Nuclear Forces Treaty Message from the President of the United States
Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range
Missiles, Together with the Memorandum of Understanding and Two Protocols,
Signed at Washington on December 8, 1987
The White House, January 25, 1988
the Senate of the United States:
am transmitting herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to
ratification, the Treaty between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range
and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The Treaty includes the following
documents, which are integral parts thereof: the Memorandum of Understanding
(the MOU) regarding the establishment of a data base, the Protocol on
Elimination governing the elimination of missile systems, and the Protocol
on Inspection regarding the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that
Protocol on the privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and
aircrew members. The Treaty, together with the MOU and the two Protocols,
was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. The Report of the Department
of State on the Treaty is provided for the information of the Senate.
addition, I am transmitting herewith, for the information of the Senate,
the Agreement Among the United States of America and the Kingdom of Belgium,
the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of
the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country
Agreement), which was signed at Brussels on December 11, 1987.
Basing Country Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the
Treaty will be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. The Report
of the Department of State discusses in detail the terms of the Basing
Country Agreement. Also attached for the information of the Senate are
the notes exchanged between both the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia
and the United States. The notes acknowledge that these countries agree
to the United States' conducting inspections, under the Treaty, on their
territory. Identical notes also are being exchanged between the Soviet
Union and the five Allied Basing Countries.
Treaty is an unprecedented arms control agreement in several respects.
It marks the first time that the United States and the Soviet Union have
agreed to eliminate, throughout the world, an entire class of their missile
systems. Significantly, the elimination will be achieved from markedly
asymmetrical starting points that favored the Soviet Union. The Treaty
includes provisions for comprehensive on-site inspections, including the
continuous monitoring of certain facilities, to aid in verifying compliance.
To a much greater extent than in earlier arms control agreements between
the United States and the Soviet Union, detailed information has been,
and will continue to be, exchanged by the Parties in order to facilitate
verification of compliance. Finally, the United States and the Soviet
Union have agreed on cooperative measures to enhance verification by national
missile systems to be eliminated consist of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched
ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles having a range
capability between 500 and 5500 kilometers. The launchers for such missiles
and unique elements of their related support structures and support equipment
also will be eliminated. The shorter-range missiles to be eliminated under
this Treaty are those with a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers.
They must be eliminated within 18 months after the entry into force of
the Treaty. Intermediate-range missiles, having a range capability between
1000 and 5500 kilometers, are to be eliminated in two phases within three
years after the entry into force of the Treaty. Elimination will take
place at designated locations and will be subject to on-site inspection
as an aid to verifying compliance.
the MOU, the United States and the Soviet Union have provided detailed
information on the location of all missiles, launchers, and related support
structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty. Each Party is
required to provide updated information on a routine basis after the Treaty
enters into force.
Treaty provides that on-site inspections are permitted at specified locations
in the United States and the Soviet Union as well as in the Basing Countries
in Western and Eastern Europe where U.S. or Soviet missiles, launchers,
and related support structures and support equipment subject to the Treaty
are or have been located. The different types of "short-notice"
on-site inspections for which the Treaty provides are designed to contribute
to our ability to verify Soviet compliance, while protecting all U.S.
and Allied nuclear and conventional forces not subject to the Treaty as
well as other sensitive intelligence and defense facilities.
addition to "short-notice" on-site inspections, the Treaty provides
for other types of on-site inspections, including the continuous presence
of U.S. inspectors at the Soviet facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25
and SS-20 missiles have been assembled, and a continuous Soviet presence
at the identified facility at Hercules Plant #1, located at Magna, Utah,
at which stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced.
Treaty is the culmination of six years of negotiations with the Soviet
Union. To a large extent, the Treaty is the result of Allied solidarity
in support of the fundamental objectives established by NATO's "dual-track"
decision in 1979. Our Atlantic and our Asian and Pacific Allies have been
closely involved throughout the period of negotiation, and they fully
support the Treaty. The Treaty enhances our collective security by eliminating
an entire class of Soviet missile systems that has been a major concern
for over a decade. Our European Allies will continue to be well protected
by the significant U.S. nuclear forces remaining in Europe, by the independent
British and French nuclear deterrents, and by conventional forces, which
include over 300,000 U.S. troops.
believe that the Treaty is in the best interests of the United States
and represents an important step in achieving arms reductions that strengthen
U.S. and Allied security. Therefore, I urge the Senate's advice and consent
to its ratification.
