOs. For example, ESF #7, Logistics Management and Resource Support, might be activated to assist the incident commander in providing resource support (e.g., facility space, office equipment and supplies, contracting services) much like an SCO under a JTCC. Lead for this capability is General Services Administration and DHS (through the Federal Emergency Management Administration, or FEMA), with DoD a supporting agency.


To facilitate visibility and coordination, NIMS has classified resources per category (e.g., function for which the resource is most useful), kind (e.g., broad class of characterization, such as teams, personnel, equipment, and supplies), and type (e.g., measure of minimum capabilities to perform its function where type I implies a higher capability than type II).

Department of State

DoS leads and coordinates all U.S. government efforts to help reconstruct and stabilize (R&S) other countries IAW National Security Presidential Directive 44 and NDAA FY2009, Section 1605. The DoS Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization is responsible for entering into arrangements with agencies to carry out reconstruction, stabilization, and conflict transformation activities. Such activities may involve OCS, and could be administered by USAID or through one of S/CRS's or USAID's approved NGOs. Specifically, the S/CRS establishes a civilian stabilization initiative to improve civilian partnership with U.S. armed forces in post-conflict stabilization situations by establishing an active response corps of 250 people, a standby response corps of 2,000 people, and a civilian response corps of 2,000 people.

Applying the Joint Staff's campaign and operation phasing model, S/CRS' contracted support occurs during Phases 0 (shape), IV (stabilize), or V (enable civil authority). In its lead role for reconstruction and stabilization, DoS coordinates this peacetime contract support, with the region's combatant commander acting in a support role. As a result, OCS could be an interagency component of theater shaping, leveraged or expanded during U.S. military operations, and key in WoG efforts to establish security and enable civil authority and services to take hold. During complex R&S engagements, the Secretary of State may decide to stand up an Interagency Management System (Figure VI-9) for R&S to assist policymakers, chiefs of mission (COMs), and military commanders in ensuring coordination among all U.S. government stakeholders at the strategic, operational, and tactical or field levels.

Figure VI-9. Interagency Management System



The Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG) is the strategic national decision-making body that coordinates interagency crisis response and provides recommendations on strategic guidance to deputies' and principals' committees on all policy and resource issues related to the specific country or crisis. This includes recommendations on lead roles between all ele-

ments of the interagency. These activities are informed by the GCC and the integration planning cell (IPC) from the strategic theater level.

Deployed to a GCC or multinational headquarters, the IPC is an interagency civilian team that integrates civilian and military planning to achieve unity of effort. The IPC team leader (led by an ambassador-level civilian), in conjunction with the CRSG, serves as (or designates) the HPM. Advance civilian teams (ACTs) implementation planning functions in support of a COM (or designate), provides surge support to coordinate and support execution of R&S operations, and coordinates with CJTF to ensure planning integration (liaisons exchanged). The ACT provides the COM with processes, structures, and authorities to integrate the activities of the allocated assets in time, space, and purpose to achieve unity of effort in the development and execution of the U.S. R&S implementation plan. In this function, the ACT serves as (or designates) the HCC supporting the requirements of the COM (e.g., HRD).

Field advance civilian teams (FACTs) may be established under the ACT to provide direct information about conditions on the ground and support operations at the tactical level. FACTs may coordinate the field execution of projects that involve not only U.S. government resources, but also foreign governments, UN, other international organizations, NGOs, or host nation activities. They provide visibility and awareness to facilitate the COM in implementing R&S programs and assist in requirements management and contractor oversight activities. Required transition between these WoG entities and DoD entities is based on operational phase.

Multi-National Partners

Coalition

In today's dynamic world, diverse requirements will require the U.S. to establish ad hoc relationships with new partners in unforeseeable locations. Partnerships with these organizations, as with other established partners, must support a unity of effort. For OCS, this requires synchronized and coordinated contracting. Although it is not envisioned the DoD would not rely on these partners to perform OCS program management functions, certain niche capabilities could be provided through these partner contingency contracting capabilities. Most notably, if a coalition partner has access to specialized providers or markets, DoD may rely on them to provide those capabilities. Similarly, many coalition partners may require contract services but have insufficient capacity to generate support to the same level DoD can, and thus DoD will provide this service to enable coalition partner participation in contingencies.

- **Mission:** Provide goods and services to coalition partners and Combined/Coalition Joint Task Force–deployed troops.
- **Role:** Secure scarce goods and services provided by vendors and service providers to moderate prices paid and ensure equitable access to the desired support.
- **Responsibilities:** Provide security and contractor management; maintain visibility and awareness of personnel in the operational area.


