NARP folder

Comments Matrix
NCB seal


Functional Areas | Security

Security

1. GENERAL.
The presence of nuclear weapons or weapon components at an accident site requires implementation of an effective security program as soon as possible.  Accidents occurring in areas where the Department of Defense does not have exclusive jurisdiction might require establishing an NDA to allow control of civilian land by military forces.  The equivalent DOE/NNSA area for an accident involving a nuclear weapon in the custody of DOE/NNSA is an NSA.  Close coordination with civil law enforcement agencies is critical for an effective security program. 


2. SPECIFIC REQUIREMENTS
The security program must allow for situational awareness both inside and outside the bounds of the NDA/NSA, if established.  This situational awareness will require close coordination with civil authorities from other Federal agencies and State, local, and tribal governments.  The security program is found in the Security Operations Branch of the Operations Section.  In general, this section will work with ESF #13 (if present) to ensure provision of technical assistance, public safety and security assessments, badging and credentialing procedures, access control, site security, traffic and crowd control, force protection, security surveillance, security and protection of personnel and temporary storage facilities during distribution of supplies from the Strategic National Stockpile, and specialized security resources.  Specifically, this section will:  

a. Provide effective control of the accident area. 

b. Protect nuclear weapons, weapon components, classified material or components, and Government-owned material. 

c. Maintain a Security Control Center. 

d. Provide necessary physical, operational, and informational security and recommend security measures to the DoD IC. 

e. Ensure a secure perimeter for the NDA/NSA.  (More than one NDA/NSA may be established, as required.) 

f. Place the Security Area perimeter outside of the fragmentation zone.  Coordinate with the ASHG and EOD personnel to determine the required radius. 

g. Establish an Entry Control Point (ECP), as directed by the DoD IC.  If necessary, multiple ECPs may be used but should be reduced to the fewest necessary to conduct the operation. 

h. Establish a standardized entry control system for the security area.  This will include implementing and using an identification and/or badging system, entry control logs, and a record of all personnel entering and leaving the security area.  These logs will be turned over to the Documentation Unit of the Planning Section every shift change, as determined by the operation rhythm.  

(1) A locally devised badging system will be in effect.  Issuance of these badges will be based upon verification of identity and necessity to be in the security area.  Identity can be verified prior to badge issuance with two forms of photo identification, with one form being issued from the individual’s Federal agency. 

(2) In the event that individuals enter the security area and do not return prior to shift change, the individual’s name will be transferred to a new control log and annotated as still in the area on the original control log.  A name can only be transferred one time; if a name is about to be transferred more than once, a search for the individual should commence immediately. 

i. Have a security element for perimeter security, entry and exit control, and protection of classified information and property.  The DoD IC should carefully review with the PLA the RUF to be used by all DoD security personnel responding to the accident and should ensure that the applicable RUF are fully understood by those personnel. 

j. Establish a security response force commensurate with the mission, enemy, troops, time, terrain, weather, and civilians in the affected area.  Consider the condition of the nuclear weapon/material when assessing the feasibility or proclivity of an adversary to gain unauthorized access. 

k. Protect radiological materials, weapons and components, classified materials and information, and Government property. 

l. In case of further emergency responses into the NDA, develop procedures that ensure immediate access by fire and medical responders, and the coroner for processing fatalities.  Ensure these procedures are provided to the Operations Section Chief so all emergency first responders understand the protocols. 

m. Provide for special, independently secured areas within the security area for discussing CNWDI, Top Secret, Sensitive Compartmented Information, or other restricted information.  Depending on need and frequency of use, a single area may be used.  Members of DoD Special Teams operating within the NDA/NSA (i.e., AFRAT, RAMT, MRAT) require CNWDI clearances. 

n. Provide special areas that are independently secured, for storing classified documents, recovered nuclear weapons, weapon components, weapon residue, and other radiological materials. 

o. As required, debrief personnel with access to classified information. 

p. Coordinate security actions with State and local officials. 

q. Review with the PLA the deadly force provisions of the RUF to ensure that they comply with CJCSI 3150.03B (references (aj)). 

r. Coordinate with the PLA to ensure that actions of military security personnel do not violate the Posse Comitatus Act (reference (ce)) while allowing for the implementation of force protection initiatives.

s. Notify the DoD IC, the Operations Section Chief,  the ASHG, the Legal Element or PLA, and the FRMAC of personnel apprehended within the security area.  Ensure these personnel are turned over, if appropriate, to civil authorities.  Chain of custody for personal property must be maintained.  Accident reports filled out by the apprehending and responding security forces should be forwarded to both the Documentation Unit of the Planning Section, as well as to the apprehending jurisdiction. 

t. Coordinate with the ASHG to determine procedures for handling unprotected personnel and human remains encountered in contaminated areas within the NDA/NSA. 

u. Coordinate with the Situation Unit of the Planning Section, as well as any intelligence unit of law enforcement or investigative agency within the Law Enforcement and Security Unit of the Operations Section. 

v. Coordinate and advise the DoD IC and security staff on Operations Security (OPSEC) matters. 

w. When appropriate, coordinate the disestablishment of the NDA/NSA with State or local governments. 