The White House, January 25, 1988
of State, Washington.
President, The White House.
President: I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (the Treaty). The
Treaty includes the following documents, which are integral parts thereof:
the Memorandum of Understanding (the MOU) regarding the establishment
of a data base, the Protocol on Elimination governing the elimination
of missile systems, and the Protocol on Inspection establishing procedures
for the conduct of inspections, with an Annex to that Protocol on the
privileges and immunities to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members.
The Treaty was signed at Washington on December 8, 1987. I recommend that
the Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to
addition, accompanying this Report is the Agreement Among the United States
of America and the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
the Republic of Italy, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland Regarding Inspections Relating to
the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and
Shorter-Range Missiles (the Basing Country Agreement). The Basing Country
Agreement confirms that the inspections called for in the Treaty will
be permitted by the five Allied Basing Countries. Also enclosed are the
Notes that were exchanged between the United States and both the German
Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia regarding inspections that will
be carried out on the territory of those two countries. The Basing Country
Agreement was signed at Brussels, Belgium, on December 11, 1987, and the
Notes were exchanged on December 23, 1987, between the United States and
the German Democratic Republic and on January 5, 1988, between the United
States and Czechoslovakia. Identical notes are also being exchanged between
the Soviet Union and the five Allied Basing Countries. I recommend that
the Basing Country Agreement and the Notes be provided to the Senate for
Treaty requires the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate, throughout
the world, their shorter-range (500 to 1000 kilometers) and intermediate-range
(1000 to 5500 kilometers) ground-launched ballistic missiles and ground-launched
cruise missiles, along with the launchers for those missiles and unique
support equipment and support structures. This marks the first time that
the two principal nuclear powers have agreed to the elimination of an
entire class of weapon-delivery systems.
Treaty is the fruit of many years' labor and of this Administration's
firm policy regarding the Soviet deployment of SS- 20s threatening our
Allies in Europe and Asia. It was negotiated in Geneva and at ministerial
meetings in Washington, Moscow, and Geneva. In addition to the U.S. Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency and the Department of State, representatives
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Secretary
of Defense, and the Defense Intelligence Agency all played important roles
in its development.
the negotiating process, we consulted extensively with our NATO and Asian
allies, particularly the Western European Basing Countries in which missile
systems, support structures, or other equipment subject to the Treaty
are located: Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom. Contemporaneously with the negotiation of the
Treaty, the United States negotiated the Basing Country Agreement with
these countries, providing for their approval and assistance in the implementation
of the Treaty's inspection provisions. We also regularly advised Congress,
in Washington and during the Congressional Observer Group's meeting in
Geneva, on the progress of the negotiations and on the objectives of the
United States in negotiating the Treaty.
Treaty had its genesis in the Soviet Deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range
missiles beginning in 1977. The SS-20 is an accurate, three-warhead, ground-mobile
ballistic missile, whose deployment by the Soviet Union increased an already
existing imbalance in favor of Soviet theater nuclear forces. These Soviet
deployments not only directly threatened our NATO and Asian Allies, they
also raised questions about the ability of the United States and its Allies,
to deter a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In December 1979, after thorough
consultations among the Allies, NATO reached what became known as the
"dual-track" decision. On the one hand, NATO would proceed to
deploy a limited number of U.S.
II missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles in Western Europe to maintain
its deterrent capability. On the other hand, the United States would pursue
arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union with a view to establishing
a balance in intermediate- range nuclear missile forces at a lower and
this Administration, the "dual-track" decision was reaffirmed,
and on November 18, 1981, the United States proposed the "zero option"
to the Soviet Union. Pursuant to this proposal, the United States would
have canceled its planned deployments to Europe of Pershing II missiles
and cruise missiles if the Soviet Union would have agreed to eliminate
all of its intermediate-range nuclear missiles.