NATO

Contracting has become increasingly important to the conduct of NATO operations. It is a significant tool that may be employed to gain access to local resources and other necessary materials and services. The strategic commander's head of contracts exercises technical supervision and oversight of all procurement activities that use NATO common funding. Contracted support, including third-party logistics support services, may be an important aspect of NATO and coalition operations. NAMSA provides logistics services, when tasked.

- Mission: Provide contingency contracting and acquisition support in operational theaters in direct support of national requirements or NATO military commands.
- Role: Establish practices and procedures to functionally control and assess contractual efficiency.
- Responsibilities: Coordinate and deconflict NATO operation-wide issues associated with procurement management regarding support to the ongoing NATO operation.

NAMSA contracting support is provided by a variety of means, such as long-term deployment to a NATO combined joint task force, short-term or ad hoc support to deployed forces on site, or remote guidance and support through the NAMSA Procurement Division. Figure VI-10 shows the NAMSA organization.

Figure VI-10. NAMSA Organization



Other—Contractor Company Responsibilities

Due to the significant number of contractors on today's non-linear battlefield, it is imperative for contractors to ensure their personnel are properly trained and equipped to understand their own rights and obligations as well as those of the U.S. military and OGAs. The responsibilities of the prime contractor, when properly codified in the terms and conditions of the contract, should include the following:

- Ensure employees are properly vetted per DoD and local command policy to work on applicable government contracts. This generally includes security and background checks, passports, visas, entry permits, country clearance, theater clearance, and registration for U.S. contractors with the embassy or consulate.
- Ensure, in coordination with the requiring activity and the contracting officer, that all CAAF employees meet the requisite medical (fitness and vaccination), training (e.g., safety, security, survival, law of war), and equipment theater entrance requirements.
- Maintain strict accountability of employees designated as CAAF employees during and throughout their deployment. Update contractor information, status, and close out IAW SPOT (or any successor) business rules. Proper close out of personnel requires out-processing through requiring activity and DRS, return of OCIE, post deployment medical checkups, and release of contractors in SPOT who terminate employment.
- Provide logistical and security support for their employees, except for mandatory evacuations and personnel recovery instances or as otherwise defined in the contract.
- Ensure all employees entering the JOA process through the designated reception centers, with required documentation (e.g., LOA and common access card, or CAC) and report upon arrival.
- Designate mission-essential employees similar to the designation of DoD civilian employees as emergency essential; these essential contractor employees occupy positions in an overseas contingency operation that are critical to its success and will use all means at their disposal to continue to provide such services.
- Ensure company personnel comply with U.S., host country, and third country national laws; treaties, international agreements, and applicable SOFAs; and U.S. regulations, directives, instructions, policies, and procedures.
- Ensure CAAF employees (and non-CAAF employees requiring base access) adhere to all local command directives, including force protection measures and other general orders (e.g., equipment, security, health, safety, or relations and interaction with locals) established by the area or local base commanders.
- Ensure compliance with rules for the use of force, which generally limit the use of deadly force except in self-defense. Personnel authorized to carry weapons (IAW 18 U.S.C. 922) must be adequately trained and adhere to all guidance and orders regarding registration, authorization, possession, use, safety, and accountability of weapons and ammunition. Register and identify armored and military vehicles operated by contractors and subcontractors.

- Ensure good order and discipline of all employees to include taking administrative disciplinary actions, as necessary. Remove and replace (at their own cost) personnel who fail to comply with or violate applicable requirements.
- Report incidents of weapons discharge, death or injury of personnel and destruction of property. Cooperate with investigation of incidents by providing access to employees and relevant information.
- Notify employee-designated next of kin and the U.S. consul responsible for the area in which the event occurred, and return personal effects if the employee dies, requires evacuation due to an injury; or is isolated, missing, detained, captured, or abducted. Coordinate mortuary affairs IAW DoD Directive 1300.22 and with 10 U.S.C. 1486.
- Ensure proper close out of contracts. This entails return of GFE and CAGO, assistance in the disposition of equipment, and coordination with the contracting officer on administrative close out procedures.
- Operate in good faith to meet all terms and conditions of contracts in execution. Ensure compliance of subcontractors with the same and as identified above.