3. RESOURCES.

a. Department of Defense Resources

(1) IRF. The IRF will have a security element for perimeter security, entry and exit control, and protection of classified information and property.  Since sufficient personnel are not likely to be included in the IRF security elements responding to a nuclear weapon accident, supplementation may be required from civil law enforcement personnel or DoD Components as available.  Security forces may expect to encounter large numbers of people attracted to the accident scene, and care should be exercised to ensure that only experienced security personnel are in supervisory positions.  Installations with a nuclear weapon capability should maintain equipment to control an accident site.  This requirement should include rope and stanchions for delineating the boundary of the accident site, NDA/NSA and ECP signs (bilingual when appropriate), and the hanging portable lights.  The IRF should provide security personnel with anti-contamination clothing and protective masks in the event that security requires their presence within the exclusion zone.  Riot control gear should be readily available but kept out of sight until needed.  Security personnel shall be armed and equipped in accordance with reference (cd) requirements.  Special consideration should be given to ensure personal protective gear is issued to first responders. 

(2) RTF. The RTF Senior Security Representative should assess workforce requirements and ensure that sufficient additional security personnel are included in the RTF.  Upon arrival of the RTF, IRF security personnel may become part of the RTF security element.  The Senior Security Representative should be prepared to meet all security requirements on a 24-hour basis without degrading the alertness and capability of his or her personnel to respond.  Environmental factors, general stress associated with the accident scene, time on post and post associated time, billeting and messing arrangements, and the duty schedules of other responders should be considered when determining duty schedules and manpower requirements.

b DOE/NNSA Resources. When DOE/NNSA is the Coordinating Agency, specific requirements, outlined in section 2. and Reference (b), apply.  Under DOE policy, DOE/NNSA provides a security element for perimeter security, entry and exit control, and protection of classified information and property.  DoD law enforcement and civilian law enforcement may supplement DOE/NNSA security personnel, if requested and approved by the SECDEF. 

c. Civilian Response. Civilian law enforcement response depends on the jurisdiction and location of the accident site.  If the accident occurs off a military installation near a populated area, local police, fire, and rescue units will be notified and may be on-scene when the IRF or the DOE/NNSA IC arrives.  Civilian law enforcement personnel may supplement military and/or DOE/NNSA security personnel, if requested. 


4. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS.

a. Accident Assessment. Once at the accident site, the Senior Security Representative must assess the situation.  This assessment includes an evaluation of ongoing emergency response operations and actions of local law enforcement agencies, and provides the foundation for the security program.  While the assessment is made, security should be established at the accident site in cooperation with civil authorities.  Fragmentation hazard distances and the possibility of contamination should be considered when posting initial security personnel around the scene.  Once posted, this area will become the security area.  This security area should not be confused with the NDA/NSA which may not yet be established and may be different in size.  The Senior Security Representatives should consider the following elements in their assessment: 

(1) Threat (real and potential danger to the secure area). 

(2) Location (on or off installation).  If on installation, determine the jurisdiction present.  Be cognizant that many military installations have different types of jurisdiction.  Confer with the PLA to determine applicable jurisdictions. 

(3) Demographics and accident environment (remote, rural, suburban, and urban). 

(4) Terrain characteristics (critical or dominating features). 

(5) Contamination (radiation intensity and extent and other HAZMATs). 

(6) Accident hazards (HEs, rocket motors, or toxic chemicals). 

(7) Local meteorological conditions (include speed and direction of prevailing winds, temperatures, precipitation, and nighttime illumination). 

(8) Transportation network in the accident area to include key avenues of approach (access routes, types, and quantities of vehicles). 

(9) Structures in the accident area (type and quantity). 

(10) Safety of security personnel (fragmentation distances, contamination, and cold and/or hot weather).

(11) Presence of casualties or fatalities. 

b. NDA/NSA

(1) An NDA/NSA may be required any time an accident involving nuclear weapons or components occurs on property where the Department of Defense or DOE does not have exclusive jurisdiction.  The NDA/NSA, which usually is initially conterminous with the fragmentation zone for the pertinent weapon, should be determined after consultation with the PLA.  Security of any part of the area contaminated by radiation existing outside the NDA/NSA is a matter of public safety and should be provided by civilian authorities and/or officials.  However, military assistance may be requested.  If requested, consult with the PLA to ensure all applicable laws are followed.  To complement security for an NDA/NSA, consider the following concept:  Military only, control the actual NDA/NSA perimeter.  Extending out, another perimeter is staffed by military and civilian law enforcement.  Out further, another perimeter is staffed by civilian law enforcement.  This concept allows for two perimeters with law enforcement personnel to contain and/or control the civilian population before gaining access to the actual security area.  This concept is shown in Figure 1. 