more than six years later, the U.S. "zero option" proposal constitutes
the basis of the Treaty. The six years of negotiations, however, did not
produce this result easily. For example, while the United States emphasized
for years its preference for the "zero option," the Soviets
at first insisted on retaining a residual force of intermediate-range
missiles and on counting the independent British and French nuclear deterrents
as though they were forces of the United States. The United States rejected
that position. Moreover, the Soviets walked out of the negotiations in
November 1983 when the United States began deployments of intermediate-range
missiles in Europe. It was not until January 1985 that the Soviets agreed
to return to the negotiations. They did not agree to the "zero option"
until July 1987.
shorter-range missiles--the SS-12 and SS-23--can fulfill many of the same
military missions as the Soviet intermediate-range missiles. Therefore,
from the outset, the United States insisted upon concurrent constraints
on shorter-range missiles in order to enhance the effectiveness of limits
on intermediate-range missiles. In the Summer of 1987, after the Soviets
proposed the elimination of shorter-range systems in Europe, the United
States proposed that the shorter-range systems of both sides be eliminated
on a global basis. In response to the U.S. proposal, the Soviets accepted
the "zero option" for shorter- range missiles as well.
much of the negotiations, the Soviet Union argued that the Treaty should
focus only on missile systems located in Europe and that missiles located
outside of Europe should be exempt from the Treaty or subject to less
stringent restrictions. The United States, however, insisted on a "global"
approach in view of the mobility and transportability of the Soviet missile
systems. The Soviets eventually agreed to this approach.
the last months of the negotiations, the Soviet Union insisted that U.S.
warheads associated with the Pershing IA missiles belonging to the Federal
Republic of Germany be included in the Treaty. The United States had insisted
from the beginning of the negotiations that systems belonging to third
countries would not be part of, or be affected by, the Treaty. On August
26, 1987, the Federal Republic of Germany announced that it would dismantle
its Pershing IA missiles when the United States and the Soviet Union had
eliminated all of their intermediate-range and shorter- range missiles
pursuant to the Treaty. This unilateral decision by the Federal Republic
is completely separate from the Treaty. This decision represents a policy
of the Federal Republic of Germany that is not legally binding upon the
Parties to the Treaty.
the Federal Republic's unilateral decision, the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed that they will eliminate their intermediate-range
missiles by 15 days prior to the end of the three-year elimination period
specified by the Treaty. At that period, the conditions established by
the Federal Republic will have been met, and the existing program of cooperation
will have therefore ceased. The U.S. reentry vehicles now associated with
the Federal Republic's Pershing IA missiles will then be withdrawn and
returned to U.S. territory. The United States will eliminate them in accordance
with the Protocol on Elimination. The Treaty and its associated documents
will not affect existing programs of cooperation.
TREATY: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
Treaty obligates the United States and the Soviet Union to eliminate all
of their intermediate-range and shorter-range ground- launched, weapon-delivery,
ballistic and cruise missiles, their launchers, and specified support
structures and support equipment.
Treaty requires periodic data exchanges and gives each Party the right
to carry out verification measures, including on-site inspections.
Treaty consists of four documents, which set forth the basic obligations
and the means of implementing those obligations.
are: The Treaty Articles, which obligate the Parties to eliminate all
of their intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems within three
years and 18 months, respectively; not to possess such missile systems
after elimination; not to produce or flight-test such missiles in the
future; and to carry out provisions to facilitate effective verification
of the terms of the Treaty;
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data, which contains the data, including
site diagrams and photographs that are integral parts of the MOU, exchanged
between the Parties prior to the signing of the Treaty regarding the locations,
numbers, and characteristics of each Party's intermediate-range and shorter-range
missile systems as of November 1, 1987;
Protocol on Elimination, which sets forth the detailed procedures for
eliminating missiles, launchers, support structures, and support equipment
subject to the Treaty; and
Protocol on Inspection, which sets forth the detailed procedures for conducting
on-site inspections, including "short notice" inspections, "baseline"
inspections, "close- out" inspections, "elimination"
inspections, and continuous portal monitoring.