VII. Way Ahead

Operational lessons learned and federal statute dictate improvement in OCS. To fully transform its capability to leverage, integrate, and administer robust contracted support during all contingencies, DoD must review its current initiatives, ensure sufficient resourcing, and identify potential gaps. Progress is being made, but additional action is required.

Currently and through the timeframe of this CONOPS, DoD is and will remain engaged in executing SSTR operations in which OCS is a significant contributor. DoDD 3000.95 recognizes

Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission...[that] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning.

This CONOPS provides a unifying strategy to facilitate current operations, foreseeable future missions, and also serves as a basis to facilitate future analysis of ongoing initiatives. Some current initiatives need to be further matured or resourced. Additional initiatives may be required.

Current Initiatives

In response to demand for and the need to improve OCS capabilities, DoD and its components have initiated multiple actions. A partial list of ongoing activities across the DOTMLPF spectrum is highlighted below to inform future analysis.

Policy and Doctrine

- The Deputy Secretary of Defense signed DoD Directive 3020.49, “Orchestrating, Synchronizing, and Integrating Program Management of Contingency Acquisition Planning and Its Operational Execution,” which established the baseline policy for OCS in accordance with Section 854, Public Law 109-364 (2006), and Section 862, FY2008 National Defense Authorization Act.
- The Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy (DPAP) is creating joint procedures, guidance, and information (PGI) to serve as one tool for all military services during contingency operations. The DPAP has drafted a DFARS case for revisions to DFARS Part 18 and is developing contingency contracting PGI for Part 18.
- Other evolving guidance includes DoDI 3020.41, “Program Management for Acquisition and Operational Contract Support in Contingency Operations,” and DoDI 3020.50, “Private Security Contractors Operating in Contingency Operations.” In response to public law, these instructions provide guidance for DoD components in employing OCS and establish a foundation for cooperation with WoG.

- Adoption of a theater business clearance process will enable synchronization and integration of external and system support contracts with theater support contracts before award.
- Director, Joint Staff, approved Joint Publication 4-10, “Operational Contract Support,” which establishes joint doctrine for the armed forces and provides guidance for operating with interagency and multinational partners.
- OCS is being integrated into other publications, such as updates to CJCS Manual 3122.03, “Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPEX),” Volume II “Planning Formats and Guidance,” and inputs to the Joint Logistics White Paper.
- The Army has revised policy (AR 715-9) and tactics, techniques, and procedures to include field manuals (FMI 4-93.42, FM 4-93.41), the *Commander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System*, and a general review of LOGCAP program.

Organization and Personnel

- DUSD(L&MR) established JCASO, and the ADUSD(PS) embedded 14 JOCSPs with CCDRs’ staffs. JCASO, which is assigned to DLA, institutionalizes a program management approach to OCS within DoD. The JOCSPs ensure contingency plans include specific information on the use and roles of contractor support and facilitate contract support integration.
- Evolving OCS standards, such as the developing Annex W template for CCDR CONPLANS, ensures OCS is properly integrated into planning; however, further organizational solutions, such as the emerging JTCC concept, must evolve and the facilities construction and management, reconstruction support, and major external support contracts by the military services must improve to more effectively execute a programmatic approach.
- The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review includes force mix to specifically addresses “Align Guidance, Requirements Validation, and Planning; Wargame to Optimize Military/Contractor Force Mix.”
- White papers on strategy, guidance, and planning are being developed by the J4, and the manpower capability-based assessment is being written by PS/DPAP. White paper content will be the basis from which the QDR 2010 report will be developed.
- To combat fraud, waste, and abuse, the DoD convened a Section 813 Panel, which established ten subcommittees to support the review of contracting integrity issues. Subcommittee 6, Sufficient Contract Surveillance, is developing a standard COR certification to ensure properly trained, ready, and capable CORs are available for surveillance of the military services’ contracts.
- The Deputy Director, DPAP, is leading a joint effort (CCAS study and working group) to size the contingency contracting force. The Deputy Secretary of Defense tasked the military services to plan for and allocate the necessary resources.

- The Army stood up separate general officer–level contracting commands: Army Contracting Command, Mission and Installation Contracting Command, and Expeditionary Contracting Command (ECC) under the U.S. Army Materiel Command. These commands have expanded their contracting support brigades to include increases in CCAS-related personnel.
- DPAP, the Defense Acquisition University, and the contracting functional integrated product team are developing standard proficiency levels for CCOs based on training, experience, and type of work to be performed.