(2) The Internal Security Act of 1950 (reference (cf)) provides the basis for establishing an NDA/NSA only in the United States.  For a DoD-led response, reference (be) should also be consulted when establishing an NDA.  For a DOE/NNSA-led response, see subsection 162(i) of the AEA of 1954 as amended (Section 2201 of reference (ba)).  An NDA/NSA is established specifically to enhance the safeguarding of classified material and Government-owned property located on non-Federal land.  Senior DoD or DOE/NNSA representatives may designate an NDA/NSA, and then only to safeguard Government resources, irrespective of other factors.  The DoD IC should seek legal advice on any decisions about establishing, disestablishing, or modifying the NDA. 

(3) The DoD IC designating the NDA (or the DOE IC designating the NSA) must ensure its boundaries are clearly defined and marked.  Area boundaries are established to reduce interference with other lawful activities and uses of the property.  Initially, the dimensions of the NDA/NSA may be quite large, which is necessary until more specific information is available on the location of the Government-owned material.  The boundary is defined by some form of temporary barrier, for example, rope and wire.  Warning signs as described in reference (be) should be posted at the entry control station and along the boundary and be visible from any direction of approach.  In areas where languages other than English are spoken, bilingual signs are required.  


Figure 1. Security Concept

 Figure 1. Security Concept


(4) Once the NDA/NSA has been established, the DoD IC must determine whether overflight restrictions are necessary to ensure the security and safety of the area.  If so, a request should be made to the Air Traffic Control Center responsible for the geographic area in which the NDA/NSA is located.  The physical dimensions of the restricted area must be reasonable, while affording the security and safety the DoD IC seeks.  The restrictions should be relaxed as conditions allow and removed as soon as practical. 

(5) The DoD IC who establishes the NDA should advise civil authorities and/or officials of the authority and need for the NDA and the security controls in effect.  If possible, the DoD IC should secure the landowners’ consent and cooperation; however, getting such consent is not a prerequisite for establishing the NDA. 

(6) In maintaining security of the NDA/NSA, personnel should use the minimum degree of control and force necessary, recognizing that the use of deadly force is only authorized for protecting nuclear weapons.  Sentries should be briefed thoroughly and given specific instructions for dealing with civilians and the applicable RUF.  All personnel should be aware of the sensitive nature of issues surrounding an accident.  Moreover, controls should be implemented to ensure that public affairs policy is strictly adhered to, and that requests for interviews and queries about the accident are referred to public affairs personnel.  Civilians should be treated courteously, and in a helpful but watchful manner.  No one may remove anything or touch any suspicious objects.  Special provisions should be made to provide unencumbered access by medical and health physics personnel in treating casualties, and handling the deceased, within the security area.

(7) Local civil authorities and/or officials should be asked to help military personnel prevent unauthorized entry and remove unauthorized personnel who enter the NDA/NSA.  Civilian authorities should usually apprehend or arrest civilian personnel who violate any security requirements at the NDA/NSA.  If local civil authorities are unavailable, or refuse to give assistance, on-scene military personnel should detain violators or trespassers.  Civilians detained by military security personnel should be turned over to civilian law enforcement as soon as possible and such detention should be brought to the attention of the PLA.  The DoD IC should be notified of each detention and the actions taken.  To avoid violating those conditions of reference (cf) that may limit the use of DoD personnel in certain civilian law enforcement activities, the DoD IC should discuss with the PLA any actions that would appear to involve military personnel in law enforcement matters. 

(8) When all Government resources have been located, the DoD IC will consider reducing the size of the NDA.  When all classified and hazardous (if present) Government resources have been removed, the NDA will be disestablished.  Early coordination with State and local officials allows an orderly transfer of responsibility to State and local agencies when reducing or disestablishing the NDA. 

c. Security Procedures

(1) Sentry posts around the NDA/NSA should be in locations that enable guards to maintain good visual contact with adjacent posts, as well as all approaches to the post, both from within and outside the NDS/NSA.  This action prevents unauthorized persons from entering the NDA/NSA undetected between posts.  Lighting will be provided, night vision equipment supplied, or guard spacing adjusted, to ensure that visual contact is maintained at night or in periods of reduced visibility.  Each guard will have a means of summoning assistance, preferably a radio, or be in contact with someone who does.  Consider getting portable intrusion detection system sensors.  This type of equipment will reduce security personnel requirements and the possibility of radiation exposure to security personnel. 