Treaty provides that each Party must eliminate all of its intermediate-range
and shorter-range missile systems. Intermediate-range missiles have a
range capability between 1000 and 5500 kilometers; shorter-range missiles
have a range capability between 500 and 1000 kilometers.
existing types of intermediate-range shorter-range missiles are listed
in Article III of the Treaty. For the United States, these are the Pershing
II intermediate-range ballistic missile, the BGM-109G intermediate-range
cruise missile, and the Pershing IA shorter-range ballistic missile. For
the Soviet Union, the existing types of missiles are the SS-20 intermediate-range
ballistic missile, the SS-5 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the
SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missile, the SS-12 shorter- range ballistic
missile, and SS-23 shorter-range ballistic missile. All intermediate-range
missile systems must be eliminated within three years after entry into
force of the Treaty. All shorter- range missile systems must be eliminated
within 18 months. For ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles not
listed in Article III as "existing types," range capability
is determined in accordance with criteria set forth in paragraph 4 of
Article VII of the Treaty.
entry into force of the Treaty, neither Party may produce or flight-test
any intermediate-range or shorter-range missiles or produce any stages
of such missiles or launchers of such missiles. The Parties are prohibited
from conducting any launches of shorter- range missiles. During the first
six months following entry into force of the Treaty, however, each Party
may launch up to 100 intermediate-range missiles for the purpose of destroying
them. Once all intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems have
been eliminated, neither Party may thereafter possess any intermediate-range
or shorter-range missile systems.
the Treaty takes account of the fact that the first stage of the Soviet
SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missile, which is not subject to the
Treaty, is outwardly similar to the first stage of the SS-20 intermediate-range
ballistic missile, which is subject to the Treaty. The Parties are permitted
to produce a ground-launched ballistic missile (GLBM), having a range
such that it is not subject to the Treaty, that uses one stage, and only
one stage, outwardly similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage
of an existing type of intermediate-range ground-launched ballistic missile
that is subject to the Treaty. However, to strengthen the ban on missile
production, the Parties are prohibited from producing any other stage
that is similar to, but not interchangeable with, a stage of any existing
type of intermediate- range ground-launched ballistic missile. In order
to help verify compliance with this provision, the United States has the
right to establish a portal monitoring system, including resident inspectors,
to monitor continuously the portal of each facility at which SS-25 and
SS-20 missiles have been assembled. Currently there is one such facility
at Votkinsk. For its part, the Soviet Union has the right to establish
a continuous portal monitoring system at a former U.S. intermediate-range
GLBM production facility at Magna, Utah.
scope and intrusiveness of verification called for in this Treaty are
unprecedented in the history of arms control agreements between the United
States and the Soviet Union. Verification obligations fall under five
technical means of verification
order to facilitate verification, the Treaty imposes a number of restrictions
on activities relating to intermediate-range and shorter-range missile
systems during the elimination periods.
example, pending elimination:
intermediate-range missiles and their launchers must be located in deployment
areas or at support facilities, such as storage or repair facilities,
or be in notified transit between them. All such areas and facilities
must be named and their locations described. An intermediate- range
missile or launcher located elsewhere (and not in a notified transit)
would thus be in violation of the Treaty.
90 days after the Treaty enters into force, all deployed shorter-range
missiles, as well as deployed and non-deployed launchers of such missiles,
must be moved to elimination facilities. The remaining non-deployed
shorter-range missiles must be moved to elimination facilities within
one year. Until their removal to elimination facilities, shorter-range
missiles and their launchers must be located at missile operating bases,
be located at missile support facilities, or be in transit.
of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles between permitted locations
must be completed within 25 days and, following the completion of transit,
information regarding the transit must be provided within 48 hours.
X of the Treaty sets forth the basic requirements regarding the elimination
of specific items and facilities and obligates the Parties to carry out
the required elimination activities in accordance with the specific procedures
set forth in the Treaty and the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection.
The locations at which elimination takes place are specified in the MOU
or in subsequent updated data. The Protocol on Elimination sets forth
detailed procedures for the elimination of missiles, launchers, launch
canisters, shelters, missile transporter vehicles, missile erectors, launch
stands, propellant tanks, and training items, as appropriate, for each
Party. Techniques such as burning, demolition, crushing, and flattening
are specified for eliminating transportable items at designated elimination
facilities. Techniques for eliminating fixed structures in situ are specified,
including dismantlement, excavation, and demolition. Provisions governing
elimination of missiles through launch, static display, and loss or accidental
destruction are also included.