Training and Education

- Emergent education and training programs include material on OCS for contracting and non-contracting personnel.
- OCS programs of instruction educate operational military leaders, officer and enlisted, on the management of contractors with deployed forces. Two examples of this are the Joint Contingency Contracting and the Joint Contingency Contracting Officer’s Representative handbooks, DVDs, and websites. The *JCC Handbook* is a consolidated source of information in a pocket-sized guide used to train contingency contracting officers at their home station. The handbook, DVD, and website are used as reference and for training while deployed. Similarly, the COR handbook, DVD, and website provide essential tools and training for CORs.
- Integration of OCS into training exercises within the GCCs and in JFCOM exercises and experiments ensures a working knowledge of OCS and provides invaluable lessons to mature OCS as a capability. Some exercises and experiments include inter-agency and multinational partners, affording the opportunity to harmonize OCS with a broader community.
- In addition to supporting exercises, JFCOM provides deployable training teams of a senior mentor, observer/trainers, analysts, and qualified subject matter experts to provide feedback and functional training based on proven doctrinal solutions and observed best practices. OCS is among the courses offered from the Joint Warfighting Center Academic Curriculum Catalog.
- The CfCO is an excellent venue for sharing lessons learned on OCS issues related to complex operations with WoG partners outside DoD.
- The Joint Knowledge Development and Distribution Capability delivers operationally relevant individual joint training, including an introductory OCS course for commanders and staffs. Another four additional courses are projected through the end of September 2010.
- The Army is developing and updating OCS training courses, such as the CAAF training support packet, OCS interactive multimedia instruction, OCS course, OCS familiarization in professional military education courses, and courses on resource management and deployment planning.

Tools and Materiel

- SPOT provides improved contractor management through better visibility and awareness of contractors. OSD-published business rules and system developer–published workbooks assist SPOT users in using and updating this web-based system. An MOU among DoD, DoS, and USAID establishes SPOT as the system of record for tracking contingency contractor personnel data in compliance with Section 861, 2008 National Defense Authorization Act. SPOT is integrated with JAMMs, which tracks contractor personnel movements within the AOR and provides access to GFS by scanning biometric cards, LOA barcodes, and CACs.
- Beyond SPOT, DoD is synchronizing efforts of DoD and other government agencies to jointly respond to disasters, both foreign and domestic. In addition to the Annex W template, DoD developed a disaster relief and emergency assistance checklist, which lists 18 essential activities undertaken to ensure emergency authorities of FAR and DFARS are appropriately invoked and communicated. In preparation for a flu pandemic, DoD is further creating a DFARS clause for continuity of mission-essential services.
- DPAP is working with the GCCs to develop a standardized organizational web template across the GCCs that provides one-stop shopping for public OCS content in the GCC's AOR.
- DPAP is also developing an automated joint after-action report that will provide feedback to commanders and policymakers to mature OCS and improve future execution.
- Other systems that support OCS include biometric and contracting systems. Biometric tools (such as Biometric Identification System for Access (BISA), Defense Biometric Identification System [DBIDS], and Advanced Vehicle/Driver ID System [AVIDS]) collect, store and retrieve unique personnel identification that facilitates base access while promoting force protection. Contracting tools include the Contractor Verification System, a contracting system that allows for generation of CACs, and the Standardized Procurement System (SPS), a joint tool for contingency contracting document preparation.
- Other emerging OCS tools include a common operational picture (COP) and a requirements development tool, the contingency Acquisition Support Module (cASM). A total force COP will provide awareness of contractors and contract capabilities in the battlespace to facilitate integration of the contractor component of the Total Force into operations. Development of a cASM tool to automate requirements development will facilitate HRD actions in response to congressional requirements and Gansler Commission recommendations. Development of a joint COR management tool will further aid the HRD and contracting officers in tracking and managing CORs; this tool is currently part of the Army's Virtual Contracting Enterprise suite, but it is in the development stages for implementation across the DoD community.
- DPAP is leading an effort to develop a three-in-one tool to record and transfer data for field purchases of supplies and non-personal services to automate a manually intense process.

- The Army has developed “smart cards” to aid deployed soldiers in areas related to CERP, FOO, and contracting for leaders and provide COR references.