(2) During the initial emergency response, entry and exit of emergency units and other personnel may be largely uncontrolled.  The Senior Security Representative will recognize that during initial response, necessary life-saving, fire suppression, and other emergency activities may temporarily take priority over security procedures; however, as response operations progress, standard security measures specified in DoD Directive O-5210.41, DOE Order 470.1, DOE Order 474.1A, and DOE Manual 474.1-1A (references (cg) through (cj)) must be enforced.  As soon as possible, an ECP will be established.  When personnel from various Federal and/or civilian authorities and/or agencies arrive at the entry control point, leaders of the groups should be escorted to the operations center.  An identification and badging system will be implemented, entry control logs established, and a record of all personnel entering and exiting the accident area made and kept by the security personnel. 

(3) A Joint Security Control Center (JSCC) or control point should be established as the focal point for security operations and be located close to the ECP.  Its location should be fixed so that personnel become familiar with the location.  Representatives of all participating law enforcement and security agencies will be at the JSCC and be able to communicate with their personnel. 

(4) A security response force is required when practicable.  Early in the accident response, sufficient personnel may be unavailable to form such a force. 

d. Security Considerations

(1) Some components in nuclear weapons may reveal classified information by their shape, form, or outline.  Specified classified components must be protected from sight and overhead photographic surveillance. 

(2) Individuals with varying degrees of knowledge and appreciation for security requirements will assist in response operations.  For a DoD-led response, a comprehensive and effective information security program is available as outlined in DoD 5200.1-R (reference (ck)), and should be issued in coordination with the SEO.  For a DOE/NNSA-led response, the DOE/NNSA IC should consult DOE Order 471.2A (reference (cl)).  The content of the information security program will be briefed to everyone in the weapon recovery effort. 

(3) CNWDI access verification may have to be waived temporarily during the initial phases of accident response.  When the urgency of the initial response is over and order has been established, compliance with DoD, DOE/NNSA, and Service directives, regulations and/or instructions should prevail.  For a DoD-led response, access procedures must be in compliance with DoD Directive 5210.2 (reference (cm)).  For a DOE/NNSA-led response, access procedures must be in compliance with references (cg) through (cj). 

(4) The two-person concept is addressed in DoD and Service directives, including reference (cn).  Senior Security Representatives establish and enforce procedures to ensure only authorized personnel are granted access to the site areas that require two-person concept compliance. 

(5) In the initial emergency response, reliability program (PRP/HRP) requirements may be waived due to a lack of PRP/HRP certified personnel, in accordance with DoD Directive 5210.42 and title 10, Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter 3, Part 711 (references (cn) and (co)).  When certified personnel are available, they should be used in security positions that require them.  Security personnel assigned to directly guard nuclear weapons and nuclear components containing Special Nuclear Material (SNM) must be PRP or HRP certified, if available.  PRP/HRP personnel should be used on the perimeter, if available. 

(6) An area should be available within the security perimeter where EOD and DOE/NNSA personnel may discuss CNWDI related to weapon(s) recovery operations.  Also, areas shall be established for storing classified documents, recovered weapons, and weapon components.  The Senior Security Representative must ensure that adequate security is provided for these areas. 

(7) If a base camp is established to support the response operation, traffic control signs should be posted, law enforcement procedures developed, and a base camp ECP established.  Verification of vehicle trip authorization, restriction of curiosity seekers, access to the camp, and maintaining order and discipline within the camp may be parts of base camp security functions.  All activities must be accomplished in accordance with local laws.  If the base camp is established in an area where the Department of Defense does not have exclusive jurisdiction, assistance will be required from civil authorities when dealing with personnel not subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 

e. Intelligence. The intelligence function of the accident response operation is located with the Planning Section.  However, some law enforcement agencies may respond with an intelligence capability.  When present, intelligence personnel should be used to the fullest extent and incorporated actively in the overall security posture, including, but not limited to: 

(1) Advice and assistance in counterintelligence to the DoD IC and security staff. 

(2) Liaison and coordination with Federal, State, and local agencies and civilian authorities and/or officials, on threats to response operations (for example, hostile intelligence collection efforts and terrorist activities). 

(3) Coordination and advice to the DoD IC and security staff on operations security. 

(4) Investigating and reporting incidents of immediate security interest to the DoD IC and the security staff (in cooperation with the local office of the FBI). 

(5) Advise and assist the DoD IC and security staff on matters of personnel and information security necessary to maintain high standards of security. 

(6) Receiving requests for large-scale photographic coverage of the accident site.


Top of Page