TECHNICAL MEANS OF VERIFICATION
Treaty recognizes the utility of national technical means of verification,
such as reconnaissance satellites, and each Party agrees not to interfere
with such means of verification. With a view to enhancing the utility
of national technical means, concealment measures are strictly limited.
Furthermore, the Soviet Union is required, up to six times a year during
the period of elimination, to open on short notice the roofs of SS-25
garages in order to help U.S. national technical means ensure that SS-20s
are not deployed at SS-25 strategic missile bases that are not subject
to on-site inspections.
Treaty requires detailed exchanges of data and notifications. Each Party
is required to notify the other each time a missile or launcher is moved
and of any changes in the data base originally set forth in the MOU. Each
Party must advise the other of the scheduled date of elimination activities,
the movement of items that are to be eliminated from the area specified
in the MOU to elimination facilities, and the completion of elimination
activities. Such notifications are required to be made through the Nuclear
Risk Reduction Centers established pursuant to the Agreement Between the
United States and the Soviet Union on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk
Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987. The notifications are designed
to provide a continuously updated data base, which will serve as a baseline
against which other observations can be measured.
Treaty provides for a wide variety of on-site inspections.
scope of the inspection measures is unprecedented in the history of arms
control agreements. The on-site inspections to be carried out include:
inspections, between 30 and 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty,
to help verify the initial update of data contained in the categories
set forth in the MOU;
inspections to verify the elimination of specified facilities;
inspections to observe actual elimination of missiles, launchers, and
support equipment at elimination facilities;
inspections to confirm the completion of the process of elimination
with respect to items lost or accidentally destroyed or placed on static
display and with respect to training equipment;
inspections of certain declared and formerly declared facilities, during
the three-year elimination period and for a ten-year period thereafter,
to aid in verifying that all Treaty-prohibited activity has ceased;
portal monitoring" by the United States at the designated portal
and perimeter of the facility at Votkinsk, at which SS-25 and SS-20
missiles have been assembled, to ensure that stages of the SS-20 are
not covertly manufactured as stages of the SS-25 ICBM. The Soviet Union
may install continuous portal monitoring at the designated portal and
perimeter of the Hercules Plant #1 located in Magna, Utah, at which
stages of Pershing II missiles formerly were produced. If, at any time
after the initial two years of the Treaty, assembly of SS-25s ceases
at Votkinsk, continuous portal monitoring would continue for another
12 months and then cease along with the monitoring of the plant at Magna,
Utah. The United States could reestablish continuous portal monitoring
if the Soviets resumed SS-25 missile assembly at Votkinsk or anywhere
specific procedures for the conduct of these inspections, including provisions
governing access for on-site inspections and the infrastructure for a
continuous portal monitoring system, are set forth in the Protocol on
and their supporting aircrews will be designated by each Party in advance
by means of lists submitted to the other Party. Specific grounds on which
a Party may object to a particular individual are set forth. The Annex
to the Protocol on Inspection specifies the privileges and immunities
to be accorded inspectors and aircrew members during the inspection process,
including immunity from criminal prosecution and inviolability of their
Protocol on Inspection designates certain "points of entry"
for each country in which missile systems subject to the Treaty are located.
A Party intending to carry out an inspection must notify the other Party,
through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, not less than a specified
number of hours before the inspection team will reach the point of entry.
Within a specified time after arrival at the point of entry, the Inspecting
Party must indicate the specific site to be inspected. An inspection team
must depart the point of entry for the inspection site within a specified
number of hours from its arrival at the point of entry.
Inspected Party must provide transport for the inspection team from the
point of entry to the inspection site. In the case of "baseline,"
"close-out," and "short-notice" inspections, the Inspected
Party must ensure that the inspection team arrives at the site within
nine hours of its specification of the inspection site.
general, one hour after notification of a specific inspection site has
been provided, the Inspected Party may not remove any Treaty-limited item
from that site prior to inspection. Except for continuous portal monitoring
and "elimination" inspections, the period of time an inspection
team may remain at an inspection site for a given inspection is 24 hours,
with one eight hour extension if agreed to by the Inspected Party. There
is a limit on the number of inspections that may be conducted simultaneously.