Next Steps

In accordance with NDAA FY2008, sections 941 and 942, a formal analysis by way of an OCS capabilities-based assessment is required to determine whether these initiatives are sufficient or whether additional solutions must be pursued. A JCIDS analysis should assess the current state of OCS and determine the metrics, gaps, risk areas, and solutions across DOTMLPF to ensure OCS capacity and capability. This effort will influence the identification and prioritization of OCS solutions in the planning programming budgeting and execution (PPBE) process to ensure required current and future solutions are resourced and sustained. As a critical capability, OCS needs to be integrated into DoD institutional processes to ensure its effective and efficient use in the future.

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Appendix A

Glossary

administrative contracting officer	Contracting officer whose primary duties involve contract administration. Also known as ACO. (FAR)
area of responsibility	The geographical area associated with a combatant command within which a geographic combatant commander has authority to plan and conduct operations. Also called AOR. (JP 1)
capability	The ability to execute a specified course of action. (JP 1-02)
capacity	The ability of individuals, institutions and societies to perform functions, solve problems, and set and achieve objectives in a sustainable manner. It provides the means to manage and sustain capabilities.
civil augmentation program	Standing, long-term external support contracts designed to augment Service logistic capabilities with contracted support in both preplanned and short notice contingencies. Examples include US Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, Air Force Contract Augmentation Program, US Navy Global Contingency Capabilities Contracts. Also known as CAP. (JP 4-10)
coalition	An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. See also alliance; multinational. (JP 5-0)
combatant commander logistics procurement support board	A combatant commander-level joint board established to ensure that contracting support and other sources of support are properly synchronized across the entire area of responsibility. Also called CLPSB. See also joint contracting support board and joint acquisition review board. (JP 4-10)

contingency contract	A legally binding agreement for supplies, services and construction let by government contracting officers in the operational area as well as other contracts that have a prescribed area of performance within a designated operational area. These contracts fall into three categories: systems support, external support and theater support. In most situations, the JFC will have limited direct control over external support contracts and very little influence over decisions related to the use of systems support contracts. The institution of a TBC process provides a method of maintaining visibility and a level of control over all contracts executing in a JOA regardless of source.
contingency contracting	All stages of the process of acquiring property or services by the Department of Defense during a contingency operation.
contingency contract administrative services (CCAS)	A subset of contracting that includes efforts to ensure that supplies, services, and construction are delivered in accordance with the terms and conditions of the contract in support of a contingency operation.
contingency program management	The process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the combined efforts of participating civilian and military personnel and organizations for the management of a specific defense acquisition program or programs during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations.
contract administration	A subset of contracting that includes efforts to ensure that supplies and services are delivered in accordance with the conditions and standards expressed in the contract. (JP 4-10)
contract support integration	The ability to synchronize and integrate contract support into the planning and execution of joint operations. (DAWG Tier 3 JCA term)
contracting officer	The Service member or Department of Defense civilian with the legal authority to enter into, administer, and/or terminate contracts. (FAR)
contracting officer representative	A Service member or Department of Defense civilian appointed in writing by a contracting officer responsible to monitor contract performance and performs other duties specified by their appointment letter. Also known as COR. (FAR)

contractor management	The ability to manage and maintain visibility of associated contractor personnel providing support to the Joint Force in a designated operational area. (DAWG Tier 3 JCA term)
contractors authorized to accompany the force (CAAF)	Contingency contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees who are specifically authorized through their contract to accompany the force and have protected status in accordance with international conventions. CAAF generally include all U.S. citizen and TCN employees not normally residing in the operational area whose area of performance is in the direct vicinity of U.S. forces and who routinely reside with U.S. forces (especially in non-permissive environments). Personnel residing with U.S. forces shall be afforded CAAF status via a LOA. In some cases, CCDR subordinate commanders may designate mission essential HN or LN contractor employees (e.g., interpreters) as CAAF.
designated reception site	The organization responsible for the reception, staging, and onward movement of contractors deploying during a contingency. The designated reception site includes assigned joint reception centers and other designated reception sites.
disposition	Transfer or elimination of an asset or security through a direct sale or some other method.
external support contracts	Prearranged contracts or contracts awarded during the contingency from contracting organizations whose contracting authority does not derive directly from the contingency operation or from system support contracting authority. (JP 4-0)
functional combatant commander	The Joint Force Commander of the following commands: U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM), U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM), U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM).
geographic combatant commander	The Joint Force Commander of the following commands: U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM), U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), U.S. European Command (EUCOM), and U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM)
head of contracting activity (HCA)	The official who has overall legal responsibility for managing the contracting activity. (FAR)

head of contingency contracting (HCC)	The senior commissioned officer, with appropriate acquisition experience and qualifications, designated by the GCC during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations. The HCC performs contingency contracting by delivering contract solutions responsive to subordinate unified JTF commanders' requirements in an efficient manner by synchronizing and integrating contract methods within and external to the theater and in conjunction with WoG and coalition capabilities.
head of program management (HPM)	The senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service, with appropriate program management experience and qualifications, designated by the GCC during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations, including stabilization and reconstruction operations involving multiple United States Government agencies and international organizations. The HPM facilitates the process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling and leading OCS in the CCDR's AOR ensuring OCS is synchronized and integrated across the CCDR staff, between JTFs in theater, and with WoG and coalition partners.
head of requirements definition (HRD)	The senior commissioned officer or civilian member of the senior executive service, with appropriate experience and qualifications related to the definition of requirements to be satisfied through acquisition contracts, designated by the GCC during combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations. The HRD ensures that requirements are defined in a way that effectively implements WoG and DoD objectives, policies, and decisions regarding the allocation of resources, coordination of interagency efforts in the theater, and alignment of requirements with the proper use of funds.
independent government estimate	An estimate of the cost/price for goods and/or services to be procured by contract. Also known as IGE. (JP 4-0)
inherently governmental function	A function that is so intimately related to the public interest as to require performance by Federal Government employees. (section 5 of the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-270; 112 Stat. 2384; 31 U.S.C. 501))

Interagency	United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. See also inter-agency coordination. (JP 3-08)
joint acquisition review board	A joint task force or subunified commander established board used to review critical common user logistic supplies and services within the joint operations area and to recommend the proper sources of support for approved support requirements. Also called JARB. (JP 4-0)
joint contracting support board	A joint task force or subunified commander established board to coordinate all contracting support and to determine specific contracting mechanisms to obtain commercially procured common logistic supplies and services within the joint operations area. Also called JCSB. (JP 4-0)
joint force commander	A general term applied to a combatant commander, subunified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. Also called JFC. (JP 1)
joint operations area	An area of land, sea, and airspace, defined by a geographic combatant commander or subordinate unified commander, in which a joint force commander (normally a joint task force commander) conducts military operations to accomplish a specific mission. Also called JOA. (JP 3-0)
lead agency	Designated among US Government agencies to coordinate the interagency oversight of the day-to-day conduct of an ongoing operation. The lead agency is to chair the interagency working group established to coordinate policy related to a particular operation. The lead agency determines the agenda, ensures cohesion among the agencies and is responsible for implementing decisions. (JP 3-08)

lead nation	One nation assumes the responsibility for procuring and providing a broad spectrum of logistic support for all or a part of the multinational force and/or headquarters. Compensation and/or reimbursement will then be subject to agreements between the parties involved. The lead nation may also assume the responsibility to coordinate logistics of the other nations within its functional and regional area of responsibility. See also logistic support; multinational force. (JP 4-0)
letter of authorization (LOA)	A document issued by the procuring contracting officer or designee that authorizes contractor personnel authorized to accompany the force to travel to, from, and within the operational area; and, outlines government furnished support authorizations within the operational area. (DODI 3020.41)
local national (LN)	An individual who is a permanent resident of the nation in which the United States is conducting contingency operations.
military department	One of the departments within the Department of Defense created by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended. Also called MILDEP. See also Department of the Air Force; Department of the Army; Department of the Navy.
multinational	Between two or more forces or agencies of two or more nations or coalition partners. See also alliance; coalition. (JP 5-0)

non-CAAF (contractors not authorized to accompany the force)	Contingency contractor employees and all tiers of subcontractor employees who are not authorized through their contract to accompany the force and do not have protected status in accordance with international conventions. Non-CAAF normally include personnel who do not satisfy all the requirements for designation as CAAF and are otherwise not so designated, such as LN employees and non-LN employees who are permanent residents in the operational area or TCNs not routinely residing with U.S. forces (and TCN expatriates who are permanent residents in the operational area) who perform support functions away from the close proximity of, and do not reside with, U.S. forces. USG-furnished support to non-CAAF is typically limited to force protection, emergency medical care, and basic human needs (e.g., bottled water, latrine facilities, security, and food when necessary) when performing their jobs in the direct vicinity of U.S. forces.
OCS program management	The process of planning, organizing, staffing, controlling, and leading the OCS efforts to meet the Joint Force Commander's objectives. (DoDD 3020.49)
operational contract support	The ability to orchestrate and synchronize the provision of integrated contract support and management of contractor personnel providing that support to the joint force in a designated operational area. (DoDD 3020.49)
partner	An organization that the DoD works with to accomplish a common end. May be an interagency (Dept of State, USAID, etc), multinational (NATO, ABCA, etc), or coalition (IGO, etc) entity.
performance work statement	A performance-based description of the user's technical, functional, and performance requirements. Also known as PWS. (FAR)
personnel recovery	The sum of military, diplomatic and civil efforts to prepare for and execute the recovery and reintegration of isolated personnel. (JP 3-50)
prime vendor	A contracting process that provides commercial products to regionally grouped military and federal customers from commercial distributors using electronic commerce. Customers typically receive materiel delivery through the vendor's commercial distribution system. Also called PV. (JP 4-09)