Inspection procedures vary depending upon the specific type of inspection
Treaty will enter into force when the constitutional procedures for ratification
of the United States and the Soviet Union have been satisfied and the
instruments of ratification have been exchanged. The MOU, the Protocol
on Elimination, and the Protocol on Inspection are integral parts of the
Treaty and upon exchange of the instruments of ratification will enter
into force as part of the Treaty. The U.S.-GDR and U.S.-Czechoslovak Notes,
which are included herewith for the information of the Senate, will also
enter into force simultaneously with the Treaty. The Basing Country Agreement
will do so as well, following completion of the constitutional procedures
of each of the Parties to it and notification thereof to all other Parties.
to the Treaty are subject to the same ratification procedures as the Treaty
itself. However, some of the provisions and procedures contained in the
Protocols on Elimination and Inspection are highly detailed and technical.
It is recognized that it may be necessary to adjust some of them to take
into account unforeseen situations. Accordingly, the Protocols provide
that the Parties may, in the Special Verification Commission established
by the Treaty, agree upon measures necessary to improve the viability
and effectiveness of the Protocols. The Protocols provide that such measures,
which would be technical in nature and would not affect the Parties' basic
obligations, would not be considered to be amendments and thus would not
Parties commit themselves not to assume any international obligation or
undertaking that would conflict with the provisions of the Treaty. This
provision will not in any way affect existing or future patterns of defense
cooperation with U.S. Allies in other areas, including strategic forces,
short-range nuclear forces (with a range capability below 500 kilometers),
or conventional forces.
Treaty is of unlimited duration. As an exercise of its national sovereignty,
a Party may withdraw following six months' notice to the other Party if
it determines that extraordinary events related to the subject matter
of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests.
BASING COUNTRY AGREEMENT
Basing Country Agreement is a necessary complement to the Treaty. The
Treaty and the Protocol on Inspection provide for on- site inspection
to verify compliance with the provisions of the Treaty not only in U.S.
and Soviet territory, but also in the countries in which U.S. and Soviet
missile systems are located.
of the items that the United States must eliminate are within the territory
of our Western European Allies. By means of the Basing Country Agreement,
the five Allied Basing Countries, on whose territory U.S. systems subject
to the Treaty are located, consent to inspections at facilities subject
to the Treaty within their territory by Soviet inspectors conducted in
accordance with the Treaty and its Protocols. This formal consent on the
part of the Allied Basing Countries provides the legal basis for the United
States to make its commitment to the Soviet Union that Soviet inspections
can be carried out on the territory of the Allied Basing Countries.
Basing Country is exchanging diplomatic Notes with the Party that will
conduct inspections within its territory. The Notes record the acknowledgement
of each Basing Country and the Inspecting Party that the Basing Country
has agreed to inspections within its territory conducted in accordance
with the terms of the Treaty, including the Protocol on Inspection, and
that the Inspecting Party has obligated itself to comply with the terms
of the Treaty and to respect the laws and regulations of the Basing Country
during the inspections. The Notes state that they do not in any way affect
the reciprocal obligations between the United States and the Soviet Union
under the Treaty. The countries that base U.S. systems subject to the
Treaty are Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, The Netherlands,
and the United Kingdom; the Basing Countries for Soviet systems are the
German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia.
OF SS-4 SILOS
addition to the Treaty documents discussed above, the United States and
the Soviet Union agreed to an exchange of letters between Ambassadors
Glitman and Obukhov, dated December 7, 1987, relating to the U.S. inspections
of silo launchers for Soviet SS-4 intermediate-range ballistic missiles.
This agreement gives the United States the right to conduct a total of
up to six on-site inspections of former silo launchers of SS-4 missiles.
Organizational matters relating to such inspections will be arranged through
the Special Verification Commission, which was established by the Treaty.
this Report is an article-by-article analysis of the Treaty, including
the MOU and the two Protocols. Also, attached is an article-by-article
analysis of the Basing Country Agreement.
believe this Treaty will significantly enhance the security of the United
States and our Allies. It will eliminate an entire class of weapon-delivery
systems in which the Soviet Union has established a clear advantage. I
therefore strongly recommend that the Treaty be submitted to the Senate
for its advice and consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.
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