requirements definition	The process of translating policy objectives and mission needs into specific requirements, the description of which will be the basis for awarding acquisition contracts for projects to be accomplished, work to be performed, or products to be delivered.
requiring activity	A military or other designated supported organization that identifies and receives contracted support during military operations. (JP 4-10)
senior contracting official (SCO)	A lead Service or joint command-designated contracting official who has direct managerial responsibility over theater support contracting. There may be multiple SCOs in the same operational area based on mission or regional focus. For example, in Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, there were two SCOs (called the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting, or PARC): one for support to forces, and one for reconstruction support. (JP 4-10)
supported unit	As related to contracted support, a supported unit is the organization that is the recipient, but not necessarily the requester of, contractor-provided support. See also requiring activity. (JP 4-10)
systems support contract	Prearranged contingency contracts awarded by Service acquisition program management offices that provide deployed technical support, maintenance support and, in some cases, Class IX support for selected military weapon and support systems. (JP 4-0)
task order	Order for services placed against an established contract. (FAR)
theater business clearance	The process which ensures that contracts to be executed in or contracted materials delivered to a Combatant Commander's Area of Responsibility are visible and meet the Commander's Intent. This includes ensuring contractors comply with battlefield orders through insertion of mandatory provisions and clauses in contracts, ensuring that any requirements for government furnished support of contractor employees is prearranged and that contract execution will be properly overseen by government authorities in the operating area.

theater support contracts

A type of contingency contract that is awarded by contracting officers deployed to the operational area serving under the direct contracting authority of the Service component, special operations force command or designated joint head of contracting authority for the designated contingency operation. (JP 4-0)

types of contracted support

There are several major types of contracted support that are commonly used to support contingency operations. Key to this contract type categorization is the source of contracting authority. This construct breaks support contracts into three categories describing the numerous contracting and contract administration authorities providing support within the operational area. It outlines the limits on along with the JFC's ability to control or influence these different types of contracted support. The JFC asserts control over external and systems support contracts via the theater business process to ensure program management of OCS in theater.

whole of government

A unified government approach that integrates the collaborative efforts of the departments and agencies of the USG to achieve unity of effort toward a shared goal.

Appendix B

Abbreviations

AAR	after action report
ABCA	American, British, Canadian, and Australian Armies' Program
ACO	administrative contracting officer
ACT	advance civilian team
ADUSD(PS)	Assistant Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Program Support
AFCAP	Air Force Contract Augmentation Program
AOR	area of responsibility
ASD(A)	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Acquisition)
BA	battlespace awareness
C2	command and control
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
CAAF	contractors authorized to accompany the force
CAC	common access card
CAP	civil augmentation program
CAS	contract administration services
cASM	Contingency Acquisition Support Module
CCAS	contingency contract administration service
CCDR	combatant commander
CCJO	<i>Capstone Concept for Joint Operations</i>
CERP	Commander's Emergency Response Program
CfCO	Center for Complex Operations
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CJCSI	CJCS instruction
CJCSM	CJCS manual
CJOA	combined/joint operations area
CJTF	Combined/Coalition Joint Task Force
CLPSB	Combatant Commander Logistics Procurement Support Board
CM	contractor management

CMP	contractor management plan
COI	community of interest
COM	chief of mission
CONOPS	concept of operations
CONPLAN	contingency plan; concept plan
COP	common operational picture
COR	contracting officer representative
CRSG	Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group
CSA	combat support agency
CSB	contracting support brigade
CSI	contract support integration
CSIP	contract support integration plan
DAWG	Deputy's Advisory Working Group
DCAA	Defense Contract Audit Agency
DCMA	Defense Contract Management Agency
DepSecDef	Deputy Secretary of Defense
DFARS	Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DIMEFIL	Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic, Financial, Intel- ligence and Law Enforcement
DLA	Defense Logistics Agency
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDI	Department of Defense Instruction
DoS	Department of State
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Personnel and Facilities
DPAP	Defense Procurement and Acquisition Policy
DRS	designated reception sites
DSCA	Defense Security Cooperation Agency
DSCA	Defense Support of Civil Authorities
DUSD/DCMO	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense, Deputy Chief Management Officer

DUSD(A&T)	Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
ECC	expeditionary contracting command
ESF	emergency support function
EUCOM	European Command
FACT	field advance civilian team
FAR	Federal Acquisition Regulation
FCC	functional combatant commander
FCIB	Functional Capabilities Integration Board
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FOO	food ordering officer
FRAGO	fragmentary order
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GCC	geographic combatant commander
GCCC	global contingency construction contract
GCSC	global contingency service contract
GDF	guidance for development of the force
GEF	guidance for employment of the force
GFE	government-furnished equipment
GFS	government-furnished support
GSA	General Services Administration
HCA	head of contracting activity
HCC	head of contingency contracting
HLD	Homeland Defense
HN	host nation
HPM	head of program management (for OCS)
HQ	headquarters
HRD	head of requirements definition
IAW	in accordance with
ICW	in coordination with
ID	identification
IGE	independent government estimate
IPC	integration planning cell

IW	irregular warfare
J1	Manpower and Personnel (directorate of the Joint Staff)
J2	Intelligence (directorate of the Joint Staff)
J3	Operations (directorate of the Joint Staff)
J4	Logistics (directorate of the Joint Staff)
J5	Strategic Plans and Policy (directorate of the Joint Staff)
J6	Command, Control, Communications, and Computer Systems (directorate of the Joint Staff)
J7	Operational Plans and Joint Force Development (directorate of the Joint Staff)
J8	Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment (directorate of the Joint Staff)
JAMMs	Joint Asset Movement Management System
JARB	joint acquisition review board
JCA	joint capability area
JCASO	joint contingency acquisition support office
JCIDS	joint capabilities integration and development system
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JCSB	joint contracting support board
JFC	joint force commander
JFCOM	Joint Forces Command
JIC	joint integrating concept
JMD	joint manning document
JOA	joint operations area
JOC	joint operating concept
JOCSP	joint operational contract support planner
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System
JOpsC	joint operations concepts
JP	joint publication
JSCP	joint strategic capabilities plan
JTCC	joint theater contracting command or center
JTF	joint task force
LN	local national

LOA	letter of authorization
LOGCAP	Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
LOW	levels of war
MCO	major combat operations
MilDep	military department
MOA	memorandum of agreement
MOU	memorandum of understanding
NAMSA	NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVFAC	Navy Facilities Command
NDAA	National Defense Authorization Act
NDS	National Defense Strategy
NGO	non-governmental organization
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NMS	national military strategy
NORTHCOM	Northern Command
NSC	National Security Council
NSS	national security strategy
OCIE	organizational clothing and individual equipment
OCS	operational contract support
ODA	other defense agency
OEF	Operation Enduring Freedom
OGA	other government agency
OIF	Operation Iraqi Freedom
OP	operational
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operations order
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OV	operational view
PGI	procedures, guidance, and information
PgM	program management
PPBE	planning, programming, budgeting, and execution

PWS	performance work statement
PSA	principal staff assistant
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
R&S	reconstruct and stabilize
RCC	regional contracting center
ROMO	range of military operations
RSOI	reception, staging, onward movement, and integration
S/CRS	Office of the Secretary of State, Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SCO	senior contracting official
SecDef	Secretary of Defense
SIGIR	Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
SME	subject matter expert
SN	strategic national
SOCOM	Southern Command
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SPOT	Synchronized Predeployment and Operational Tracker
SSTR	stabilization, security, transition, and reconstruction
ST	strategic theater
STRATCOM	Strategic Command
TA	tactical
TBC	theater business clearance
TCN	third country national
TOR	terms of reference
TPFDD	time-phased force deployment data
TRANSCOM	Transportation Command
UJTL	universal joint task list
UN	United Nations
USACE	U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
USC	U.S. Code

USD(AT&L)	Under Secretary of Defense Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
USD(C)/CFO	Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer
USD(P)	Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
USD(P&R)	Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
WMD	weapons of mass destruction
WoG	whole of government

